

BRITISH POLICY ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA --1889-1901

by

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## ABSTRACT

By 1888 the idea of a "Scientific Frontier" based on Kabul and Kandahar, first suggested after the Second Afghan War, had been accepted by military authorities in England and India, who were prompted by fear of Russian aggression. The idea was to occupy this line in case of a Russian move towards India, or in case of domestic troubles in Afghanistan following Abdur Rahman's death,

To be in a position to occupy this line without delay it was necessary to secure lines of communication. Lord Lansdowne, with this end in view, pressed on plans that had already been begun and made new plans for the acquisition of control over all the passes leading from India into Afghanistan. This meant a movement into tribal territory, which added political and administrative implications to the military problem, and aroused the jealousy of the Afghan Amir.

Relations with the Amir were improved by the Durand Agreement of 1893 which brought the tribes within the British sphere of influence. To meet the other problems Lansdowne enunciated a new policy of direct tribal relations and recommended but did not implement a scheme for a separate frontier administration.

Lord Elgin pursued Lansdowne's policy, pushed forward in all the passes, occupied Chitral (from which the strategic line might be outflanked), demarcated the Durand Line, and

insisted on an active tribal policy. This forward movement contributed to tribal unrest which produced the uprising of 1897. Following the uprising, policy was re-evaluated but Elgin's Viceroyalty ended before positive conclusions had been reached.

Lord Curzon attacked the problem energetically and, brooking no opposition, completely re-organized the military defences of the border, (without departing from the idea of a "Scientific Frontier"), set in motion a new method of tribal control, and completed his plan by the creation of the North-West Frontier Province".



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOT NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


AP	Ardagh Papers
Add. Mss.	Additional Manuscripts
BM	British Museum
CC	Cross Collection
C-BP	Campbell-Bannerman Papers
DO	Demi-Official Letters bound together with PSLI
EC	Elgin Collection
Enc.	Enclosure
FO	Foreign Office
FP	Fowler Papers
HC	Hamilton Collection
India	The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department
IO	India Office
IOL	India Office Library
LP	Lansdowne Papers
L-WP	Lee-Warner Papers
Mss. Eur.	European Manuscripts
Panjab	The Chief Secretary, or Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Panjab.
PC	Parliamentary Collection
PD	Parliamentary Debates
PRO	Public Records Office

PSDI	Political and Secret Despatches to India, i.e., from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General in Council. From 1897 onwards PSDI are bound together with PS LI
PSDO	Political and Secret Demi-Official Correspondence.
PSH	Political and Secret Home Correspondence
PSLI	Political and Secret Letters from India, i.e., from the Governor-General in Council to the Secretary of State for India. Unless otherwise specified these letters are classified as <u>Secret Frontier</u>
PSM	Political and Secret Memoranda
S.of S.	Secretary of State for India
SP	Salisbury Papers
WO	War Office

# General Tribal Map

Scale of Miles

10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



## CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Geographical, historical. The Problem: Strategical, political, and administrative.

In 1900 Lord Curzon wrote:

"If we take the whole land frontier of India from the Shan States to Persian Baluchistan the most critical, most anxious, and most explosive section of the entire frontier is that between the Swat River and the Gomal Valley". 1

That is the area with which this thesis will be largely concerned, though it will be necessary to refer also to the territory north of the Swat River but south of the great mountain barrier. Broadly speaking the area under consideration was bounded on the north by the Hindu Kush, on the south by Baluchistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan District of the Panjab, on the east by Kashmir and the Panjab, and on the west by Afghanistan.

This region formed part of the boundary of India; but as a boundary it was peculiar in that it consisted of a double line, the administrative boundary of India and the eastern boundary of Afghanistan, commonly called the Durand Line and between them a wild mountainous zone peopled by warlike and unsettled tribes. This zone, the North-West Hills, was the one serious breach in the vast mountain wall protecting India from land invasion and "here we find in the past great empires slung across the mountains like saddle-bags with bases of power on the plateau at Kabul, at Ghazni, or at Kandahar, and also in the Panjab plains"<sup>2</sup>. The area has often been called,

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1. PSLI. Vol.126. No.133. 13 September, 1900. Enc. Minute by Lord Curzon on Frontier Administration. 24 August, 1900
  2. Spate, O.K.H. India and Pakistan. London, Methuen. 1957 p.XXIX

and with historical justification, "the gateway to India". Through twenty-five centuries numerous invaders entered India through the gaps in the North-West Hills. Only with the coming of the Europeans were sea routes substituted for the great land entrance, but with the rise to pre-eminence of British sea power thoughts of invasion were again, perforce, centred on the historic gateway of the North-West.

The physical features of this area are the result of "the buckling caused by the meeting...of the Himalayan, Hindu Kush, and other more western systems of crust movement, setting in from three sides against the rigid peninsular mass".<sup>1</sup> Consequently it is an extremely complex area, and can only be described here in very general terms, tending, actually, to over-simplification.

The Kabul River, entering the Indus from the west, roughly divides the area into two zones. In the northern one the mountain tendency is generally north-south. In the 220 miles from the ridge of the Hindu Kush to the Kabul River, the land drops from the 25,263 feet of Tirich Mir in the north of Chitral to the 5,000-6,000 feet of the Mohmand Hills and the Malakand Ridge separating the Swat Valley from the Vale of Peshawar. Flowing down from the watershed in the north, the Yarkhun, Chitral-Kunar, Panjkora, and Swat Rivers run parallel to the Indus and join the Kabul. Though the valleys of these rivers widen out as they near the Kabul, in the far north

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1. Quoted in Spate. op.cit. p.436



they are deep, narrow gashes. Chitral, for example, which is not quite thirty miles from Tirich Mir is at an elevation of less than 5,000 feet. This river system drains the territories of Chitral, Dir, Swat, and Bajaur.<sup>1</sup>

South of the Kabul River, the north-south tendency is interrupted by the east-west axis of the Safed Koh and this east-west tendency continues almost to the Gomal River. The upper Kurram Valley, however, cuts across the general pattern in a north west-south east direction. The general east-west flow of the rivers would indicate that this area would offer the best chance of communication with the plateau of Afghanistan and thence with Central Asia. Such indeed is the case.

✓ It is a historical fact of great significance that every important expedition directed against India with Peshawar as the primary objective and Lahore and Delhi as the ultimate aim, has come by way of Kabul or Ghazni. It is obvious, therefore, that great strategic significance would be attached to the routes connecting the plains with these strategic centres in Afghanistan.

First in importance is the Khyber route which leads west from Peshawar passing south of the Kabul River, enters the Khyber Pass just west of Jamrud, passes the hill fortress of Ali Masjid, crosses a small watershed at Landi Kotal at a height of 3,600 feet and comes to the frontier at Landi Khana.

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1. Holdich, T.H. India (The Regions of the World) London. Henry Frowde. 1904. A disproportionate amount of this book is devoted to the Geography of the North-West Hills, a region with which Holdich was intimately acquainted.

From the time the road leaves the Vale of Peshawar until it reaches the boundary it passes through rocky, inhospitable terrain and is steeply enclosed by lofty mountains.

South of the Khyber and separated from it by the Safed Koh is the Kurram route. While the Khyber leads from Peshawar to Jalalabad, at the confluence of the Kunar and Kabul Rivers and on the direct road to Kabul, the Kurram begins at Kohat and leads to either Kabul or Ghazni, the distances and difficulties being about equal. From Kohat the road follows the Miranzai Valley, which is dominated by the Samana Range, and crosses a low watershed into the Kurram Valley. This valley is open and well populated and offers no difficulties until the head of the valley is reached, where the road leaves the river and crosses southern spurs of the Safed Koh by the Peiwar Kotal, 9,200 feet, and the Shutargardan Pass, 11,900 feet. The height of these passes makes this route less practicable than the Khyber, especially during winter.<sup>1</sup>

The next route of importance and the one allegedly used by Mahmud of Ghazni, is the Tochi Valley route, based on Bannu and leading to Ghazni. As far as the Durand Line the valley is wide and well cultivated with only a gradual upward slope. It is shut off from the plateau, however, by a narrow but high and rugged band of mountains. The Tochi was never of importance as a trade route, but it was considered strategically important

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1. Sir Frederick Roberts used this route for his march on Kabul during the Second Afghan War. The Peiwar Kotal proved an easy position to defend and a difficult one to assault. See Roberts, F. Forty One Years in India. 2 vols. London. 1897.

since the feats of Mahmud of Ghazni might again be possible. Moreover, it had a local importance in that it dominated Northern Waziristan.

South of Waziristan and separating it from the Sulieman mountain system of Baluchistan is another highway to Afghanistan following the valley of the Gomul River. This route was supposedly the oldest of all north-west trade routes and was the one used by the Afghan Powindahs on their yearly trading expeditions to India.<sup>1</sup>

This is not to say that the northern zone is completely devoid of passes. Far to the north the Baroghil, 12,500 feet, and the Dorah, 14,800, cross the Hindu Kush offering no great difficulties in the process and give access to the Chitral Kunar Valley. But the upper part of the Chitral-Kunar Valley is, as has been mentioned above, little more than a deep gash cut through the mountains. Thus though the passes are not of themselves difficult, the routes to which they give access are hazardous. Again, the watershed that separates the Chitral Valley from Dir and Bajaur and extends south-west towards the Kabul Valley, is crossed by many passes. One or two of these once formed important lines of communication between Kabul and India. Babur certainly,<sup>2</sup> and Alexander probably,<sup>3</sup> used a route that followed the Kabul River to the eastern limits of the Ningrahar Plain, rose by an easy slope into the Kunar Valley,

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1. Holdich. pp. 73ff. Each pass is discussed in detail.

2. Babur. Memoirs trans. Leyden & Erskine 1829

3. Stein, M.A. On Alexander's Track to the Indus. London. 1929

crossed the low watershed into Bajaur and Swat and led finally to the Vale of Peshawar.

Much has been written of the bare brown hills of the North-West; of the deep windswept gorges and jagged ridges; of the hungry tribesmen resorting to plunder as the sole means of sustenance. This is not an accurate picture. There are arid, rocky, inhospitable regions it is true and as examples the lower Mohmand Hills and certain sections of Waziristan may be cited. But moving westward from these lower hills one finds forests of pine, deodar, and evergreen oak and on the southern flanks of the Safed Koh these form valuable stands of timber. The northern mountains have plane, poplar, ilex, and great forests of pine and deodar as well as extensive mountain grasslands. Of course altitude and exposure play their part and there are many bare valley sides just as there are many peaks perpetually snow clad.<sup>1</sup> It must also be remembered that valleys are a necessary corollary of mountains, and where these valleys are well watered they are often quite fertile. The valleys of the North-West Hills are no exception to the general rule. In the Kurram Valley, for instance, "more or less all along are corn fields and fruit gardens, mulberry groves and fertile glades passing up to ridges crested by oak and olive, yew trees and pine".<sup>2</sup> So it is with many other areas. Waziristan contains many extremely fertile plains and

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1. Imperial Gazetteer of India. New Series, Oxford. 1908. Vol. XIX. pp. 144-6. A comprehensive list of the flora and fauna of the North-West Hills.
  2. Spate. p. 436-7

valleys, even the hill fastnesses of the Mahsuds hiding secluded glens producing food in abundance. The valleys of Swat, Dir, and Bajaur are far famed for their beauty and fertility, while the Tirah of the Afridis and Orakzais has been compared to the Vale of Kashmir. Chitral, too, has its productive areas.

"The Lutko Valley...for instance is famous...for its cultivation.....The fruit of the valley is renowned, peaches, apples, pears and splendid grapes abound; the grain crops could not be finer, and every village is embowered in huge walnut tress, truly, a land flowing with milk and honey". 1

Agriculture is carried on throughout the hill country. Dry crops such as wheat, barley, and maize, are grown and rice is cultivated in the valley bottoms. Sheep and goats are grazed on the mountain grasslands. This does not pretend to prove that the hills are an extremely rich agricultural area, or even that enough food is produced to feed the comparatively large population. What is intended is to destroy the myth of a totally barren region peopled by savage tribes who must plunder to live.

Now concerning these tribesmen it has been truly said that "no ethnological problem is more complicated than that which is presented by the North-West Frontier of India".<sup>2</sup>

It is impossible to deal at all adequately with so complicated a problem (even if one were competent to do so) in the limited space available here. Consequently, the various tribes with which this thesis will be concerned will be discussed as the

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1. Durand, A. The Making of a Frontier. London, 1899.p.90

2. Davies. C.C. The Problem of the North-West Frontier.-1890 - 1908. C.U.P. 1932.p.37

need arises, and even then in only the most general terms.<sup>1</sup>

On 29 March, 1849, the annexation of the Panjab was proclaimed and British administration in India became coterminous with the territories held by the independent tribes of the North-West Hills. The problem which grew out of this juxtaposition may be said to fall into two parts, administrative and Imperial, but the parts are so interwoven as to defy complete separation. It is therefore simpler to treat the problem as one and indivisible but to examine it from two standpoints, that of provincial administrators and that of Imperial strategists.

For nearly thirty years after the annexation of the Panjab the problem remained almost wholly administrative, and

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1. Raverty, H.G. Ethnographical Notes on Afghanistan. London, 1880-83, is the outstanding nineteenth century authority. See also
- Caroe, O. The Pathans. London, 1958.
- Rose, H.A. A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Panjab. London, 1911-14
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- Raverty, H.G. "Afghan Waziris and their Country" Asiatic Quarterly Review, 2 January, 1895
- PSLI. Vol. 74. No. 114F. 28 May, 1895. Notes on Kurram by W.R.H. Merk, 8 February, 1894. For distribution see map which accompanies this chapter.

the energies of frontier officers were devoted to establishing a "modus Vivendi" with the tribes. To this end two ideas of frontier administration developed, each growing out of the special circumstances of the area to which it was applied. They are generally described as the Sind and Panjab schools of frontier administration.

"The policy adopted in Sind can be roughly described as an uncompromising repression of outrages by a strong military force; the success of the Panjab system depended to a very large extent upon an efficient political management of the tribes".<sup>1</sup>

The Sind system was developed by Major John Jacob who was appointed to sole political power on the Upper Sind Frontier in 1848. Before Jacob's appointment several forts had been constructed along the one hundred fifty miles of vulnerable border but the troops in these positions remained on the defensive. Well armed tribesmen on both sides of the border raided back and forth continuously. Life and property were in constant jeopardy. Jacob forbade the tribesmen on the Indian side of the border to carry arms, ceased construction of forts, encouraged cultivation right up to the frontier, and instituted a system of border cavalry patrols which were highly mobile. These measures quickly brought order out of chaos. The nature of the frontier, a level desert tract, made the cavalry patrols possible and contributed to the success of the system. No political arrangements were made with the trans-border tribes, no allowances were paid, British law was administered uncompromisingly in British territory.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Davies. op.cit. pp.18-19

2. Records of Scinde Irregular Horse. 2 vols. 1853-1856  
also Napier, W. Administration of Scinde. 1851

The Panjab frontier on the other hand was an entirely different proposition. As an administrative boundary the old Sikh line of conquest had been adopted. This line stopped like a high water mark at the foot of the hills, from which innumerable valleys and "nullas" gave unto the fertile and cultivated plains offering easy means of ingress to raiding tribesmen.

The frontier was too long, the terrain too rough, and entrances too many for adequate patrolling. The Sikhs had waged constant warfare with the tribes, had collected tribute at the point of the sword, and had only managed to maintain a semblance of order in the immediate vicinity of their forts.

In order to secure the tranquility of the border and a measure of security for British subjects living in proximity to the hills, a chain of forts connected by a good military road was constructed along the frontier and a special, mobile military force, the Panjab Frontier Force, was raised and placed under the Board of Administration.<sup>1</sup> Not until 1886 was this force incorporated into the regular army. Frontier officers were prohibited from crossing into tribal territory under any pretext whatever as a concession to tribal sensibilities. This method of dealing with the tribes came to be called the "close border" system.

But positive measures were also attempted, for though

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1. In 1884 there were fifty-four posts along the frontier. Sixteen of these were held by the Panjab Frontier Force, twenty-six by Militia, and the remainder by combined parties of Militia and regulars. Wyllie. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. London, 1912. p.17.



the "close border" system held sway for twenty-five years, the "close border" was a unilateral arrangement. British frontier officers were prohibited from going beyond their administrative boundaries but tribesmen were encouraged to come into administered territories to trade, to settle their quarrels, or to visit the hospitals and dispensaries. It was assumed that the tribesman might be tamed by exposing him to the benefits of civilization.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, during the first twenty years agreements were negotiated between the Government and practically every tribe on the frontier.<sup>2</sup> These agreements would outline the services expected of the tribes, services including a guarantee of border security, denial of sanctuary to outlaws, and the control of troublemakers. In return for these considerations the tribes were given allowances subject to good behaviour.<sup>3</sup>

The nature of the tribes and of tribal organization led to frequent breaches of these agreements and in these cases it became necessary to employ various means of coercion to force the tribes into the desired course of behaviour. The simplest and most obvious method of coercion was the suspension of allowances but if this method did not prove efficacious fines were imposed and if the fines were not paid the tribe offending was subjected to an economic blockade or a punitive

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1. See Edwardes, H. A Year on the Panjab Frontier. 2 vols. London, 1851
  2. Aitchinson, C.U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sonads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. 4 ed. Calcutta, 1909
  3. For a point by point comparison of the Sind and Panjab methods see PSM.A12. Sind and Panjab Frontier Systems by Sir H.B. Frere. 22 March, 1876.

expedition. Since the success of the blockade depended on favourable geographical factors that were not always present, more often than not the "butcher and bolt" expedition was the punishment meted out. In all forty-two such expeditions were undertaken during the years between 1849 and 1890.<sup>1</sup>

Much has been written in condemnation of the system that relied for its success on punitive expeditions, but Panjab administrators argued that despite the expeditions which were necessary evils, the "close border" was the best possible system. This is the administrative viewpoint and statistical evidence can be produced that gives weight to the contention. An examination of the facts concerning expeditions between 1849 and 1878 will show that during those years twenty-six<sup>2</sup> were undertaken, and that the expeditions apparently had some lasting effect appears from the fact that few clans appear

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1. Parliamentry Papers. vol. LVIII.13. Return setting out wars and military operations on or beyond the boundaries of British India in which the Government of India has been engaged since 1849.

Government of India. Frontier and Overseas Expedition From India. Vol.1.

Tribes North of the Kabul River, Simla, 1907 Vol.II

Tribes Between the Kabul and Gomul Rivers. Simla, 1908

also, Wylly, H.C. From the Black Mountains to Waziristan  
London, 1912

Nevill, H.C. Campaigns on the North-West Frontier 1849-1908. London, 1912

2. This figure does not include occasions on which less than 1000 men were used, for these were normally classed as raids not expeditions. Nor does it include several occasions on which punitive measures were undertaken against villages in administered territory. However, a complete list is given in Appendix G.

more than once in the list and none more than twice. Moreover, an examination of the dates on which the expeditions were undertaken shows that their necessity steadily decreased. In the first five years of frontier control there were twelve expeditions; in the second five year period the number dropped to seven; in the third to three; and in the next fifteen years there were only six expeditions altogether.<sup>1</sup>

The effective "walling off" of the trans-frontier region from European penetration was apparently producing the desired results. The tribes were gradually realizing that they could not raid and plunder with impunity. The border was being made secure.

But the Government of India had to look beyond the actual frontier lest some "strong man" in Kabul, Kandahar, or Central Asia might threaten invasion.<sup>2</sup> This was not considered a serious matter since Government was aware that no tribal army could stand up to the Indian army on the plains. It was therefore proposed to meet such an invasion, if it were to occur, in the valley of the Indus. All that would be necessary to ensure victory would be adequate warning and to provide this an information bureau was established at Peshawar. But times were changing. In 1825 the distance separating the British frontier on the Sutlej and the Russian Central Asian outpost

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1. For Sir John Lawrence's defence of the Panjab system see PSM. A4. Minute on the Panjab Frontier. 8 February, 1864
  2. PSM. A 8b. Memorandum on Khelat and Central Asia by G.S.V. Fitzgerald. 1 July, 1875

of Orenburg was more than 2000 miles. By 1875 the Russian advance through Central Asia had brought their forces within close proximity to the Afghan frontier, and this caused British statesmen to express growing alarm.

Meanwhile a quarrel between the Khan of Kalat, through whom the Sind authorities sought to control the tribes of Baluchistan, and his Sirdars, led to near anarchy in tribal territory which led to a wave of unrest along the British borders. In 1873 the British agent at the Court of the Khan was withdrawn, but instead of despatching an expedition the Government of India sent Captain Robert Sandeman on a mission intended to reconcile the Khan to his Sirdars. Sandeman's second Mission in 1876 culminated in the Treaty of Jacobabad and marked the beginning of British expansion into tribal territory, on the North-West Frontier, by the creation of the Baluchistan Agency. In 1877 Sandeman was appointed Agent to the Governor-General with head quarters at Quetta.<sup>1</sup>

The method used by Sandeman in extending British control over Baluchistan was to select tribal chieftains, who, he thought, were the rightful leaders of their people, and by a judicious distribution of service allowances, coupled with an equally judicious application of military power, raise these chieftains to such a position of pre-eminence in tribal circles that they would exercise control over their turbulent fellows. The success of the system was contingent upon the

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1. T.Thornton. Life of Sandeman. London, 1895. Davies.op.cit. p.31-34.

possession of military posts that dominated the country and closed the door to escape over the border; a frontier officer with a personality that commanded the respect of the tribesmen and with sufficient intelligence to be able to choose the right man to support; and a mobile military force at the command of this officer which could coerce when diplomacy failed.<sup>1</sup>

The acquisition of control over Baluchistan gave to the British control over Quetta, a position of considerable strategic significance. Located as it is in the centre of the Upland Plateau of Baluchistan, it not only commands the Bolan Pass route from India into southern Afghanistan, but also threatens the flank of any army marching on India by way of Kabul or Ghazni. But Quetta was also looked upon as a position of offensive importance, a position on which could be based an advance to Kandahar and thence to Herat.<sup>2</sup> For such an advance was contemplated, indeed, Disraeli conceived of a war with Russia fought on the shores of the Caspian.

This idea was expressed during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 when as a result of the intervention of the British fleet to save Constantinople, the Russians, perhaps as a diversionary measure, moved troops towards Afghanistan. Disraeli then stated that if the Russians seized Constantinople and war was declared, "the Empress of India should order her

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1. A good exposition of the Sandeman system and of Sandeman's work in Baluchistan and Waziristan is to be found in Bruce, R.I. The Forward Policy and Its Results. London. 1900. See also Thornton. op.cit.

2. See Parl.Papers. Quetta and Central Asia LXXVII.1878-9 also PSM.A13. Khelat Affairs by Sir W.Merewether and Major Sandeman, 26 April, 1876. also A.15. Quetta Memorandum by Lord Napier of Magdala, May 1877. A.16. Support to and communications with Quetta. W.Merewether. 23 March, 1878

armies to clear Central Asia of the Muscovites and drive them into the Caspian. We have a good instrument for this purpose in Lord Lytton, and indeed he was placed there with that view".<sup>1</sup>

There is a far cry from the Lawrence policy of awaiting the enemy in the Valley of the Indus. But followers of Lawrence were still convinced that theirs was the only sound policy. They contended that India's best defence in case of attempted invasion was the giant barrier erected by nature in the form of the mountains, and hardly less important the in-habitants of those mountains.<sup>2</sup> Their argument followed this general pattern:

British experience in the first Afghan War had indicated the extreme difficulties of communication and transport to be encountered in this wild mountainous zone. To these difficulties could be added the fanatical independence of the tribes. If these tribes were left to their own devices by the British, there was every reason to suppose that they would, in defence of their independence, resist a Russian invader and make an already hazardous invasion route a veritable nightmare. If the Indian army were content to wait in security near their bases for nature and the tribes to take their inevitable toll, they would merely have to "mop up" in the Indus Valley the footsore, hungry, debilitated, and decimated

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1. Money Penny and Buckle. Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. Vol. VI. p. 155. Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 22 June, 1877

2. Parliamentary Papers. 1878-9. LXXVII. (73) 15.

remains of any army with the temerity to attempt an invasion of India.<sup>1</sup>

But there were those who maintained that the whole argument of the non-interventionists would fall to the ground without the assumption that the tribes would resist an invader. This assumption, they argued, could not be safely made. Russian intrigues in Afghanistan were making headway and the possibility existed of a holy war being proclaimed by the Amir in which the tribes might join. In any case the prospect of loot on the plains of India would offer an irresistible temptation to the tribesmen. While it might be possible to defeat such an invading force in the Indus Valley the political repercussions of the invasion might be serious. Indeed, it was conceivable that the Muslim population of India would rise to join the invaders.<sup>2</sup>

Strategical arguments were advanced in addition to these political ones. It was pointed out that the Indus Valley was hot and extremely unhealthy for troops, that the right bank of the river frequently commanded the left, and that, as history showed, invading armies had never found the Indus a serious barrier. If the Indus were rejected as a defensible boundary, the only alternative that would permit of remaining true to the policy of non-intervention would seem to be the administrative frontier. But this line, in the words of Lord Roberts

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1. The most detailed exposition of this argument may be found in Hanna, Indian Problems. Vol.1. Can Russia Invade India? London, Constable, 1895.
  2. Boulger, D.C. England and Russia in Central Asia. London, 1879

"with a belt of huge mountains in its front, inhabited by thousands of warlike men, over whom neither we nor any other power had control, and with a wide...river in the rear, seemed ...an impossible frontier, and one on which no scheme for the defence of India could be safely based." 1

During Lord Lytton's viceroyalty the British Government and the Government of India both tended to look beyond the mountain barrier and to contemplate military activities in Central Asia. To prepare for this contingency positions of vantage were essential in order to see what went on behind the mountain barrier. Pursuit of this aim led the Government of India to interest itself in Chitral, and in the establishment of British agents at Herat, at Kandahar, and at Kabul.<sup>2</sup> This interest forged another link in the chain of causation that produced the second Afghan War.

During this war and the discussions that followed it the idea of a "scientific frontier" was developed; that is to say, a frontier which strategically and militarily was best suited to the defence of India. The suggested frontier was to be based on the Afghan cities of Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, for these cities guarded the approaches to all the major passes leading into India from Central Asia, and the seizure of one or more of these strategic centres had always been the preliminary to a land invasion of the sub-continent. The Kabul-Kandahar Line had the political advantage of being outside the administrative frontier of India and the strategical advantages

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1. Parliamentary Debates (Lords) Authorized edition. 4th series. 7 March, 1898
  2. Balfour, Lady Betty. Lord Lytton's Indian Administration London, 1899



of being comparatively short, of being protected on both flanks on the north by mountains on the south by desert, and of being linked to India by all the major invasion routes of history, which routes would serve admirably as lines of communication and supply.<sup>1</sup>

But the war showed that these lines of communication could only be kept open at great expense and by bottling up large numbers of soldiers. The logical conclusion seemed to be that if the Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar Line was to be a truly effective line of defence, a large part of Southern Afghanistan together with the territories through which passed the main lines of communications would have to be annexed, or at least brought under firm political control.

This would have been a tremendously costly undertaking, and there was wide-spread opposition to it. But though the decision was finally made to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Government was unwilling to go the whole distance and revert to the Lawrence policy.<sup>2</sup>

The result of the disagreement was a compromise. This was to form an alliance with the Amir of Afghanistan, to strengthen him by subsidy and gifts of military equipment, and to make Afghanistan an effective bulwark against Russian

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1. Parliamentary Papers. LXX.C.2811.C.2852,C.2865.C.3090. 1881. Papers relating to the occupation of Kandahar and the transfer of administration of Kandahar to Amir Rahman Khan. also PSM.All7. The Defence of the North-West Frontier of India, by General Sir F.Roberts, 22 June, 1886. A Memorandum on proposals for the Defence of the North-West Frontier by the Defence Committee.of 1885.
  2. PSM.A 39.Note on the Retention of Kandahar. H.W.Norman. 20 September, 1880. A.40. Memorandum on Kandahar, H.C. Rawlinson. 25 September, 1880. A.41. Note by General Lord Napier of Magdala on Kandahar. 12 October, 1880. For a good summary of the argument see Davies,op.cit.p.10-15

aggression. Concomitantly, the Amir was guaranteed the support of British troops and armaments in the event of an unprovoked attack on his country.<sup>1</sup>

Since the integrity of Afghan territory had been guaranteed, it became necessary to determine exactly what the boundaries of Afghanistan were, and to attempt to get Russia to recognize them. This necessity became more pressing when, in 1885, a Russian force defeated the Afghan garrison and occupied the frontier village of Panjdeh. This incident brought Britain and Russia to the brink of war.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, a boundary commission consisting of British, Russian, and Afghan delegates was appointed and eventually in 1887 an agreement was signed<sup>3</sup> establishing the boundaries of Northern Afghanistan with the exception of that portion which followed the crest of the Pamir Range.<sup>3</sup> The understanding between the two great powers was that any attempt to cross the line would be interpreted as an act of war.

The establishment of the Russo-Afghan boundary did not succeed in exorcising the spectre of possible Russian invasion. In 1887, under the direction of the Government of India, a committee, including the Commander-in-Chief, the Military Member of Council, and other high civil and military officers

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1. See Appendix A for Agreement.

2. Greaves, R.L. Persia and the Defence of India. London. 1959 ch.5. pp. 70-84

3. Yate, C.E. Northern Afghanistan. Letters from the Boundary Commission. London. 1888. PSM. A.53. Correspondence in regard to Demarcation of the North-West Frontier of Afghanistan. Parts, I, II, III, IV, V, & VI. 1884-1887

of Government, prepared a "Secret Memorandum on the General Strategical Situation of Russia and England in Central Asia".<sup>1</sup> The memorandum was not immediately dealt with,<sup>2</sup> but at about the same time that it was sent to the India Office, that Office forwarded to the Governor-General in Council a memorandum by General Brackenbury, dated 7 August, 1887, and dealing with the same subject. The Secretary of State suggested the appointment of a small secret commission of the highest military and political officers in India to discuss and recommend a future military frontier. Their report would be sent to a similar commission of high military and political figures in England. The Government of India took no action because they felt that the memorandum they had recently despatched to London had anticipated the Secretary of State's request. Consequently, the commissions were never appointed.<sup>3</sup> It is significant, however, that both in India and in London, thoughts were centred on the necessity for defining a "military frontier".

The recommendations of the Government of India are interesting. They deny on military and political grounds the feasibility of any frontier within the administrative confines of India, and indeed, incline to the opinion that a Russian move towards Afghanistan should be countered by the occupation

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1. W.O.32/264. Memorandum on the Defence of Afghanistan.
  2. A note prepared at the War Office two years later was actually a reply to this memorandum, but there was no official statement to this effect.
  3. LP.Part XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne. The Outlook in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 21 July, 1890

of Herat via Quetta and Kandahar, and the despatch of a force from there to cut the Russian line of communications between the Caspian and Afghan Turkestan. This plan was predicated on the understanding that the agreement with the Amir of Afghanistan bound the British Government to prevent any Russian violation of Afghan territory. But another interpretation of the agreement was possible: that although the British Government had accepted the condition that a Russian violation of Afghan territory would be a "causus belli", they had not agreed to take prior action to prevent such aggression. If the latter interpretation were accepted, then, to fulfill obligations to Afghanistan and to defend India, the irreducible minimum of action was an advance by the Indian armies to the Kabul-Kandahar Line. In any case, this would be the first step to take whether for purposes of offence or defence. Brackenbury's minute condemned the scheme of an adventure into Central Asia but accepted the principle of occupying the Kabul-Kandahar Line as absolutely essential. Briefly put, the military frontier recommended by the Government of India and by military authority in England was the "scientific frontier".

The creation of an Afghan buffer state had, it is clear, in no way lessened the need for a military frontier. There were a number of reasons for this. The alliance between the Amir and the Government of India had never been very cordial.<sup>1</sup>

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1. PSM. A.54. Correspondence between the Viceroy and the Amir. 1885-1886. A.109. Memorandum on British Relations with Afghanistan. W.Lee-Warner, 24 January, 1896.

The Amir used his subsidy for building a large army and his attitude did not inspire confidence that this army was intended solely to fight the Russians. The British found the Amir touchy, irritable, and a stickler for prestige. Perhaps he had learned too well the history of his grandfather's connection with the British Government. In any event the Government of India could not count on the attitude that might be adopted by the successor of Abdur Rahman and consequently felt the need of making plans of their own to meet any contingency.<sup>1</sup>

But even if the Amir and his heirs and successors forever could be relied on to fulfill their obligations to the British Government, there was still the necessity of being prepared to support the Afghan army in time of crisis. In military strategic terms this involved exactly as much as would be involved in an invasion of Afghanistan. British troops would be required to march into that country and to do so this line of communication would have to be open, and the troops would have to occupy bases of operation within Afghanistan. Thus, military authorities were convinced that if a march into Afghanistan were undertaken, either to repel an attack on India, or to assist the Afghans in resisting a Russian invasion of their territory, British troops would certainly occupy the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar Line.

It was obviously impossible to occupy this line during peace time since it lay entirely within the territories of an ally of Government, an ally too, who was extremely jealous

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1. PSM.A.71. Note on our Future Policy in Afghanistan  
R. Sandeman, 20 July, 1886

of any infringement of his territorial rights or any interference with his domestic affairs. But if the actual occupation of the line was out of the question, the next best thing seemed to be to build up strength at points where the scientific frontier came nearest to British territory, or at points from which easy lines of communication lead to the line.

During the viceroyalty of Lord Dufferin<sup>1</sup> plans were set on foot for the construction of extensive works at Quetta, for the piercing of the Amran Range by a tunnel under the Khojak Pass, and for the storage of railway materials at this point for the purpose of pushing the line to Kandahar, eighty miles distant. Quetta was connected to the Indian railway system by the Bolan and Sind-Pishin Lines, the Indus was bridged at Sukkur, and the arsenals and cantonments of the Panjab were connected to this bridge by strategic lines. The completion of these plans would make possible the massing of a large force at Kandahar, the southern bastion of the scientific frontier.

Meanwhile, after the second Afghan war an agreement had been made with the Afridis of the Khyber Pass by which that tribe, in return for allowances and a guarantee of non-interference in their domestic affairs, allowed the Pass to be opened. The Khyber route led to Kabul, and as long as the tribes kept to their bargain, the northern end of the line was

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1. Lyall, A. The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava.  
2 vols. London, 1905.

also within easy reach of the cantonments of the Panjab. To make the Khyber more secure, the Government of India suggested, in 1885, the strengthening of the fortifications at Peshawar, the construction of a railway through the pass to Landi Kotal, and the construction of a fort at railhead.<sup>1</sup> Though this plan was not carried out, it does suggest the trend of opinion. Indeed, so important was the ability to reach Kabul quickly considered to be that the Committee on North West Frontier defences contemplated the construction of a railway up the Kabul River Valley that would have outflanked the Pass and brought troops within striking distance of Jalalabad on the direct road to Kabul. The committee also suggested that the mouth of the Gomal Pass should be defended and that the Pass, which lead to Ghazni, should be surveyed. In 1888 a survey was attempted but the operation failed in the face of tribal hostility. All this points to the development of a policy, the objective of which was to push forward from bases at Quetta, Dera Ghazi Khan, Bannu, Kohat, and Peshawar, by all major roads that led to Kabul, Ghazni, or Kandahar, so as to be poised for a rapid advance on the scientific frontier.

In pursuing Imperial strategic motives we have not paused to consider their impact on administrative practice. Certainly, the forward policy presages the death of the Lawrence idea of non-intervention. Advocates of the new idea argued that

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1. W.O.32/263. Governor-General in Council to Lord Randolph Churchill. No.112. (Military) 10 July, 1885. Enc. Report by Committee on North-West Frontier. (India) Defences.

Lawrence himself had sounded the knell of his policy when he granted a subsidy to Sher Ali. In any case, the agreements negotiated with Abdur Rahman had committed the British Government to action beyond the Indian frontiers under certain circumstances.

Panjab administrators could still cite facts and figures to demonstrate the efficacy of their border policy of non-interference tempered by punitive expeditions. They showed that between 1878 and 1888 there had been only two expeditions specifically intended to punish unprovoked tribal aggression, the Waziri expedition of 1880-81, and the first Black Mountain expedition of 1888. Several others had been organized to punish attacks on lines of communication during the second Afghan war, but these could in no way be attributed to maladministration. Moreover, of the two admitted as being administrative in aim, it might be argued that the Black Mountain expedition had been the result of the forward tendencies of the Government of India for the immediate cause had been the incautious provocation offered by a British Officer.<sup>1</sup> Of course, it might be argued by the other side, that the expeditions designed to punish tribal activities during the war had had such a salutary effect that they prevented the tribes from venturing to attack British territory.

But the inference to be drawn from these facts is that

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1. The official account is that a small party of British troops were attacked in British territory, two officers and four men being killed. Government of India. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India. 6 vols. Vol.1. Simla, 1907



if the problem were purely administrative the Panjab "close border" system might be the answer. But the problem of Imperial defence was more far reaching. Even the most ardent supporters of the Lawrence School were ready to admit that conditions in 1888 were not what they had been fifty years before, or even what they had been in 1869 when Lawrence had declared the strongest security of the British Indian Empire to lie "in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost."

The question to be decided was how far Imperial strategic necessity required interference with tribal independence. Here there was wide divergence of opinion. It has been customary to speak of the policy of this period as if there were two schools designated as "forward" and "stationary". Actually there were at least four separate manifestations of the forward philosophy. There were those who demanded complete annexation of tribal territory, those who wished to see the Sandeman system of complete political control without annexation, those who desired to bring about gradual domination through the construction of roads and strategically located military posts, and those who desired to see only the roads and passes in British hands. As for the "stationary" school, it could not be truly said to exist at all; for everyone admitted that obligations had been undertaken which necessitated some trans-frontier interference. There were those who deprecated the existence of these obligations and professed a belief that the

Lawrence policy, if it had been strictly adhered to, would have been the best method of defending India, but the obligations could not be wished away and all they could do was advocate a minimum of interference.<sup>1</sup>

But through what agency was this interference to be exercised? Before attempting an answer to this question we shall look briefly at the administrative organization which brought Government influence to bear on trans-frontier tribal territory. The most noticeable fact is that though this region was one in which Imperial interests were directly involved, and one which came within the province of the Foreign Department, it was, in fact, under the control of the Panjab administrative system. The frontier region lying within the administrative border had been divided into two Commissionerships; that of Peshawar which comprised the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, and Kohat; and that of Derajat, made up of the districts of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan. The Deputy Commissioners of these six districts, assisted by Commandants of Border Military Police, were responsible for relations with the tribes on their own district borders. On the whole Pathan frontier there was only one special tribal officer, Colonel Robert Warburton, who had been appointed to the Khyber area during the second Afghan war.

Thus the chain of reference ran from Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner, from Commissioner to Panjab Secretariat,

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1. PSM.A80A. Improvement of Relations with the tribes on the North West Frontier. Note by Sir A.C.Lyall. 27 November, 1890

from there to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, and from the Governor-General in Council to the Secretary of State. The Panjab Government was not merely a forwarding agent, as was the Commissioner of Peshawar when Indo-Afghan relations were concerned. For though the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab and his officers on the frontier were administrators by training and experience, their long association with the frontier and the tribes, had, theoretically made them particularly competent to advise the Government of India, and hence the Imperial Government, on matters related to tribal policy. Thus the Viceroy and his Foreign Secretary made no decisions without having consulted the Lieutenant-Governor at every step of the way, and issued no orders except through his agency and with his concurrence. At best the system was bound to be productive of delays; at worst it could produce unbearable friction between an authority intent on efficient administration and not concerned with the frontier as long as it was peaceful, and one willing to risk peace in the pursuit of Imperial aims.

The Government of India could, of course, overrule the local administration and attempt to enforce its own policy on the frontier; but without the co-operation of the Lieutenant-Governor it could not fully succeed. For not only had he the power to raise argument after argument and so delay the implementation of any decision reached by the Government of India without his consent, but he controlled the agents through

whom the policy would be enforced. It is improbable that any Lieutenant-Governor would have adopted extreme measures to circumvent the declared policy of the Government of India, but until the time of Lord Curzon the intermediary position of the Panjab Government was treated with deference, though Lytton, Lansdowne, and Elgin, at least, chafed at the curtailment of their own authority which was involved.

The Panjab administration of the frontier was based on the existence of a "close border" which in essence consisted of keeping peace by confining the activities of border officers to administered territory until the need for a punitive expedition arose. This system was sufficient to satisfy administrative needs; but if the desire of the Government of India to extend its control over the main passes leading to Afghanistan were to be realized, then it is apparent that there would have to be a great deal of interference in the territories of the many tribes concerned. Sandeman's activities in Baluchistan had shown one possible method of doing this, but whether the Sandeman system was adopted or not, it seemed obvious at this point that the old Panjab system was doomed and that new ways would have to be found to meet the new situation.

In considering possibilities of change another question occurs. Since expansion into tribal territory was to be the outcome of Imperial policy, and since the exponent of that policy was the supreme, and not the provincial government,

might it not be more appropriate to make the men responsible for trans-frontier work directly responsible to the Government of India, just as had been done, in fact, in Baluchistan?

Lord Lytton had drawn the plans for a huge trans-Indus state under the control of an Agent to the Governor General, who would have, under the Viceroy's orders, directed Imperial policy on the North-West Frontier.<sup>1</sup> In reference to this plan Lord Salisbury had written in a despatch of 29 November, 1877:

"The Panjab Government was interposed between the Governor-General and the Frontier Officers at a time when communications between Calcutta and the Panjab was tedious and difficult, when the state of affairs beyond our territory caused little solicitude, and when the duties imposed upon the Government of Lahore, were not such as to prevent the frontier from receiving a large share of its attention." 2

Though Lytton's grandiose scheme had fallen to the ground, the idea had not been forgotten, in fact, it had been supported in one form or another by a great many high ranking officials, civil and military, in England and in India. The reasons for the change which had brought Salisbury to approve the principle, were in 1887 even more pertinent than they had been ten years earlier.

(1887)

Thus at the beginning of Lord Lansdowne's viceroyalty

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1. PSM. A.124. Reorganization of the Frontier by Sir R. Montgomery. 30 June, 1877. A.22 Memorandum on the Reorganization of the Western and North-Western Frontiers A.N.Wollaston, 12 December, 1878.  
A.23. Memorandum on the Rectification of the North-West Frontier of India. Henry Green, 30 December, 1878  
A.25. Note on the Proposed Rectification of the Western Frontiers of India. H.B.Lumsden, 15 January, 1879
  2. Quoted by Curzon in his Minute on Frontier Administration 24 August, 1900. PSLI. Vol.126. No.133. 13 September, 1900

the Government of India was faced with a threefold problem: firstly, to secure the defence of India and provide for the fulfillment of obligations to Afghanistan, by acquiring control over the main passes leading to the scientific frontier; secondly, to devise a means of political control over the tribes in whose territories these passes lay; thirdly, to devise a form of administration that would be capable of interpreting and applying the policies of the Government of India faithfully and efficiently. These problems occupied the attentions of three Viceroys over a period of thirteen years, and the chapters that follow deal with their strivings toward the solution that was finally reached.



# The "SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER"

Scale 1 inch = 43 miles  
0 50 100

DURAND LINE

ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY

LINES OF COMMUNICATION



## LORD LANSDOWNE'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM: A NEW TRIBAL POLICY

In the summer of 1889 Lieutenant-General Brackenbury, Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, and Major-General Newmarch, Military Secretary at the India Office, co-operated in the preparation of a memorandum on the defence of India,<sup>1</sup> which was clearly a reply to the "Secret Memorandum on the General Strategical Situation of Russia and England in Central Asia" which had been prepared under the direction of the Government of India in 1887.<sup>2</sup> Brackenbury and Newmarch condemned the 1887 scheme which, in case of a Russian move against Afghanistan, had called for the occupation of Herat and an advance from there to sever Russian communications between the Caspian and Afghan Turkestan. Rejection of this scheme left a choice of two alternatives, either, to remain passive behind the Indian frontier, or, to advance into Southern Afghanistan. The former was condemned on political grounds, that is, for fear of the reaction of the Afghan and Indian peoples to a Russian invader in their midst. Therefore, only one choice remained, an advance into Afghanistan, to be made, if possible, with the approval of the Amir, but "without it if necessary". The military objective of such a move would be to ensure that decisive battlefields were of British choosing and to prevent at all costs, a Russian occupation of

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1. W.O. 32/264/0149. Memorandum by Lieutenant-General Brackenbury and Major-General Newmarch. 19 August, 1889.
  2. See page 30 above.



Kabul and Kandahar. The primary British move would be to occupy Kandahar, "at the same time closing with detachments, and small but strong works, the passes leading upon the Indus from the road between Kandahar and Kabul". For the defence of Kabul either Jalalabad or Ghazni would have to be occupied. The former had the advantage of closing the road from Chitral by which a small Russian "turning force" might attempt to advance, the latter that it would outflank a Russian move towards Kabul itself. These views were supported by Sir H. Brownlow<sup>1</sup> and Lord Wolseley<sup>2</sup> at the Horse Guards, though Brownlow argued that if sufficient forces were available Kabul itself should be occupied.

Strategists in 1880 had maintained that a British force at Kandahar would not only stop an advance from Herat via Kandahar but would also flank an attack on India by way of Kabul. But Kandahar is nearly three hundred and twenty miles from Kabul and this distance, as Sir Robert Warburton pointed out to Sir John Ardagh, Lansdowne's private Secretary, was too great for a force based on Kandahar to be of permanent use in checking a Russian advance from Kabul.

"On this account an idea is in progress to secure a post somewhat nearer to Kabul, either Ghazni or Kelat-i-Ghilzai, from which we can more surely prevent and threaten their line of advance and force the Russians to remain stationary at Kabul<sup>3</sup>

But the plan was not to force the Russians to remain stationary at Kabul but to prevent their occupation of it, and it is

1. W.O.33/49. Memorandum on the Report of the Indian Mobilization Committee Regarding the Situation in Central Asia by Sir H. Brownlow, Horse Guards, 1 February, 1889.
2. Ibid. Memorandum by Lord Wolseley, 25 August, 1889.
3. L.P. vii. Vol. 1. No.500. Warburton to Ardagh. 21 June, 1889

difficult to see how a force at Ghazni, or indeed, at Jalalabad, could do this. Perhaps it was with this consideration in mind that Brownlow had suggested a British occupation of the strategic city.

Warburton had also stressed the idea of a direct advance on Kabul, and Ardagh, in turn, advised Lansdowne that if money were available for railway construction it should be spent on the Kabul River Valley line.<sup>1</sup> Lansdowne took this advice seriously. He cancelled a project for the construction of a line from Peshawar to Jamrud, and instead ordered a survey of the Kabul River Valley as the line for a railway that could be built to Jalalabad and eventually to Kabul.<sup>2</sup> It seems clear that, from this time on, a simultaneous advance to Kabul and Kandahar was contemplated as the way in which the "scientific frontier" would be occupied, though "the passes leading upon the Indus from the road between Kandahar and Kabul" were also regarded as extremely important.

In 1890 Lansdowne, in a policy declaration, stated that the occupation of the Kabul-Kandahar line

"Is unanimously regarded as an irreducible minimum in the event of deliberate and substantial aggression by Russia upon the territories of our ally. The military frontier of India against Russia is, with one consent, considered...to be the line that joins Chitral, Kabul, Kandahar, and Girishk; and as this line could not be held in sufficient strength by the Amir's troops, we may accept General Brackenbury's conclusion that 'the permanent occupation of the Southern provinces of Afghanistan will be forced upon us by the next forward move of Russia'!"<sup>3</sup> Although no understanding to this effect has as yet been formally arrived at between Her Majesty's Government and that

1. AP.12. Notes written for Lord Lansdowne No.64. Note on Lord Salisbury's idea of railway construction in Baluchistan. undated.

2. LP.ix. Vol.2. No.49. Lansdowne to Cross. 23 June, 1890

3. We must assume that he meant a Russian forward move which violated Afghan territory or threatened India.

of India, it has been the recent policy of the latter to prepare...for giving effect to a decision of this kind." 1

✓ Lansdowne believed that the Government of India should be prepared at any moment for Russian occupation of Afghan territory which would make occupation of the "scientific frontier" immediately essential. "It would be a condition precedent of any future operations which we may thereafter resolve to undertake", whether these operations meant consolidating on the "scientific frontier", or, striking a blow at Russia directly.

The aim of achieving a state of preparedness that would make possible a speedy occupation of the Kandahar-Kabul line ✓ led to what has been called "the forward policy of the nineties". This policy received its greatest impetus from Lansdowne, and during his Viceroyalty there was intense activity on every section of the North-West Frontier from Baluchistan to Hunza and Nagar. In this chapter the activities of this period will be discussed in some detail, with the intention not only of showing the scope of Lansdowne's plans and his singleness of purpose, but also, of tracing the origins of problems which confronted Lansdowne, Elgin, and Curzon, in turn. A topical method of presentation has been selected as a measure of expediency, and because this method tends to compartmentalize, one should bear two things in mind: firstly, that though

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1. LP XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on the Outlook in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 21 July, 1890

treated separately, the various operations discussed were conducted simultaneously and are, moreover, united in aim as well as in time; and secondly, that foundations are here being laid for more detailed discussion of specific problems in later chapters.

To prepare for an occupation of the "scientific frontier" by establishing control over the passes leading upon the Indus from Afghanistan meant breaking completely with the Panjab "close border" tribal policy. In 1887 General Roberts had sought to obtain a relaxation of the stringent rules that prevented British officers from crossing the administrative frontier into tribal territory. His reasons for making this request were that

"the necessity for securing the very fullest information regarding the country occupied by the border tribes...the prospect of our being called upon to march troops into the Amir's territory, makes it of the very greatest importance that we should have complete knowledge of every route leading from the Indus to Afghanistan proper, and that we should secure the good-will of the tribesmen, in order that, when an advance is ordered, we may be certain of their assistance..... We have immediately before us the prospect of exploring the Gomal route and it is most desirable that we should obtain as soon as possible a thorough knowledge of the route through the Tochi Pass". 1

Lord Dufferin agreed that many of the restrictions could be relaxed,<sup>2</sup> and Sir James Lyall, Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab expressed a similar view.<sup>3</sup> But it was Lansdowne who took the necessary action.<sup>4</sup>

1. LP. 1B. Vol.1. PSLI. No.179. 17 December, 1889. Enc.No.1. Quarter-Master-General in India to the Secretary of the Government of India in the Military Department.
2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Collen to Young, 12 August, 1887
3. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Tupper to Collen. 21 December, 1888
4. Ibid. Enc. No.7. Notification by the Government of India.Foreign Department. Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.Regulations for modifying rules for crossing border.

But Lansdowne was prepared to go much further towards an improvement of tribal relations which he could not "consider...as either suitable or satisfactory". In relation to the Panjab border he declared,

"there is probably no other spot in the world where, after thirty-five years of peaceful occupation, a great civilized power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours or has acquired so little knowledge of them." <sup>1</sup>

He knew the tribes were different from those over whom Sandeman had acquired control, but he argued that "no serious attempt had been made to effect a durable improvement in our relations with them", and he believed that the "policy and methods" which had been successful in Baluchistan, would have similar results on the Panjab frontier. In any case he was determined to try.

"The Government of India considers that throughout that portion of the frontier region which borders on the Panjab, it should no longer be content to find itself face to face with an almost impenetrable wall of hostile tribesmen. It desires on the contrary to cultivate more friendly relations and more direct and frequent intercourse with them than at present exist; to increase its influence over them, to know what is passing within the regions which they inhabit and beyond it, to improve the frontier communications, to encourage the tribes to supply the Indian Army with recruits under ordinary circumstances, and to look towards the British Government and not towards an invader in the event of foreign aggression. It would also welcome the removal of the obstacles which prevent the acquisition of a more intimate knowledge of the important Ghilzai tribes which stretch along the eastern flank of Afghanistan. In connection with this part of the subject, it is considered of great importance that British control should be thoroughly established in the Kurram Valley, and that frontier lines of communication, such as the roads through Dir to Chitral and through the Tochi and the Gomal Passes, should be thoroughly explored...In order to give effect to this policy...nothing in the way of annexation is required, or should be attempted, nor should any step be taken likely to lead to collision. The aim should be rather to enlist the

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1. PSLI. Vol.61. No.124. 7 October, 1890. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab. (Confidential), 17 October, 1889.

interests of the tribes on our side, as is done in Baluchistan, and, while securing for British officers complete freedom of movement amongst them, to entrust the guardianship and protection of the passes to the tribes themselves." 1

No serious objections to this policy, were raised. Sir James Lyall contented himself with pointing out that it would in all probability arouse the jealousy and antagonism of the Amir who claimed a shadowy kind of suzerainty over most of the tribes.<sup>2</sup> At the India Office a note on the minute paper stated that the ground on which Lansdowne had accepted the policy seemed indisputable, but,

✓ "The extension of British influence and control and the maintenance of the independence of these turbulent tribes are conditions which will no doubt prove to be difficult to reconcile one with the other." 3

But more pressing was thought to be the need to convince the Amir that "the strengthening of our position on the North-West and West Frontiers of India do not threaten his independence but are imperatively necessary to the security of the Indian Empire". Nevertheless, it was noted that though the co-operation of the Amir would facilitate prosecution of the policy, "whether he co-operates or not the Government of India will pursue the course they have marked out".<sup>4</sup> Sir Alfred Lyall was only mildly enthusiastic. He recognized that the policy stemmed from strategical considerations, but doubted whether military ideas should "preponderate so decidedly" in peace time.<sup>5</sup> Lord Cross sanctioned the policy, but with words of

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Confidential Note recorded by Sir James Lyall on the letter of the Government of India. 17 October, 1889.

3. PSDI. Vol.16. Minute Paper on Letter from India No.124. 7 October, 1890. The Minute is unsigned but may be the work of Sir Arthur Godley.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid. Note by Sir A. Lyall. 27 November, 1890.

caution:

"Any measure that your Excellency may contemplate with the object of extending authority over and acquaintance with these tribes should...be undertaken with peculiar caution... Choose carefully the time and methods of pressing forward political operations in a country that certainly trenches upon the recognized limits of the Amir's sovereignty...I am aware that some of the measures now contemplated...are dictated by weighty military considerations, or by the anticipation of important strategic contingencies...but do not forget that our general foreign policy is based on friendship and good understanding with Afghanistan." 1

Privately, Cross informed Lansdowne that regarding "any matter which, according to your mature judgment, is advisable for security, you may entirely rely upon my support".<sup>2</sup>

But Lansdowne's first concern was not with the Amir but with the agency he was to employ in execution of his policy.

His aim was "unity of administration and consistency of policy" and he considered the creation of a separate frontier province.<sup>3</sup>

Previous attempts to secure unity of administration had involved the idea of transferring Sind to the Panjab. Lord Dufferin had favoured such a scheme but had left the final decision to Lansdowne.<sup>4</sup> The existence of the Baluchistan Agency meant that Sind was no longer a frontier district, so the transfer was now not justified. In any case, Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay would have objected strenuously,<sup>5</sup> and as on previous occasions there would have been demands from Bombay for territorial compensation to satisfy which would have required the dismemberment of the Central Provinces.<sup>6</sup>

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1. PSDI. Vol.16. No.4. (Secret) 26 December, 1890
  2. L.P. ix.Vol.1. No.57. Cross to Lansdowne.12 December,1889
  3. L.P. ix.Vol.1. No.28. Lansdowne to Cross. 13 May, 1889
  4. Ibid.
  5. LP. vii. Vol.2. No.20. Reay to Lansdowne.6 July, 1889
  6. LP. xiii.Note by Lord Lansdowne on the Transfer of Sind from Bombay to the Panjab. 11 June, 1889

Lansdowne, therefore, decided against the transfer.<sup>1</sup> He had previously decided that when the Sind Question was settled, he would take up the other idea "with the hope of preparing a scheme for the better administration of the frontier".<sup>2</sup>

The question was raised in Council on 20 June, 1889,<sup>3</sup> and a protracted discussion followed. It was quickly agreed that a scheme such as that proposed by Lytton in 1887 for a huge trans-Indus province stretching from Kashmir to the sea was out of the question; partly because it would have been too unwieldy a charge, and partly because Lansdowne was primarily concerned with the central or Pathan section of the frontier, and his council was firmly opposed to removing this section from the control of the Panjab Government.<sup>4</sup> Only Sir James Browne strenuously advocated the creation of the trans-Indus province.<sup>5</sup> The council also rejected the idea of a single Commissioner, under the orders of the Government of India, to conduct tribal relations on the Pathan frontier, though they did agree that the "close-border" should be abandoned and that men "able and willing" to carry out the new policy effectually should be appointed to the frontier, and that these men should be strictly political in function, and should be relieved from all administrative duties in the border districts.<sup>6</sup> But under whose directions were these men to be

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1. LP. VII. Vol.1. No.310. Lansdowne to Reay. 20 June, 1889

2. LP. IX. Vol.1. No.28. Lansdowne to Cross. 13 May, 1889

3. LP. XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne. 11 September, 1889.

4. Ibid.

5. LP. XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on the Administration of the Frontier Districts adjoining the Panjab. 28 June, 1890

6. LP. XIII. Memorandum of 11 September, 1889.



placed? Lansdowne would have preferred to place them directly under the Government of India, but he had not the support of his Council on this issue either. There were weighty arguments against such a scheme, for it was practically impossible to separate the political management of the tribes from the administration of the frontier districts and conflict between politicals under the Government of India and administrators under the Panjab Government would be inevitable. Consequently, it was decided to leave the direction of frontier affairs to the Panjab Government, but to inform that Government that though the idea of a single frontier command had been for the time abandoned "we adhere to our intention of dealing with it in accordance with a uniform policy, that policy being something very different from that which tradition usually associates with the Panjab Government."<sup>1</sup>

In reply to an objection from his Council that frontier officers with no district responsibilities would encourage the extension of interference and annexation, Lansdowne replied that,

"A more active policy than that which has hitherto been pursued on the Panjab frontier appears to me to be inevitable in the future...I would make it clear that while it was our object to extend our influence in these regions, we desired to leave their Government to the tribes by which they were inhabited, under the same kind of rough and ready guidance which had been so successfully introduced by Sir Robert Sandeman in the case of the Baluch frontier tribes." <sup>2</sup>

Lansdowne was never happy with the decision that had been made and deplored the existence of a "dual system" under which the

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

tribes south of the Gomāl River were managed by Sandeman's methods and those north of the river by the Panjab Government.<sup>1</sup> He consoled himself with the thought that the frontier had been left to the Panjab on an experimental basis, and if the experiment failed, he would have a stronger case than ever for "placing the frontier under one management."<sup>2</sup>

The dangers inherent in the "dual system" became realities when a bitter controversy developed between the Panjab Government and the Baluchistan Agency over the sphere of each, and the methods to be used in the Gomāl Valley. Lyall maintained

"We must have the...Gomāl Valley Powindah highway as a buffer between Sandeman and the Waziris, if the arrangements by which we control the latter are to last and be a reality, and if the annexing tendency of Sandeman's administration is to be stopped at the ...Gomāl." <sup>3</sup>

Sandeman feared that Lyall would allow the Waziris to do as they liked,<sup>4</sup> and argued for a system of definite control:

"If we are to be in a position to defend Afghanistan in time of danger and prevent our enemies using the Ghazni-Kandahar line as a base of operations against India, the greater number of the tribes we are able to bring under our influence, the nearer we can get to Ghazni with them on our side bound to us through their own interests...the better it seems to me it will be for our Government". <sup>5</sup>

Lyall said that his objection was on Imperial grounds and that Sandeman's advance would alarm the Amir of Afghanistan, while it was Imperial policy to keep him in a friendly mood;<sup>6</sup>

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1. LP.IX. Vol.2. No.14. Lansdowne to Cross. 25 March, 1890  
Ibid. Vol.3. No.25. Lansdowne to Cross. 6 May, 1891.
  2. LP.VII. Vol.3. No.150. Lansdowne to Roberts. 12 March, 1890
  3. LP.VII. Vol.4. No.84. Lyall to Lansdowne. 28 July, 1890
  4. Ibid. No.88. Sandeman to Lansdowne. 29 July, 1890
  5. Ibid. No.109. Sandeman to Ardagh. 8 August, 1890
  6. Ibid. No.84. Lyall to Lansdowne. 28 July, 1890

but at the India Office, Lyall's brother, Sir Alfred, declared that the real base of objection on the part of the Panjab Government was the fear that underlying the proposals for advance lay the prospect of a revival of the idea of a frontier commissionership.<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne inclined to Sandeman's views, and though he admitted that Sandeman was "a little too much inclined to go ahead and to resent instructions", he felt that it was true that

"The Panjab Government errs on the other side. It has not managed the tribes for which it is responsible satisfactorily during the last few years, and I have no doubt that the region lying beyond the Gomal Pass could not be conveniently controlled from Lahore, and by the Panjab officers stationed at Dera Ismail Khan or Tank.....The easy going ways of the Panjab Government are by no means suited to such a task. Inefficient arrangements for preventing breaches of the peace mean that such breaches are ignored or allowed to remain unpunished until a punitive expedition becomes necessary." 2

Lansdowne took advantage of Lyall's presence in Simla in 1890 to try and arrange an understanding, but found that the ideas of Lyall and Sandeman were "wide as the poles asunder".<sup>3</sup> But since he had bowed to the pressure of his Council<sup>4</sup> and allowed the Panjab Government to "control its own 'frontage'", the only solution seemed to be "to establish a 'scientific frontier' between the two".<sup>5</sup> This frontier was the Gomal River.

But Lansdowne remained dissatisfied and two years later he suggested to Kimberley that the question should be reconsidered, since it was most inconvenient to have neighbouring

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1. PSM. A80A. "Improvement of Relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier". Note by Sir A.C. Lyall, 27 November 1890
  2. LP. IX. Vol. 2. No. 41. Lansdowne to Cross, 23 September, 1890
  3. Ibid. No. 24. Lansdowne to Cross, 26 May, 1890.
  4. Ibid. No. 14. Lansdowne to Cross. 25 March, 1890
  5. Ibid. No. 24. Lansdowne to Cross. 26 May, 1890

tribes adjoining the same passes under two different administrations. And when one of these administrations was the "inheritor of Sandeman's traditions" and the other the Panjab "with its notorious aversion to anything that can be called... a forward policy", the inconvenience assumed "the most formidable proportions".<sup>1</sup> The net result, Lansdowne maintained, was clearly

✓ "constant friction, unnecessary correspondence, and waste of power...while, in the case of the Panjab Government, the direction of frontier policy is liable to fall into the hands of officials not possessing any special qualifications for the work and fully occupied with the ordinary business of Provincial administration.....The best solution of the difficulty would be to place the military and civil administration of the whole trans-Indus frontier in the hands of a single administration working directly under the Government of India". 2

Kimberley's response was not enthusiastic. He commented, it is "an important administrative reform, worthy, no doubt, of careful consideration, though I am afraid I should not agree with you that the substitution of Sandeman's 'traditions' for the traditions of the Panjab Government would be a gain". 3

Lansdowne replied that he did not propose to take up the subject in the last year of his administration, but he was still convinced that it was a reform that would inevitably have to be made. He pointed out that his four years' experience had convinced him, even though he had been on excellent terms with the Lieutenant-Governors of the Panjab, that the interposition

✓ "of the Panjab Government in matters of frontier administration not only leads to friction and difficulty, but increases the chances of complications on the frontier. It necessitates the

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1. LP. XIII. "Memorandum on Afghan Policy." by Lord Lansdowne. 4 October, 1892.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Kimberley's Marginal Notations 28 October, 1892.

maintenance of two sets of frontier officials, owing allegiance to different administrations, and pulling, as often as not, in different directions. The result is to unsettle the minds of the tribesmen, to produce inconsistencies of treatment and fluctuations of policy, and to bring about misunderstandings and collisions which, in their turn, beget punitive expeditions with all the attendant expense, and suffering, and ill-feeling, which they involve".<sup>1</sup>

- ✓ Finally, as one of his last official acts in India, Lansdowne prepared a minute for the guidance of his successor, Lord Elgin, in which he strongly recommended the formation of a trans-Indus state, which the Durand Agreement had made more than ever necessary.<sup>2</sup>

Though Lansdowne was dissatisfied with the "dual system" and with the administrative procedure of the Panjab Government, he lost no opportunity to push forward the policy he had adopted. The first practical application of this policy was in the Zhob Valley. The Zhob River flows northward from the plateau of Baluchistan and enters the Gomal at Kajuri Kach. The valleys of the Gomal and Zhob, therefore, offered a shorter, more direct route between the Panjab and Quetta than that "via" Sind and the Bolan Pass. For this reason Lansdowne thought of the Zhob Valley as "a region in the political and material condition of which British interests are directly concerned".<sup>3</sup> He declared it to be of the utmost importance to India's security

"(1) that we should control the country...and that the tribes.. should be well disposed towards us; (2) that they should learn

1. LP. IX. Vol.4. No.48. Lansdowne to Kimberley. 5 October, 1892
2. LP.XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne concerning the "Settlement effected between Sir Mortimer Durand and the Amir of Afghanistan about the Indo-Afghan Frontier". 13 Jan. 1894.
3. LP.XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on the Zhob Valley 20 May, 1889.

that they have much to fear from our hostility, but much to hope for from our good will; (3) that their country should be tranquil, prosperous, and productive, so as to become, in case of necessity, a source from which supplies might be drawn; and (4) that the arterial roads, leading from Pishin towards the Gomal Pass should be rendered traversable by our forces and maintained in good repair." 1

The headmen of the Zhob Valley had petitioned to be brought under British administration.<sup>2</sup> Lansdowne wished to take advantage of this fortuitous circumstance, and he invited the Panjab Government to co-operate in the task of opening the Gomal Pass at the same time.<sup>3</sup> Sandeman suggested a meeting between himself and Lyall, declaring, "I believe we can almost make success certain if we act together with a single eye to the Imperial interests of the British Government."<sup>4</sup>

Lyall suggested that a military road should be made through the pass, posts constructed to protect it, and a military post built at the mouth of the Gomal as had been suggested by the defence committee of 1885.<sup>5</sup> He thought that if the Mahsuds, who reported that they got Rs.15,000 annually in plunder from the pass, were offered allowances doubling this amount they might agree to the peaceful opening of the route.<sup>6</sup> At Lansdowne's request Lyall, Roberts, and Sandeman formed a committee to discuss action to be taken in the

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1. Ibid. also PSLI. No.103.(LP.1B.1) 12 July, 1889. Enc. No.2. India to Sandeman. 11 July, 1889.
  2. PSLI. No.103. (LP.1B.1) 12 July, 1889. Enc. No.1.Sandeman to India. 31 January, 1889. Appendix to Enc. No.1.Petition of Headmen of Zhob.
  3. PSLI. No.103. (LP.1B.1) 12 July, 1889.
  4. PSLI. No.13. (LP.1B.2.) 28 January, 1890.Enc.No.1. Sandeman to India. 12 August, 1889.
  5. See above page 34.
  6. PSLI. No.13. (LP.1B.2) 28 January, 1890. Enc.No.3. Panjab to India. 21 October,1890.

Gomal-Zhob area. Sandeman announced that in December he was going to Zhob to announce its incorporation into the Baluchistan Agency. He suggested that R.I. Bruce, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, should work with him in settling with the tribes bordering the Zhob Valley, and should take the opportunity of bringing the Mahsuds and Waziris of Wana into the picture by inviting their jirgas to meet him and discuss the Government's desire to open the Gomal Pass. The argument was that by working from a strong position in the rear, and with Sandeman's prestige behind him, Bruce would probably succeed in getting Mahsud agreement. The whole committee agreed to these proposals as did Lansdowne.<sup>1</sup>

Sandeman also raised the question of bringing the Wana area under the jurisdiction of the Baluchistan Agency, but Lyall objected and it was decided that Bruce, though subordinate to Sandeman, would negotiate with the Waziris as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, and not as an agent of the Baluchistan administration.<sup>2</sup> Foiled in his attempt to cross the boundary into Panjab preserves, Sandeman insisted that at least Bruce should be allowed to operate according to his system.

"It is necessary that Mr. Bruce...should possess a power similar to that which I hold in regard to the districts of British Baluchistan; namely, that he should be able to send for any person or to carry out any measure he considers necessary to the success of the scheme without further

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Memorandum regarding the measures for opening the Gomal Pass. H.C.Fanshawe. 23 November, 1889

2. Ibid. Enc. No.6. Note of Consultations with Sir.R.Sandeman, and Mr. Bruce at Lahore by J.B.Lyall. 3 December, 1889.

reference to any other authority.....The Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels...must all come more directly...under British influence, and...it would be a wise measure...to authorize Mr. Bruce when with me to think out a well considered plan for bringing the whole tribe under one management." 1

Bruce was not given the wide powers Sandeman had suggested, but he was authorized to offer the Waziris allowances to the value of Rs.50,000 annually.<sup>2</sup> In January, 1890, Sandeman was able to report that after much patient work, the Waziri tribes had assembled in jirga at Appozai, later named Fort Sandeman, and had

"accepted the conditions of service drawn up by Mr. Bruce, and they as a body agree...to be responsible for the safety of the Gomal Pass, and keeping it and the Zhob route open to traffic".<sup>3</sup>

That Bruce believed this to be a beginning only, and that he had become, to use the word coined by Sir Mortimer Durand, a "Sandemaniac",<sup>4</sup> is obvious to us when we read in his report;

"If the scheme of Imperial defence is to be carried through... the present isolation of Waziri territory...must...cease; for in this scheme the opening up of the Gomal and Tochi Passes has become a detail of the first importance. The former... leads to Kandahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and the latter to Ghazni.....I presume that...Government's object is not merely to secure the military tenure of the Gomal and Tochi Passes, but to open out the entire country, reclaim it from anarchy, ...develop its resources, so that its supplies, transport,&C., may be available for...Government, and in short bring it into line with its southern neighbours.....what has been done with these tribes can also be done with the Waziris.....In the course of time the same system might be...extended as far northward as the Khaibar." 5

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.7. Memorandum by Sir R.Sandeman, 27 November, 1889.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.8. India to Panjab, 23 December, 1889.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.16. Sandeman to India, 20 January, 1890.  
For full reports of negotiations and settlement at Appozai see PSLI. No.75 (LP.1B.2) 23 June, 1890. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India, 21 April, 1890 and enclosures there to. Sandeman to India, 10 March, 1890, Bruce to Sandeman, 24 February, 1890, McIvor to Sandeman, 28 February, 1890.
  4. LP.VII. Vol.2. No.235. Durand to Lansdowne, 14 December, 1889 with reference to Barnes.
  5. PSLI. No.75. (LP.1B.2) 23 June, 1890. Enc. to Enc.No.1. Memorandum by Bruce, 6 November, 1889



The settlement of the Zhob area had not been accomplished without a minor military expedition. The Khiderzai section of Shiranis, inhabiting the highlands to the west of the valley, had been guilty of raiding, and Sandeman thought it opportune to explore the country while demonstrating to the tribe their accessibility to troops. A force left Appozai on 1 November and within two weeks the tribe had submitted. By 5 December all fines had been paid and meanwhile, the country had been thoroughly explored.<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne's policy concerning the Gomal was accepted by his Council without dissent,<sup>2</sup> and Lord Cross agreed both regarding the importance of the Gomal route<sup>3</sup> and the necessity of making a good road through the pass.<sup>4</sup> His official despatch declared that "the importance, both upon political and strategic considerations, of opening a direct communication from the Panjab "via" the Gomal Pass and Zhob Valley with our position in Quetta is manifest."<sup>5</sup>

North of the Gomal Bruce, under the direction of the Panjab Government, set about bringing the Mahsuds under control. His plan was to "form a manageable representative jirga" through which to work, and Ogilvie, Commissioner of the Derajat Division<sup>6</sup>

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1. PSLI. No.8. (LP.1B.3) 14 January, 1891. and enclosures thereto.
  2. LP.VII. Vol.2. No.312. Lansdowne to Roberts. 14 December, 1889
  3. LP.IX. Vol.2. No.3. Cross to Lansdowne. 16 January, 1890
  4. Ibid. No.18. Cross to Lansdowne, 2 May, 1890
  5. PSDI. No.8. (Secret) 28 February, 1890
  6. After the annexation of the Panjab six frontier districts were created, namely, Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. In<sup>o</sup> 1876 the three Northern districts were formed into the Commissionership of Peshawar, while the other three, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan became the Commissionership of Derajat.

Wrong.

thought that though the allowances granted were not large enough to give Bruce an efficient control of the tribe, they were large enough to test the feasibility of forming an influential jirga.<sup>1</sup> This was to be done by putting powers of patronage in the hands of the jirga members, or maliks. In other words the levies would be the appointees of the maliks, who would share the pay of each man they appointed according to the tribal proportion.<sup>2</sup>

But the jirga that had agreed at Appozai to make the Gomal safe was unable to keep its promise. The Panjab Administration Report of 1891-92 stated that raids were still being committed "by sections...over whom we have little or no control. The thieves...can, with impunity return to their homes through Spin after raiding in Zhob, our levies in Kajuri Kach being powerless to check them". As a result of continued outrage a blockade was imposed against the Mahsuds and tribes of the Wana area, and towards the end of 1892 Bruce took up the task of exacting reparation and punishing offenders. He suggested the surrender of prisoners and the return of stolen property and the payment of fines. Failing compliance within a month he proposed a small expedition.<sup>3</sup> Lansdowne refused to sanction the expedition and suggested instead that the jirga should be

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1. PSLI. No.13. (LP.1B.2) 28 January, 1890. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Ogilvie to Panjab, 7 June, 1889. Note by Ogilvie, 5 June, 1889.
  2. The other form of service was to pay the levies at the full rate and pay the headmen separately to keep order. This was the Khyber system, but Ogilvie called it blackmail.
  3. PSLI. No.11. (LP.1B.7) 11 January, 1893. Enc. No.17. Panjab to India. 23 September, 1892.

summoned to Kajuri Kach and threatened with an expedition if they did not mend their ways.<sup>1</sup> The Commissioner of Derajat, agreed with Bruce that threats instead of punishment was fatal to the idea of establishing control.<sup>2</sup> But neither was necessary for while this discussion was going on Bruce succeeded in persuading the Wana tribes to comply with his terms.<sup>3</sup> The blockade was lifted and Bruce went to work on the Mahsud jirga having been authorized by Lansdowne to exact terms similar to those accepted by the Wana tribes, but with the understanding that the Government would not be bound to use force if he failed.<sup>4</sup> The maliks brought in plunder and prisoners, on condition that the punishment would be fines only, and these fines they paid themselves. Such a proceeding might enable Bruce to report that reparation had been made in full but it could have little preventive effect since the real culprits had paid nothing nor had they suffered any punishment. In fact, outrages increased and when five Mahsuds were sentenced to prison terms for the murder of a Public Works Department official, three members of the jirga involved in the trial were in turn murdered. Though Bruce and Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, who had succeeded Lyall as Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, both recommended a punitive expedition to support the maliks, Lansdowne refused on the grounds that an expedition might

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1. Ibid. Enc. 36. India to Panjab. 12 November, 1892.

2. Ibid. Enc. 46. Panjab to India. 15 December, 1892.

3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. 46. Bruce to Panjab, 14 December, 1892.

4. Ibid. Enc. No.52. India to Panjab. 31 December, 1892.

imperil the result of negotiations then being conducted with the Amir.<sup>1</sup>

This leads us to consideration of a factor that seriously hampered Lansdowne's policy in Waziristan before 1894, namely, Afghan interference. Early in 1890 the Amir had laid claim to Waziristan and the Gomal Valley, and pointed out to Lansdowne the folly of acquiring control over the tribes through a process that was bound to alienate the friendship of Afghanistan. He wrote,

"If the consideration involved is this, that on the occasion of Russia attacking Afghanistan, the proximity of railway and road to Afghanistan is essential, then I say this much, that if the hearts of the people of Afghanistan be alienated from that illustrious Government, proximity of railway and road to Afghanistan would be of no avail." 2

Lansdowne replied that the construction of road and railway was as much for the benefit of Afghanistan as India, and in any case the British had always dealt directly with the Waziris as the only method of securing the peace of the border.<sup>3</sup>

At the beginning of 1892 there were several reports that Afghan agents were among the Zhob and Waziri tribes, which tended to indicate that the Amir meant to assert his suzerainty over them.<sup>4</sup> Lansdowne ordered Barnes, who had replaced Sandeman, to send levies to occupy Gul Kach on the Baluchistan

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1. PSLI. Vol.75. No.122. 10 July, 1894. and enclosures thereto. See also PSLI. Vol.80. No.117. 18 June, 1895. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Bruce to Lockhart, 19 March, 1895. Bruce gives a comprehensive review of the entire proceedings in this report to Lockhart.
  2. PSLI. No.47.(LP.1B.2) 5 May, 1890. Enc. No.1.Amir to Viceroy, 4 February, 1890.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Viceroy to Amir. 26 March, 1890.
  4. PSLI. No.138. (LP.1B.6) 2 August, 1892. Enc. No.1. Barnes to Durand, 10 February, 1892 and enclosures thereto.Enc.to Enc. No.4. Bruce to Fanshawe, 16 February, 1892.

side of the Gomal,<sup>1</sup> and ordered Waziris receiving British pay to tell the Amir's agents that they could have no dealings with any power but the British, and that they could not allow the establishment of Afghan posts in their territories.<sup>2</sup> The Waziris were promised protection against the Amir provided they committed no acts of aggression.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, by mid-May, the Afghans had occupied a post at Wana, with the consent of a fairly large faction of the tribe.<sup>4</sup> The Afghan Commander, when asked why he had come to Wana replied that the Amir had heard that the British were extending their boundaries and had sent him to make enquiries and to discuss the question with the district officers.<sup>5</sup>

By this time Fitzpatrick had familiarized himself with the situation and in a lengthy minute set forth his views on Waziristan, where he thought the "forward policy" was the right policy. He accepted military authority to the effect that a Russian attack would be met on the Kabul-Kandahar Line:

"And for this purpose our main forces would operate from a base...extending from Quetta to the neighbourhood of the Gomal and Tochi Passes, with probably an advanced post somewhere at the west of Daur pointing towards Ghazni; and that, as this main force would be a small one...we should, with a view to making the most of it, at once set about improving...all the communications on which it would depend...the communications along the length of the base, the communications connecting it with British India, and the line leading to the outpost west of Daur". 6

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.9. India to Barnes. 7 March, 1892.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.13. India to Panjab. 23 March, 1892.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.28. India. to Panjab. 14 May, 1892
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.32. Panjab to India. 19 May, 1892
  5. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.36. Anderson to Panjab. 27 May, 1892.
  6. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. 40. Confidential and Urgent Note by Sir Denis Fitzpatrick on our position with reference to Waziristan, June, 1892.

But Fitzpatrick looked upon the pacification of the entire country as too big a task to undertake. He would, therefore, curb the "benevolent aggressiveness" of the frontier officers and content himself with getting "absolute and exclusive possession of the lines of communication to which we attach importance, with a very narrow margin on either side".<sup>1</sup>

Of course, the attainment of even this limited objective meant preventing the Amir from annexing Waziristan. On the other hand, he realized that British action in Waziristan probably appeared to Afghans as a threat to their independence. He, therefore, suggested as an expedient that an agreement be arranged whereby the Amir promised not to interfere in Waziristan, while the tribes acknowledged Afghan suzerainty by payment of a tribute that would be provided by increased British subsidies.<sup>2</sup> In other words he proposed an indirect method of bribing the Amir to let the Government of India have its way in tribal country.

Meanwhile the Amir continued to press his claims,<sup>3</sup> and had acquired control over certain sections, the "Kabul faction". Lansdowne ceased payment of allowances to this group,<sup>4</sup> and warned the Amir in the clearest terms that the British Government

"will not tolerate any further advance on the part of your officers and troops, or permit Your Highness to establish any new posts, or to increase any garrisons which you may now have, in Waziristan or the country to the south of it." 5

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.41. Amir to Viceroy. 5 June, 1892.

4. Ibid. Enc. No.45. India to Panjab. 22 June, 1892.

5. Ibid. Enc. No.48. Viceroy to Amir. 6 July, 1892.

But intrigues continued<sup>1</sup> and in August an ultimatum was issued demanding that all Afghan troops should be withdrawn from Waziristan before 1 October on pain of expulsion.<sup>2</sup> Preparations were made for the use of force, but the Afghan troops were withdrawn before the deadline.<sup>3</sup>

Lansdowne had adopted an uncompromising attitude towards the Amir because he did not see how the alternative would work. To give the Amir concurrent rights in Waziristan presented many obvious difficulties, and any way, Lansdowne was not merely concerned with lines of communication, but also with securing the active friendship of all Waziri tribes. "Our duty is", he declared, "to maintain the independence of Waziristan, and our own right to unrestricted intercourse with the Waziris".<sup>4</sup> But the exclusion of the Amir from Waziristan meant protecting the tribes from any Afghan attack, and the corollary, punishing the tribes if they raided into Afghanistan. This involved the exercise of a firm control, but Lansdowne argued that this liability could no longer be avoided, and that it did not have to be an onerous task, for which he called Baluchistan to witness.<sup>5</sup>

Lord Kimberley had succeeded Cross as Secretary of State in August, 1892, and he was far more concerned about Afghan sensibilities than was Lansdowne. He accepted the strategic idea of the "scientific frontier" and the consequent need to

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1. PSLI. No.175. (LP.1B.6) 13 September, 1892. Encs.1-62
  2. Ibid. Enc. No. 63. Viceroy to Amir, 29 August, 1892
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.69. Maitland to Adjutant General. 2 September, 1892.
  4. LP.XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on Relations with the Amir. 11 July, 1892.
  5. Ibid.

control the passes, but he also accepted the Amir's argument that the "scientific frontier" could not be held without the friendship of Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> He accepted the occupation of the Gomal Valley "as an accomplished fact for which there may have been imperative reasons", but he pronounced against occupation of the Tochi Valley which was not immediately necessary and which would give the Amir gratuitous offence.<sup>2</sup> Similarly he argued against the tendency "to convert 'influence' into direct control", but he admitted that "the amount of influence which it is politic to maintain is, ...one of degree and opportunity, on which no fixed rule can be laid down".<sup>3</sup> He put the case clearly:

"It is a difficult matter to steer so as to secure a good frontier and at the same time avoid alienating the Afghan ruler. Such difference, as there is between us, resolves itself into this, that I attach much more importance, than you do, to the latter consideration".<sup>4</sup>

Sir A. Lyall expressed similar views, for though he professed to be "quite in favour of gradually extending and consolidating our influence over all the tribes of the independent belt", and quite opposed to allowing "the Amir to extend his influence over them", he advised a cautious approach, since

"trans-frontier measures which, however important and generally desirable, are not at present urgently necessary, while their purpose may be defeated by any false step or inopportune advance".<sup>5</sup>

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1. LP. IX. Vol.4. No.44. Kimberley to Lansdowne. 4 October, 1892.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid. No.59. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 15 December, 1892
  5. PSM. A 80A. "Improvement of Relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier", Note by Sir. A.C.Lyall. 27 November, 1890.



In any case, the attitude of the Amir and the exigencies of negotiations between him and the Government of India<sup>1</sup> had hampered the application of Lansdowne's policy to Waziristan. The Gomal Pass had been opened but it certainly had not been made secure, while no progress at all had been made towards securing the Tochi Pass or any of the lateral communication routes. Bruce's efforts to improve tribal relations, hindered by the presence of Afghan troops and Afghan agents, and by the prohibition of force to support jirga decisions, had been unsuccessful. Perhaps the only concrete achievement had been the prevention of the Amir's domination of Waziristan.

Meanwhile Lansdowne's policy had resulted in activity on other sections of the border including the northern regions of Chitral and Gilgit. Chitral, a state of about 9,000 square miles in area, stretching southward from the peaks of the Hindu Kush for a distance of two hundred miles, is divided longitudinally into deep narrow valleys supporting some agriculture and a small population, and was considered strategically important because its valleys led to several passes over the mountain ranges and into Central Asia.<sup>2</sup> The Chitral-Kunar River flows through the main valley of Chitral and on to join the Kabul at Jalalabad. It was therefore conceivable that a force established in Chitral could move

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1. These negotiations are discussed in Chapter 3, below.
  2. Particularly, the Baroghil and the Dorah. PSLI. Vol.73. No.69. 25 February, 1894. Report by Captain Younghusband on the Passes of the Hindu Kush. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Barr to India, 22 February, 1894. Also PSM.A95. "The Northern Frontier of India. Roads and Passes. Measures for the Defence of the Frontier", by F.E.Younghusband. February, 1895.

down this route and outflank one of the principal lines of advance to the "scientific frontier".<sup>1</sup> Gilgit lies to the east of Chitral and is part of an inhospitable mountainous area lying between the northern borders of Kashmir and the Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Mustagh ranges. The whole area may be divided politically into Gilgit, Mastuj, Yasin, Hunza, and Nagar. Strategically the area commands the entrance to several difficult passes over the mountain barrier.<sup>2</sup>

This region first became a factor in British policy in 1878, when, under the auspices of Lord Lytton, a treaty was negotiated between the Mehtar of Chitral and the Maharaja of Kashmir, whereby the former acknowledged the suzerainty of the latter and received a subsidy in compensation, while the British as their part of the bargain, were permitted to establish a political agency in Gilgit.<sup>3</sup> The agency was withdrawn in 1881 after a Liberal victory in England in 1880 had resulted in Lord Ripon's being sent to India as Viceroy.<sup>4</sup>

In 1889 Lansdowne declared that there was good reason for reverting, with some modifications, to Lytton's scheme.

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1. W.O.32/264. Memorandum by Brackenbury and Newmarch. 19 August, 1889.
  2. PSLI. Vol.73. No.69. 25 February, 1894. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Report by Captain Younghusband on the Passes of the Hindu Kush. February, 1894. PSM. A95. "The Northern Frontier of India; Roads and Passes. Measures for the defence of the Frontier", by F.E.Younghusband, February, 1895.
  3. PSM.A.18. Memorandum on Chitral, including the Frontier States of Gilgit and Yasin.A.N.Wallaston, 8 October, 1878 Ibid. Part II. A.N.Wallaston, 16 November, 1881. Appendix to A.18. Memorandum on the present condition of Affairs in Gilgit by Major Biddulph, March, 1881. PSDI. Vol.21. No.30. 16 August, 1895. This despatch recapitulates the history of The British connection with Chitral and Gilgit.
  4. Ibid.

"The advance of Russia up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the great development of her military resources in Asia, have ...increased the necessity for strengthening every point in our line of defence and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush, which afford a difficult but not impracticable route for a force large enough to cause much excitement, if nothing worse, in Kashmir and among the tribes of Bajaur, and perhaps at Jalalabad and on the Panjab frontier." <sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne felt it impossible to disregard the risks and allow a foreign power to establish its influence in the area, especially as there were indications "that not only the Russians but also the Afghans and Chinese have of late attempted to tamper with some of the small chiefships in this quarter."<sup>2</sup> The proposals made by Lockhart as a result of his mission to the area in 1885 had been extravagant,<sup>3</sup> but Lansdowne felt that the plans put forward by Durand, who had visited the region in 1888, were quite reasonable.<sup>4</sup> They included the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency and the opening of a direct road from Peshawar to Chitral "via" Dir. The scheme would ensure, Lansdowne said, that

"we shall have the upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference from China and Russia and Afghanistan, and we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall be protected from any 'coup de main' from the northwards, and we may eventually succeed in establishing our influence in Kafiristan also. We shall have thereby provided for a really important part of our scheme of frontier defence and at small cost to ourselves. We shall not have secured ourselves against a serious advance by the Dorah Pass. Such an advance cannot in all probability be repelled except by a British force moving

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1. PSLI. No.58. (LP.1B.1) 6 May, 1889

2. Ibid.

3. Lockhart, W.S.A. and Woodthorpe, R.G. Confidential Report on the Gilgit Mission 1885-6. London. 1889.

4. PSLI. No.58. 6 May, 1889. Enc. "Report on the Present Military Position in Gilgit," by Captain A.Durand, 5 December, 1888.

from Jalalabad up the Kunar Valley, or from Peshawar "via" Dir. But everything will have been prepared for such a movement and Kashmir at least will be safe from attack." 1

Lord Cross recognized that movements of other powers had "admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening every point in the line of defence of the North-West Frontier of India, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush." 2

He therefore accepted Lansdowne's plan for the Gilgit Agency, declaring the concept to be "sound and well-founded", and the idea of a road to Chitral from Peshawar "an important feature in connection with the scheme". 3

As soon as sanction was received Durand was ordered to go to Gilgit at once and to prepare for visits to Hunza and Nagar to counteract Russian and Chinese attempts to establish influence there by the offer of increased subsidies in return for co-operation with the British. Then he was to visit Chitral and set on foot new arrangements there. He was authorized to offer the Mehtar an increased subsidy of Rs. 6,000 per year and a gift of rifles. 4 Durand accomplished all this satisfactorily and in order that the Mehtar might use his gift properly he left four muslim non-commissioned officers in Chitral to instruct the Mehtar's irregular forces. 5 Cross approved these arrangements without comment. 6

But relations with Hunza and Nagar did not long run

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1. PSLI. No.58. (LP.1B.1) 6 May, 1889
  2. PSDI. No.22.(Secret) (LP.1B.9) 28 June, 1889
  3. Ibid.
  4. PSLI. No.165. (LP.1B.1) 3 December, 1889. Enc. No.6.  
Durand to Nisbet. 5 August, 1889
  5. PSLI. No.170.(LP.1B.4) 14 October, 1891.
  6. PSDI. No.40. (Secret) (LP.1B.9) 13 November, 1891.

smoothly. On 25 May, 1891, Durand learnt that Uzr Khan, son of the Raja of Nagar, intended seizing the Kashmiri posts of Chalt and Chaprot.<sup>1</sup> On 27 May, having heard that a Nagar official was on his way to occupy the posts, Durand made a rapid march with a small Kashmiri force and reached Chalt on 29 May. Uzr's force was dispersed.<sup>2</sup> During the next few days letters were received from Hunza announcing that it was subject to China and if attacked would fight until Chinese help arrived.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, on 15 June, agents from both rajas were received by Durand, who was informed that Hunza had thrown off Chinese suzerainty in favour of the British Government, and had given up all intention of taking Chalt and Chaprot.<sup>4</sup> Durand did not trust these assurances, left Kashmiri garrisons at both posts, and sent to India for more British officers. Three lieutenants arrived in Gilgit in July. A new aspect was given to the case by the arrival on the Pamirs of parties of Russians whose avowed object was to annex the Great, Little, and Alichur Pamirs,<sup>5</sup> and by the discovery that the Raja of Hunza, who had refused to allow British correspondence to pass through his state, had been in communication with both Russia and China. Lansdowne wrote,

"The Government of India therefore apprehended that, unless he is brought completely under control, he may introduce a Russian force into Hunza, within a few marches of Gilgit."<sup>6</sup>

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1. PSLI. No.1C. (LP.1B.4) 25 October, 1891.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. For Russian proceedings on the Pamirs see PSLI.No.158. (LP.1B.4) 8 September, 1891. and enclosures thereto. also PSLI.No.184.14 October, 1891 and enclosures thereto. also PSLI. No.212.16 December, 1891, and enclosures thereto.

6. PSLI. 1C.(LP.1B.4) 25 October, 1891.

Durand now put forward proposals which included a fort at Chalt and a road from there to Gilgit; the exercise of complete control over Hunza and Nagar, including the construction of roads and the utilization of force to subdue them at the least sign of opposition; the deposition of the Raja of Hunza, and his replacement by his son, a child of five, under the tutelage of the late Raja's wazir who was a refugee in Chitral; British officers to winter in Chitral in case of a Russian attack; additional guns and reinforcements of two hundred Gurkhas for Gilgit; a telegraph line from Gilgit to Srinigar; and, an increase of the Agency staff.<sup>1</sup> Lansdowne approved these proposals<sup>2</sup> and Cross who had declared "I have not the smallest intention of allowing Hunza to show any signs of disloyalty [sic] "<sup>3</sup> and again, "I mistrust the Russians everywhere, and we cannot for a moment allow Hunza to be disturbed"<sup>4</sup> agreed wholeheartedly. Cross had the support of Lord Salisbury, who had said, with reference to these northern regions, "I should go and occupy such parts of the country as is clearly 'no man's land' before anyone else gets there".<sup>5</sup>

At the beginning of December Durand set out to construct the fort at Chalt, on the right bank of the Hunza River and commanding the road between Gilgit and Hunza, and to improve the road. The tribes gathered to resist his advance. On

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.6. Memorandum by Durand. 4 September, 1891
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.7. Resident Kashmiri to Durand. 15 September, 1891.
  3. LP.IX. Vol. No.31. Cross to Lansdowne. 24 July, 1891.
  4. LP.IX. Vol.3. No.40. Cross to Lansdowne. 24 September, 1891
  5. Ibid. No.46. Cross to Lansdowne. 5 November, 1891.

2 December he captured the "seemingly impregnable" fort at Nilt, and on 20 December took another "position of strength". There was no further opposition. Nagar was taken on 21 December, and Hunza on the 22nd. The states submitted unconditionally but UZR Khan and the Raja of Hunza fled to the mountains.<sup>1</sup>

In October 1892 another incident extended the influence of the Gilgit Agency. Headmen of the small state of Gor came to Gilgit and asked that a British officer should visit them, and since it was considered to be "important to establish good relations with Gor", which flanked the Gilgit-Chitral road, Surgeon-Major Robertson set out on 11 November with a small escort. He had arranged that a party of Gor elders should go in advance of him and inform the neighbouring Chilasis that the visit was friendly. The Goris did not do this and the Chilasis decided to attack the party. Robertson's position was dangerous, but retreat was impossible so he pushed on and took a small Chilasi village. On 30 November, having been reinforced he took Chilas after heavy fighting. A garrison was left there and a mule road was constructed from Gilgit. Durand thought it necessary to maintain the position, partly for the security of Gilgit, and partly because withdrawal might precipitate tribal trouble.<sup>2</sup> Lansdowne's justification of the absorption of Chilas is instructive. He declared, "The attempt to enter into amicable relations with the people of Gor has had the effect of leaving us in possession of the important post

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1. PSLI. No.4. (LP.1B.5) 6 January, 1892. and enclosures thereto

2. PSLI. No.142. (LP.1B.8) 11 July, 1893, and enclosures thereto

of Chilas".<sup>1</sup> The real importance of the position was that it was the terminus of a route through Hazara, from Abbottabad "via" the Khagan Valley, that would provide a much shorter supply road for Gilgit than that in use through Kashmir.<sup>2</sup>

Kimberley approved the idea of a road. He wrote,

"we think here that your intention to open up the Khagan Valley is a good move. A better communication with Chilas and Gilgit is obviously a desideratum, now that we have committed ourselves to interference with these out of the way places".<sup>3</sup>

It was in October, 1892, as well that Aman-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, died.<sup>4</sup> One of his sons, Afzal, who happened to be on the spot, succeeded to the throne, and proceeded to dispose of as many potential rivals as he could lay hands on. One brother, Nizam, fled to Gilgit, another, Amir, to Bajaur. Lansdowne's Government recognized Afzal as "de facto" Mehtar and declared their policy to be, as far as was possible,

"to avoid entangling ourselves in disputes which may arise between Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, or in any tribal quarrels occasioned by them. The main object should be to provide adequately for the safety of the Gilgit Agency, and to adopt such measures as may be indispensable for that purpose."<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, they regarded Afzal's succession as "very satisfactory", perhaps because he had invited a British officer to Chitral.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. LP.IX. Vol.5. No.25. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 April, 1893.

3. Ibid. No.23. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 5 May, 1893.

4. PSLI. No.193. (LP.1B.6) 19 October, 1892. Enc. India to Resident in Kashmir, 27 September, 1892

5. Ibid.



For a few weeks things seemed to be settling down and a mission to Chitral, in accordance with Afzal's request, was being considered. The only source of anxiety was Umra Khan, the chief of Jandol, who had taken advantage of the confusion following the death of Aman-ul-Mulk to seize Narsat, a territory at the south end of the Chitral Valley. The case of Umra Khan was an intricate one.<sup>1</sup> From the time of the annexation of the Panjab, the fixed policy of the Government of India had been to exclude Afghan interference from Bajaur and Swat, territories lying immediately north of the exposed districts of Peshawar. But Abdur Rahman tried hard to exert his influence in this area.<sup>2</sup> He began by breaking down the quasi-independence of the small chiefships of Kunar and having incorporated them into Afghanistan began work on Bajaur. He was warned by Ripon in 1883, though without effect. Then for a period of four years he was fully occupied with internal revolts, but in 1888 he summoned the Swat and Bajaur Khans to meet him in Jalalabad, and from that time the Sipah Salar, i.e. Commander-in-Chief, had been kept in the Bajaur area. By working on the dissensions of the chiefs of the area, and attaching himself to the weaker factions, he had succeeded in building a considerable influence. However, Umra Khan had meanwhile become the strong man of Bajaur, and refused all

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1. PSLI. Vol.83. No.214. 30 October, 1895. Enc. "Political History of the Chitral Relief Force", by Major H.A.Deane. This gives a complete history of Umra Khan's rise to power, and his subsequent fall.
  2. PSLI. No.155. (LP.1B.6) 16 August, 1892. This despatch gives a historical summary of the Amir's activities in Bajaur.

Afghan overtures. To the Government of India he was the symbol of Bajauri independence, and it was conceived that he might be used as a foil to the Amir's pretensions.

In 1889 it was proposed that Durand should visit Umra Khan and discuss the terms on which he would allow the Chitral-Peshawar road to be built. The scheme was abandoned, however, because Durand had not been advised of the terms he could offer and Umra Khan refused a meeting unless he could be given definite pledges.<sup>1</sup> But after long negotiation a tentative agreement was reached whereby Umra agreed to a postal road through his territory to Chitral. The draft agreement proposed, in exchange for this concession, to support Umra Khan against "external aggressors", to give him a gift of two hundred rifles, and to grant him permission to purchase arms and ammunition in India, subject to the proviso that the Government of India would decide when support and the purchase of arms were necessary.<sup>2</sup> Umra would not accept the proviso, and refused to sign the agreement.<sup>3</sup>

The situation was further complicated in 1891 when the Khan of Asmar, a small state on the left bank of the Kunar River and regarded by some people as part of Bajaur,<sup>4</sup> died, leaving a daughter betrothed to Habibulla Khan, son of the Amir. The Sipah Salar, on pretext of escorting the lady to

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1. PSLI. No.43. (LP.1B.2) 24 April, 1890. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, by A.Durand, 29 December, 1889.
  2. PSLI. No.90. (LP.1B.5) 24 May, 1892. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 24 December, 1891.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Gazetters said it was part of Bajaur, but Panjab frontier officers said it was not. PSLI. No.90. (LP.1B.5) 24 May, 1892 Enc. No.14. Panjab to India. 3 April, 1892.

Kabul, occupied Asmar.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon, Umra Khan sent an agent to Peshawar to get ammunition.<sup>2</sup> He brought with him a signed copy of the agreement which had been proposed by the Government of India but upon examination, it was noted that the proviso "as Government may deem fit according to the circumstances of the time" had been omitted.<sup>3</sup> Lansdowne, alarmed at the Amir's activities in Bajaur, decided to let Umra have the ammunition he wanted, and instructed the Commissioner of Peshawar to advise the Sipah Salar and the Amir that they would be held responsible if the peace of Bajaur were broken.<sup>4</sup> The Sipah Salar had meanwhile announced his intention of turning Umra Khan out of Bajaur and of dividing the country between Muhammad Sharif, ex-Khan of Dir, and Safdar Khan of Nawagai.<sup>5</sup> Lansdowne interfered on Umra's behalf and warned both the Amir<sup>6</sup> and the Mehtar of Chitral<sup>7</sup> that he would not tolerate acts of war in Bajaur, but on the other hand Umra was informed that British support was conditional on his refraining from aggression. In reply to his complaint that he had not received the gift of rifles, nor indeed anything else, in return for the agreement he had signed, he was told that this matter was still under consideration, but the delay was the result of his

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1. PSLI. No.90. (LP.1B.5) 24 May, 1892. Enc. No.13. Panjab to India, 29 March, 1892.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.16. Udney to India. 26 April, 1892.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.17. India to Udney, 27 April, 1892. Enc. to Enc. No.20. Udney to Amir, 28 April, 1892. Udney to Ghulam Haidar Khan. 27 April, 1892.
  5. Ibid. Enc.toEnc.21. Ghulam Haidar Khan to Muhammad Aslam Khan and other chiefs and maliks of Swat, 16 January, 1892. Safdar Khan to Muhammad Sharif Khan, 13 January, 1892.
  6. PSLI.No.149.(LP.1B.6) 9 August, 1892. Enc.No.2. Viceroy to Amir 28 June, 1892.
  7. Ibid. Enc. No.3. India to Aman-ul-Mulk, 29 June 1892.

having altered the agreement to suit his own purposes.<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne's first reaction to the occupation of Asmar had been to order the Amir to leave it at once, but because of the prospect of negotiations, and because his "Council was a good deal divided upon the point",<sup>2</sup> he contented himself with a warning that evacuation would be required if further clashes occurred attributable to Afghan aggression.<sup>3</sup> He dismissed the Afghan claim to Asmar,<sup>4</sup> and maintained that his action had no connection with his relations with Umra Khan since Government was bound to maintain Bajauri independence even if Umra Khan had never established his supremacy. The agreement with Umra, which would bind the Government of India if its terms were accepted, would impose no new obligations, for "we could not have resisted the Amir without taking sides with the Bajauris". To those who argued that the agreement should not be made for fear of giving umbrage to the Amir he replied that their objections arose from a "mistaken and not very dignified estimate of our position upon the frontiers of India".<sup>5</sup>

Thus matters stood when, in mid-November, 1892, Sher Afzal, brother of Aman-ul-Mulk, who had been a refugee in Badakhshan, descended on Chitral "via" the Dorah Pass, killed

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Panjab to India. 4 July, 1892. Forwarding a copy of a letter Panjab to Umra Khan, undated.
  2. LP. IX.Vol.4. No.30. Lansdowne to Cross. 28 June, 1892.
  3. PSLI. No.155.(LP.1B.6) 16 August, 1892. Enc.Viceroy to Amir 23 July, 1892.
  4. LP.XIII.Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on Relations with the Amir. 11 July, 1892.
  5. Ibid.

Afzal-ul-Mulk, and declared himself Mehtar.<sup>1</sup> Nizam-ul-Mulk immediately informed Durand that he was moving against Sher Afzal, and that if he became Mehtar he would agree to the stationing of British officers in Chitral and to the construction of a telegraph line to Gilgit, and that he would obey the orders of the British.<sup>2</sup>

In conjunction with Nizam's move, Durand sent 250 Kashmiri rifles, two guns, and one hundred levies to Gupis, opposite the mouth of the Yasin Valley, beyond the Gilgit district, to strengthen his position in case it became necessary to treat with Sher Afzal.<sup>3</sup> By acting thus, without the sanction of Government, Durand believed he had averted a serious crisis, and Lansdowne thought he was completely justified in so thinking.<sup>4</sup> He may have been right, for whether it was intended or not, his action could not but have been interpreted as British support for Nizam-ul-Mulk. In any case, Sher Afzal's force went over to Nizam, and the former fled to the Sipah Salar in Asmar.<sup>5</sup>

Durand, pleased with the turn events had taken, wrote, "Considering the necessity of putting an end to the anarchy in Chitral at a time when the Russians seem preparing yet another move, considering also that the people are, I believe, in favour of Nizam-ul-Mulk, that, by countenancing him in so far as permitting him to return to his country goes, and it must be remembered that he was our guest and was free to go where he chose as he was repeatedly told, we may have a popular and

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1. PSLI. No.233.(LP.1B.6) 28 December, 1892. Enc. 9 &10. Commissioner Peshawar to India. 14 November, 1892 & 16 November, 1892
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.13. Resident Kashmir to India. 19 November, 1892
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.18. Resident Kashmir to India. 23 November, 1892
  4. Ibid. Enc.No.63. India to Resident Kashmir, 17 December, 1892
  5. Ibid. Enc. No.58. Resident Kashmir to India. 16 December, 1892

subservient ruler of the whole of Chitral, who is moreover the rightful heir to the throne, and shall probably obtain a far firmer hold on the country than we ever had before." 1

Lansdowne was pleased because Durand's action had saved him the necessity of deciding, among "the competing ruffians", which to support.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Robertson was immediately sent to Chitral and arrived there on 25 January, 1893. Nizam was profuse in his expressions of loyalty, but two months after his arrival Robertson reported that he was sitting on a volcano. Nizam was unpopular, the people expected Sher Afzal's return, and Umra Khan was threatening the southern borders of the country, nominally on behalf of Amir-ul-Mulk.<sup>3</sup> On 26 May Robertson left Chitral but he left behind him Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gurdon with the whole of his escort. Lansdowne approved this action and wrote,

"recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has been hitherto adopted...and we consider that...it is indispensable that a British officer should for some time to come remain in the state." 4

Robertson now worked out a set of proposals for the future management of the northern area to which Durand agreed. They included: the stationing of a British officer in Chitral and the occupation of Yasin; the strengthening of the Gilgit garrison; the recognition of "de facto" mehtars but no guarantee of succession; the formal installation of Nizam-ul-

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1. PSLI. No.3. (LP.1B.7) 4 January, 1893. Enc. to Enc. No.6. Durand to Barr, 25 November, 1892.
  2. LP.IX. Vol.4. No.57. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 28 November, 1893.
  3. PSLI. No.142.(LP.1B.8) 11 July, 1893. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Robertson to Barr, 18 March, 1893. Report on Chitral.
  4. PSLI. No.142. (LP.1B.8) 11 July, 1893.

Mulk; the construction of a road and telegraph line from Gilgit to Chitral; and, the public assumption by the Government of India of the protection of Chitral and Yasin.<sup>1</sup> Lansdowne agreed to all these proposals except those calling for the formal installation of Nizam and a guarantee of his protection. He thought it essential that Chitral should remain under the suzerainty of Kashmir, subject only to British influence.<sup>2</sup>

General Brackenbury disagreed with the proposal to keep a British officer in Chitral. He thought that Russia should be stopped in the Pamirs by agreement, and Chitral given to the Amir so that Afghanistan would become a buffer against Russia in the north as well as in the north-west. He based his argument on the assumption that an Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873 would be honoured and the Amir would be required to evacuate his trans-Oxus provinces. Under these circumstances he could not reasonably be expected to hold the narrow Wakhan buffer strip, but with Chitral thrown into the bargain it would be a reasonable proposition.<sup>3</sup> Sir David Barbour and Sir Charles Pritchard also dissented from the proposals. They argued that the increase of responsibility was unwarranted, and that the policy would only serve to bring about a tribal coalition against Government. They suggested instead a policy of cordial understanding with the Amir, so that in case of necessity the road to Chitral "via" Jalalabad

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1. PSLI. No.188.(LP.1B.8) 29 August, 1893. Enc.to Enc.No.1. Robertson to Barr.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Barr. 31 July, 1893.
  3. Ibid. Enc. Remarks by General Brackenbury. also LP.XIII Note on Chitral Affairs. 6 May, 1893.

and the Kunar Valley could be used instead of the Peshawar-Dir road.<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne rejected all these arguments. He said that Chitral was under the suzerainty of Kashmir and could not be given away by the Government of India, that his policy had not as yet been fairly tested, and that eventually, if he kept on recognizing "de facto" mehtars, a strong man was bound to arise in Chitral through the process of "survival of the fittest".<sup>2</sup> But underlying Lansdowne's objections was the fact that he distrusted the Amir very nearly as much as he did the Russians. He maintained that the Amir had never really been friendly to the British and at no time could they rely safely on his good will.<sup>3</sup> Thus Lansdowne would resort to any expedient to keep the Amir out of Waziristan and Chitral. He declared "If I object to the Amir's encroachments in the Kunar Valley, it is mainly because they are leading him towards Chitral. It would never do to have him there. He would spoil our game for us completely".<sup>4</sup>

Concerning Kimberley's fears of provoking the enmity of Afghanistan, Lansdowne replied that offending the Amir was not analagous with offending the Afghan people. He felt that the Amir was hated in Afghanistan and that it was far more important

"to add permanently to our political and strategical strength upon the frontier than to propitiate a ruler whose tenure of

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1. PSLI. No.188. (LP.1B.8.) 29 August, 1893. Enc. Minute of Dissent by Sir David Barbour and Sir Charles Pritchard. 8 July, 1893.
  2. LP. XIII. Note by Lord Lansdowne on Chitral Affairs, 6 May, 1893.
  3. LP.IX. Vol.4. No.4. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 23 August, 1892
  4. Ibid. No.51. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 26 October, 1892.



power is as precarious as that of His Highness. I believe it is possible for us to strengthen ourselves permanently and substantially upon the frontier if we deal prudently with the tribes. I do not believe that anything we could have done, or can do, in order to ingratiate ourselves with the Amir, would have the effect of converting him into a really trustworthy ally." 1

Sir Stewart Bayley, speaking for the Political and Secret Committee of the Council of India, expressed sympathy for the views of the dissentients, but did not think that they had a good case, and Kimberley, who a few months before had written:

"though I regret the necessity of advancing to so great a distance from our frontier in order to counteract Russian intrigues, I am reluctantly obliged to admit that we cannot safely leave such points as Chitral, Hunza, and Nagar, and the Indus Valley tribes open to them", 3

gave his consent hoping that the arrangement would be temporary.

"Apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march from the Chitral frontier, renders it a matter of importance for us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.....If the Amir could be brought to abandon all idea of bringing Chitral under his control, the danger of a chief under Afghan influence such as Sher Afzal, obtaining power over Chitral would be much lessened. Again should the present negotiations with Russia <sup>4</sup> be brought to a successful issue, and a line of boundary be agreed on and delimited, even though in close propinquity to the Chitral boundary, and her danger which you now apprehend would be materially reduced. Thirdly, if the

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1. Ibid. No.56. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 23 November, 1892. The question of Lansdowne's relations with the Amir are more fully discussed in Chapter 3 below.
  2. PSM. A.88. Note on Reorganization of the Gilgit Agency, by Sir S.C.Bayley, 17 November, 1892.
  3. LP.IX.Vol.4. No.54. Kimberley to Lansdowne. 24 November.1892
  4. Negotiations relative to a boundary in the Pamirs. see Alder G.J. British Policy on the 'Roof of the World' 1865-95 with Special Reference to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1895. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of Bristol. 1959.

political operations of your frontier officers succeed in dispelling the suspicions and irritations of the frontier tribes, that element of danger will be in a fair way to disappear.....I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in the state as a temporary measure." 1

Kimberley had found the problem a perplexing one. He agreed that Lansdowne's proposals were best if permanent occupation were intended, but he could not be sure of what was necessary until the results of Durand's Mission to Kabul and the Pamir Boundary Commission were known. In the meantime, he shrank "from adding to our innumerable obligations until it is proved that there is absolutely no tolerable alternative<sup>2</sup>". But even if circumstances made it possible to withdraw the mission from Chitral, he conceded that it would be "necessary in some way to make it clear that we intend Chitral to remain a portion of the Gilgit Agency, i.e., under British influence"<sup>3</sup>. Lansdowne thought it might be possible eventually to substitute a native for a European agent at Chitral, but that could only be done when things had become quiet.<sup>4</sup>

Only the activities of Umra Khan disturbed, in the Chitral area, the last months of Lansdowne's Viceroyalty. Reports were rife of these activities in Narsat and of plans for the invasion of Kafiristan.<sup>5</sup> In Chitral Younghusband was, with difficulty, restraining the Mehtar from launching an attack on Umra, and felt that his hold was growing weaker daily.<sup>6</sup>

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1. PSDI. No.34. (Secret) 1 September, 1893.
  2. LP. IX.Vol.5. No.49. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 18 August, 1893.
  3. Ibid. No.30. Kimberley to Lansdowne. 2 June, 1893.
  4. Ibid. No.39. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 27 June, 1893.
  5. PSLI.Vol.74. No.110. 26 June, 1894. Enc.No.1. Resident in Kashmir to India, 26 November, 1893 and enclosures thereto.
  6. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.8. Younghusband to Durand, 18 November 1893.

Ammunition which the Jandoli Chief had ordered in Peshawar in July had not been delivered by December,<sup>1</sup> and he was angry.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps he had also guessed that the Durand Agreement of 12 November meant that Lansdowne no longer had need of his services.

Concurrent with these activities in Waziristan and Chitral had been operations designed to secure the safety of the Kurram Valley, through which led a route to Kabul. The Treaty of Gandamak, 1879,<sup>3</sup> defined the Kurram Valley as an "assigned district"<sup>4</sup> to be administered by the Government of India, and in 1880 Abdur Rahman was informed that the part of Kurram inhabited by the Turis was to be completely independent of his control.<sup>5</sup> In that year also, the Government of India tried to set up tribal self Government in the valley, but the experiment failed because of factional strife. British officers sent to settle affairs failed without the means to enforce their decisions. In 1888 an Anglo-Afghan joint commission visited the valley, but their efforts were also unsuccessful. Still the Turis remained under nominal British protection.<sup>6</sup>

When Lansdowne came to India the Kurram was a greatly disturbed area. The Amir complained of Turi raids on his

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.5. Udney to Panjab. 25 November, 1893.
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.5. Umra Khan to Udney, 2 November, 1893
  3. Aitchison, op.cit., vol. XI. 346.
  4. The surplus of revenue over expenditure had to be handed back to the Amir.
  5. F.O.65, 1062. Proclamation to Maliks of Kurram, 26 December, 1878. Quoted Davies, op.cit. p.159.
  6. PSLI. No. 114F. 28 May, 1894. Enc. "Note on Kurram" by W.R.H. Merk, officer on Special duty in Kurram, 8 February, 1894. This note summarizes the history of Kurram up to 1894 and discusses at length the social and political structure of the various tribes in the Valley.

subjects,<sup>1</sup> the Government of India countered with charges against the Afghans.<sup>2</sup> Frontier officers charged that the policy of the Amir was that "of continually harrassing and wearing the Turis down so that they might be driven in despair to petition for restoration to Kabul".<sup>3</sup> In 1891 the Turis petitioned to be taken under the administration of the British Government,<sup>4</sup> and meanwhile the Amir was pressing for Government action to control the tribe.<sup>5</sup> Lansdowne consulted Lyall<sup>6</sup> who made no concrete proposals, though he did point out the difficulties of the Amir who could not make reprisals against the Turis for fear of offending the Government of India.<sup>7</sup> Udney, and Leigh, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, both agreed that the only solution was annexation and administration of the Valley.<sup>8</sup> Then came reports that the Amir was arming the tribes who were preparing for an attack on the Turis.<sup>9</sup> Lansdowne declared that he could not permit this, and suggested the appointment of a British officer to settle the various claims, and promised that he would enforce any awards against

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1. PSLI. No.179. (LP.1B.4) 14 October, 1891. Enc. No.1. Amir to Viceroy, 2 August, 1889.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Barnes to General Amir Ahmad Khan, Amir's Agent with the Government of India. 24 September, 1889
  3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.4. Ommanney to Panjab, 19 October, 1889.
  4. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.8. Translation of petition from Turi Maliks to Commissioner of Peshawar, 19 April, 1891.
  5. Ibid. Enc. No.10. Amir to Viceroy. 6 June, 1891.
  6. Ibid. Enc. No.11. India to Panjab. 1 July, 1891.
  7. Ibid. Enc. No.12. Panjab to India. 18 August, 1891.
  8. Ibid. Encs. to Enc. No.12. Udney to Panjab, 3 August, 1891. Leigh to Udney, 20 July, 1891.
  9. Ibid. Enc. No.16. Panjab to India, 17 September, 1891. Enc. to Enc. No.16. Leigh to Panjab. 14 September, 1891.

the Turis if the Amir would do likewise for his subjects.<sup>1</sup> The Amir refused the proposal since, he said, it would be impossible to find a completely disinterested officer. Meanwhile there had been a general combination of Sunni tribes in the valley against the Shiah Turis, who had been practically driven from Lower Kurram. Darwesh Khels poured into the valley to help with the looting.<sup>2</sup> The Amir admitted that he had given his subjects permission to attack the Turis,<sup>3</sup> at which Lansdowne warned that unless Afghan subjects evacuated the valley, he would sanction military action to protect the Turis.<sup>4</sup> The Amir replied that he had given his permission because he was no longer able to restrain the tribes, and suggested as the only possible solution that the Government of India should send troops into the valley.<sup>5</sup> Lansdowne accepted this proposal and made plans for a force to enter the Kurram in the Autumn of 1892.<sup>6</sup>

✓ The force entered the valley in early October with W.H.Merk as political officer. Before the end of the month he had held satisfactory interviews with Turi, Bangash, and Zaimusht jirgas and has restored the "status quo ante" with regard to land ownership.<sup>7</sup> He had also made arrangements with

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1. PSLI. No.179. (LP. 1B.4) 14 October, 1891.
  2. PSLI. No.22.(LP.1B.5) 3 February, 1891. Enc. No.2. Udney to Panjab and enclosures thereto.
  3. PSLI. No.58. (LP.1B.5) 27 April, 1892. Enc. No.1. Amir to Viceroy, 25 February, 1892.
  4. PSLI. No.84. (LP.1B.5) 18 May, 1892. Enc. No.17. Viceroy to Amir, 28 April 1892.
  5. PSLI. No.153. (LP.1B.6) 16 August, 1892. Enc.No.1. Amir to Viceroy, 20 May, 1892.
  6. Ibid. Enc. No.5. Viceroy to Amir. 23 July, 1892.
  7. PSLI. No.43. (LP.1B.7) 22 February, 1893. Enc.to Enc. No.1. Merk to Panjab. 17 November, 1892.

the Zaimushts for a road through their territory from Kohat to Kurram. The Panjab Government accepted his plan but censured him for having acted without consulting them,<sup>1</sup> and the Government of India also approved, taking note of the censure.<sup>2</sup>

Merk then set about the establishment of an administration in the valley. The head of the administration was the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, who was appointed to govern the country

"according to local law as controlled by his will, not by way of representing a ruler who is minor or a government which is in commission...but simply in his capacity as the officer of a government to which the people have made over their country and which, without formal annexation, Government has decided to hold and govern".<sup>3</sup>

The Turis agreed to pay revenue but a complicated land settlement was not introduced, and neither were courts, codes, or police. Tribal law was administered in daily durbar and no written petitions were heard. Arrangements were made to settle cases which had arisen after the British officer had left the valley in 1886. A militia corps was formed and this corps did police duty but regular troops were retained in the valley pending the proper training of the militia and the construction of a fort at Para Chinar.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, advances had been made in the Miranzai Valley, leading from Kurram to Kohat. The old boundary of the

- 
1. Ibid. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 4 January, 1893.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.4. India to Panjab,
  3. Merk. "Notes on Kurram", op.cit.
  4. PSLI. No.98. (LP.1B.7) 17 May, 1893. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Merk to Udney, 29 November, 1892. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab. 20 March, 1893.

valley had been the watershed of the Samana Range which formed its north side, but when the surveyors marked the line on their maps, they had been persuaded by the Khan of Hangu, Tahsildar of the Valley, to exclude from British territory certain Malla Khel villages on the southern slope of the range. Thus he had been able to maintain a fiction of their independence and keep them as private vassals, pocketing all fines imposed by their jirga and forcing them to provide him with a personal bodyguard. The Khan had been, under the Duranni Governors of Kohat, Deputy Governor and farmer of revenue in the Miranzai Valley, middleman for dealing with the neighbouring hill tribes, and party chief of the Samil political faction.<sup>1</sup> His powerful position led the British, when they annexed the valley, to accept him as their middleman for dealing with the tribes. The Malla Khel villages were a never-ending source of trouble on the Miranzai border, as were the intrigues of the Khan and his son, Baz Gul, who had been banned from Government employ, and who perhaps, felt that intrigue could not injure his prospects and might improve them.<sup>2</sup>

In 1889 the Panjab Government proposed that the administrative boundary should be advanced up to the foot of the Samana Range so as to bring the Malla Khel villages under administration; that Baz Gul should be moved from the frontier,

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1. For the distinction between Gar and Samil, see Davies, op.cit., page 50-1.
  2. PSLI. No.10. (LP.1B.3) 14 January, 1891. 69 Enclosures to Enc. No.1, covering 130 printed folio pages, together give the complete official history of the area up to 1889.

by persuasion if possible, otherwise through arrest and confinement; that the Khan should be ordered to collect outstanding fines under penalty of loss of office, jagirs, and allowances; that the jirga of the offending clans should be summoned and threatened with an expedition if they did not behave; and that a force should be posted at Hangu.<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne agreed to these proposals and sent a warrant for the detention of Baz Gul,<sup>2</sup> but conditions did not improve greatly and a punitive expedition was recommended by the frontier officers<sup>3</sup> and supported by Lyall.<sup>4</sup> By May only five Samil clans were still holding out, all others having paid their fines.<sup>5</sup> The Khan was reported to be obstructive and sullen,<sup>6</sup> and Ommanney, Commissioner of Peshawar, suggested that he should be replaced by a trained officer. He also suggested that if fines were not all paid by September, an expedition should take the boundary up to the Crest of the Samana Range. He argued that this action, in addition to securing the safety of the Miranzai Valley, would put the Government in a dominating position as regarded the Orakzais and Afridis of Tirah.<sup>7</sup> Lansdowne accepted these proposals,

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab, 27 July, 1889

3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Leigh to Ommanney, 7 February, 1890  
also 10 February, 1890. Ommanney to Panjab, 13 February, 1890  
also 18 February, 1890

4. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Panjab to India. 22 February, 1890

5. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Panjab to India. 4 May, 1890

6. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.10. Leigh to Ommanney, 9 April, 1890

7. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.10; Ommanney to Panjab, 21 April. 1890



and at the same time accepted the proffered resignation of the Khan and appointed a revenue officer in his place.<sup>1</sup>

The five clans did not submit and in August they were blockaded.<sup>2</sup> The Khan and his family were removed to Abbottabad, crown lands which had been leased to him were attached, and his allowances were suspended.<sup>3</sup> Lansdowne sanctioned an expedition to start around the middle of January, 1891. The terms to be imposed included the payment of all fines outstanding; permission to locate posts on the Samana Range and for the Kohat Border Police to patrol the range; the payment of revenue by all tribesmen inhabiting the south side of the range; tribal responsibility for all offences; the settlement of all disputes by jirga before the Deputy Commissioner.<sup>4</sup>

Troops crossed the border on 26 January, 1891, terms were accepted by the tribe, and the force was back in Kohat before the end of February. A small force was left behind to protect the workmen engaged in building roads and posts. On 4 April this party was attacked and forced to evacuate the range. The expeditionary force was reassembled at Kohat and two weeks later the range was reoccupied. The tribe submitted, paid fines, and restored stolen property.<sup>5</sup>

The basis of this operation was administrative and not strategical and the expedition would probably have been carried out if the "close border" had never been forsaken.

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.12. India to Panjab. 2 June, 1890.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.14. Panjab to India. 5 August, 1890.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.15. India to Panjab. 21 August, 1890
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.22. India to Panjab. 2 January, 1891
  5. PSLI. No.155. (LP.1B.4) 8 September, 1891 and enclosures thereto.

There are, nevertheless, several reasons why the incident has been recorded here. In the first place, the administrative aim could have been achieved by an extension of borders to the foot of the Samana range and the banishment of the Khan of Hangu. Actually, the crest of the range was occupied and the reasons given in justification of this action are interesting. Firstly, it was claimed that the military position on the Samana dominated the road from Kohat to Kurram and made it secure, and thus, the operation was tied to the plan for securing roads and lines of communication. Secondly, the theory was advanced that the Samana was a position which dominated the Afridis and Orakzais, and thus the occupation was linked with the "Sandemanian" concept of securing dominant military positions as the first step in establishing tribal control. There is no evidence that there existed a threat to the Kohat-Thal road so serious as to warrant occupation of the range; nor did the position dominate the Afridis and Orakzais; but it is significant that the attempt was made to fit the operation into the overall plan for the defence of the North-West Frontier. It might also be noted here that the British position on the Samana was a problem with which both Elgin and Curzon had to deal.

A case that had much in common with the Samana Affair was that which developed in the Black Mountain region of Hazara.

An expedition, which Lansdowne said was forced on the Government of India by the Panjab Government<sup>1</sup>, had been under-

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1. LP.IX. Vol.4. No.51. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 26 October, 1892.

taken against these tribes in 1888.<sup>1</sup> One of the terms of the settlement that followed was that in future British troops would be free to march along the crest of the Black Mountain at any time. In 1890 the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara suggested that the custom should be established of marching annually a regiment along the crest of the mountain. Lyall supported the plan and suggested that the first march should be made in October of that year.<sup>2</sup> Lansdowne approved, but ordered that the jirgas should be previously summoned to Abbottabad and informed of Government motives.<sup>3</sup> The jirgas would not come in, but Lyall thought the march should take place anyway.<sup>4</sup> Lansdowne agreed<sup>5</sup> and the troops set out but met heavy opposition and had to retreat.<sup>6</sup> Lyall ascribed this unexpected and powerful opposition

"to the stupid suspicions raised in their jealous and fanatical minds by the new activity of our policy and by the bad advice from people within our own borders." 7

He submitted plans for an expedition<sup>8</sup> to which Lansdowne agreed.<sup>9</sup> The expedition enforced on the tribes terms which included the surrender of hostages; tribal assistance in making roads to the crest of the mountain; jirgas to attend whenever troops marched

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1. The early history of British relations with Black Mountain tribes is given in PSLI. No.151. (LP.1B.4) 1 September, 1891
  2. PSLI. No.9. (LP.1B.3) 14 January, 1891. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 1 August, 1890
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab. 19 September, 1890
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Panjab to India. 2 October, 1890
  5. Ibid. Enc. No.4. India to Panjab. 10 October, 1890
  6. Ibid. Enc. No.5. Panjab to India. 17 November, 1890  
Enc. to Enc. No.5. Ommaney to Williams. 29 October, 1890  
India to Ommaney, 27 October, 1890
  7. Ibid. Enc. No.5. Panjab to India. 17 November, 1890
  8. Ibid. Enc. No.6. Panjab to India. 2 December, 1890
  9. Ibid. Enc. No.7. India to Panjab. 2 January, 1891

along the crest and to furnish escorts whenever officers wished to enter the country; restoration of persons and property captured; the payment of blood money for those killed; and, the supply of men for the border military police.<sup>1</sup> Lansdowne suggested a force of 200 levies,<sup>2</sup> but Udny disagreed,<sup>3</sup> and Lyall argued that there were no strategical considerations to justify so large an expenditure.<sup>4</sup>

But Lansdowne thought that the expenditure would be justified. He agreed that no important road passed through the area, but argued that the tribes had always been troublesome, and apart from the advantages of dominating them, their country gave easy access to Buner, should it be necessary to coerce the Bunerwals. He also added a strategic argument,

"the routes which lead from the Hazara border to Gilgit may, moreover, on account of their directness...become in time an important link between the Panjab and the Gilgit Agency, the isolation of which we regard with serious apprehensions".<sup>5</sup>

Lord Cross sanctioned Lansdowne's proposals on the ground of securing the peace of the border, but not "on the ground... that it promises to secure the first link in the route between the Hazara border and Gilgit".<sup>6</sup> When one considers that a year later, after Chilas had "accidentally" fallen into the

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1. PSLI. No.70. (LP.1B.3) 6 May, 1891. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 16 February, 1891. PSLI. No.151.(LP.1B.4) 1 September 1891. Enc. to Enc. 31. Appendices IV. VI. and VII give agreements with tribes.
  2. PSLI. No.151.(LP.1B.4) 1 September, 1891. Enc. No.32. India to Udny, 8 July, 1891.
  3. Ibid. marginal notations.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.33. Panjab to India. 8 August, 1891. For summary of costs see Appendix IX to Enc. 31.
  5. PSLI. No.151. (LP.1B.4) 1 September, 1891.
  6. PSDI. No.82. (Political) 19 November, 1891.

possession of the Government of India, Lansdowne was able to get Kimberley's approval for the opening of a direct road from Abbottabad to Gilgit "via" the Khagan Valley; one is inclined to be sceptical of the motive of tribal recalcitrance for the Black Mountain expedition, and to wonder whether it might not have been another gambit in the game of securing lines of communication to support the "scientific frontier", of which Chitral was regarded as the northern bastion. Proof that the conquest of Chilas was premeditated has not come to light and the circumstances of its falling into British hands coincidental with the occupation of the Black Mountain may have been fortuitous. Nor is there proof that the Black Mountain expedition was conceived as strategical rather than administrative in aim. But what seems apparent is that Lansdowne took advantage of the situation which had developed in the area to further his designs. We must also note that just as the occupation of the Samana was rationalized as protecting the Miranzai Valley route and dominating the Afridis and Orakzais, the Black Mountain position was supposed to protect the Khagan Valley route and dominate the Swatis and Bunerwals. In other words, Lansdowne makes an effort to justify all his frontier activities in the context of securing a favourable strategic position.

Two other activities of Lansdowne's viceroyalty must be mentioned. In spite of the Amir's objections he pushed on completion of the Khojak tunnel and the railway extension from

Quetta to New Chaman, where supplies were stored for the extension of the line to Kandahr.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, he prevented construction of a railway line from Peshawar to Jamrud, and instead had ~~had~~ the valley of the Kabul River surveyed as the line for a railway that could be built to Jalalabad and eventually to Kabul.<sup>2</sup>

Lansdowne's policy was firmly based on the concept of the "scientific frontier",<sup>3</sup> though he was "impressed with the Indus as a second line of defence".<sup>4</sup> He was supported in his views by Generals Brackenbury and Roberts,<sup>5</sup> indeed by the majority of his Council,<sup>6</sup> the secretaries in the foreign<sup>7</sup> and military<sup>8</sup> departments, and many others, including men like Sir Robert Warburton<sup>9</sup> and Sir Robert Sandeman.<sup>10</sup> Roberts indeed proposed a railway building programme including lines from Mianwalla to Attock; from Kalabagh on the Indus to Bannu;

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1. LP.IX. Vol.2. No.3. Lansdowne to Cross. 14 January, 1890  
This question will be more fully discussed in Chapter 3 below.
  2. LP.IX. Vol.2. No.49. Lansdowne to Cross. 23 June. 1890
  3. LP.VII. Vol.4. No.3. Lansdowne to Elliott, 2 July, 1890
  4. LP.IX. Vol.1. No.59. Lansdowne to Cross. 8 November, 1889
  5. W.O.32/264. Secret Despatch from India No.180. (Military)  
15 September, 1890. Enc. No.1. Minute by Sir F. Roberts.  
8 June, 1891.
  6. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Minute by Lieutenant-General Brackenbury  
8 August, 1891. Enc. No.3. Minute by Sir P.Hutchins  
12 August, 1891. Enc. No.4. Minute by R.C.B.Pemberton,  
15 August, 1891, Enc. No.7. Minute by Lord Lansdowne,  
22 August, 1891.
  7. PSLI. No.124. 7 October, 1890. Enc. No.3. Cunningham to  
Fanshawe, 16 June, 1890
  8. Collen, E.H.H. "The Defence of India". Paper presented at  
the proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 14 March, 1906
  9. LP.VII. Vol.1. No.500. Warburton to Ardagh. 21 June, 1889
  10. LP.VII. Vol.3. Enc. to No.436. Sandeman to Lyall. 24 May,  
1890.

a great arterial road from Pishin through the Zhob Valley and Gomal Pass, across the Indus at Kafirkot, and thence by a direct route to Lahore; and, finally, lines to Kandahar and Jalalabad, which he was sure the Amir would approve of if the price were high enough.<sup>1</sup> Of course the plan was too expensive for the Indian treasury. Lansdowne also had the firm support of Lord Cross,<sup>2</sup> and Salisbury took a gloomy view of the immediate future and wished to be prepared for any contingency. He was particularly concerned with the difficulties that might attend the Afghan succession and the political strength of the War Department in Russia as against the Emperor.<sup>3</sup> But in truth Salisbury was more interested in Persia and a railway through Baluchistan than he was in the "scientific frontier".<sup>4</sup>

Salisbury was perturbed that the Government of India was concentrating its entire efforts on preparation for a war in Afghanistan. He wrote privately to Sir Frank Lascelles;

"One of the most anxious cares of the India Gov[ernment] for at least two generations has been to provide against the possible danger of a Russian attack upon India. But, of late years at least, they seem to have confined their apprehension to dangers connected with Afghanistan. That Russia will seduce Afghanistan from her alliance, or that she should occupy one or more important positions in the country, & that she should, from these, operate upon the allegiance of the people of India, has been a danger ever present to the mind of the Indian Gov[ernment], & all their precautions have been directed to avert it, But I do not think they have done wisely to neglect the Persian dangers to the extent to which they have done. The same circumstances and motives which might carry Russia

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- 1..LP.VII. Vol.4. No.54. A.Roberts to Lansdowne. 18 July, 1890  
LP.IX. Vol.1. No.47. Lansdowne to Cross. 23 August, 1889
  2. LP.IX. Vol.3. No.12. Cross to Lansdowne, 20 March, 1891  
Ibid. No.47. Cross to Lansdowne, 12 November, 1891
  3. LP.IX. Vol.1. No.20. Cross to Lansdowne. 16 May, 1890
  4. LP.IX. Vol.3. No.47. Cross to Lansdowne. 12 November, 1891.

into Afghanistan, might, if she finds it too dangerous a venture, carry her into Persia. A successful occupation of Persia, reducing it to Russian vassalage, using and improving all its vast resources, and preparing them from that base for a further move Eastward, would be a policy that might attract a Russian Gov[ernment], & might be very menacing to India. It can only really be frustrated by the construction of railways from the coast or the mountains, from Quetta, Kurrachi or Gwadeh, which should carry troops to within striking distance of Meshed. But to any policy of this kind the Indian Gov[ernment] is at present very averse, partly because it is at variance with recent traditions, partly because it involves financial burdens which at present they are in no condition to bear." 1

Salisbury, in fact, wrote to Lansdowne in the same vein, pointing out the fact that

"IN recent years I have been deeply impressed with the conviction that there is a defect or gap in the plans which your Gov[ernment] has been forming and carrying out for some years for the defence of the North-West Frontier against a Russian attack.....It seems to me that this [The danger of Russian domination of Persia] is the most serious danger on the North-West that you have to confront, & from the policy that has been pursued I fear that it has been left altogether out of calculation." 2

Salisbury believed that Russia would make "an early effort ...to make herself mistress of the Straits", and that this would involve "an expedition against India to put pressure upon England in order to paralyse her resistance in the Bosphorous".<sup>3</sup> Indeed, so Cross informed Lansdowne, there was a general feeling in the War Office and Foreign Office that Russia would take advantage of any confusion in Afghanistan during the interregnum between the death of Abdur Rahman and the establishment of his successor

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1. S.P.Bound volumes. Persia. Salisbury to Lascelles.  
6 October, 1891

2. S.P."Drafts, Copies, Minutes, Memo[anda] etc.1890-1892"  
Salisbury to Lansdowne. 21 October, 1891.

3. S.P.Loose Papers. Salisbury to Lansdowne. 21 October. 1891



"as a decisive reason for precipitating her action in Europe, and that an advance into Afghanistan, a threat upon the Indian frontier, coinciding with an alliance with France, would be the most favourable conditions under which Russia could make those operations against the Bosphorous which are evidently foreshadowed by her rapidly growing fleet in the Crimea".<sup>1</sup>

It was not until the defence conferences of 1901-02 that the War Office gave up the idea that a Russian move against India would be in the nature of a diversion, and accepted instead the position that "in fighting for India, England will be fighting for her Imperial existence".<sup>2</sup> Apropos of this study it is instructive to note that a War Office statement of 1902 maintained that

"England would be compelled by the necessity for maintaining her prestige to apply her main strength across the Indian frontier; and as Russia can nowhere put effective pressure on England except in Afghanistan, it is there that the contest must be decided." <sup>3</sup>

But even the fear of a diversionary attack correlated with internal troubles in Afghanistan meant that the Government of India had to be ready to advance towards the Kabul-Kandahar line the instant the Amir's death was announced, so as to prevent disorder, to support the successor, and so as to be able to proclaim the succession instantly and simultaneously in Kabul and St.Petersburgh.<sup>4</sup> But as long as

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1. LP. IX. Vol.3. No.10. Cross to Lansdowne. 6 March, 1891
  2. Quoted in Greaves. op.cit. p.214.
  3. W.O. 106/48. E3/1. The Military Resources of Russia, and probable method of their employment in a war between England and Russia, Secret, 1902. Also. W.O.106/48.E3/2. Military needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia Secret. 1901.
  3. LP.XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on Future Policy towards Afghanistan in the Event of the Amir's Death. 21 January, 1891. Also. LP.IX.Vol.3. No.10. Cross to Lansdowne. 6 March, 1891.

the British Government held the opinion that the main Russian attack would not be towards India they were loath to promise reinforcements for the Indian army. Nevertheless, Lansdowne maintained that if Russia violated Afghan territory

"We ought to advance troops into Southern Afghanistan, whether we are invited to do so by the Amir, or have to take action without his consent; and we are further of opinion that we ought, if possible, to anticipate Russia at Kabul and Kandahar."<sup>1</sup>

He believed that the Indian army would be able to hold the Kabul-Kandahar line on its own for a time,<sup>2</sup> though he admitted that the forces available would be "barely sufficient for our own requirements".<sup>3</sup> Thus, he turned a deaf ear to Salisbury's plea for intervention in Persia, for as Cross expressed it

"if we cannot get a promise of troops from home to defend the North-West Frontier, how are we to hope for sufficient to defend Persia also?"<sup>4</sup>

This discussion emphasizes two significant facts. The first of these is the degree to which the Viceroy and Secretary of State were free to decide the policy of the Government of India, at least as it applied to the North-West Frontier. Lord Salisbury, as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, declared that he "preached in vain both to Lansdowne and Curzon" concerning an "Indian policy or rather Indian neglect which greatly afflicts me".<sup>5</sup> And when he wrote to Lansdowne

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1. PSLI. No.132. (Secret-Military) LP.IIIB. Part II.  
6 September, 1892.

2. Ibid.

3. Kimberley Papers, Bound Volume, Lansdowne to Kimberley, 11 January, 1893. Enc. Lansdowne to Lascelles, 7 January, 1893. Quoted in Greaves, op.cit. p.209.

4. LP.IX.Vol.3. No.47. Cross to Lansdowne, 12 November, 1891

5. SP.Loose Papers. Salisbury to Northcote, 8 June, 1900

himself, he did not discuss the North-West Frontier because it did not come within the province of his own department. He wrote:

"Though I was once familiar with all the Indian conditions of the North-West problem, my knowledge is a little dim, and much of it is antiquated. On the questions therefore which exclusively belong to the I [ndia] O[ffice] I do not venture to address you". 1

The second fact to note is Lansdowne's complete absorption in his plan to defend India by marching into Afghanistan, a defence which Salisbury called a "frontal attack on a mountain barrier, which is not held by ourselves". 2

But Lansdowne's plan took into account the latter difficulty which he hoped would be overcome by opening the roads and passes and converting the tribes to friendliness. he was

✓ "much impressed with the necessity of 'assimilating' the frontier tribes as rapidly as possible. They are an important factor in the calculation, and we should see to it that they do not pass on to the wrong side of the account." 3

He hoped to see them assimilated by application of the "Sandeman system", which he called a "sound one", while maintaining that

"we are suffering in other parts of the frontier from having omitted to do what he [Sandeman] has so successfully done in the case of the tribes under his administration". 4

When stress was laid on the great differences between Pathan and Baluch tribes, he stoutly maintained that

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1. S.P. "Drafts, Copies, Minutes, Memo[randa] etc. 1890-1892 Salisbury to Lansdowne, 21 October, 1891.
  2. SP. Loose Papers. Salisbury to Northcote, 8 June, 1900
  3. LP.VII. Vol.1. No.110. Lansdowne to Roberts. 17 February, 1889.
  4. LP.IX. Vol.3. No.25. Lansdowne to Cross. 6 May, 1891.

"many of the northern tribes could be brought under our influence by the same methods as the tribes with which Sandeman has been concerned, and, on the other hand, that the Murris, Bugtis, & Co. would, if they had been treated as the Panjab Government treats its tribes, be giving us plenty of trouble at the present time, instead of being, as they are, friendly and good neighbours to us". 1

✓ This leads directly to the third aspect of Lansdowne's policy, the desire to change the Panjab Administrative system. He abandoned his original idea of a new frontier province or agency, hoping that "the Panjab Government, when once it sees what we want, will address itself loyally to the task".<sup>2</sup> But in the last minute that he wrote in India he pointed out that the attempt to reform the Panjab system had not been strikingly successful, and that the changes brought about by the Durand Agreement would make the system more than ever unworkable.<sup>3</sup> He maintained that, in the case of the Waziris at any rate, the traditions of the Panjab had to be abandoned, and that in no case should the territory north of the Gomul be managed by "an overworked Government with no special knowledge".<sup>4</sup>

In the formulation and execution of his policy Lansdowne had had the whole hearted support of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, Sir H.M. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir H. Brackenbury, the Military Member of Council. He had behind him also a great weight of military authority both in England and in India. On no occasion did he have to overrule

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1. Ibid.

2. LP.IX.Vol. 1. No.59. Lansdowne to Cross. 8 November, 1889

3. LP.XIII. Memorandum on the Settlement between Sir Mortimer Durand and the Amir of Afghanistan about the Indo-Afghan Frontier. 13 January, 1894.

4. Ibid.

his Council, but he did not press the issue of a frontier province to which the majority of the Council was opposed. Despite his antipathy towards the Panjab methods of tribal control, his relations with Sir James Lyall, and later with Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, were cordial. His relations with the India Office were also happy. So long as Cross was Secretary of State he received firm support, for as Cross admitted, he leaned very heavily on Lansdowne's judgement.<sup>1</sup> When Kimberley succeeded to the office the situation changed, for though he gave Lansdowne general support, he had definite views of his own and did not hesitate to make them known.

Kimberley did not need to be converted to the necessity of defending India against Russian aggression. In 1885 he had written, "defence against a foreign enemy is more urgent even than 'protective' works designed to alleviate famine, important as the latter undoubtedly are."<sup>2</sup> When Kimberley assumed office ✓ Lansdowne prepared a memorandum setting forth his frontier policy under eleven heads and asking for comments on them.<sup>3</sup> The comments indicate a considerable amount of agreement between Viceroy and Secretary of State. They agreed that obligations to the Amir and the political situation in India combined to make an advance towards Afghanistan necessary in the face of a Russian move towards India; that the opening of the Gomal and Zhob Valleys had been expedient; that a

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1. LP.IX.Vol.3. No.5. Cross to Lansdowne, 20 July, 1891.

2. Kimberley Papers. Bound Volume. Letters to Dufferin, November, 1884. to July, 1885. Kimberley to Dufferin. 15 May, 1885. Quoted in Greaves. op.cit. p.13.

3. LP.XIII. Memorandum on Afghan Policy. 4 October, 1892.

measure of tribal control was essential; that the extension of influence should not commit the Government of India to constant interference in the domestic affairs of the tribes, or to the assumption of the complete responsibility for their protection; but they also agreed that without

"such interference, it will not be difficult to bring them under our influence, and to induce them to accept levy service from us for the protection of the roads passing through their country, and to abandon the lawless modes of life to which they have hitherto been accustomed." 1

Kimberley accepted the position that

"an advance to the Kabul-Kandahar line being held by high military authorities to be the best way of meeting a Russian invasion of Afghanistan, it must be admitted that, from a military point of view, ...it follows logically that we should obtain control of the passes". 2

But though, as he told Lansdowne, he understood his policy as it related to the "scientific frontier", he expressed some reservations. He felt that he was not competent to judge the military aspect of the case, but was nonetheless perturbed at the prospect of an advance all along the frontier. He had himself in 1885 approved of the collection of railway materials for an advance to Kandahar, but Lansdowne's policy contemplated "meeting our enemy beyond our present frontier at every point", and though he made no pretence of strategical competence he raised several pertinent questions. Where were the troops to be found? Would not the financial burden be intolerable?"Cannot .../defences/ be proceeded with at a

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1. LP.XIII.Memorandum on Afghan Policy by Lord Lansdowne, 4 October, 1892. with Lord Kimberley's marginal notes, 28 October, 1892.
  2. Ibid. Kimberley's reply to Lansdowne's memorandum of 4 October, 1892.

much slower pace?" Was there not a tendency in Lansdowne's policy to undervalue the friendship of the Amir? For, he argued, without Afghan friendship the "scientific frontier" could not be held. And finally, was there not a danger that political officers would tend to turn "political influence... into an actual occupation of territory"? <sup>1</sup>

But, with Cross's support, and despite Kimberley's reservations, Lansdowne had rapidly pushed forward the plans for an eventual occupation of the Kabul-Kandahar line, which he accepted as the "irreducible minimum" for the defence of the frontier.<sup>2</sup> He had completed the Khojak tunnel, pushed the railhead to New Chaman, and stored there sufficient supplies to carry the line to Kandahar; he had opened the Gomal Pass and the Zhob Valley; he had re-established the agency at Gilgit, subdued Hunza, Nagar, and Chilas, and set up a British agent in Chitral; he had subdued the tribes of the Black Mountain and built roads and posts there; he had extended the administered territories in the Miranzai Valley and built roads and posts on the Samana Range; he had occupied and established administration in the Kurram Valley; he had surveyed the Kabul River Valley with an eye to the construction of a railway to Jalalabad; and, he had enunciated a new tribal policy designed to make the roads to Afghanistan secure and to convert the tribes to allies. The exigencies of his

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1. LP.IX. Vol.4. No.44. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 13 October, 1892 also LP.LX. Vol.5. No.16. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 30 March 1893.
  2. LP.XIII. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on the Outlook in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 21 July, 1890.

relations with Abdur Rahman had prevented him from opening the Tochi Pass and the road from Peshawar to Chitral, the Durand Agreement, completed under his supervision, gave to his successor the free hand in tribal territory that he had never had. The story of that agreement is the subject of the next chapter.



## INDO-AFGHAN FRICTION ON THE FRONTIER: THE DURAND AGREEMENT

It was inevitable that Lansdowne's policy should arouse the suspicions of the Amir of Afghanistan. Lansdowne himself recognized this fact, and in 1891 he wrote,

"Our forward move in the Zhob Valley, the opening of the Gomal Pass, our two recent frontier expeditions, our obvious anxiety to extend British influence among frontier tribes, over some of which he conceives himself to have a kind of suzerainty, the completion of the Khojak tunnel, the extension of our railway down the slope of the Khwaja Amran to New Chaman, and the transfer to the latter place of our reserve of railway material (which was, I believe, ostentatiously marked "Kandahar Reserve') could not fail to attract his attention, and have, we know for a fact, attracted it, and provoked adverse comments on his part".<sup>1</sup>

This realization led Lansdowne to place on his list of ✓ priorities the need to arrive at an understanding with the Amir which would persuade him to facilitate preparations for the occupation of the "scientific frontier", and if need be, to assist in execution of the scheme.<sup>2</sup> Throughout his viceroyalty Lansdowne pursued negotiations that aimed at achievement of such an understanding, but less than two months of his term of office remained when the Durand Agreement was finally signed.

In the Autumn of 1888 Afghanistan was suffering from serious internal troubles. A Ghilzai revolt had been put down,<sup>3</sup> but the tribes of Afghan Turkistan, under the leadership of

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1. LP. xiii. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne in the Amir's proposed visit to India. 10 June, 1891.
  2. LP. xiii. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on the outlook in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 21 July, 1890.
  3. See Fraser-Tytler, W.K. Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central Asia. O.U.P. 1950. Sykes, P.M. History of Afghanistan (2 vols) London. 1940. The Ghilzais appealed to Queen Victoria for aid. Sykes, P.M. Sir Mortimer Durand London. 1926.

Ishak Khan, had meanwhile raised the standard of rebellion.<sup>1</sup> When the tide of battle seemed to be going against him, the Amir appealed to Lord Dufferin for assistance, and asked him to occupy Kandahar and Jalalabad,<sup>2</sup> and also to send a mission to Kabul to discuss frontier problems.<sup>3</sup> But his departure for Turkestan made the reception of the mission impossible and his subsequent defeat of Ishak Khan made assistance unnecessary.<sup>4</sup> This was the situation when Lansdowne arrived in India in December, 1888, but circumstances soon brought about a condition of strained relations between the Amir and the new Viceroy.

Disputes in the Kurram Valley had led to the appointment of an Indo-Afghan joint commission which had failed completely to reach an agreement, and resulted only in recriminations from both sides;<sup>5</sup> the Amir vigorously protested against the completion of the Khojak tunnel;<sup>6</sup> he was indignant when Lansdowne warned him of the possible effect on Russia of his troop movements in Turkistan;<sup>7</sup> and, he was so angry that he

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1. See Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, and Sykes. op.cit.
  2. Diary of Sir Mortimer Durand. Quoted in Sykes. Sir Mortimer Durand; page 200.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid. also LP.1A. Lord Lansdowne's Administration of India in the Foreign Department. General Review by the Official Foreign Secretary.
  5. PSLI. No.113. (LP.1B.1) 2 August, 1889. Udny's report and other enclosures regarding the failure to effect a settlement with the Amir in the Kurram Valley.
  6. PSLI. No.63. (LP.1B.1) 13 May, 1889
  7. A warning instigated by the Foreign Office. PSH.vol.106 p. 1629. Morier to F.O. 13 February, 1889. Ibid.p.1629 Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 16 February, 1889.

was unapproachable for three days<sup>1</sup> after receiving a letter from Lansdowne which reprimanded him for the cruel punishments he administered to offenders.<sup>2</sup> Then came British operations in the Zhob and Gomal Valleys, and the survey of the Kabul River Valley, which were sources of further alarm to the Afghans.

Consequently, in September, 1890, a British mission was again invited to Kabul,<sup>3</sup> but Lansdowne regarded the proposal as completely unsatisfactory.<sup>4</sup> He felt that the Amir would be unable to resist the temptation to harangue the British representatives in open Durbar, and such a blow to prestige could not be contemplated; secondly, since there was no way of knowing what proposals the Amir intended to make, there was no way of preparing to discuss them, while the lack of telegraphic communications with Kabul would make references tedious, and deferred answers would probably lead the Amir to say that the British agents were not the plenipotentiaries he had asked for; and, thirdly, the Amir had to be convinced that British frontier activities were directed against Russia, not Afghanistan, and that defence plans of allied governments could not be discussed in public.<sup>5</sup>

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1. LP.xiii. Memorandum on the Viceroy's conversation with Colonel Attaulla Khan, former Agent to the Governor General in Kabul. 14 August, 1891.
  2. A Reprimand approved by Cross and Salisbury.P.S.H.vol.iii p.531. FO to IO. 23 October, 1889
  3. PSLI. No.149.(LP.1B.2) 31 December, 1890.Enc. No.1. Amir to Viceroy, 3 September, 1890.
  4. LP.xiii. Note on the Amir's proposal that a British Mission should visit Kabul, 24 September, 1890.
  5. Ibid.

Nevertheless, Lansdowne knew that a number of questions needed discussion. They included the motives of British frontier policy; the threat to Afghanistan occasioned by the Russian advance; the necessity for the Government of India to keep open "the whole of the main passes leading from British India to Afghanistan"; the Amir's frontier with India, especially in the vicinity of Chageh, a Baluch village which his troops had occupied; railway extensions to Kandahar, to Jalalabad, and within Afghanistan; telegraphic lines from India to Afghanistan; British officers as look-outs on the Russo-Afghan frontier; the development of commerce between India and Afghanistan; and, the question of the Afghan succession.<sup>1</sup> From this formidable list Lansdowne wished to prepare an agenda, and he thought this could best be done by a meeting in India between the Amir and the Viceroy, preliminary to sending a mission to Kabul.<sup>2</sup> The Amir refused such a meeting on the grounds of ill health and the unsettled state of affairs in Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup>

Still, British activities at New Chaman, in Waziristan, Miranzai, and Chitral; and Afghan activities in Waziristan, Bajaur, and Asmar, caused tensions to increase. In February, 1891, the Amir again proposed the despatch of a mission in order "that the demarcation of the limits between that powerful Government [India] and this God-granted Government [Afghanistan] which is a necessary and urgent matter, and an

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1. Ibid.

2. PSLI. No. 149 (LP.1B.2) 31 December, 1890. Enc. No.2. Viceroy to Amir, 14 October, 1890.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Amir to Viceroy, 5 November, 1890.

incumbent duty, might be early carried out.....Then they [the people of Afghanistan] would think that the movements of the officials of the Illustrious Government [India], which they had considered as being for aggression, were not really so." 1.

By this time Lansdowne had come to accept the possibility of having to send a mission to Kabul without preliminary discussions with the Amir. As a compromise he suggested a written statement from the Amir detailing subjects to be discussed, areas where the frontier needed delimitation, the tribes which the Amir considered as belonging to Afghanistan, and any other matters that would lay the foundation for a satisfactory agreement to be arrived at through a meeting in India, or a mission to Kabul.<sup>2</sup> The Amir's reply stated merely that the limits between the Kabul River and Seistan were unknown, and that if a mission were sent to Kabul he would appoint officers to go with them and demarcation could be carried out at once.<sup>3</sup> Lansdowne pointed out that British officers sent to Kabul would not have the authority to conclude an agreement without reference to India, and he again mentioned the obvious advantages of a "summit" meeting,<sup>4</sup> upon which Lansdowne himself was invited to Kabul.<sup>5</sup> Though Lansdowne declared this to be impossible, he, in turn suggested that when he was in Peshawar in October, 1892, he

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1. PSLI. No. 45. (LP.1B.3) 18 March, 1891. Enc. No.1.  
Amir to Viceroy, 8 February, 1891
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Viceroy to Amir. 5 March. 1891.
  3. PSLI. No.122. (LP.1B.4) 14 July, 1891. Enc. No.1.  
Amir to Viceroy, 24 March, 1891.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Viceroy to Amir. 7 July, 1891.
  5. PSLI. No.58. (LP.1B.5) 27 April, 1892 Enc. No.1.  
Amir to Viceroy, 25 February, 1892.

might meet the Amir there, or at some point near the border.<sup>1</sup>

Despite these manoueuvers Lansdowne was already convinced that he would have to send a "high Indian official" to Kabul, though he believed that the prospect of coming to terms with the Amir was not encouraging.<sup>2</sup> He felt that there were few points on which he could make concessions and in no case were these "extensive or of material value", while, on the other hand, any attempt to demarcate a boundary would lead to claims by the Government of India which would be necessarily distasteful to the Amir. Nevertheless, he realized that the Amir had reason to feel suspicious of British motives and a delegation might be able to make "some small concessions" and to disabuse his mind of some of "the prejudices and suspicions with which it is laden." In any case, the Amir had to be convinced of the Russian menace and of the need for concerted action in the event of a fresh Russian move, and this could be better done in person than by letter.<sup>3</sup>

Lansdowne was unable to offer concessions because the areas of friction were in each case directly associated with the "scientific frontier" plan. In the first instance, the railway was being pushed on to New Chaman because "old" Chaman was not a suitable site for a terminus and for the storage of the "Kandahar Reserve" of railway materials since

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1. PSLI.No.45.(LP.1B.5.)27 April,1892. Enc.No.2.Viceroy to Amir, 26 March,1892.  
 2. L.P.xiii. Memorandum on the Amir's visit to India. 10 June, 1891.  
 3. Ibid.

it was on the slope of the mountain range.<sup>1</sup> Before the construction of the Khojak tunnel, "old" Chaman had been the border post where British officials had taken over the mails from Kandahar, and for this reason it was generally accepted that the territory beyond the walls of the fort was Afghan. Sandeman had selected the site for New Chaman but in doing so he had believed himself to be encroaching on Afghan territory.<sup>2</sup> Sir James Browne shared this opinion.<sup>3</sup> Lansdowne argued that both were mistaken and that the limits of Baluchistan extended to the foot of the range, and that in any case, the Amir could not expect the line to stop short of a suitable terminus out of deference to his claims to a "barren wilderness". The Amir might have conceded the point if he had been consulted, but Lansdowne argued that the matter was so urgent that there had been no time for talk.<sup>4</sup> When the Amir protested, and stated that the Afghan tribes were beginning to accuse him of handing over their territory to the British without consulting them,<sup>5</sup> Lansdowne contented himself with the assertion that New Chaman was on British territory, and that the railway was intended as much for the benefit of Afghanistan as of India.<sup>6</sup> To admit the Amir's

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1. .LP. xiii. Memorandum on Relations with the Amir. 11 July 1892.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid
  4. Ibid.
  5. PSLI. No.47. (LP.1B.2) 5 May.1890. Enc.to Enc.No.2. Amir to Viceroy, 18 February, 1890, enclosing petitions from the Maliks of tribes in the vicinity of New Chaman telling of British encroachments on their territories.
  6. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Viceroy to Amir, 26 March, 1890.

claim, which was at least as good as that of the Government of India, would have endangered the plan for controlling the main route to Kandahar, so to admit his claims to Waziristan and Asmar would jeopardise plans for securing the Gomal and Tochi routes in the former instance, and the direct route to Chitral in the latter. Similarly, Afghan interference in the Kurram Valley posed a threat to that route to Kabul. To make the tale complete the Khyber route seemed to be threatened because of Afghan interference with the Afridis and Orakzais.<sup>1</sup> Upon being questioned the Amir admitted that he had received Afridi jirgas and gave "to all the said tribesmen who had come, such letters of advice and admonition as are necessary for a King of a tribe."<sup>2</sup>

Lansdowne suggested several possible explanations for the Amir's activities on the frontier. One was that the Government of India had used too much "European diplomacy" with him and had convinced him that the British dared not break with him; another, that he nursed the idea of becoming head of a great Muslim kingdom, and therefore, resented British action in Bajaur, Chitral, and Waziristan aimed at maintaining the independence of these areas; but since he knew that a settlement was inevitable, he aimed at being in possession of as much as possible when the time for settlement came; and, another, that he was genuinely alarmed lest British activity should turn out to be preliminary to

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1. PSLI. No.163. (LP.1B.6) 6 September, 1892 and enclosures. Correspondence relative to attempts by the Amir to bring the Orakzais and Afridis under his control.

2. PSLI. No.58. (LP.1B.6) 27 April, 1892.

Amir to Viceroy, 25 February, 1892. Enc. No.1. Amir to Viceroy, 25 February, 1892.



the absorption of Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> But Lansdowne believed that the Amir would have been an "untrustworthy friend", even if British policy had never departed from the "close border". Afghan friendship was in fact so uncertain, he declared, that he would not for the sake of obtaining it, "neglect any measure which I considered of first rate importance for securing our frontier."<sup>2</sup>

Kimberley's attitude we already know,<sup>3</sup> and he suggested to Lansdowne that the Amir's encroachments, though serious if taken together "as indicating a settled disposition to disregard your warnings and push forward his pretensions without regarding our rights", taken separately were not of great importance, except, perhaps, for the move towards Chitral.<sup>3</sup>

Lansdowne agreed that the Chitral position was an important one, but he was more concerned about the situation in Waziristan,<sup>4</sup> and he expressed the conviction

"that we shall never bring him [the Amir] to reason until we prove to him by decisive action that we are in earnest, and that we cannot allow him to play fast and loose with us any longer."<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps it was well that Kimberley's influence restrained Lansdowne, or he might have been tempted to act unwisely. In any event, he was not prepared to allow matters to drift any longer. He warned the Amir that the Government of India

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1. LP. ix. vol. 4. No. 41. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 23 August, 1892.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. No. 38. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 8 September, 1892.

4. Ibid. No. 48. Lansdowne to Kimberley. 5 October, 1892.

5. Ibid. No. 31. Lansdowne to Kimberley. 5 July, 1892.

would "regard with displeasure" any attempt on his part to make himself ruler of the Afridis, and also warned him against further advance into Bajaur or Waziristan.<sup>1</sup> He conceded that Afghan troops could remain at Wana and Asmar until a settlement was effected, but expressed determination that "the settlement...shall not be indefinitely delayed." He reminded the Amir that he had declared the boundary demarcation to be a matter of urgency, and therefore, the Government of India was prepared to "effect a settlement of the frontier during the coming winter". To this end, General Roberts had been selected to lead a mission to Kabul. But this offer would only stand until 1 September, and would be withdrawn if the Amir's acceptance had not been received by that time. But, he declared, "whether you accept this offer or not, it will be necessary to decide what territory does, and what does not, form part of the Kingdom of Afghanistan". Lansdowne's tone was peremptory. He was offering the Amir a final chance to put forward his claims, failing which he was prepared to demarcate a frontier without consulting him.<sup>2</sup>

The Amir's reply of 3 August was a mixture of conciliation and firmness. He reiterated his belief in the necessity of a mission, expressed pleasure at the appointment of Roberts, but declined to set a date for the reception of

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1. PSLI. No 155 (LP.1B.6) 16 August, 1892. Enc. Viceroy to Amir, 23 July, 1892.
  2. Ibid.

the mission for the same reason that he had hitherto failed to reply to Lansdowne's invitation to meet him in Peshawar, namely, that the Hazara rebellion,<sup>1</sup> which had broken out on 21 March, 1892, had kept him fully occupied. He declared that he had no claim to Kurram, and had no desire to bring the Afridis and Orakzais under his supremacy, but maintained that Waziristan and Asmar were both integral parts of Afghanistan, and that his agents had done no wrong in moving in their own territories.<sup>2</sup>

Lansdowne proposed a reply that would have pressed for an early reception of the mission, partly because he thought that Afghan forces could not be left in Asmar, Chageh, and Wana for long without causing trouble, and partly because Roberts was leaving India in the spring.<sup>3</sup> Kimberley felt that the Amir's letter though evasive was not unfriendly and did not justify preemptory demands. He suggested that it should be left unanswered.<sup>4</sup> Lansdowne replied that this was impossible, for if eventually the Government of India were forced to act alone, it would be a serious charge against them that they had ignored the excuse of the Hazara rebellion.<sup>5</sup> The logic by which he reached the conclusion to demand reception of the mission was sound. He argued that the Amir's letter though friendly in tone as regarded the mission

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1. See Fraser-Tytler, op.cit. also Sykes, op.cit.

2. PSLI. No.178.(LP.1B.6) 13 September 1892. Enc. No.1. Amir to Viceroy, 3 August, 1892.

3. PSLI. No.178.(LP.1B.6) 13 September, 1892.

4. Ibid. Enc. Telegram. S of S. to Viceroy, 19 August, 1892.

5. Ibid. Enc. Telegram. Viceroy to S of S. 20 August, 1892.

had been "arrogant and unconciliatory" concerning Waziristan and Bajaur, and, secondly, that the mission could not be indefinitely postponed while the Amir kept the disputed territories. Therefore, the Government of India had a choice of two alternatives, either, to demand that the Amir should evacuate the positions he had seized, or, to demand that he receive a mission to settle the frontier peaceably. Lansdowne chose the latter alternative because he thought it to be a demand the Amir could more easily meet. Though the argument was logical, the conclusion may not have been the wisest, for unwanted missions at Kabul had usually come to a bad end, and, as Kimberley pointed out, the object was to secure the safety of the frontier, not to force a mission on the Amir.<sup>1</sup> Kimberley's views prevailed, and the letter sent ordered evacuation of Wana, and gave permission for troops to remain in Chageh and Asmar, only so long as they remained inactive, in the hope that a settlement would be made within a reasonable period.<sup>2</sup>

The Amir's reply was friendly, though he still refused to name a date for the mission. He agreed to withdraw from Wana and to hold the question of Asmar, Chageh, and other disputed points in abeyance until the mission had been received.<sup>3</sup> All Lansdowne could do was to repeat that the postponement could not be indefinite, and that Roberts was

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1. Ibid. Enc. Telegram. S of S. to Viceroy, 23 August, 1892.
  2. PSLI. No.178. (LP.1B.6) 13 September, 1892. Enc. No.4. Viceroy to Amir, 29 August, 1892.
  3. PSLI. No.187. (LP.1B.6) 12 October, 1892. Enc. No.1 Amir to Viceroy, 11 September, 1892.

leaving India in the spring.<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne was becoming exceedingly impatient with the delays. He objected to treating with the Amir as with a foreign power upon a footing of equality. He objected to the idea that

"we have in the Amir a neighbouring power co-ordinate with our own, and possessing equal rights with ours in the neutral, or independent territories lying between his borders and ours. I object particularly to the argument that, because Imperial exigencies may compel us to pursue what is called a forward policy upon the frontier, the Amir has a right to respond to every move in advance which we may make by a corresponding move on his side".<sup>2</sup>

He argued that the Amir's alliance was not needed for its own sake, but "in order to strengthen an outwork of the Indian Empire", nevertheless, it was nonsense to sacrifice any material guarantee for the safety of the frontier to keep a doubtful friend.

"If, e.g. the military authorities are right in believing that a cantonment at Spin would be of strategical value to us in the event of a collision with Russia, I would say, let us have a cantonment at Spin, even if the gain involves a corresponding loss of His Highness's friendship."<sup>3</sup>

That the Amir's friendship was untrustworthy Lansdowne was convinced. He maintained that in one respect only, that of keeping control of the Afghan tribes, had Abdur Rahman done what was expected of him. On the debit side Lansdowne listed his ill-treatment of the British Agent at Kabul, his punishment, deportation, or execution of those found to be

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Viceroy to Amir. 27 September, 1892.

2. LP. xiii. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on Relations with the Amir. 11 July, 1892.

3. Ibid.

friendly to the British; his rewards to those who showed enmity; his deportation to India of destitutes who became a charge on the Government; his interception of mail from the news writer at Herat; his refusal to give information regarding the distribution of his troops; the ruinous effects on trade of his heavy taxation and his resentment of advice concerning this matter; his refusal of facilities for transport through Afghanistan of horses bought in Persia; his refusal to permit passage of Muslim officials going to join the British Agency at Meshed; the desecration of British cemeteries at Kabul and Kandahar; his reprehensible language towards the Government of India in public Durbar; his barbarous punishments and his anger when reprimanded about them; his refusal, despite requests in 1885, 1886, 1888, and 1889, to allow British officers to be stationed on his northern frontier; his refusal to allow the British to explore the Upper Oxus; and, his refusal, when the Russians were on the Pamirs, to allow his agent in Badakhshan to communicate news to Gilgit.<sup>1</sup>

All this indicated Abdur Rahman's desire to be free of all control, that he resented British direction of his foreign affairs, and was fiercely jealous of any interference with domestic matters. He signed himself "Abdur Rahman, Padshah of Afghanistan, by his own will and that of his own independent tribe." But whatever the cause of his

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1. PSLI. No. 155. (LP.1B.6) 16 August, 1892.

intransigence, Lansdowne was determined that the Roberts mission, than which "a more signal mark of our confidence and good-will could hardly be devised", was to be his last chance to state his case.<sup>1</sup>

Robert's task would be to reassure the Amir regarding British intentions and to discuss the whole frontier question. He was to be authorized to offer an increased subsidy of six lakhs as satisfaction for the Amir's claim to New Chaman. Lansdowne was prepared to concede, if pressed, the Amir's right to maintain a post at Wana, in return for a guarantee of the British right to deal directly with the Waziri tribes, and a firm promise that there would be no Afghan interference elsewhere in Waziristan. A similar concession might be made in regard to Asmar provided the Amir undertook to advance no further up the Kunar Valley towards Chitral, to refrain from interference in Bajaur and Swat, and provided he gave complete satisfaction at all other points. In addition to settling the frontier Roberts was to try and persuade the Amir to retain possession of the Wakhan buffer strip, to adopt a "civilized" trade policy towards India, and to refrain from the use of barbarous punishments.<sup>2</sup>

If the mission were not accepted, or if it failed, Lansdowne was prepared to order a unilateral demarcation and to force acceptance of it. This would perhaps lead to a

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

rupture of Anglo-Afghan relations, but he thought it better to force a rupture when the Government was prepared for it than to continue with the intolerable state of existing relations which would eventually lead to a rupture in any case. But before using force, coercion could be applied by refusing to pay the Amir's subsidy and by refusing to supply him with arms.<sup>1</sup> It was not long before Lansdowne ordered the detention in India of all guns and materials for the manufacture of warlike supplies that had been consigned to the Amir.<sup>2</sup>

In October the Amir wrote to say that the Hazara rebellion still prevented him from fixing a date for reception of the mission.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of 1893 the situation was still unchanged, and Lansdowne suggested as a deadline the end of the first week in March beyond which date Roberts would be unable to leave Peshawar.<sup>4</sup> Kimberley agreed,<sup>5</sup> and the Amir was informed that if his acceptance of this date had not been received by 7 February, it would be impossible to send a mission at all.<sup>6</sup>

The Amir's reply was delivered personally by Salter Pyne, an Englishman who had been a clerk with a Bombay firm and who, in 1885, had gone to Kabul with a consignment of goods for the Amir. He had remained in Kabul to establish machine shops for the manufacture of arms and had risen high in the

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1. Ibid.
  2. PSLI.No.206(LP.1B.6.) 9 November, 1892. Enc. No. 2. Viceroy to Amir, 25 August, 1892.
  3. PSLI.No.29.(LP.1B.7) 1 February, 1893. Enc. No. 2. Amir to Viceroy, 21 October, 1892.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No. 3. Viceroy to S. of S. 3 January, 1893.
  5. Ibid. Enc. No. 4. S. of S. to Viceroy, 6 January, 1893.
  6. Ibid. Enc. No. 5. Viceroy to Amir. 11 January, 1893.



Amir's favour and in his councils. It was a signal mark of trust and favour that he had been deputed to Calcutta to lay the Afghan case before Lansdowne.

The letters which Pyne brought<sup>1</sup> explained that a mission could not be accepted during the winter, since snow in the passes made it impossible for the Afghan Sirdars to reach Kabul, and no agreement could be concluded in their absence. Moreover, the Amir explained that he had, for two months and ten days, been confined to his bed "suffering from several other diseases in addition to gout". He asked that his detained materials be released. Lansdowne replied that though he was favourably impressed by the Amir's reasonable attitude towards Kurram and Wana, he could not release the materials until by settlement or withdrawal of troops the Amir had shown a desire to meet the wishes of Government.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the problem was being discussed with Pyne, who remained in India until June. At first Lansdowne had objected to using him as an intermediary, but he was soon convinced of his intelligence, good intentions, and influence with the Amir.<sup>3</sup> By the end of June Lansdowne was counting heavily on Pyne's good offices to persuade the Amir of the desirability of an amicable agreement.<sup>4</sup> All available

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1. PSLI. No.73. (LP.1B.7) 5 April, 1893. Enc.No.2.  
Amir to Durand. 15 February, 1893.  
Ibid. Enc. No.3. Amir to Viceroy, 17 February, 1893.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Viceroy to Amir, 27 March, 1893.
  3. PSLI. No.124. (LP.1B,7) 20 June 1893.
  4. Ibid.

material relative to the situation on the frontier was made available to him, and upon his leaving India he was given an "aide memoire" which clearly stated the British case and the reasons for British objections to the Amir's frontier activities.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with Pyne's request to "strengthen his hand" some of the Amir's detained materials was released.<sup>2</sup>

Pyne had scored a diplomatic triumph. From distrust of him, Lansdowne had been won to a kind of admiration, as had been Sir Mortimer Durand. What is more significant, Lansdowne had not kept his promise to demarcate unilaterally should the Roberts mission not be received in Kabul, and had placed his hopes for a satisfactory settlement on the Amir's envoy.

Pyne's success in Kabul was no less remarkable. Within a month of his leaving India he reported to Durand that the Amir was "exceedingly well-disposed and inclined to be reasonable at present", and that he had promised not to interfere or intrigue in Chitral, Bajaur, or Swat, if he were given assurances that Umra Khan would be held in check.<sup>3</sup> Pyne enclosed a letter from the Amir asking for a map showing the boundary the British wanted, so that markers could be erected which he could see and approve.<sup>4</sup> Pyne suggested that the matter could be clinched by sending the map and releasing

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1. PSII. No.186. (LP.1B.8) 29 August, 1893. Enc. No.1. D.O. Durand to Pyne, 10 June, 1893.

2. PSII. No.124. (LP.1B.7) 20 June, 1893.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Pyne to Durand, 17 July, 1893.

4. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Amir to Pyne, undated.

the balance of the detained supplies.<sup>1</sup>

In discussions with Pyne the Amir had put his case clearly. He maintained that since Afghan territory had been guaranteed, if fortifications were to be made against Russia they ought to be made on the Russo-Afghan border, but instead the Government of India were fortifying "Quetta and other small mountain places on the border between India and Afghanistan", leaving Afghanistan open to attack. As for the British attempt to secure the friendship of the tribes, he declared this to be impossible, since the tribes would surely join the side they expected to win. The only chance to get tribal unity against an invader, he argued, was to allow them to be brought under Afghan rule, then, in an emergency, he would declare a "jehad", and they might rally to the call.<sup>2</sup>

Because of Pyne's efforts prospects for a settlement appeared to be brightening, but meanwhile, other developments made a mission to Kabul more urgent than ever. The Russian Government was pressing strongly for the fulfillment of the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873 which required the Amir to evacuate certain trans-Oxus provinces which he held. In July Kimberley advised Lansdowne that the Amir had to be persuaded to retire behind the Oxus, and that in order to get an agreement in this connection concessions might be

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Pyne to Durand. 21 July, 1893.

2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Amir to Pyne, 15 July, 1893.

made elsewhere, for example, the Amir might be given permission to import guns freely, might be compensated for New Chaman, and given Chageh and Asmar,<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne proposed to Kimberley that the Amir should be informed of the general situation and told that an officer was to be sent to Kabul to discuss the matter. He suggested that Sir Mortimer Durand should lead the mission and asked whether he should be empowered to go beyond the assurances that had been given to the Amir in 1880, and whether, "if the Amir shows himself willing, advantage should be taken of Durand's presence in Kabul...to effect settlement of other outstanding questions."<sup>2</sup>

Kimberley, after discussion with the Foreign Office, replied accepting the terms of the proposed letter to the Amir. He also accepted Durand as negotiator, and agreed that he should go without military escort. Regarding the frontier dispute he wrote, "I shall be glad if he can effect a settlement of the other outstanding questions, but he should not press these if the Amir shows unwillingness to discuss them on the present occasion". Regarding assurances to the Amir he declared, "I would in no way extend our present responsibilities".<sup>3</sup>

Lansdowne's letter to the Amir<sup>4</sup> evoked an immediate and satisfactory response. The Amir asked who would lead the

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1. PSLI. No.175 (LP.1B.8) 15 August, 1893. Enc.No.1. S of S. to Viceroy, 13 July, 1893.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Viceroy to S.of S. 20 July, 1893.
  3. Ibid. Enc.No.3. S of S. to Viceroy, 21 July, 1893.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Viceroy to Amir. 24 July, 1893.

mission and, since he obviously expected that the talks would not be confined to the trans-Oxus provinces, he suggested that

"the officer should be able and one of the renowned officials of India, so that he may have knowledge of the internal matters of the illustrious Government, and not that beyond bringing one or two words of message he may have no further authority to discuss matters. At this time a confidential person is necessary, so that he may have authority to carry on discussions, if necessary, on any matters of any kind whatever."<sup>1</sup>

Lansdowne replied that Durand had been selected, and that he would be ready to start by mid-August.<sup>2</sup>

Durand's instructions make it quite clear that the main purpose of the mission was

"to acquaint His Highness the Amir with the fact that the Russian Government insists on the literal fulfillment of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1872-73, which defined the north-eastern limits of Afghan territory, and that Her Majesty's Government do not consider it possible to resist the claim. This involves His Highness's withdrawal from trans-Oxus Shighnan and Roshan, which he has for the past ten years occupied against the advice of the Government of India. Her Majesty's Government will, in no case, accept responsibility to enforce His Highness's retirement, but they cannot, in face of the agreement of 1872-73 assist him in maintaining his occupation."<sup>3</sup>

Lansdowne and Durand both believed that this would be unpalatable to the Amir. It was left to Durand to persuade him that he would be better off holding cis-Oxus Darwaz and having a definite frontier on the north-east formed by the Upper Oxus.

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.6. Amir to Viceroy, 1 August, 1893.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.7. Viceroy to Amir, 7 August, 1893.
  3. PSLI. No.213. (LP.1B.8) 27 September, 1893. Enc. No.3. India to Durand, 14 September, 1893.
  4. Ibid.

In case the Amir should take the opportunity to discuss his frontier with India, Durand was instructed "to enter into those questions, and...endeavour to come to an amicable understanding with regard to them".<sup>1</sup> In addition to this his instructions referred him to the proposals that had been drafted for Roberts in 1892,<sup>2</sup> and in addition to the concessions then proposed he was authorized, in return for "a thoroughly satisfactory settlement", to remove the prohibition on the Amir's import of arms and ammunition, and in order to smooth the beginning of the talks, to hand over a consignment of Hotchkiss guns being held at Peshawar. Durand was given a free hand in choosing the men to accompany him, the only stipulation being that the party should be a small one.

He selected Colonel E.R. Elles, on special duty, as a military expert who had the confidence of the military authorities in India; Surgeon-Major E.H. Fenn, in medical charge; Lieutenant J. Manners-Smith, first Political Officer and Personal Assistant, as an expert on the Gilgit Agency and the northern portion of the frontier; Lieutenant A.H. MacMahon, second Political Officer, as an expert on Baluchistan; J.S. Donald, third Political Officer, as an expert on the Panjab frontier; E.H.S. Clarke, Assistant Political Secretary in charge of English correspondence,

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1. Ibid.

2. PSLI. No.155.(LP.1B.6) 16 August, 1892. PSDI. No.42. (LP.1B.9) 18 November, 1892. See above page.

as an expert on Afghanistan, since he had accompanied Sir Lepel Griffin to Kabul in 1880 and Sir West Ridgeway on the Afghan frontier 1884-86, and had also a thorough knowledge of the records of the subjects to be discussed; Assistant Surgeon Khan Bahadur Abdur Rahim Khan, Assistant Political Officer in charge of Persian correspondence, as an expert interpreter; and, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, Assistant Political Officer, as an expert on Pathans and an acquaintance of the Amir. There was no escort and camp followers were not armed.<sup>1</sup>

The mission entered the Khyber on the morning of 18 September, and on the 20th. were received at Landi Khana by the Sipah Salar and an escort. The Sipah Salar was courteous and cordial, his hospitality "almost embarrassing". The party reached Kabul on 2 October, and three days later Durand was received ceremonially by the Amir. Following this formality the serious discussions began.

From the beginning the Amir expressed a greater interest in the frontier with India than in the northern frontier and agreed to withdraw from Shighnan and Roshan without serious objection. Perhaps the fact that, while Durand was on his way to Kabul, a Russian officer, Captain Vannovsky, had demanded a passage through Roshan<sup>2</sup>, helped

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1. PSLI. No.1. (LP.1B.8) 3 January, 1894. Enc. Durand's report on the mission to Kabul. Durand to Cunningham, 20 Dec.1893. Unless otherwise specified the account of proceedings at Kabul will be based on this comprehensive and most interesting report.
  2. PSLI. No.217.(LP.1B.8) 4 October, 1893. Papers regarding Captain Vannovsky's demand for passage through Roshan. See also Alder, op.cit.

to persuade the Amir that he could no longer hold his trans-Oxus provinces without meeting Russian opposition. In any case, Durand believed so, and he made use of the incident to strengthen his arguments.<sup>1</sup> Only in the case of the Wakhan buffer strip did the Amir express any reservations, and he could not be blamed. The Wakhan "tongue" is a long narrow strip of territory, in one place only ten miles wide and no where more than a day's march across, stretching along the Oxus to the north of Chitral. From a military point of view it was indefensible, and though the Amir eventually agreed to hold it under his suzerainty, he refused to fortify it.<sup>2</sup> In agreeing to retain it at all he was doing the British Government a favour. When the settlement of the northern frontier had been agreed on, the Amir asked for a written guarantee to support him against further Russian aggressions. Durand replied in a letter that referred to the guarantee given by Sir Lepel Griffin in 1880, and then continued in these words:

"This assurance remains in force, and...it is applicable with regard to any territory which may come into your possession in consequence of the agreement which you have made with me to-day in the matter of the Oxus frontier".<sup>3</sup>

This satisfied the Amir, and now with his primary duty done, Durand turned to the "difficult and laborious task of working out a reasonable settlement for the Indian frontier. The Amir

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1. For quotations from Durand's private diary see Sykes, op.cit. p.212 -13.
  2. Ibid.
  3. PSLI. No. 1. (LP.1B.8) 3 January, 1894. Enc. Durand to Amir, 11 November, 1893.



made much of his ready acquiescence regarding the Oxus frontier, and pointed out that he was entitled to consideration on that account in the matter of differences with the Government of India. Secondly, he imagined that he had an intimate personal knowledge of the geography of the areas in dispute and declined to accept any maps or statements that did not accord with his views. Moreover, he was disposed to claim for Afghanistan everything that former Afghan monarchs had possessed, arguing that British occupation of India was a thing of yesterday, and that he had more right to press his claims to Kashmir and Delhi, than the Government of India had to talk of fifty years connection with the Waziris, Afridis, and Bajauris.

But he was not violent or discourteous, though in many respects difficult to deal with. He could not abide being contradicted, and Durand had constantly to be alert.

"It is necessary to forego all logical advantages, and to bring him to any desired point by indirect means, never putting him in the wrong, and avoiding most cautiously everything which can irritate him, or arouse his almost insane jealousy of interference with his internal affairs."

But on the whole Durand was impressed with his good humour and pleasantness. "One of his peculiarities" was his distrust of British maps. "That is no good," he used to say, "your maps are all wrong. I know. I have been there". In the beginning he gave the impression that he thought the maps deliberately false. "I always notice that when one of my alleged encroachments is concerned your maps make it very

big indeed; when we are talking of one of yours it is a tiny little thing". Nevertheless proceedings were generally quite amicable. >

As a rule very few officials were present in Durbar. Often the Sipah Salar and Pyne were the only two seated. Of those present Durand believed that Pyne was by far the most influential. He had, Durand reported, "by a remarkable mixture of courage, sagacity, and good temper...succeeded in gaining the complete confidence of the Amir". Officially he ranked third in the Durbar, the Sipah Salar and the Amir's uncle sitting above him, actually, he had far more power than either of them, Relations between Pyne and the Amir Durand described as "most intimate", indeed, one gathers that the term "affectionate" would not be misused in describing them.

Durand spoke glowingly of the services Pyne had rendered to him and to the Government of India and wrote, "though his ways are not our ways...his influence is consistently used for good". Durand gave him full credit for having lessened the Amir's suspicions and for having paved the way for the mission, and for having been of great use in Kabul. He concludes the eulogy by declaring him to be thoroughly loyal and well meaning, and by expressing the conviction that the Government of India was indebted to him more than to anyone else for the change which had come over the Amir. On the strength of this recommendation Kimberley attempted to get Pyne a Knighthood, but had to report that he was "vexed"

that he did not succeed.<sup>1</sup>

But whether through Pyne's influence or not, five weeks of patient negotiation brought an agreement more "satisfactory" than Durand had dared hope, for the Amir "practically gave up his claim to suzerainty over the independent frontier tribes". In order to attain this object Durand had to recognize the Amir's occupation of Asmar which he flatly refused to evacuate. He was left as well the Birmal Valley on the north-west corner of Waziristan, a tract which was occupied in winter when the Waziris had left it, by Afghan Kharoti herdsmen. Durand thought that the Amir might have been persuaded to give it up, but he would have been dissatisfied, and a friendly settlement was important. In any case, Durand had ascertained before conceding the point that there would remain a good line of communication around the rear of the Waziri tribes, an important factor in the Sandeman system of tribal management. The balance of the agreement was in favour of the Government of India. Durand felt no need to include Afridi country in the agreement since the Amir had practically withdrawn his claim to it before negotiations started. The Amir agreed to withdraw from Chageh, to accept the proceedings at New Chaman, to give up all claim to Wana, and to withdraw his claims to suzerainty over

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1. L.P. ix. vol. 5. No.76. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 15 December 1893. Durand got a K.C.S.I. He had expected a G.C.B. Sykes.op.cit. p.224.

all Pathan tribes from Chitral to the Persian border. In return his subsidy was increased by six lakhs, he was given Birmal, and allowed to keep Asmar, he was promised permission to import munitions from India, and was promised help in this respect by gifts from the Government of India. In fact, the concessions were well within the limits of those authorized except in the case of Birmal, and that was more than offset by gains in other areas. A frontier agreement and retirement from Shighnan and Roshan had been obtained at less cost than the Government of India had, in 1892, been prepared to pay for the former alone.

Concerning the minor questions Durand had no success. The Amir would not discuss trade, or his methods of punishment. He said he would continue to deport malcontents, and if India did not receive them he would kill them. The British agent was treated with contempt, but so were all natives of India treated in Afghanistan. Regarding Eastern Wakhan, he agreed to accept only a nominal suzerainty.

The agreements were signed on 12 November, 1893, and Durand was perfectly satisfied with them, since they were in no way forced on the Amir, but were the result of mutual concessions freely and willingly accepted, and with which the Amir expressed himself as thoroughly pleased. Durand had come to believe that the Amir, "though madly jealous of his independence, and by nature very suspicious...is at heart true to the British alliance".

Durand recommended that to get full benefit from the

agreement demarcation should be undertaken immediately, especially since the Amir, too, had expressed a similar desire. Lansdowne agreed that it was necessary to demarcate quickly for to fail to do so would be unfair to the Amir and would "constitute a neglect of our duty to the tribesmen".

( He affirmed,

"though nothing is further from our intentions than the annexation of tribal country on our frontier, we believe... that without annexation and without interference in the internal affairs of the tribes, it will be possible to bring them further within our influence, and to induce them to regard themselves as owing allegiance to us".<sup>1</sup> )


But Lansdowne's term of office was nearing an end. Throughout his viceroyalty he had chafed at the exigencies of relations with the Amir that had prevented him from applying effectively the tribal policy he had enunciated. Now, just as he was free to do so, he must leave. But to his successor he left a free hand in tribal territory, and also this advice,

( "All this is an immense gain, but it must not be supposed that the agreement...will, by itself, be sufficient to prevent all further trouble. I am convinced, on the contrary, that further trouble will arise unless advantage is taken of the settlement in order to put the affairs of the frontier upon a proper footing"<sup>2</sup>. )

The attempts of Elgin and Curzon to put frontier affairs "upon a proper footing" will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

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1. PSLI. No.2. (LP.1B.8) 3 January, 1894
  2. LP.xiii. Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne on the "settlement effected between Sir Mortimer Durand and [the] Amir of Afghanistan about [the] Indo-Afghan Frontier", 13 January, 1894.

# Waziristan



## WAZIRISTAN: ELGIN'S ATTEMPT TO PURSUE LANSDOWNE'S POLICY

Lord Elgin had visited the India Office after his appointment as Viceroy and had found that he was able "entirely to sympathise with the frontier policy put before me". This policy, strongly expressed by Lord Kimberley, was that there should not be any advance or assumption of fresh responsibilities "that might lead to an extension of British India", and says Elgin, "nothing could have been more complete than my acquiescence".<sup>1</sup>

But one of the first papers handed to Elgin in Bombay was a memorandum by Lord Lansdowne, prepared especially for Elgin's information, in which he summarised his tribal policy and made a case for moving forward frontier posts into tribal territory.<sup>2</sup> Elgin was "startled by this paper, which seemed...quite inconsistent with the policy professed at home", and without waiting for further information, he brought the matter to the attention of Kimberley in his first letter from India.<sup>3</sup> He must have been startled afresh by Kimberley's reply which, while deprecating the argument that further control of the passes was required on military grounds, and repeating that no fresh posts were to be established without reference to the India Office, still said, that "fresh posts might be necessary to secure

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1. F.P. vol.1. Elgin to Fowler, 10 July, 1894.
  2. L.P. xiii "Memorandum on the settlement effected between Sir Mortimer Durand and (the) Amir of Afghanistan about (the) Indo-Afghan Frontier". 13 January, 1894.
  3. F.P. vol.1. Elgin to Fowler, 10 July, 1894. This reference is to Elgin's recollection of the letter, which has not been preserved in the Elgin Collection. It may be in the Kimberley Papers.

tranquillity on the frontier; and that Sir M. Durand had stated that the Amir had spoken strongly of the necessity of our exerting ourselves to prevent raids, and injury being done to Afghan subjects.<sup>1</sup>

This apparent "volte-face" by Kimberley was, perhaps, more apparent than real. As long ago as 1884 he had

"suggested very confidentially to Lord Ripon to have the whole of our system of frontier defence carefully considered with a view to plans being formed for perfecting our communications by road and railway, such plans to be steadily pursued from year to year, until the system is complete."<sup>2</sup> Again, a year later, he declared himself to

be strongly of the opinion that India should have a "properly armed frontier".<sup>3</sup> Of course, these statements might be attributed to the state of Anglo-Russian relations in Central Asia at the time they were made, but certainly, Kimberley's view of frontier policy, as set out for Lansdowne's benefit, were not so positive as his comments to Elgin might indicate.<sup>4</sup> In any case, his views might have been modified by his conversations with Durand concerning the Kabul Convention.<sup>5</sup>

After his initial shock, Elgin set out to acquire information and opinions regarding the problem of the frontier, particularly as it applied to Waziristan, at that

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1. Ibid. Though Elgin says he has a copy of this letter it is not included in the Elgin Collection.
  2. Kimberley Papers (Private) Loose Papers. Kimberley to Ponsonby, 12 June, 1884. Quoted in Greaves, R.L. Persia and the Defence of India, London, 1959. p.4.
  3. PSLI. vol.43.no.38.10 March, 1885. Minute by Kimberley on this letter. Quoted in Greaves, p.32.
  4. See page above.104.
  5. See note 4, page139 above.



time the most disturbed border region. He solicited comments on the aims of the Government and the methods best suited to the accomplishment of these aims.

Bruce assumed the aims of Government to be, firstly, the establishment of friendly relations, and the identification of tribal interests with British interests. This would ensure that in time of emergency (i.e. of war with Russia) the resources of tribal country would be available to Government, that troops could be moved without fear of an enemy behind the lines, in short, that tribal country and its people would be a source of strength and not of weakness in the great scheme of Imperial defence. Secondly, routes and passes should be opened and safe lateral communications established. This would be an extension of the first object but would also have the beneficial peace time effect of increasing trade facilities. Thirdly, the condition of the tribes should be improved by the extension to them of the humanizing influences that would redeem them from semi-barbarity and help them to earn an honest livelihood.<sup>1</sup>

This is but a restatement of Lansdowne's policy of 1889<sup>2</sup>, which had been held in abeyance pending the outcome of the negotiations with the Amir. These negotiations had

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1. PSLI. vol. 75. No.122. 10 July, 1894. Enc. to Enc.No.1. Bruce to Fanshawe. 28 February, 1894.
  2. See above page. 140.

now been concluded and Bruce, supported by his Deputy Commissioners, argued that immediate steps should be taken to settle relations with the tribes as a necessary prerequisite to demarcation of the line laid down in the Durand Agreement.<sup>1</sup>

The plan put forward by the frontier officers was a far reaching one.<sup>2</sup> It included the occupation of Wana with a military force; the construction of outposts at Jandola, Tank, and in the Gomal; the opening of the route between Jandola and Wana by way of the Shahur Valley; the opening of the routes "via" Khaisara and Shakai to Sheranna and "via" Kanigoram, Makin, and Razmak, to Daur; and the occupation of the Tochi Valley. To protect these routes the construction of major fortifications and many levy posts was projected. Bruce also asked that a mobile military force should be placed at his disposal.

Military posts to dominate the country, a mobile military escort for the political officer- the terms are familiar. Bruce and his associates were obviously intent on emulating Sandeman. They hoped to create a second Baluchistan Agency. The motive of securing the peace of the administrative frontier is ignored in Bruce's list of objectives. Perhaps this was because that aim was implicit

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1. PSLI. vol. 75. No. 122. 10 July, 1894. Enc. to Enc. No. 1. Anderson to Bruce, 25 February, 1894. Ibid. King to Bruce. 22 February, 1894.
  2. Ibid. King to Bruce. 22 February, 1894. with notes and comments by Bruce.

in each of those stated, perhaps because, as was claimed, the Panjab system of frontier management had so far succeeded as to have made administrated territory practically secure against tribal raids.<sup>1</sup> But the "great object" was not administrative necessity but Imperial defence, and the idea of Imperial defence hinged on the "scientific frontier". This frontier could only be maintained if strategic lines of communication were secured and two of these lines, the Gomal and the Tochi, crossed Waziristan.

But however important the Gomal and Tochi might appear to military strategists, no one could argue that they compared in significance with the Khyber, and the Khyber had been kept open by agreement with the Afridis since 1881.<sup>2</sup> Fitzpatrick, who premised his argument on the assumption that the Khyber system worked because the tribes were aware that nothing but a right of way was required of them, maintained that if the Waziris could be similarly convinced, they would be unlikely to raise serious objections to the opening of the Tochi and Gomal routes.<sup>3</sup> Neither Bruce nor the Deputy Commissioners who served under him believed that the Khyber system could work in Waziristan. They argued that

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1. See above, page 35 .cf. PSLI. vol.75. No.122. 10 July, 1894. Enc to Enc. No.1. Note by Sir Denis Fitzpatrick on the Demarcation of the Waziri boundary. 25 March, 1894.
  2. See above page 33 . Also, Warburton. Eighteen Years in the Khyber 1879-1898. London. 1900.
  3. PSLI. vol.75. No. 122. 10 July, 1894. Enc.to Enc.No.1. Note by Sir Denis Fitzpatrick on the Demarcation of the Waziri Boundary. 25 March, 1894.

since the Khyber passed through a barren, uninhabited region, tribal quarrels could not affect the road and could be allowed to continue. In Waziristan, on the other hand, the routes passed through fertile, inhabited land, and the roads could only be made secure by keeping peace among the three mutually antagonistic tribes who shared the land.<sup>1</sup> In any case, roads alone were not enough, for if the roads passed through a hostile population, the effective strength of any army trying to use them would be greatly reduced, and problems of supply and transport made infinitely more difficult. The tribes had to be persuaded to open the roads, and also to become the friends and allies of Government.

Other considerations made it essential to exercise a measure of control over the Waziris. The Durand Agreement had made the Government of India, at least morally, responsible for the tribes and hence for the security of the Afghan border. The political officers believed that the tribes were angry that the Amir had consented to a demarcation without their prior consent, and also that he had separated Birmal from the rest of Waziristan.<sup>2</sup> These feelings of anger and resentment they expected to lead to

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No. 1. Bruce to Fanshawe. 28 February 1894.
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No. 1. Anderson to Bruce, 25 February, 1894.

raids into Afghanistan, and the only way to prevent them was by exercise of control.<sup>1</sup> This obligation to the Amir was one which the Government had not previously had and, the frontier officers argued, the Panjab Government was not equipped to discharge it. But even if fines, blockades, and punitive expeditions did succeed in making the Afghan border secure, these measures could never lead to the establishment of friendly relations, a "sine qua non" for the attainment of Government aims.

The frontier officers did not doubt that the methods which had been used in Baluchistan would be equally successful in Waziristan. Fitzpatrick pointed out that this was not necessarily the case.<sup>2</sup> Among the Waziris there were no powerful chiefs or Tumandars.<sup>3</sup> There were maliks, but their hold on the tribesmen was limited and an attempt to increase their control by artificial means did not guarantee success. Again, frontier officers argued from the fact that many petitions for British interference and even for British administration, had been received, but they did not consider, or if so they ignored, the possibility that most of these petitions came from those who thought that their private interests could best be served by hitching their

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1. Ibid. King to Bruce, 22 February, 1894.
  2. Ibid. Fitzpatrick's Minute, 25 March, 1894.
  3. The Baluch Chiefs held hereditary powers recognized by the tribes. Sandeman put them in a position where they could more effectively exercise these powers.

wagons to the British star. But despite these arguments, Fitzpatrick was willing to recommend some such scheme as that proposed by Bruce if it could be shown that the interests of Imperial defence demanded it.

Bruce and his officers aimed at complete control of Waziristan. They cleverly based their arguments on strategic necessity and thus appealed to many who would otherwise have condemned their expansionist tendencies. Their arguments, though they may have been in many cases specious, were hard to refute since they came from men with much frontier experience, and were supported by the highest placed military officers in India. Fitzpatrick, in his minute, performed amazing feats of balance. He came down firmly on neither side. His strongest arguments were destroyed by his qualifications. One is not surprised when Elgin writes that Fitzpatrick "told me himself that he had no policy in frontier matters";<sup>1</sup> and one cannot but understand that "even his friends admit it impossible from his note to discover what he wished to propose."<sup>2</sup>

When the various opinions had been received and assessed, Elgin prepared a despatch that made it immediately apparent that the policy which, in London, had won his "complete...acquiescence" had been discarded.<sup>3</sup>

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1. F.P. vol.L. Elgin to Fowler, 10 July, 1894.

2. Ibid.

3. P.S.L.I. vol. 75. no. 122. 10 July, 1894.

He put forward a three-fold justification for his apostasy.<sup>1</sup> Firstly, he argued, the Durand Agreement had imposed on the Government of India responsibility for the safety of the Afghan frontier; secondly, before the signing of the Durand Agreement obligations had existed in respect to the safety of roads and adjacent territories; and, thirdly, that the policy he was advocating, while increasing the influence of Government, did not mean annexation.

Kimberley had earlier approved, at least by implication, of the first proposition,<sup>2</sup> but Elgin felt no need to rely on this fact, rather he appealed to reason. The Durand Agreement had been designed, among other things, to keep the Amir out of Waziristan. It would be ridiculous to throw away the advantage gained by the agreement by allowing the Amir to send his troops into Waziristan to punish raiders himself. The alternative was to exercise enough control to prevent raids. The second obligation was no less clear, for the Government professed to keep the Gomal Pass open when in fact it was quite unsafe; it professed to protect administered territory when, in fact, the Zhob District was almost daily subjected to murder and pillage.<sup>3</sup> In this connection Fitzpatrick was in

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1. F.P. vol. 1. Elgin to Fowler, 10 July, 1894.

2. See above page 104.

3. The Gomal Pass was supposedly open, but raids were so numerous that by June, 1894, the Powindahs were threatening to leave it for the Zao Pass and the Zhob Agency. In the first five months of Elgin's Viceroyalty there were 27 killings and as many woundings plus numerous other outrages Enc. to Despatch of 10 July, 1894. PSLI. vol. 75. No. 122.

conflict with the forceful Sir James Browne, Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan, who was chafing at the dilatory fashion in which the Panjab Government was handling the Waziris.<sup>1</sup> With regard to the third proposition, everyone agreed that a general military advance and complete occupation and administration of tribal territory were out of the question. But what alternatives remained? One, Elgin described as "inactivity tempered by punitive expeditions", but to him this choice was unthinkable. He declared that he detested punitive expeditions not only because they gave such little return for the money spent on them, nor because their moral effect was a vanishing quantity, but because of their inhumanity. He painted a picture of soldiers marching through a whole country killing and destroying, as likely as not leaving the guilty untouched, and all because the resources of Government had not been equal to the task of apprehending a murderer or a robber. "I would", he says, "sanction a punitive expedition only as a last resort and I cannot subscribe to a policy that includes them as a probable, if not necessary result unless I am satisfied that no other expedient exists!"<sup>2</sup>

But he believed that there was another way. Direct administration was out of the question, but steps could be

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1. F.P. vol.1. Elgin to Fowler. 10 July, 1894. It will be remembered that a similar duel had been carried on between Sandeman and Sir James Lyall.
  2. Ibid.



taken to make the commission of outrages difficult, and to prevent the escape of criminals. More specifically, borders were to be protected, posts and caravan routes made secure, leading men and sections of a friendly persuasion protected, and a military post established at Wana to secure the safety of the Gomal route. In all this an attempt would be made to secure tribal co-operation by keeping interference in internal affairs at a minimum, and by encouraging the administration of justice through the tribal jirga system.<sup>1</sup> The letters from Bruce, Anderson and King, together with the petitions from certain sections of the Waziris, had indicated to him that a "prudent officer might secure the consent of the tribes to the preventive measures we think necessary", and, he maintained, "if that is admitted, I say it is our duty to try".<sup>2</sup>

Elgin was supported by the military members of his Council and they were primarily concerned with the "obligation" to protect certain roads. Sir E.H.H.Collen, the Military Member of Council, speaking several years later, declared that for many years all those who had considered the matter had come to the conclusion that "the line, or front, Kabul-Kandahar, is the strategic line which must be taken up should unhappily an attack be made on our ally i.e. Afghanistan." He pointed out at the same time the

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1. PSCI. vol. 75. No. 122. 10 July, 1894.
  2. F.P. vol.1. Elgin to Fowler, 10 July, 1894.

strategic significance of the routes to India from intermediate points along the line which were "capable of being made lines of communication". Indeed, he went so far as to

suggest that the aim of British policy should be "that Kabul and Kandahar should eventually be united by a railway, that the right flank should be connected by rail with India (Peshawar to Kabul); that on the left flank our railhead at Chaman should be pushed on seventy miles to Kandahar; that the railway through the Gomal and Zhob Valleys should be made, and if possible, Ghazni linked to India in the same way by the Tochi Route, or by a branch from the Gomal."<sup>1</sup>

Sir George White, the Commander-in-Chief, and Sir Henry Brackenbury held similar views, and it is quite likely that their advice, together with that of Lansdowne, Durand, and Cunningham, who had taken Durand's place as Foreign Secretary, persuaded Elgin to adopt a Policy to which he had, a few months earlier, declared himself to be antipathetic.

✓ In any case, he did not completely sacrifice his principles by adopting the full scheme advocated by Bruce. Instead, he put forward a policy which he felt to be the minimum necessary to the fulfillment of obligations, and extracted ✓ guarantees from his military colleagues that the post at Wana would not involve interference with the internal affairs of the tribes.<sup>2</sup>

The policy was approved in Council by the narrow majority of four to three. The dissenting members of Council, Pritchard, Westland, and Macdonnell, set forth their views

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1. Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 14 March 1906. "The Defence of India". A paper read by Lieut. General Collen
  2. H.C. Part 11. vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton. 18 March, 1896.

in a minute of dissent that accompanied the official despatch.<sup>1</sup> They argued that Government had a choice of two alternatives, either, to rest on the Administrative Boundary and attempt to influence the Waziris from without, the "close-border" policy, or, to assume direct administrative control up to the Durand Line. They dissented from a middle course which they felt would be but an expensive prelude to annexation. They noted that recent tribal raiding had been on the Gomal and Zhob areas which had recently come under British control, and from this fact drew the inference that the raids were positive indications of tribal antagonism to the forward move. Attempts to police the Afghan border would arouse greater antagonism, and the end would be a line of posts marching with the Durand Line, which had, indeed, been foreshadowed in Lansdowne's memorandum which had introduced Elgin to the frontier problem. The solution offered by the dissentients was to treat the Waziris in the same fashion as the Khyber Afridis were being treated.

Elgin dismissed the dissent as indicating a difference of opinion wider than was actually the case. Westland, he said, had admitted frankly that he knew nothing about the question, MacDonnell's experience was altogether in non-frontier districts, and Pritchard, though he had served in Sind, was "very difficult to move in any direction."

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1. PSLI. vol. 75. No. 122. 10 July, 1894. Enc. Minute of Dissent. 6 July, 1894.

Elgin had no doubt but that the dissent was the result of the quarrel between Fitzpatrick and Browne. The three Civil Service members of Council desired to support the Civil Service administrator in the Panjab. Indeed, Elgin maintained, they had acted together for similar reasons before, so that he had had to attempt, by cultivating friendly relations with them in their own departments and elsewhere, to break down regular coalition.<sup>1</sup>

In March, 1894, Lord Rosebery succeeded Gladstone as Prime Minister and in the ensuing Cabinet shuffle Lord Kimberley moved to the Foreign Office and Sir Henry Fowler became Secretary of State for India. Fowler relied on Sir Alfred Lyall for advice,<sup>2</sup> and Lyall prepared a memorandum to aid Fowler in his consideration of Elgin's policy despatch.

Lyall's opinion was that "We shall be found next winter, to assume a more or less direct charge of nearly all the tribal country which the Afghan border demarcation will have cut off from the Amir. We shall have to subsidise the tribes, to place military posts inside the country, to establish political agencies, and to attempt to postpone these consequences of what has been done, but they are inevitable".<sup>3</sup>

In effect Lyall said that Elgin would be unable to continue the policy he had marked out, that he would have to go much farther than he anticipated, and in the end adopt a policy similar to that contemplated by Bruce.

Elgin thought this "more than likely". He was, in fact, half

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1. F.P. vol. 1. Elgin to Fowler. 10 July, 1894.
  2. F.P. vol. 3. Fowler to Elgin. 6 July, 1894.
  3. F.P. vol. 3. Fowler to Elgin. 6 July, 1894. Quoting extract from a memorandum prepared for Fowler by Sir A. Lyall.

convinced that it might be better to adopt at once the "complete scheme", a course which Sir M. Durand approved. But on the other hand, in the light of Kimberley's instructions, he felt it to be his "duty to put forward the minimum that would in our opinion enable us to fulfill our obligations".<sup>1</sup> He agreed with Lyall that the consequences of past actions, and of obligations which had been undertaken, could not be ignored, but realized that "if we can secure ourselves by means that involve less interference with the tribes, we are bound to use these means first."<sup>2</sup> On one point he disagreed with Lyall who had treated the whole frontier from the Pamirs to the Persian Gulf in the same fashion. Elgin, in his thinking, made three divisions, which in order of importance he listed as the Quetta to Khyber region, the Northern region, and the Southern region.<sup>3</sup> In other words, the region considered to be most important was that through which routes led to the "scientific frontier"; least important, that region where Quetta and a dominant control over the tribes and the Bolan Pass had already been secured. Concerning the Quetta to Khyber section, he believed that unless the whole policy towards Afghanistan was to be reversed and the expenditure on it thrown away, control of tribal country had to be assured "either by means

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1. F.P. vol. 1. Elgin to Fowler. 31 July, 1894.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. He pointed out that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George White, agreed with him in this respect.

of the tribal organization or in spite of it".<sup>1</sup> He stated frankly, "Where our obligations and our interests are greatest I should not be afraid of the consequences which, it is probably true, must flow from the policy already adopted, though I think we may even here proceed tentatively". Where obligations were not so pressing, or interests not so acute, he would keep a "tight rein" on frontier officers and refuse assent to any advance of troops or increase of responsibilities.<sup>2</sup>

Bruce's appeal had been to one body of prejudice, Elgin appealed to another. He denied that "let them alone" expressed exactly the result of non-interference with the tribes. Rather it meant denying to them access to any civilising power, especially since boundaries had been drawn and other powers excluded. Therefore, if the tribes remained in a state bordering on savagery, and were as a result irreconcilable and hostile neighbours, the Government of India would have only itself to blame. Hence it was a duty, becoming to a great civilizing power, to lose no opportunity of improving the condition of the tribes. He put forward the thesis that the tribesmen were largely "laborious cultivators of the soil...the prey of petty rapacious chiefs", who desired nothing better than to be allowed to cultivate their lands in peace, but who were denied this simple right by the

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1. Ibid

2. Ibid

inability of their form of society to offer them protection.<sup>1</sup>

✓ On this basis he built support for his middle policy, a policy that would allow him to "proceed tentatively", a policy involving the irreducible minimum of interference. He argued that it would be unnecessary to interfere widely or to undertake local government or any definite control beyond a general keeping of the peace. This alone would ensure protection for the "laborious cultivators" who would consequently support the scheme, and who, if supported in turn, would deal with disorder under their own laws and  
 ✕ customs. That the humanitarian motive was not the predominating one is apparent when we remember that Elgin intended keeping a "tight rein" on his officers in areas where there was no vital interests to be considered. In other words, where the tribes could be used to serve the interests of Empire they would be exposed to the benefits of civilization, elsewhere they would be left to their own devices, "in a state bordering on savagery".

✓ Though Fowler had previously advised Elgin to "give very careful consideration to the drift of the policy of the Indian Government on the Western Frontiers of India" and to criticise closely proposals of military and political officers when they pointed "towards an enlargement of our existing responsibilities",<sup>2</sup> his reaction to the despatch of 10 July was that the policy it expressed was "in the

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1. Ibid.

2. F.P. vol.3. Fowler to Elgin. 6 July, 1894.

circumstances the wisest".<sup>1</sup> Fowler made this declaration believing with Lyall that expansion of control was inevitable, and if so, the best that could be hoped for was a "gradual movement in this direction...rather than a sudden assumption of the complete administration". With this in mind, he accepted Elgin's protestations that his proposals were "the minimum which...will, for the present, enable you to maintain order so far as concerns the territories for which you have assumed responsibility, the Amir's frontier, and the trade routes."<sup>2</sup> "For the present" is in this context a significant phrase, underlining Fowler's belief that control of the tribes would "in the nature of things develop".<sup>3</sup>

Fowler's official despatch though it accepted Elgin's policy did so in a chill disapproving tone. It stated

"I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure. I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable."<sup>4</sup> The dissimilarity in tone between Fowler's official and private letters may be due to the fact that he had to conciliate a Council of old Laurentians, whom he could not overrule on the financial aspect of the new policy.

Elgin had already authorised the Government of the Panjab to inform the Waziris by proclamation that a Commission

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1. F.P. vol. 3. Fowler to Elgin. 24 August, 1894.
  2. Ibid
  3. Ibid
  4. PSDI. vol. 20. No. 37. (Secret) 24 August, 1894.



✓ was about to be appointed to demarcate the boundary of Waziristan, and that at the same time a political officer would arrange for service allowances, levies, and other matters designed to establish permanent relations with the tribes, to pacify the country, to preserve order, and to open lines of communication.<sup>1</sup> On 12 September Bruce was informed that he had been appointed British Joint Commissioner for the demarcation of the Afghan-Waziristan boundary; that King, Anderson, and Grant had been appointed to assist him, and that he was to have a brigade of troops as an escort; that a permanent military post was to be established at Wana which would be the headquarters of the brigade during the demarcation proceedings.<sup>2</sup>

The force marched from Dera Ismail Khan in three columns on 11, 12, and 13 October. At Tank a "complete and representative jirga"<sup>3</sup> of Wana Ahmadzais met Bruce and asked for aid in the establishment of peace and security in their territory.<sup>4</sup> Bruce told them that a garrison was to be established at Wana and that territory in the immediate vicinity of the post would be considered as a protected area where reparation would be

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1. PSLI. vol.75. No. 122. 10 July, 1894.

2. PSLI. vol.77. No. 272. 21 November, 1894. Enc.1. India to Panjab. 12 September, 1894.

3. If a contemporary accounts are trustworthy, there was no such thing as a completely representative Waziri jirga. Maliks possessed influence but exercised a very limited control. Raverty.H.G. "The Independent Afghan or Pathan Tribes". A.G.R. v.viii. 1893-4 "Afghan Waziris and their country". A.Q.R. Jan. 1895. Wyllly.H.C. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. London.1912. Caroe.O. The Pathans. London.1958.

4. PSLI. vol.78. No.1. 2 January 1895. Enc.No.1. Bruce to Fanshawe. 20 October. 1894.

exacted for all breaches of the peace; that raids across the Amir's border were henceforth to cease; and, that disputes should be submitted to the British political officer for settlement. The Jirga immediately submitted a petition asking that these things be done.<sup>1</sup>

But Bruce was soon made aware that opposition was brewing, for though on 20 October he reported that "all indications seem to afford testimony of a cheerful and friendly spirit generally amongst the Waziris, both Darwesh Khel and Mahsuds, towards the British Government",<sup>2</sup> a week later he was informed that a certain religious leader, Mulla Powindah, had placed himself at the head of discontented factions and was intent on attacking Wana.<sup>3</sup> The discontented included those whose independent spirits rebelled at the thought of domination by any power, whose livelihood through plunder was threatened by the move to establish law and order, and whose relatives and friends had been jailed because of the murder of Kelly and the levies.<sup>4</sup> The Mulla addressed a letter to Bruce telling him that the gathering had no hostile intent but desired assurances that the Government had no intention

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Petition of Wana Ahmadzais. 19 October, 1894.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.1. Bruce to Fanshawe. 20 October. 1894.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.5. Bruce to India. 28 October. 1894.

✓ 4. The Mahsuds were good cultivators where conditions were suitable and excellent traders as well. Bruce said that the "Octroi" returns at Tank showed a remarkable increase after Sandeman's settlement of 1889. The increase being the result of a larger Mahsud trade. Certain sections lived largely by preying on the herds of the Darwesh Khel and Powindahs.

of occupying Mahsud country, and also that the prisoners should be released.<sup>1</sup>

Bruce refused to deal with the Mulla except through a "representative jirga" and advised him to disband his followers.<sup>2</sup> Turner, the officer commanding the brigade, was ordered to stand ready for an advance to break up the gathering. The Panjab Government approved this action, but advised caution about entering Mahsud country, since such a move would certainly be interpreted as a step towards the occupation of the whole of Waziristan.<sup>3</sup>

On 3 November about two thousand tribal swordsmen made a daring attack on the camp at Wana and inflicted heavy damage before they were ousted in severe hand-to-hand fighting.<sup>4</sup> Elgin warned Bruce not to take retaliatory action without the express consent of the Government and reminded him that he had gone to Wana with peaceable intent, not to conquer or dominate the country. He was ordered to reopen negotiations and to set terms that the maliks might find possible of fulfillment. The force at Wana was to be strengthened, not "to attack the Mahsuds but to deter the recalcitrant sections from any further acts of aggression".<sup>5</sup>

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1. PSII. vol. 78. No.1. 2 January, 1895. Enc. No.8. Panjab to India, 3 November, 1894.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No. 13. Panjab to Bruce. 4 November, 1894.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.9. Bruce to India. 3 November, 1894.
  5. Ibid. Enc. No.17. India to Panjab. 6 November, 1894.

On 19 November the Mahsud jirga was informed that they had until 1 December to meet Government terms which included the surrender of all looted property or its cash value, the surrender of hostages, and the banishment of the Mulla; non-compliance would result in military action.<sup>1</sup> On 25 November the jirga reported that they were ready to meet all the terms except the surrender of hostages and the banishment of the Mulla. Bruce asked for their final answer on the twenty-eight<sup>2</sup>. On the thirtieth they returned to say that they had succeeded in persuading the Mulla to disband his following and that he agreed with them that if they were given until 12 December they would be able to comply with all the terms<sup>3</sup>. On the eleventh they reported that they had received the assent of all the sections to all the terms which would be met on the following day. On that day, however, the hostages from the Shabi Khel and Abdalli sections refused to come in, though they had previously agreed to do so.<sup>4</sup> Thus, all Bruce's very hard work went for nothing, and he had to advise Government that there was now no alternative to the military expedition.

This affair illustrates the tremendous difficulties inherent in an attempt to bring the rule of law to an area like Waziristan. There was no power in the country, neither mulla nor malik, who was able to coerce these few tribesmen

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.43. Bruce to India. 19 November 1894.
  2. For terms see Ibid. Enc. No.19. Bruce to India. 7 November 1894.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.54. Bruce to India. 25. November. 1894.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.73. Bruce to India. 1 December 1894.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No. 107. Bruce to India. 12 December.1894.

on whose surrender had hinged the success or failure of the negotiations. Perhaps if the Government had taken Bruce's advice and had sanctioned a military demonstration to support the authority of the maliks when it had been flouted after the Kelly case,<sup>1</sup> the tribes might have been convinced that the Government was in earnest and the attack on Wana might have been prevented; or if the plea of the maliks had been heeded and they had been granted military support when they set out after the attack to negotiate with their fellows, it might have been possible to avert the expedition. But these "ifs" loom large when it is recalled that one or two recalcitrants who refused to surrender themselves, could, at the final minute, bring about the collapse of negotiations painstakingly conducted over many weeks.

With the collapse of negotiations, civil and military control in Waziristan was placed in the hands of General Sir William Lockhart, the Officer Commanding the Panjab Frontier Force, as had been previously planned,<sup>2</sup> and within a month troops had visited every part of Waziristan and had destroyed many villages.<sup>3</sup> Some effort had been made, at the insistence of Bruce, to protect the homes of those maliks who had remained faithful. Many of them had been employed as guides and post carriers, and also in pointing out the villages of

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1. See above page 62.

2. PSLI. vol. 78. No.1. 2 January 1895. Enc.No.59. India to Panjab. 29 November, 1894.

3. PSLI.Vol. 78. No.35. 20 February, 1895. The enclosures to this despatch give a full account of the military proceedings.

those who had been the leaders in opposition to the Government, or, perhaps, of those who had won the enmity of the "faithful maliks".

Lockhart had stiffened the terms of settlement and in doing so had made a most significant demand, the opening of the Shahur Valley between Jandola and Wana.<sup>1</sup> Though accepting the new terms, Elgin pointed out that the Shahur would have to be kept open by the Mahsuds themselves, since it was outside the scope of Government policy to establish a post there.<sup>2</sup> By the beginning of March all the terms imposed on the Mahsuds had been fulfilled and troops were withdrawn from Waziristan, with the exception of garrisons left at Wana, in the Tochi Valley, and at Barwand in the Shahur.<sup>3</sup>

The problems of demarcation and of redistribution of tribal allowances were still unsolved. To these had now been added the questions arising from the occupation of the Shahur and Tochi Valleys. It will be simpler if these are dealt with topically, rather than if a chronological narrative is attempted.

The Amir had originally agreed to send an Afghan Commissioner to work with the British so that the tribes could see that demarcation was a joint effort.<sup>4</sup> After the attack on Wana, however, he decided to leave the entire matter to the British Commission and advised the Government of India

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1. PSLI. vol. 78. No.35. 20 February, 1895.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid.

4. PSLI. vol. 78. No.1. 2 January, 1895. Enc. to Enc.67 Officer on Sepcial Duty, Kurrōm to Panjab. 23 November. 1894.

that he would accept its demarcation provided it conformed to the Durand Agreement.<sup>1</sup> It would appear that the Amir, conscious of his position as spiritual leader of the Afghans, and not wishing to jeopardise his own security by an overt act of co-operation with infidels, had decided to stand aloof in the face of tribal opposition to the British Commission.

But the absence of the Afghan Commissioner probably made the task simpler. In any case the work progressed rapidly. King began work on the southern section<sup>2</sup> on 28 January and finished it in fifteen days.<sup>3</sup> Lockhart then marched his force to the Tochi and Anderson began work in March. He finished in early May, having been delayed by bad weather.<sup>4</sup> The Commission had now completed its work. It remained for the Government of India to persuade the Amir to ratify the maps and make the demarcation official. This he did not do for some time.

Meanwhile the allowances question was being discussed. Elgin had instructed Lockhart that he should "avoid giving the impression that tribal allowances are still payable",<sup>5</sup> but Lockhart had found difficulty in reconciling this order with the fact that the Mahsud levies were still receiving allowances in mid-January, and Bruce had promised allowances to the maliks who had been of service during the expedition.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Ibid

2. The boundary was divided into two sections, from Domandi on the Gomal northwards to a halfway point. And from Charkiaghgar southwards to the same point. PSLI. vol. 78. No. 35 20 February, 1895.

3. Ibid.

4. PSLI. vol. 79. No. 96. 15 May, 1895.

5. PSLI. vol. 78. No. 35. 20 Feb. 1895. Enc. 23. India to Lockhart.

6. Ibid. Enc. 26. Lockhart to India. 15 Jan. 1895. (13 April. 1895.)

Elgin replied that he had no intention of repudiating payments that had been made, but he was concerned lest Government should be committed to the payment of allowances to those from whom fines and penalties were being extracted.<sup>1</sup>

The whole problem of tribal allowances was a thorny one. The settlement of 1890<sup>2</sup> had been made hurriedly and had not been very successful. Tribal organization was very intricate and was based on heredity. The system known as "nikat" or the tribal "sarishtha" fixed the share of each section, subsection, clan, and family and established the order of precedence of the head of every family, "his relationship with section and subsection, and the connection and standing of the whole to the parts, the parts to the whole. It was ...a tribal family tree, of which every main branch, every lateral and sub-lateral branch, is known to everyone down to the last twig and even the last bud".<sup>3</sup> By this system benefits were distributed and expenses met. It applied to Government allowances, booty, or fines assessed. Any settlement that did not conform to the system would have the seeds of failure within it, for it would create jealousies and heart burnings, rather than satisfaction. Bruce laboured assiduously to put his settlement on the right basis. In addition to preparing a genealogical tree he summoned jirgas, collected information from whatever source he could, and prepared a

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.27: India to Lockhart. 17 January, 1895.
  2. See above page 59.
  3. Caroe, Sir O. The Pathans London. 1958 pp.402-3.



comprehensive table showing all the tribal ramifications that had to be considered.<sup>1</sup> The whole scheme for the redistribution of allowances had been prepared, and accepted by the Government of India, by the end of June, 1895.<sup>2</sup> But the question of what was to be expected in return for the allowances had yet to be decided.

Fitzpatrick wished to issue a proclamation to the tribes making it quite clear that apart from certain routes that ran through their country the British had no interest in it, since it was not worth the money or trouble that administration would involve, and that an army forced to enter Waziristan would only stay long enough to punish offenders and would then withdraw.<sup>3</sup> Bruce objected to the idea of such a proclamation because, he said, to tribal minds excuses and explanations meant weakness, and Elgin, though he agreed with the general idea of a declaration of non-interference, was not prepared to commit himself to a wording as strong as that suggested by Fitzpatrick.<sup>4</sup> The result of the difference of opinion was that Bruce got his way. Perhaps he was genuinely concerned that the proclamation would have weakened the British position, but it is at least possible that he did not want to be bound by a declaration that represented the antithesis of his own ideas, especially

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1. PSLI. vol.85. No.58. 18 March, 1896. A genealogical tree and table contained in an appendix to Enc. to Enc. No.1 Bruce to Panjab. 26 May. 1895.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab. 28 June. 1895.
  3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. 47. Panjab to Bruce. 21 November, 1894.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.39. India to Panjab. 19 November, 1894.

at a time when there seemed to be opportunities of enlarging the territories under direct control. These opportunities were represented by petitions from the Wana Ahmadzais, the Urmars of Kanigoram, the Darwesh Khels of the Shakai Valley, and the maliks of Daur, all asking for British intervention in their countries and for administration in one form or another. That the petitioners were truly representative of the sections they professed to speak for is dubious, but in one or two cases, which will be pointed out, the petition may have represented genuine majority desires.

✓ The petition of the Wana Ahmadzais had asked for the establishment of peace and security on condition that no revenue should be collected, that there should be no forced labour, that supplies should be paid for at a fixed rate, that there should be no change in the proprietorship of land, that cases should be tried by tribal custom and by jirga, and that there should be an increase in their service allowances.<sup>1</sup> Bruce had accepted these terms<sup>2</sup> and the Government had approved his action.<sup>3</sup> The petitioners had probably been prompted by the fact that they inhabited a fertile plain, were comparatively prosperous, and hence obvious targets for plunder. The Government had been prompt to accept their offer because they felt it incumbent on them

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1. See above page 156. PSLI. vol.78. No.1.2 January 1895. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Petition of Wana Ahmadzais.10 October. 1894. Ibid. Enc.to Enc. No.70.Petition. 31 October.1894.
  2. Ibid.Enc.toEnc.No.70.Bruce to Panjab.16 November.1894.
  3. Ibid. Enc.No.71. India to Panjab.1 December,1894.

to keep order in the immediate vicinity of their military posts.

Other petitions were easily disposed of by being ignored. Among these was one from the Urmars of Kanigoram,<sup>1</sup> a non-Pathan people representing a small minority group in the midst of a Mahsud community. It is obvious why they would have welcomed British administration, and just as obvious why their petition was refused.

The other petition dismissed out of hand was from a group of Mahsud maliks and asked that if the Shahur Valley was occupied the whole of Mahsud country should be taken over and administered.<sup>2</sup> Fitzpatrick felt that this was intended to indicate the repugnance the tribe felt towards the idea of opening the Shahur,<sup>3</sup> but Bruce was convinced that the request was indicative of the genuine desires of the maliks.<sup>4</sup> This might well have been the case for the petitioners were those who had thrown in their lot with the British, and who, because of the lack of effective support, had suffered the murder of three of their number and had had to share in the general loss occasioned by the punitive expedition. The maliks possibly shared the views of the political officers that only direct administration could guarantee effective control over the Mahsuds and their own political pre-eminence. But the Government of India was no more prepared to accept the

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1. PSLI. vol. 78. No.35. 20 February, 1895. Enc.to Enc.13  
Petition. 17 December, 1894.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.50. Panjab to India. 27 January, 1895.

3. Ibid.

4. Bruce, R.I. The Forward Policy and Its Results. London.  
1900. pp. 296-297.

petition at face value than Fitzpatrick had been and it was dismissed.

The petition of the Shakaiwals<sup>1</sup> came in for considerably more discussion, involving an interpretation of what exactly the Government meant by non-interference. The Shakai Valley is situated to the north-east of Wana and is cut off from that area by a ridge of mountainous country. Its inhabitants, though Darwesh Khels, had no connection with the Darwesh Khels of the Tochi, since Mahsud country intervened between the two. They had, therefore, asked, that for all practical purposes their valley should be considered as a part of Wana, and that whatever arrangements were made for Wana should apply also to them.<sup>2</sup> Everyone agreed that the grouping together of Shakaiwals and Ahmadzais for the purpose of distribution of allowances was a measure of administrative expediency,<sup>3</sup> but Fitzpatrick felt that Bruce had more far reaching plans for the valley since he had declared his intention of putting Shakai on "precisely the same footing as Wana", a tract "which it has been determined to take completely in our possession and over which it has been resolved to establish something like an administration".<sup>4</sup> The Shakai Valley could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered as vital to the scheme of Imperial defence and Fitzpatrick therefore insisted

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1. PSII. vol. 78. No.35. 20 February, 1895. Enc. No.59. Panjab to India, 1 February, 1895.
  2. PSII. Vol. 80. No. 100. 20 May, 1895. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Petition. 21 January, 1895.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.1. Bruce to Lockhart. 22 January, 1895.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Panjab to India. 22 February, 1895.

that Bruce be forbidden to set up in the Shakai such a system of administration as had been established in Wana.<sup>1</sup>

Elgin would not admit that the Government had undertaken the management of Wana and was prepared to base the distinction between Wana and Shakai on the fact that there was to be a military post at the former place and none at the latter.<sup>2</sup> Fitzpatrick was still not satisfied for, he said, "We have practically taken possession of Wana, and determined to take upon ourselves to keep the peace there, decide certain civil disputes in a rough sort of way, and establish something like an administration".<sup>3</sup> These methods he maintained could not but involve interference with internal tribal affairs, while the avowed policy of Government was one of non-interference. Exasperated by Fitzpatrick's persistence, Elgin replied that he could not "accept the view...that in the arrangements made in Wana they had established something like an administration, but without further argument on that point they do not intend to establish anything of the sort in Shakai or to interfere with internal affairs there".<sup>4</sup> Bruce was disappointed that the insistence of Fitzpatrick had forced the Government into conformity with its declared policy.<sup>5</sup> In the case of the Shahur Valley the result was different.

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.9. Panjab to India. 3 April, 1895.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.10. India to Panjab. 5 April, 1895.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.11. Panjab to India. 6 April, 1895.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.12. India to Panjab, 12 April, 1895.
  5. Ibid. Enc. No.13. Bruce to India. 25 April, 1895.

Lockhart's reasons for demanding the opening of the valley were that the route offered the best means of communication. between the Panjab and Wana "via" Jandola; that it offered an alternative trade route to the Gomal; that it would, if fortified cut off the Mahsuds from Wana and the Gomal; and, that it would be a part of the scheme of "safe lateral communications".<sup>1</sup>

When he insisted that pacification of the country depended on the opening of the valley, Elgin decided, despite his earlier protestations, to allow Lockhart to establish levy posts on an experimental basis and to tell the tribe that if the experiment failed, Government might find it expedient to establish a military post.<sup>2</sup> But Lockhart was cautioned not to use this argument as a threat that would be binding on Government, since policy still precluded the permanent occupation of any Mahsud territory.<sup>3</sup> Lockhart now insisted on the establishment of a military post, if not on a permanent basis, at least until the levy system had been properly organized.<sup>4</sup> The political officers and Fitzpatrick supported him and Elgin finally agreed.<sup>5</sup>

But another argument developed over the location of the levy posts. Though called the Shahur Valley route, it followed the Shahur Valley only as far as its junction with the Khaisera Valley through the heart of Mahsud country,

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1. PSLI. vol. 78. No.35. 20 February, 1895.
  2. PSLI. vol. 78. No.35. 20 February, 1895.
  3. Ibid.
  4. PSLI. vol. 88. No.58. 18 March, 1896.
  5. Ibid.

or of a more southerly route "via" Karabkot skirting the edge of Mahsud territory. Advocates of the southern route said that it fulfilled all the conditions for which the route was being opened without the risk of being interpreted as a move to dominate the Mahsuds.<sup>1</sup> But Bruce and his associates wanted to dominate the Mahsuds, and if the posts followed the northern route they would have an excuse for entering Mahsud territory with a military escort and would thus be a step nearer to fulfillment of the requirements of the Sandeman system of tribal management.<sup>2</sup>

Both aspects of the Shahur question were discussed at length by the Governor General in Council. Elgin found himself in a minority supporting Bruce and Lockhart, but since he did not wish to overrule his council he referred the case to Hamilton for a decision.<sup>3</sup> Sir George White, who on this occasion voted with the civilians, drafted the dissentient view.<sup>4</sup> Both sides were aware that the post would be contrary to the policy laid down in the despatch of 10 July, 1894, but Elgin argued that it was unreasonable to bind him to decisions that had been made in a time of geographical ignorance.<sup>5</sup> The dissentient view was that Government was indeed bound by the declaration of 1894 to a policy of strict non-intervention

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1. PSLI. vol. 88. No.58. 18 March, 1896.
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Bruce to Panjab. 26 May, 1895.
  3. H.C. Part II. vol. II. Elgin to Hamilton, 18 March, 1896.
  4. H.C. vol. 2. Elgin to Hamilton, 18 March, 1896.
  5. PSLI. vol. 85. No.58. 18 March. 1896.

and that the retention of the post at Sarwekai,<sup>1</sup> a distinct modification of the policy sanctioned, was being advocated to establish a precedent for modification elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

Elgin contended that though retention of the post would violate the letter of his policy, it would not compromise the principles on which that policy rested. The policy was concerned with getting such influence in tribal country as would prevent trouble that would lead to interference in internal affairs. Everyone agreed that the establishment of a dominating position in the heart of tribal country was the surest way of acquiring control. Thus the post would be the best insurance against Government interference with the internal affairs of the Mahsuds.

Hamilton expressed his opinion in favour of the southern line for the levy posts, but left the problem of the retention of the garrison to Elgin.<sup>3</sup> In the Council of India only Sir Stuart Bayley minuted on the subject and he supported Elgin, though he did point to the necessity of looking into the financial aspect of the question before a decision was finally taken.<sup>4</sup>

Elgin decided to keep the post at Sarwekai, though in deference to Hamilton's opinion he adopted the southern line for the levy posts.<sup>5</sup> Grant, the political officer in

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1. The Post had originally been set up at Barwand but had been moved to Sarwekai for the sake of the troops' health.
  2. PSII. vol.85. No.58. 18 March, 1896.
  3. PSDI. vol.22. No.19. 8 May, 1896.
  4. PSDI. vol.22. Note by Sir S.Bayley on Letter from India No.58. 18 March, 1896.
  5. H.C. Part II. vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton 28 July, 1896. Enc. Elgin to Fitzpatrick. 5 July, 1896.



the area, thereupon promised the Shaman Khels of the valley protection against the mulla Powindah, who, it was alleged, was attempting to stir up trouble in that valley and in the Tochi.<sup>1</sup>

This sequence of events is to some extent typical of the way trans-frontier interference was extended. In 1894 the experts had declared that the occupation of Wana was essential to the safety of the Gomal. Wana had been occupied and tribal opposition punished by a military expedition. Then it was realized that the occupation of Wana had been premature, since the Shahur Valley was a much more suitable site for a post. The Shahur was occupied, firstly for the duration of the expedition, then until levy posts had been established, then on a more permanent basis. Finally the tribes of the valley had been guaranteed protection. Government was now morally bound to maintain a post in the valley, since those to whom protection had been promised could not be forsaken. Meanwhile the forces could not be withdrawn from Wana either, because the tribes there had been given similar guarantees. The officers on the spot, civil and military, found it possible from time to time, to present a "fait accompli" which they justified on the grounds of local knowledge and experience, or of immediate expediency.

Elgin regretted that the maintenance of the post at Sarwekai would preclude "the continuance of the policy of

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1. PSLI. vol.88. No. 182. 14 October, 1896. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 13 July, 1896.

strict non-interference,<sup>1</sup> though it is not clear why he concluded that a post at Wana was compatible with the ideal of non-interference while a post in the Shahur Valley was not. He knew that he would be charged with inconsistency and rationalized his action by declaring, firstly, that the exercise of the control recommended by the local officers would make pacification of the country more secure, since it would bring about "in Waziristan very much the same state of things as in Baluchistan"; and, secondly, that

"with these opinions of the local authorities on record, the insistence on what they will term the 'withdrawal' from Barwand will not give the policy of strict non-interference a very good chance of success. Not that the officers would consciously fail to do their utmost.....but still they would have hanging about their necks a terrible load of their own predictions."2

If we remember that in 1894 Elgin had put forward a policy involving the bare minimum of interference, which he was sure would increase with time as his policy moved towards administration, the charge of inconsistency falls to the ground in any case.

The establishment of the post did lead to a modification of policy, for when Grant requested permission to interfere authoritatively to stop inter-tribal quarrelling in the area under his jurisdiction, Elgin, with Hamilton's consent, agreed though he "would have preferred to have given a longer trial to a more complete system of non-interference having regard... to our profession of 1894."<sup>3</sup> Significantly, he pointed out to

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1. H.C. Part II. vol. II. Elgin to Hamilton. 18 March, 1896.

2. Ibid.

3. H.C. Part II. vol. II Elgin to Hamilton, 28 July, 1896.  
Enc. Elgin to Fitzpatrick. 5 July, 1896.

Fitzpatrick that

"the decision to retain the military post at Sarwekai means that we are to interfere to the extent which you are now authorizing Grant to interfere, i.e., to insist by force, if necessary, that disputes shall be settled without fighting".

This degree of interference was now to be adopted "as a general system" and Fitzpatrick was instructed to give orders to his political officers to that effect.<sup>1</sup> But Elgin clung to the remnants of non-interference. Disputes were to be settled "by such proceedings as are customary, jirga, or arbitration, or the like", and while the political officers were to give assistance and advice, they were in no circumstances to

"carry off any offenders to be tried by British methods... nor to undertake the responsibility of adjudicating...in any case or of interfering in any other capacity than that of 'amicus curiae'".<sup>2</sup>

If Elgin decided, despite strong opposition, to garrison the Shahur Valley, there could be no doubt about his attitude towards the Tochi; for since it was supposed to be one of the major routes into India, leading to Ghazni, one of the key positions on the "scientific frontier", policy demanded that it should be occupied.

Elgin and his military advisers were anxious to establish a military post in the valley and a Dauri petition for aid against the Darwesh Khels provided the excuse for interference.<sup>3</sup> But a petition, even a genuine one, was not

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. PSLI. Vol. 79. No.96. 15 May, 1895. Enc. No.15.

alone sufficient justification for occupation and other arguments were produced. It was stated that the increased geographical knowledge acquired during the expedition and the demarcation proceedings had changed expert opinion regarding the importance of Wana, which dominated neither Darwesh Khels nor Mahsuds, and though it did give protection to the Gomal, that route was itself less important than had been believed, since it was sparsely furnished with fodder and had a poor water supply. From the point of view of tribal control or military strategy the Tochi was far superior to Wana as the site for a cantonment.<sup>1</sup> We must not lose sight of the fact that for several years military officers had been desirous of obtaining control of the Tochi, that its occupation had been foreshadowed by Lansdowne, and had been part of Bruce's original scheme. There was no question of abandoning Wana, but Elgin thought that the establishment there could be so reduced as to make possible the construction of the posts at Wana and in the Tochi at a total cost not exceeding that which had been allocated for Wana alone. To this argument Major General Sir O.T. Burne added the speculation that the Tochi cantonment could take the place of the Bannu post, which was located in an unhealthy area, and thus further savings would be effected.<sup>2</sup>

Fitzpatrick opposed the idea. He thought that the advantage of securing a greater hold on the tribes would be

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1. PSLI. Vol. 79. No. 96. 15 May, 1895.

2. PSM.A. 105. note by Major General Sir. O.T. Burne. 12 July, 1895.

outweighed by the concomitant increase of responsibilities.

He said,

"It is hopeless to expect that if we advance up the Tochi and establish ourselves at Razmak<sup>1</sup> or elsewhere we shall find a resting place there. The further we advance the further we shall be drawn on by the force of circumstances and the zeal of subordinates, and even when we had established complete dominion over the whole of Waziristan up to Durand's Line, we should find rest there only so long as the country across the line might happen to be held by a ruler who could maintain effective control over it." 2

The Civilian members of Elgin's Council also opposed the scheme. Elgin was bitter about this and in his private letters to Hamilton bemoaned the fact that these men who had earlier declared that they knew absolutely nothing about military or strategic matters, were nevertheless allowed to vote on issues involving these things, and what was worse used their votes to oppose his policies.<sup>3</sup>

The majority of the Secretary of State's Council was also opposed, and Sir Donald Stewart spoke for the group. Bruce, he said, wanted to get complete control of the tribes and to achieve this he appealed to the prejudices of those who had to deal with his proposals. As for those who were not primarily concerned, as was Bruce, with administration, there were two groups

✓ "irresponsible and ambitious soldiers...who would support and applaud any scheme that is likely to bring them the chance of active employment and distinction...and the philanthropist who believes the border tribes are savage barbarians... and who would be tickled with the idea of Mr. Bruce's system of civilization and...would probably be of the opinion that the

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1. Razmak was in the Shahur Valley, not the Tochi.
  2. PSII. Vol.79.No.96. 15 May 1896. Enc. No.28. Panjab to India. 21 April. 1895.
  3. H.C. Part.II. Vol.1. Elgin to Hamilton. 20 October, 1895.

end justifies the means though the means involves the expenditure of a good deal of powder and shot in the process".<sup>1</sup>

Stewart dismissed the idea of the strategic importance of the Tochi and declared that if the British Government wanted to take over the administration of tribal territory up to the Durand Line, it should be done openly and the consequences accepted; but the Secretary of State should not be a party to a system of "veiled annexation under the cloak of strengthening our frontier defences".<sup>2</sup> Sir Stuart Bayley gave the minority view that only strategic considerations should decide the issue, and if the authorities on the spot were convinced of the importance of the Tochi, the opportunity to secure it without an expedition and without tribal conflict, should not be allowed to slip by.<sup>3</sup>

Though Hamilton felt that it was "undesirable that the Secretary of State in his wish to help the Indian Government should be too often forced to dissociate himself from his Council",<sup>4</sup> on this occasion he overruled the Political and Secret Committee and sanctioned Elgin's proposals,<sup>5</sup> but he pointed out the need for precise estimates of costs since his Council looked on themselves as the "statutory guardians of the Indian treasury".<sup>6</sup> His preoccupation with the control of his

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1. PSLI. Vol. 79. Note by Sir Donald Stewart on Letter from India No.96. 15 May, 1895.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Note by Sir S. Bayley, 21 June, 1895.

4. H.C. Part I. Vol.L. Hamilton to Elgin. 2 August. 1895.

5. E.C. Vol. No.97. Godley to Elgin. 30 July. 1895.  
cf. PSDI. Vol.21. No.27. 9 August, 1895.

6. H.C. Part.I. Vol.I. Hamilton to Elgin. 2 August, 1895.

Council over finances was expressed again a few weeks later when he wrote of the great desirability of Elgin's proposals "if they could be carried out and maintained at a reasonable cost".<sup>1</sup> His Council, he said, opposed any forward move on principle and did not weigh the merits of individual cases. He, on the other hand, in any particular case tried to balance strategic and political gain against the financial drawbacks. But when, as in the case of the Tochi, the movement forward was part of a well co-ordinated plan for improving frontier defences the weight had to be thrown into the military and political scale.<sup>2</sup> This shows that Hamilton, like Elgin, accepted the strategic argument for the occupation of the Tochi, and accepted as well the "well co-ordinated plan", which could only have been the occupation of all roads leading to the "scientific frontier". Perhaps the influence of Lansdowne and Roberts was a factor in bringing him to this way of thinking.

✓ Anderson had, meanwhile, prepared a scheme for the administration of Upper and Lower Daur, that is that portion of the Tochi Valley inhabited by the Dauris, based on tribal requests and the necessity of securing Government aims in the area.<sup>3</sup> ✓ He recommended a revenue settlement of one-tenth of the gross produce, the establishment of schools and dispensaries, the appointment of officers to decide civil

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1. H.C. Part I. Vol. I. Hamilton to Elgin. 23 August, 1895.

2. Ibid.

3. PSLI. vol. 84. No. 1. 1 January, 1896. Enc. to Enc. No. 1. Anderson to Panjab. 6/10 September, 1895.

and criminal cases, in fact that this much of Waziristan, at least, should be brought under complete control. Elgin, though admitting that the establishment outlined by Anderson indicated "an intention of exercising at once a larger interference and incurring a greater outlay than had been contemplated by the Government of India and sanctioned by the Secretary of State", nevertheless, accepted the main proposals,<sup>1</sup> and on 31 October, 1895, Anderson met the Dauri jirga and explained to them the form the administration of the valley would take.<sup>2</sup>

The jirga accepted his proposals and since it had not been possible to have their lands measured offered to demonstrate their good will by an annual payment of Rs.6000 for three years, after which they would accept the figure of one-tenth. The maliks also recommended the rights of "sayyids, mullas, fakirs, and Hindu Brahmins" to contributions from the general treasury, and offered, in addition to the sum already promised a further amount of Rs. 2000 to pay these costs. The share of the revenue to be contributed by each village was apportioned by the jirga.<sup>3</sup>

This settled affairs of the Dauris but made no provision for the conduct of relations with the Darwesh Khels of the Tochi area. In discussing this problem Anderson first distinguished between "authoritative" and "unauthoritative"

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab. 18 October, 1895.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Anderson to Fanshawe. 2 November, 1895.

3. Ibid.



interference. He assumed that wherever factional or personal disputes threatened to interfere with the safety of roads, posts, or administered territory, the political officer would be justified in interfering authoritatively, that is with force. On the other hand, though bound to interfere as little as possible, he should not hesitate to use, "unauthoritatively," his personal influence to help settle inter-tribal, or inter-factional disputes.<sup>1</sup> Of course, the principle of "authoritative" interference in the vicinity of military posts had already been accepted by Elgin.<sup>2</sup>

Anderson also made a practical suggestion for the improvement of the management of the area. As matters stood, the Political officer in the Tochi, the Deputy Commissioners of Bannu and Kohat, and the officer on special duty in Kurram, each had one or more sections of the Darwesh Khels under their jurisdiction. To obtain unity of management, Anderson suggested that the political officer in the Tochi should be designated the political officer for north Waziristan and given complete control over all Darwesh Khels from Daur to the borders of Bannu, Kohat, and the Kurram Valley. He would be able to keep in touch with all of them since each section passed through North Waziristan at least once each year on their seasonal migrations, but to make the arrangement more efficient a road from Daur to Thal would permit the Tochi

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Anderson to Panjab. 6/10 September 1895.

2. See page 173 above.

officer to meet regularly with the officers from Bannu and Kurram and settle cases involving their territories. Bruce had previously recommended separate political officers for north and South Waziristan, and Fitzpatrick also approved the scheme.<sup>1</sup> Elgin accepted the proposals and two new political agencies were born, South Waziristan with headquarters at Wana, and North Waziristan based on the Tochi.<sup>2</sup>

Bruce thought that the time had now come when positive action was all that could consolidate what had been gained and cheaply and effectively lay the foundation for a peaceful tribal state under direct administrative control.<sup>3</sup> To those who maintained that the tribes were not in a receptive mood, he replied that opposition had come from a comparatively small, unruly group who opposed the increase of the authority of the maliks, a group who had profited greatly from the plunder of the Powindah and other traders in the Gomal and Zhob districts, a group who were jealous because of the inequalities of the 1889 distribution of allowances, and a group of religious fanatics led by the Mulla Powindah. On the other hand, the willingness with which troops had been received in many areas, the services that had been rendered by the maliks, and the many petitions, showed an earnest desire of large numbers of tribesmen for peace and good government.

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 12 October, 1895.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab. 18 October, 1895.

3. PSLI. Vol.85. No.58. 18 March, 1896. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Bruce to Panjab. 26 May, 1895.

The presence of troops and civil officers in the country to support the maliks had led to compliance with heavy terms. This, Bruce felt, proved his contention that the maliks, if properly supported, could wield great influence. To follow up the advantages that had been gained, he called for the establishment of a strong military position at Razmak in the Shahur Valley, outposts at positions of secondary importance, perhaps Wana and Sheranna, and strong, mobile military escorts for the political officers. Thus would the conditions be established for the application of the Sandeman system, and to attempt to influence the tribes by means other than those applied by Sandeman would, in Bruce's opinion, lead only to punitive expeditions.

But Elgin declared that he was not prepared to go so fast as Bruce wished and that he was determined to maintain that policy "which we distinctly enunciated, and to which our actions hitherto led up".<sup>1</sup> But what was that policy? The whole progress of affairs in Waziristan seemed to be a steady movement towards complete administrative control, but paradoxically, the directors of the policy persistently denied any intention of doing precisely what they were doing. Sir Alfred Lyall was shrewd enough to see the answer. He saw that the despatch of 1894 did not bring out any important differences between Bruce's scheme and that of Elgin. The principal distinction was that while Bruce would have

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1. H.C. Part II. Vol.I Elgin to Hamilton. 29 October, 1895.

immediately, begun negotiations with the Waziris for the introduction of military and tribal

"arrangements which would be necessary for bringing Waziristan under firm British control, for the pacification of the country, keeping peace on the ...border, and opening up military roads, - the Government of India preferred not to announce a definite scheme of administration, but rather to proceed step by step, ascertaining by experiment how far it was necessary to go for the fulfillment of obligations". 1

This is the whole point of Elgin's policy. He was convinced that the exigencies of Imperial defence demanded that a measure of control should be exercised in Waziristan, and he was determined that this control should be exercised with tribal co-operation or in spite of it.<sup>2</sup> He also believed that the extension of administration was quite probably inevitable, but still he was prepared to "proceed tentatively", step by step, interfering when he thought it to be essential, and even keeping the interference at a minimum. Both Fowler and Hamilton agreed with this approach.

But if neither Elgin, nor the Secretary of State, felt themselves bound by any firm, inflexible principle of non-interference, why did their official correspondence persistently maintain such a principle. Again Lyall gives the answer,

✓ "these disclaimers were usually inserted to conciliate those members of the Council who were against the forward policy and as long as the Government of India were permitted and encouraged to continue that policy any one could foresee that the disclaimers must soon fall of themselves before the logical consequences of a changed situation." 3

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1. PSDI. Vol.20. Note by Sir A.Lyall on Letter from India No. 122, 10 July 1894.
  2. F.P. Vol.1. Elgin to Fowler. 10 July, 1894. Ibid. Elgin to Fowler. 31 July, 1894.
  3. PSDI.Vol.20.Note by Sir A.Lyall on Letter from India.No.122 10 July, 1894.

Dissenters in Elgin's Council had argued against his policy because it would lead to the occupation of the whole of Waziristan. Lyall, Fitzpatrick, Fowler, Bayley, Hamilton, and Elgin himself, agreed that it probably would, but they maintained that the obligation to pacify the whole country could no longer be avoided. Since 1889 the forward move had been sanctioned and Government would have been illogical indeed to refuse to pay the cost of what it had itself set in train. The best it could do was to postpone the inevitable for a time. Hamilton expressed the same idea in somewhat different words:

"There is a pressure, one might almost say a law behind us, which inevitably forces us forward; but our progress ought to be the more cautious from our past experience of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of retracing our steps." <sup>1</sup>

Elgin knew that direct unilateral action would destroy even the fiction of non-interference. He therefore aimed at control through tribal consent, and as a step in this direction he adopted Anderson's idea of a distinction between "authoritative" and "unauthoritative" interference.<sup>2</sup> There was no question of setting out to "authoritatively establish the peace in Waziristan as a whole", therefore, the whole of South Waziristan could not be included in the "area of control" of the officer at Wana, nor the whole of North Waziristan in the "area of control" of the officer in the Tochi, in the sense that their powers would be the same throughout the whole of their respective jurisdictions.<sup>3</sup>

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1. H.C. Part I. Vol.I. Hamilton to Elgin. 12 September, 1895.

2. H.C. Part II. Vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton. 1 September, 1896.  
Enc. Barnes to Fitzpatrick, 28 August, 1896.

3. Ibid.

"Both officers would be instructed within certain limits always to interfere authoritatively; within certain other limits, necessarily somewhat indefinite,...they would be allowed a discretion, but beyond certain limits...they ought certainly not to interfere authoritatively, if at all, without obtaining permission." 1

Generalization was impossible because circumstances differed according to the nature of the tribe, the troops at the disposal of the political officer, and the efficiency of the levy system. Where troops were stationed the officer should interfere authoritatively, because there he could do so with success, elsewhere he should use his influence to keep the peace. Between places and cases where interference should be authoritative and where it would be impossible or useless to interfere at all, there were many gradations and only the officer on the spot could judge how far he could go without failure. Therefore, Elgin argued for greater freedom of action for the political officer. If he were free to decide when to offer advice, when to use levies to support the maliks, when to appoint jirgas, when to withhold allowances or support; and if he were "persona grata" with the tribes; and if he remembered the cardinal principle of interfering authoritatively only when success was assured; his influence would grow and as the tribes realized the advantages of a quiet life applications for his help would increase in number and peace would gradually come to the border.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. Elgin's attempt to get the Panjab Government to change its administrative practice and give their frontier officers more independence did not succeed. The Government of India was still awaiting proposals from the Panjab when the tribal uprising of 1897 occurred.

The interference, whether "authoritative" or "unauthoritative", would depend on the tribal jirga system. In this Elgin's views conflicted with those of Bruce who would, by manipulation, which Fitzpatrick called "packing the jirga"<sup>1</sup> and Hamilton called "challenging the jurors"<sup>2</sup> have obtained the decisions he desired and then enforced them at the point of the bayonet, in the name of supporting the maliks. Elgin would not accept the position that the maliks should be supported by military expeditions. In reply to a request from Bruce that the Shakai maliks should be given a firm promise that they would be given the same support as servants of Government,<sup>3</sup> he said,

"The affairs of Waziristan are, under the orders of the Secretary of State, to be administered in accordance with local custom, and it is far from the wish of the Government of India that the weakness of the maliks should ultimately result in our having to occupy the whole of Waziristan. The maliks must be presumed to act on their own responsibility. While it may be expected that the tribesmen will not forget the experience of the past winter the military expedition, but will fear the probable consequences of retaliating on their maliks." 4.

This was hardly fair because the maliks, though acting on their own responsibility, were doing government work, and besides, the expedition had not been directed against the tribes because of their retaliatory action against the maliks but rather because of the attack on Wana.

The insistence of Fitzpatrick that the maliks would not

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1. PSLI. Vol.82. No.196. 9 October, 1895. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Panjab to Bruce. 22 July, 1895.
  2. H.C. PartI. Vol.I. Hamilton to Elgin. 22 November, 1895.
  3. PSLI. vol.82. No.196. 9 October, 1895. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 11 July, 1895.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.3. India to Panjab. 2 August, 1895.

long continue to work for Government without a promise of protection,<sup>1</sup> persuaded Elgin to let it be known to the tribes that any outrage against a malik for the part he had played in a jirga would be an offence for which the Government would be entitled to call the tribe to account under the third condition of the arrangement which provided for the surrender for trial and punishment of offenders against the state, public servants, or the persons who work for Government.<sup>2</sup> The compromise did not satisfy Bruce for it did not commit Government to support the Maliks. But Elgin refused to place the Government of India at the mercy of any "wild ruffian who from personal enmity, blood feud, or desire to create a disturbance murdered or attacked one of these men".<sup>3</sup>

Elgin's views in this matter were in line with his idea of non-interference, and a tentative, step-by-step advance. He would encourage the maliks to exercise such authority as they possessed on their own responsibility, and if an outrage were committed against one of them the political officer would adhere to the policy of setting the tribal machinery of justice in motion. If satisfaction were not forthcoming, the punishment would be economic, not military. If the system did break down, there would be no reversion to the punitive expedition, but, the whole issue would be placed squarely before the tribes and they would be informed

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Panjab to India. 4 September, 1895.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.6. India to Panjab. 25 September, 1895.

3. H.C. Part II. Vol.I Elgin to Hamilton. 29 October. 1895.



that there would have to be a modification of the tribal system which was not working either from inherent defects or because the tribesmen were not co-operating. In either case the modification would be justified.<sup>1</sup> We must assume that by "modification" Elgin meant an increase of administrative control.

Three factors make Elgin's policy comprehensible. Firstly, he relied implicitly on the advice of experts in matters affecting the defence of India. This tendency first appeared early in his Viceroyalty. He had come to India firmly convinced that there should be no extension of trans-frontier responsibilities. Lansdowne's minute had begun the work of conversion and the advice of men like Sir George White, Lockhart, Collen, Cunningham, and Bruce had completed it. He consistently ridiculed the idea of civilians expressing opinions on strategic matters and of men without frontier experience daring to have views of their own on frontier problems. Civilians on his Council voted not against his policies, which they could not possibly judge, but for Fitzpatrick, a fellow civilian. This, of course, implies that Elgin's policy was not his own but that of his expert advisers. In fact, it was Lansdowne's; for he and the military experts had stated the policy in general terms, and the Durand Agreement had made possible its application. Elgin attempted to apply the policy which Lansdowne

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
1. Ibid.

enunciated. Secondly, Elgin had a strong sense of duty and honour. The Government of India had willingly entered into agreements with Afghanistan and the obligations imposed by these agreements could not be put to one side, they had to be met in full. Thirdly, he was imperialist enough to believe that British rule would be of inestimable benefit to the tribes and that sooner or later they would recognize this fact.

Once Elgin had accepted the position that the needs of Imperial defence demanded the extension of British control in Waziristan, he realized that it was incompatible with the ideal of strict non-interference. He attempted to compromise, to preserve the ideal and at the same time provide for the defence of India and fulfill other obligations. The dissentients to the despatch of 1894 had declared the task impossible and in a measure they were right. The aims of policy could only be secured through interference. Then he tried to keep that interference at a minimum cannot be doubted, but it was easy to be drawn on by ambitious officers and military men enamoured of the latest strategical fad. It was all the more easy when the principle was accepted that the destiny of independent tribal territory was to be drawn within the confines of British India. In this context Elgin's policy, or rather Elgin's application of Lansdowne's policy, appears not only comprehensible, but as Fowler said, perhaps "in the circumstances the wisest"<sup>1</sup>.

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1. F.P. Vol.3. Fowler to Elgin, 24 August. 1894.



# Dir and Chitral

Scale of Miles  
10 15 20 30

## LORD ELGIN'S CHITRAL POLICY: A POLITICAL CONTROVERSY.

We must now take up another of the major frontier problems with which Elgin contended, that of Chitral. The genesis of the problem has already been traced in chapter two but at this point a brief recapitulation is necessary. Chitral had a two-fold significance. In the first place, only the narrow, unfortified Wakhan "tongue" separated it from Russian territory; and secondly, the Chitral-Kunar Valley led to Jalalabad and offered a road by which a Russian force might be able to advance to threaten a British move towards Kabul via the Khyber. Cross, Lansdowne, and Kimberley had all agreed that British influence in Chitral had to be maintained, and an important point in Lansdowne's policy had been the opening of a direct road from Peshawar to Chitral.

When Lansdowne left India the Chitral throne was occupied by Nizam-ul-Mulk who had attained this position with the help of British arms, and who received continuing support from a British political officer, Captain F. Younghusband, who had been left at Chitral with his military escort. Kimberley had sanctioned this position as a temporary measure, pointing out that if Durand's negotiations at Kabul were successful, if the Russians signed a satisfactory agreement concerning the Pamirs, and if the "frontier officers succeed in dispelling the suspicions and irritations of the frontier tribes", occupation would no longer be necessary.

Lord Elgin, in the early days of his Viceroyalty, hoped

that the Durand Agreement, one clause of which specified that the Amir would "at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral", would enable the Government of India to relax political control in Chitral. He hoped that Nizam-ul-Mulk would himself assume responsibility for the maintenance of order within his dominions and that the Chitralis would be made aware that the Government of India had no desire to take sides in internal quarrels.<sup>1</sup> If no new complications developed he intended to withdraw the agent from Chitral in the spring, and in the interests of economy to provide for the diminution of the Gilgit Agency.<sup>2</sup>

This decision had been taken by Elgin before he had been a month in India and is in complete accord with the view of frontier policy which he had brought from England with him. But even if Elgin had felt otherwise, the reduction of the Gilgit Agency could, perhaps, be explained; for during Lansdowne's Viceroyalty the centre of interest had begun to shift to the Westward away from Gilgit and towards Chitral. In any case Younghusband and Durand agreed that the decision was a mistake, for though the Mehtar was bound to the British connection by ties of gratitude and "identity of interests", he was "weak, dissipated, cowardly, lazy, unpopular, and susceptible to influence." Without British support he could neither maintain his position nor inspire resistance to a Russian invasion.<sup>3</sup>

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1. PSLI. Vol.74. No.99. 12 June, 1894. Enc. No.1. India to Resident in Kashmir, 19 January, 1894.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Younghusband to Durand. 10 November, 1893

As far as both officers were concerned, "no agreement made with the Amir, no promises from Russia" outweighed the advantages of "making things safe in Chitral".<sup>1</sup>

The real base of the argument was fear of a Russian attack, an attack which Younghusband said was anticipated by Russian frontier officers and eagerly awaited by the tribes to the north who wished to rid themselves of the Amir's domination. If British influence were withdrawn, the Chitralis, no less than the more northerly tribes, could easily be persuaded to throw in their lot with the invaders, of whose powers the tribes held exaggerated opinions, and the total effect would be to "set a rolling such an avalanche as gathering strength as it swept along, would come crashing down on the plains of India with almost irresistible force. To stop such an avalanche at the foot of the mountains would require a dam of enormous proportions. To stop it at its source in the watershed would be far more simple, far more easy, and far more effective".<sup>2</sup>

Spring came and then Summer and a British agent remained in Chitral. The demarcation that would have made the Durand Agreement effective had yet to be carried out, tribal affairs on the southern boundary of Chitral were in a state of flux, and the Pamir discussions with the Russians were no nearer a successful conclusion than they had been the preceding Autumn. Under these circumstances Elgin decided to maintain the "status quo" in Chitral for another year, but he declared that a "policy of activity and extension" was not in accord with his views and he was still set on evacuation as soon as circumstances were propitious. All he required was the right to send

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Durand to Resident in Kashmir. 18 February, 1894.
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Younghusband to Robertson, 12 February, 1894.

an officer to Chitral whenever it might be necessary. Meanwhile to avoid the appearance of internal interference, Younghusband was ordered to leave Chitral and to reside in Mastuj, a place more in keeping with the duties of a frontier lookout.<sup>1</sup>

At Chitral the situation was deteriorating. Younghusband reported that a group of headmen who had the ear of the Mehtar were pressing for an attack on Narsat, the territory at the southern end of the Chitral Valley which had been occupied by Umra Khan. The British, it was charged, had made no effort to prevent Umra Khan from taking the territory, though they were diligent in preventing Chitral from recovering it.<sup>2</sup>

Younghusband had heretofore counselled patience since the matter was under the consideration of the Government of India. Now, realizing that any untoward incident might snap his slender hold on the Mehtar, he suggested that British prestige might be restored if an attack were permitted. But he was ordered to repeat his former advice, though he was authorized to tell the Mehtar that as the responsible ruler of Chitral the decision was his to make, the British could only advise.<sup>3</sup>

It will be recalled that Umra Khan had declared his intention to undertake operations against the Kafirs from bases in Narsat. But the Amir had marked Kafiristan for his own and was not pleased to see the Bajauri chief expressing pretensions in that direction. He, therefore, suggested that the British should issue a prohibitory order to Umra Khan,

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.6. India to Resident in Kashmir, 2 June, 1894
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.8. Younghusband to Robertson, 18 November, 1893
  3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.8. Robertson to Younghusband, 27 December, 1893.

and that

"in the event of his not accepting the prohibitory orders of the illustrious Government permission may be granted to the high officials of the Afghan Government to destroy Umra Khan so that he may know how a robber is punished". 1

The Durand Agreement had altered the whole complexion of the situation in Bajaur. Lansdowne had supported Umra Khan as a foil to the Amir's pretensions and in order to build up a responsible authority with whom he could negotiate for a right of way to Chitral. The Amir had now agreed to stay out of Bajaur, and besides, Umra's personal ambition for territorial aggrandizement had become an embarrassment. In the face of pressures from the Amir and from Younghusband, Elgin decided to reverse Lansdowne's decision to supply arms to the Khan and to entrust to Sir Richard Udny, who would be in the area for the purpose of demarcating the Durand Line, the responsibility of putting the situation clearly before the Bajauri Chief.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, a letter preemptorily informed him that

"the Government of India do not intend to save you from the punishment which attends on wanton aggression and breach of peace.....The countenance and support of the Government of India will not be given to a neighbour who provokes others to war". 3

As the year 1894 advanced conditions worsened. Umra Khan became more pugnacious, the Chitrali headmen more dissatisfied, the Mehtar continued to lose prestige among his own people, and by the same token the British gathered odium. Umra Khan declared that the increased subsidy promised to the Amir in the Durand Agreement was a bribe for Afghanistan to stand

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.10. Amir to Viceroy (translation), 14 March, 1894.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.12. India to Panjab. 30 March, 1894.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.11. India to Umra Khan, 30 March, 1894.



aloof while the British occupied all of Dir, Swat, and Bajaur.<sup>1</sup> By the middle of April reports had been received that he was attempting to rouse the people of Swat and Buner to join him in a holy war to prevent this.<sup>2</sup>

The Afghan Sipah Salar in correspondence with Umra claimed all of Kafiristan for Afghanistan but Umra disputed this claim, declaring that

"Our right to it is proved both according to the laws Shariat and equity, for our predecessors had conquered the Kohistan and had ruled over Kamdesh, and our neighbourhood is also proved." <sup>3</sup>

These "impertinent statements and unwise ideas" alarmed the Amir who thought that Umra's impertinence had reached such a degree "owing to his being nourished by the illustrious Government", and again he sounded Elgin on the possibility of his being permitted to punish the Bajauri. <sup>4</sup>

Elgin was thus being pressed from two sides to allow an attack on Umra Khan. The Amir on the one hand was anxious to curb the ambitious chief, perhaps to safeguard his own pretensions, perhaps to get an excuse to interfere in Bajaur. The Mehtar of Chitral was anxious to redeem himself in the eyes of his subjects. Elgin wanted to keep the Amir on his own side of the Durand Line and to placate the Mehtar, but at the same time he did not wish to risk the chance of a Yusufzai combination

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1. PSLI. Vol 74. No.110. 26 June, 1894. Enc. to Enc. No.16. Umra Khan to Udny, 2 April, 1894.
  2. PSLI. Vol.75. 17 July, 1894. Peshawar Confidential Diary, 9 July, 1894.
  3. PSLI. Vol.74. No.110. 26 June, 1894. Enc. to Enc. 23. Umra Khan to Ghulam Haidan Khan (Translation) 27 April, 1894.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.34. Amir to Viceroy, 11 June, 1894.

against the Government of India, nor did he wish to jeopardize the possibility of securing a direct road to Chitral. Young-husband recommended that the Amir should be given a free hand and moral support in order that British prestige should not suffer, but Elgin did not overlook the fact that an attack that failed would be as disastrous to prestige as an outright veto on military activities. He therefore determined to attempt to maintain the "status quo", to repeat the warnings against aggression to Umra Khan, to assure the people of Swat that no designs were held against their independence, and to try to arrange for the speedy demarcation of the Durand Line.

A new complication was added in May. Amir-ul-Mulk, who since the murder of his brother, Afzal, had been with Umra Khan, made his way to Chitral and was received by the Mehtar who held his brother's capabilities in so low esteem that he did not take the customary precaution of having him murdered.<sup>1</sup> Nizam's opinion was shared by Younghusband who described Amir as an inoffensive youth "without character but mild and amenable". Amir <sup>ul-Mulk</sup> declared himself to be thoroughly loyal to his brother and to the British Government and Younghusband was convinced that of his own accord he would never seek to oppose the wishes of either.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, on 1 January, 1895, Amir <sup>ul-Mulk</sup> caused Nizam to be murdered and had himself declared Mehtar in his stead.<sup>3</sup> He

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1. PSLI. Vol.75. No.148. 7 August, 1894. Memorandum of Information from Beyond the North-West Frontier. July, 1894
  2. PSLI. Vol.77. No.2724F. 21 November, 1894. Enc. Gilgit Diary 20 October, 1894
  3. PSLI. Vol.78. No.24. 6 February, 1895. Memorandum. January, 1895. PSM. A94. "Note on Chitral" with reference to the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk and Umra Khan's invasion" by Captain F.E.Younghusband, 5 March, 1895.

immediately sent a deputation to Lieutenant Gurdon, the Assistant Political Officer who was in Chitral at the time, and asked for official recognition, which could not, of course, be granted without the consent of the Government of India. The news brought Robertson hurrying from Gilgit with about one hundred Kashmiri troops and steps were taken to strengthen the garrisons at Mastuj and Ghizr.<sup>1</sup>

Robertson reported that the underground intrigues going on in Chitral were more tortuous and complicated than he would have believed possible. He felt that Nizam had been hated, not only on his own account, but because he had brought the British to Chitral. The British were feared and hated because it was felt that they intended to occupy all the territory up to the Durand Line, and this belief had been fostered by Nizam's constant protestations that Chitral belonged to the British. Amir was hated as much as his brother had been but he was tolerated because it was believed that he was merely "locum tenens" for Sher Afzal, who had meanwhile escaped from Kabul and joined Umra Khan. It was Robertson's opinion that the revolution had been a "coup" by Sher Afzal's party, and that Amir was but a tool in the hands of Umra Khan and Sher Afzal, and that he had been sent to Chitral to dispose of Nizam.<sup>2</sup>

But once Amir was established and his advisers had tasted power for themselves they were no longer willing to

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1. Ibid.

2. PSLI. Vol.78. DO.5, February, 1895. Enc. DO. Robertson to Barnes, 22 January, 1895. See also. PSLI. Vol.79. No.46 6 March, 1895. Enc. No.56. Udry to India. 15 February, 1895.

share it with Sher Afzāl or anyone else. Consequently, they petitioned Robertson for aid against Umra Khan.<sup>1</sup> The Government of India gave Robertson permission to give them as much moral and material support as he could, consistent with his own safety.<sup>2</sup>

The local officers saw in this turmoil, as Durand had seen in a similar situation two years before, an opportunity to increase their own influence. Barnes, the Resident in Kashmir, suggested that he should go to Chitral with a suitable escort, select the most suitable man for Mehtar, set him up, deport Amir-ul-Mulk, and from that point onward exercise a more intimate interference in internal affairs to prevent bloodshed, regicide, and revolution.<sup>3</sup> Younghusband advised that Shuja-ul-Mulk, a mere child and brother of Amir, should be installed as Mehtar. The installation of a child would, of course, guarantee to the political officer the opportunity for internal interference.

Meanwhile, Umra Khan, in collaboration with Sher Afzal, had launched an attack against Southern Chitral. Elgin informed him that unless he retired by 1 April force would be used against him and to that end a body of troops was being assembled on the Peshawar border. "The sole object of the Government of India" he was told, "is to put an end to the present and to prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory,

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1. PSLI. Vol.79. No.1135F. 27 March, 1895. Gilgit Agency Diary. 7 February, 1895.
  2. PSLI. Vol.78. No.46. 6 March, 1895. Enc. No.58. India to Barnes, 19 February, 1895.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.10. Barnes to India. 19 January, 1895.

and, as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn".<sup>1</sup> For the benefit of the tribes, the Government declared that it had no intention of permanently occupying the territories through which the forces marched and fully intended avoiding all acts of hostility towards the tribes as long as they did not impede the line of march.<sup>2</sup>

The Governor-General's Council was not unanimous in deciding to prepare for a movement of troops into Yusafzai country. In a minute of dissent Sir Charles Pritchard objected to orders for the collection of supply animals on the grounds that Robertson was in no immediate danger of attack and that the preparations for war would precipitate an attack if none were intended. He felt that an advance would bring about a tribal combination, with the possibility of a "jehad" being preached which would put the Amir in a difficult position and create conditions decidedly favourable to Russia. He advised strict adherence to a policy of non-interference.<sup>3</sup>

His views were not without support. The Pamir agreement<sup>4</sup> with Russia was signed in March, and influential members of the Council of India, including Fowler, Lyall, and Sir Donald Stewart, were convinced that the signing of this Agreement should lead to a withdrawal from "the doubtful positions along the Hindu Kush".<sup>5</sup> They had been inclined to the view that

1. PSLI. Vol.78.DO.20 March,1895.Enc. India to Panjab.14 March 1895.

2. See Proclamation.Appendix F. . FP.Vol.2. Elgin to Fowler, 20 March, 1895. Enc.

3. PSLI.Vol.79. No.78. 1 May,1895. Minute of Dissent by Sir. C. Pritchard. 8 March, 1895.

4. See Agreement Appendix

5. EC.Vol.30.Part I.No.27.Reay to Elgin,8 March,1895. Enc. Minute by Sir.A.C.Lyall,undated.PSM.A.96."Chitral and the Gilgit Agency" by Sir A.C.Lyall, 11 March,1895. PSM.A98. "Chitral and Gilgit" by Sir Donald Stewart,26 March,1895

Sher Afzal should be installed as Mehtar of Chitral, but though his joining forces with Umra Khan had changed their feelings towards him,<sup>1</sup> they still held that a strong man capable of reasserting the independence of Chitral should be found, and that a puppet Mehtar should be avoided at all costs. Stewart advocated complete withdrawal from Chitral, and while most of his friends advocated the maintenance of a measure of influence, they were all agreed that no responsibility for internal politics should be accepted, that "de facto" Mehtars should be recognized, and that the Government of India should remain neutral "anent their feuds". Lyall urged a return to "natural boundaries", though he did not define the term.<sup>2</sup> In fact, opinion at the India Office was setting in the "backward direction" and this appeared to be the tendency in the Government generally.<sup>3</sup>

But it was too late for withdrawal. The defences of southern Chitral had crumbled, partly because the Chitrali army had gone over to Sher Afzal, and the British garrison was closely besieged in Chitral fort. Umra Khan had defied the ultimatum.

There were many rumours to the effect that he had been encouraged by the Amir and the Sipah Salar. The fortuitous escape of Sher Afzal from Kabul was treated with suspicion.<sup>4</sup> The Sipah Salar, who was engaged with Udney in demarcating the

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1. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.27. Reay to Elgin, 8 March, 1895
  2. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.34. Reay to Elgin, 27 March, 1895.
  3. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.37. Godley to Elgin, 29 March, 1895.
  4. PSLI. Vol.79. No.1698F, 24 April, 1895. Enc. Kabul, News Letter, No.13. 10 April, 1895.

northern portion of the Durand Line, refused to escort the Commission into the Bashgal Valley where he might have forced Umra Khan's retirement by threatening his line of retreat.<sup>1</sup> It was reported that several regiments of the Sipah Salar's command had joined the forces besieging the Chitral Fort.<sup>2</sup> Udny, meanwhile, was shut up in his camp and prevented from getting news from Chitral, though he was practically in sight of the fort.<sup>3</sup>

There was no unanimity of opinion as to the motives to be ascribed to the Afghans. Some said that the Amir was looking for an excuse to annex Bashgal and Narsat,<sup>4</sup> others that he was attempting to bring about the destruction of Umra Khan through the precipitation of a clash between him and the Government of India,<sup>5</sup> and still others argued that the Amir expected to see Sher Afzal, who was under Afghan influence, emerge victorious in the end.<sup>6</sup>

On 1 April, 1895, a relief force under General Low crossed the Peshawar border and headed for Chitral by way of the Malakand Pass, Swat, and Dir. On 23 March another force under Colonel Kelly had set out from Gilgit, and it was Kelly's

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1. PSLI. Vol.79. No.66. 17 April, 1895.
  2. PSLI. Vol.79. No.1698F. 24 April, 1895. Enc. Kabul News Letter, No.13. 10 April, 1895.
  3. PSLI. Vol.79. No.66. 17 April, 1895.
  4. PSLI. Vol.79. No.1135F. 27 March, 1895. Gilgit Agency Diary, 7 February, 1895.
  5. PSLI. Vol.79. No.66. 17 April, 1895.
  6. Ibid.

force which relieved the Chitral garrison.<sup>1</sup> One might be inclined to wonder why it was necessary for Low's force to march from Peshawar if the relief could have been effected from Gilgit. One answer is that Kelly's small force might not have been successful had it not been for the diversion created by Low; and the other, that Elgin was most anxious to send a force from Peshawar as one method of opening the road which was an important factor in Lansdowne's, and his own, policy. He wrote, "If we face all the risks that are incident to this expedition ...we must, if possible, prevent the recurrence of the present emergency. The first and essential thing will be to ensure the opening of the road from Peshawar to Chitral". 2

If Elgin regarded the opening of the road to Chitral as of primary and essential importance, it is reasonable to suppose that he did not intend to withdraw from Chitral and leave the road to be closed again as soon as the Chitral garrison had been relieved. But he no longer had the excuses for retention of the Chitral position that had been afforded by the intransigence of Umra Khan, the unsettled Pamir question, and the undemarcated Durand Line; for Umra Khan had now fled defeated to Kabul, the Russians had signed a Pamir Agreement in March, and Udney and the Sipah Salar had completed the demarcation of the northern portion of the Durand Line in April.

In fact, Elgin had been converted by the advice of the

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1. The complete official correspondence regarding the Marches of Low and Kelly, the siege and relief of Chitral may be found in PSLI.Vol.80. No.13. and enclosures thereto. See also Beynon, W.G.L. With Kelly to Chitral, London. 1896. Robertson G. Chitral. London. 1898. Younghusband, F.F. The Relief of Chitral, London, 1895. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India. Vol.I. Simla, 1907.
  2. FP.Vol.2. Elgin to Fowler, 13 March, 1895. The emphasis is mine.



"experts". He had come to India determined "to follow the doctrines of the Lawrence school" and in his first despatch on Chitral began "by a natural impulse with the arguments for withdrawal".<sup>1</sup> But he knew his limitations and said, "I cannot pretend to decide what is and what is not a strategic position".<sup>2</sup> Thus, since he had to depend on someone for military advice, he chose to be advised by the highest military authorities in India.

He had come to accept the forward philosophy on the theory that India could only be governed by maintaining the fact that the British were the dominant race, who could not afford

"to let it be thought that we are unable or unwilling to observe obligations we have entered into, and therefore the obligations of the thirty years since the time of Lord Lawrence must remain, even if we regret them".<sup>3</sup>

He believed that to move backward after so many years of consistent advance would be tantamount to a declaration that all the vast expenditure had been a complete waste; that the obligations to Kashmir in Chitral and the obligations to the tribes incurred by the Durand Agreement were non-existent; indeed, that for thirty years the Indian taxpayer had been squeezed to provide money for trans-frontier wild goose chasing. Apart from financial considerations, a backward move would almost certainly be interpreted as treachery towards those tribesmen who had supported British policy; as well as cowardice

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1. EC. Vol.30. Part II. No.51. Elgin to Rosebery, 7 July, 1895.

2. EC. Vol.30. Part II. No.38. Elgin to Reay, 28 May, 1895.

3. EC. Vol.30. Part II. No.51. Elgin to Rosebery, 7 July, 1895.

in the face of opposition. The dominant race theory could not admit such concepts as treachery and cowardice. Moreover, a backward movement involving loss of prestige, might precipitate a serious frontier uprising that would very likely be coupled with "dangers behind us that would paralyze our efforts".<sup>1</sup> Elgin felt, as did many Liberals in England, that he was "reaping the whirlwind sown under a former regime".<sup>2</sup>

So. Elgin, a believer in the Lawrence policy of "masterly inactivity", and a supporter of the theory of Colonel Hanna that it was a practical impossibility for Russia to invade India successfully,<sup>3</sup> felt himself bound to support the views of military strategists whose theories were built on the negation of his own beliefs.

The argument of the Indian military party were clearly put by Sir George White, the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>4</sup> He pointed to the Russian advance in the direction of the Pamirs and argued that this poor territory could not have been coveted for its own sake; nor, could he accept the Russian excuse that the move had been made to give the soldiers a change of air and practice shooting big game. He rather supposed that the advance had been made because it secured a base "for future advances into territories which offer attractions either by

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1. Ibid.

2. EC. Vol.30. Part II. No.34. Reay to Elgin, 22 March, 1895.

3. Hanna, H.B. Indian Problems. Vol.1. Can Russia Invade India? London, 1895. Elgin says, "Can Russia Invade India? by Colonel Hanna confirms my own views". EC. Vol.30. Part II. No.39. Elgin to Reay, 4 June, 1895.

4. PSLI. Vol.79. No.89. 8 May, 1895. Enc. undated minute by Sir George White.

their wealth or strategic possibilities", and the bend of the Oxus could only be important to the Russians because it brought them within reach of the passes of the Hindu Kush. This, of course, bore a direct relationship to the "scientific frontier" idea. For though it was generally admitted that the Kabul-Kandahar line was the line of Indian defence "par excellence", it had always been recognized that a force moving down the Chitral-Kunar Valley could cut the main line of advance to Kabul "via" the Khyber. Moreover, the demarcation of the Durand Line had shown many passes that could not be controlled from Kabul, and since any line that could be turned was obviously not the best line of defence, the so-called "scientific frontier" could only be made truly defensible by adding Chitral as its northern bastion.

But even if Russia did not threaten invasion by way of Chitral, the effect of only a few Russian troops in Chitral would be to lock up a disproportionately large number of British soldiers on the Peshawar border, for if the few Russians were to be joined by the tribesmen a serious invasion would be possible, especially if the main British forces were engaged in repelling a simultaneous Russian advance by one of the more southerly passes. Sir Henry Brackenbury <sup>1</sup> and Sir Robert Low <sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid. Enc. Minute by Sir Henry Brackenbury, undated.

2. PSLI. Vol.79. D.O. 15 May, 1895. Enc. Note by Sir Robert Low 25 April, 1895. For similar views see PSM. A 100. "Policy in Regard to Chitral" by Sir O.T.Burne, 10 June, 1895. PSM. A 99 "Future Policy in Regard to Chitral", by Sir S.C.Bayley, 26 March, 1895.

agreed with White's analysis. *not quite correct!*

White also advanced the argument of British prestige as a pre-emptory reason for retaining Chitral. He asked,

"When Russian soldiers appear on the crest of the Hindu Kush, which of the infidel powers is likely to obtain the support of the tribesmen, advancing Russia who has never been known to go back, holding out the golden promise of the loot of the cities of Hindustan, or retiring England, who could not or would not retain hold of what she had guaranteed to Kashmir, and whose advance would promise nothing to her supporters but the barren inhospitality of the Pamirs?"

Elgin himself introduced other considerations in reply to Brackenbury's suggestion that Chitral should be handed over to the Amir, and to the opinion expressed by members of the Council of India that the Pamir Agreement made withdrawal possible. His reply to the latter contention was that the Pamir Agreement was based on the idea of Afghanistan as a buffer state, but there was no guarantee that at the death of Abdur Rahman Afghanistan might not break up, in which eventuality Russia might occupy Badakhshan and Afghan Turkestan, wholly invalidating the Pamir Agreement.<sup>1</sup> The possible collapse of Afghanistan provided a partial answer to Brackenbury's suggestion as well, but there was also the question of prestige involved in the fulfillment of obligations to Kashmir. Furthermore, acceptance of the idea would lead the Amir to believe that the Durand Agreement could be broken down whenever, and wherever, he chose, particularly if it were true that he had been responsible for the escape of Sher Afzal and had been a party to the attack on Chitral.

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1. PSLI. Vol.79. No.89. 8 May, 1895.

✓ The logical conclusion based on acceptance of these arguments, was to hold Chitral under British control. But the events of the preceding months had shown that a small body of troops was unable to maintain their position there. Therefore, a larger garrison was necessary, but such a garrison could neither be fed from local supplies, nor supplied from Gilgit except at enormous cost. Thus, to maintain a suitable garrison at Chitral, it would be necessary to hold the Peshawar-Chitral road. Elgin therefore proposed a substantial garrison of regular troops for Chitral, the completion of construction of the road which had been begun by Low's troops, agreements with the tribes that would allow the road to be built and provide tribal levies to hold it throughout the greater part of its length, and strong garrisons at two vital points on the road, the Malakand Pass and the crossing of the Swat River at Chakdara.<sup>1</sup> These recommendations were made though he was

"fully conscious that the course which we recommend may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and in an increase of responsibility with the tribes on our North-West Frontier which we would fain avoid".<sup>2</sup>

Though Elgin's council had unanimously supported his proposals, (presumably Pritchard did not press his objections to the point of official dissent) there had been some opposition outside of the Council, to the policy he had adopted. Major Harold Deane, who had been political officer with Low's force

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

and who had remained as political officer after the relief of Chitral, Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar, and Fitzpatrick, all attacked the illogicalities of the military scheme. They could not equate the proposed policy with that policy of cultivating friendly relations with the tribes which had been enunciated by Lansdowne and declared publicly to the tribes by Elgin.<sup>1</sup> Robertson reported that the Chitralis had already developed a very thorough hatred of the British,<sup>2</sup> and Cunningham declared that he could not see how harmonious relations were to be established with the Yusafzais, naturally jealous of their independence, by the seizure of their strongholds and the construction of roads.<sup>3</sup> He likened the operation to a Foreign Office attempt to secure friendly relations with France by the seizure of vantage points in French territory. The analogy was not perfect since France could not be coerced while the tribes probably could, but the principle was sound for coercion does not mean friendship. Apropos of arousing tribal anger and fear, both Fitzpatrick and Cunningham pointed out that a sort of "free masonry" existed between all the frontier tribes and that attempts to subvert in any way the independence of the Yusufzais was apt to have repercussions all along the border.<sup>4</sup>

Fitzpatrick deflated an argument by Low that a garrison

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1. At a Durbar held at Lahore, 30 November, 1894. See Elgin, *Speeches*, Calcutta, 1899. p.91 ff.
  2. *PSLI*. Vol.79. D.O. 15 May, 1895. Enc. Robertson to India, 30 April, 1895.
  3. *PSLI*. Vol.80. D.O. 21 May, 1895. Enc. Cunningham to Panjab, 11 May, 1895.
  4. *Ibid*. Enc. Panjab to India, 17 May, 1895.

on the Malakand would ensure the peace of the whole northern border by pointing out that there had been peace on that border for the previous thirty years with the exception of one or two expeditions "of the pettiest description".<sup>1</sup> Other propositions upon which Elgin's policy was based were also refuted. Deane said that the tribes still remembered the pronouncement of the old Akhund of Swat that it would be the duty of every Muhammedan to fight the Russians, and in any event, the prospect of the loot of India would not blind the tribes to the corollary of Russian occupation of their homes.<sup>2</sup> All three dissenters agreed that British prestige would be increased rather than lessened by withdrawal. Deane spoke for all:

"If Government can make such arrangements for Chitral as will not entail the maintenance of the road, I say emphatically that a withdrawal from the country...will put Government in a very strong position with the tribes. They will regard Government as acting in good faith towards them; they would be satisfied that Government had no desire to interfere with their independence; and the trust...that would be created, leading them to look on Government as their friend, would be the best guarantee...against any other influence being brought to bear on the tribes". 3

These arguments did not deter Elgin, nor did the knowledge that his policy was going to meet serious opposition in London. For Godley, Permanent Under Secretary at the India Office, had informed him that there was very little chance that his views would be accepted;<sup>4</sup> Lord Reay,

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1. PSLI. Vol.79. D.O. 15 May, 1895. Enc. Panjab to India, 3 May, 1895.
  2. Ibid. Note by Major H.A.Deane, 25 April, 1895.
  3. PSLI. Vol.81. No.172. 27 August, 1895. Enc. to Enc. No.6, Note by Major H.A.Deane, 3 August, 1895.
  4. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.99. Godley to Elgin, 25 April, 1895

Parliamentary Under Secretary, informed him that the consensus of Liberal opinion was that the whole Chitral policy had been a mistake;<sup>1</sup> and Fowler, pre-eminently concerned with English opinion, stated:

"There are broad questions of a political, and financial, and also of a military character, underlying further extension of our responsibility on the North-West Frontier: and from all that I can discern, the public opinion of this country is hostile to such a policy".<sup>2</sup>

The Viceroy had not found the decision an easy one to make. "If I could meet certain difficulties I should cordially support withdrawal",<sup>3</sup> he says. And again, "I am almost inclined to think that we shall be obliged to...consider the opening of the road outside practical politics".<sup>4</sup> And yet again, "If a road by arrangement is impossible, I am being driven to the conclusion that it cannot be opened".<sup>5</sup> But always there was the return to obligations, to prestige, to the advice of the experts, and the fear that they might be right.

"I have endeavoured more fully to appreciate the strategic value of Chitral.....I do not pretend to any acquaintance with military science, I should not wish to give a decisive judgment; but I confess the way in which it has been put to me during the last week appeals strongly to me as a layman." <sup>6</sup>

The whole question hinged on the importance of Chitral strategically, for upon its answer depended whether the road should be opened or not. Fowler therefore consulted the highest military authorities in England, though he informed Elgin that

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1. E.C. Vol. 30 Part I. No.58. Reay to Elgin, 17 May, 1895.
  2. FP. Vol.3. Fowler to Elgin, 25 April, 1895.
  3. FP. Vol.2. Elgin to Fowler, 10 April, 1895.
  4. FP. Vol.2. Elgin to Fowler, 17 April, 1895.
  5. Ibid.
  6. FP. Vol.2. Elgin to Fowler, 24 April, 1895.



"the ultimate decision will rest with the Cabinet".<sup>1</sup> Soon he was able to report that "the highest authorities, both military and political, are opposed to the making of a road, or to the placing at Chitral of an English force, or an 'English' agent".<sup>2</sup> He quoted to Elgin the "expert" opinion of Sir Redvers Buller who maintained that the arguments used

"with regard to Chitral, as to the effect upon us of an advance of the Russians, appear to me to be equally forcible if applied to Afghanistan at the moment which is predicated, when that country ceases to be under solid Government on the demise of the Amir".<sup>3</sup>

Buller argued as well that it was ridiculous to occupy the outpost before the main line, the "scientific frontier", was occupied; and equally ridiculous to suppose that three or four thousand troops could easily march through a country which it had taken the best efforts of 20,000 British troops to traverse. He admitted, however, that in the eventuality of the "scientific frontier" being occupied it might be necessary to hold Chitral. But if it were admitted that an advance to Chitral would have to be made concurrent with an advance to the Kabul-Kandahar Line, then in order to be consistent with the policy hitherto pursued by Lansdowne and Elgin the road leading to Chitral had to be held in the British interest. This latter consideration Buller did not take into account, nor did he

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1. FP. Vol.3. Fowler to Elgin, 3 May, 1895.

2. FP. Vol.3. Fowler to Elgin, 17 May, 1895.

3. Redvers Buller to Campbell Bannerman, 10 June, 1895. Quoted in Hamilton, E.H. The Life of Henry Hartley Fowler, First Viscount Wolverhampton. London. 1912. p.346-47. Fowler quoted this letter to Elgin without identifying the author except to say he was "A very distinguished officer (not Lord Wolseley)". FP. Vol.3. Fowler to Elgin, 12 June, 1895.

discuss the possibility put forward by the Government of India of the 3,000 Russian troops being aided by the tribes.

The Council of India was nearly unanimously opposed to Elgin's policy. Sir Alfred Lyall thought that Elgin was trying to scare the Secretary of State into a change of policy with the "formidable spectres" of Afghanistan dissolution and war with Russia in that country, which contingencies had been present when Lansdowne, and later Elgin himself, had agreed to a withdrawal from Chitral.<sup>1</sup> Sir Donald Stewart condemned each and all of White's strategical arguments,<sup>2</sup> as did Sir Charles Crosthwaite who argued that if the British army were fighting on the Kabul-Kandahar Line with Afghan support, the small Russian force that could come down the Kunar Valley could be easily dealt with; if they did not have Afghan support, then the "scientific frontier" would not be occupied, and it would not matter to a force waiting in Peshawar whether the attack came by way of Kabul or Chitral.<sup>3</sup> In fact, only Sir Stewart Bayley accepted the strategical argument and approved of Elgin's plan,<sup>4</sup> and he, according to Sir Arthur Godley, was the "weakest" member of the political committee.<sup>5</sup> According to

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1. PSM. A 96 A. "Future Policy in Regard to Chitral", by Sir A.C.Lyall, 7 June, 1895
  2. PSM. A 98. "Chitral and Gilgit" by Sir D.Stewart, 26 March, 1895.
  3. PSM. A 102. "Policy Towards Chitral" by Sir C.H.T.Crosthwaite, 28 April, 1895. PSM. A102 A. "Future Policy Towards Chitral" by Sir C.H.T.Crosthwaite, 30 May, 1895.
  4. PSM. A99. "Future Policy in Regard to Chitral", by Sir S.C. Bayley, 26 March, 1895. A 97 "Note on Affairs in Chitral" by Sir S.C.Bayley, 15 March, 1895.  
A 106 I & II. "Chitral: British Relations and Policy" by Sir S.C.Bayley, 13 July, 1895.
  5. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.74. Godley to Elgin, 12 June, 1895

the same source, Fowler made no effort to press Elgin's views and even if he had it would have availed nothing since the Cabinet would certainly have been opposed, and if the Cabinet had not been, there would have been no support for the policy from the Liberal Party in the House of Commons.<sup>1</sup>

But the final decision was left to the Cabinet and at a special meeting held during the second week of June it was decided that Elgin's policy should be overruled, that Chitral should be evacuated and the road not built. Fowler telegraphed:

"I wish to add my personal assurances of the regret with which we arrived at decision not to accept your proposals. Cabinet gave most anxious consideration to the whole question, and consulted highest military authorities in the country, who, excepting Lord Roberts, are generally against retention of Chitral, as are also Political Committee, India Office. The decision of the Cabinet was unanimous." 2

Lord Rosebery, perhaps to help soften the blow, wrote to Elgin himself, dismissed the strategic significance of Chitral and the possibility of a Russo-tribal combination, and argued against a dispersal of force, maintaining that while the Government of India, under Elgin's direction, was

"guarding against Russians on every peak of the Hindu Kush, France, a great military, and in these matters most unvarnished and unscrupulous Government, was preparing to establish a coterminous frontier with India on the East". 3

Since France and Russia were in strict alliance, it would be wise to keep Indian forces concentrated for a move in which ever direction was necessary.

But there was no time to act on Fowler's orders. In

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1. Ibid.

2. Fowler to Elgin, 13 June, 1895. Quoted in Hamilton, op.cit. p.350.

3. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.76. Rosebery to Elgin, 15 June, 1895.

June, 1895, the Liberal administration fell, Lord Salisbury formed a Conservative Government, and Godley informed Elgin that the whole question of Chitral was to be reopened and that there was a good chance that the Liberal Policy would be reversed.<sup>1</sup> There would be strong opposition to such a course, but Godley believed that the Secretary of State could, if he wished, carry it through, especially since he would have the unanimous support of the Governor General in Council.

Lord George Hamilton, Fowler's successor at the India Office, did not immediately decide the Chitral issue, and was at first somewhat doubtful of the wisdom of Elgin's policy, for, he declared, he had learned to distrust purely strategical arguments at the Admiralty.<sup>2</sup> He was, moreover, inclined towards the concentration and not the dispersal of forces. Three other factors led him to hesitate; firstly, the political advisers of the Government of India had been inaccurate in their forecasts of the difficulties in Chitral and had been unable to avert rebellion there; secondly, he had already overruled his Council on the Tochi question and thought it "undesirable that a new Secretary of State in his wish to help the Indian Government should be too often forced to dissociate himself from his Council;"<sup>3</sup> and, thirdly, there was the question of costs, a vital consideration to the Council of India, which looked upon itself as the watchdog of the Indian treasury.

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1. EC. Vol.30. Part I. No.77. Godley to Elgin, 28 June, 1895
  2. HC. Vol.I. Hamilton to Elgin, 26 July, 1895.
  3. HC. Vol.1. Hamilton to Elgin, 2 August, 1895.

The question was discussed twice in Cabinet with Lansdowne fully supporting Elgin's views, and Lansdowne's influence was considerable, even when a Liberal Government was in power. For in 1894 Reay had told Elgin "Lansdowne agrees with your Waziristan despatch and that is all important".<sup>1</sup> Now Hamilton informed Parliament that in examining the Chitral policy, he had had the valuable assistance of Lansdowne, "who, I should say, is the highest living authority in this country on questions of this kind".<sup>2</sup> Eventually Hamilton was persuaded that Elgin's policy was sound, if for no other reason, to show the Amir that his machinations had not succeeded and that the Durand Agreement could not be broken down.<sup>3</sup> His inner defences fell when the Government of India prepared estimates showing that the combined cost of all the military installations necessary to secure the road and maintain a garrison at Chitral would not be more than had been formerly spent on Gilgit alone.<sup>4</sup> Elgin's proposals were accepted subject to the condition that the tribes agreed to the construction of the road and to the location of military posts at the Malakand and at the crossing of the Swat River at Chakdarra.<sup>5</sup>

It will be recalled that in March Elgin had had a proclamation issued to "All the people of Swat and the people of Bajaur who do, not side with Umra Khan", which stated, in part,

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1. EC.Vol.30. Part I<sup>No 77</sup> Reay to Elgin, 3 August, 1894.
  2. PD.(Commons) 4th Series. Authorized edition. Vol.36 3 September, 1895. Col.1625
  3. HC.Vol.1. Hamilton to Elgin, 7 October, 1895.
  4. HC. Vol.1. Hamilton to Elgin, 9 August, 1895
  5. PSLI. Vol.81. No.172. 27 August, 1895. Enc. No.7. India to Low 10 August, 1895

"The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and, as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops". 1

From the time that Elgin's proposals became known there had been a public outcry, especially from the Liberals, that these proposals violated the terms of the proclamation, and hence constituted a "breach of faith" with the tribes. The first words of the body of the proclamation had been, "be it known to you and any other persons concerned". Those who held that there had been a breach of faith maintained that "any other persons concerned were Chitralis, and hence Government was obligated to withdraw the garrison from Chitral. Similarly, promises to those "who do not side with Umra Khan" were being broken by the retention of the road and especially by the construction of military posts at Malakand and Chakdarra.<sup>2</sup>

Elgin argued that the garrison was being kept in Chitral to "prevent any future, unlawful aggression" on the territory, and was, thus, within the terms of the proclamation. In any case, "any other persons concerned" had been intended as a warning to the Sipah Salar who had been showing altogether too much interest in Chitral. As for the Malakand and

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1. FP.Vol.2. Elgin to Fowler, 20 March, 1895. Enc. Proclamation undated.
  2. References are too many to quote, but reference to the national press, daily and periodical, for the summer and Autumn of 1895 will provide ample evidence, both in the form of reported political speeches, and letters to correspondence columns.

Chakdarra positions, the troops had had to fight hard to take them. Their defenders had obviously been siding with Umra Khan, and therefore the proclamation had no application to them. As for the rest of the road it would be held through agreement by tribal levies and there would be no British interference with the independence of the tribes through whose territory it passed.<sup>1</sup>

There is no evidence in the correspondence between Elgin and Fowler that the recommendations of the Government of India had been rejected because of the terms of the proclamation. It is true that on 30 May Fowler had sent a private telegram to Elgin intimating that there was some feeling that there were inconsistencies between the terms of the proclamation and the proposed policy, but Elgin had immediately cabled his explanation and no more was said on the subject. If therefore the Cabinet had decided against his policy because of the proclamation, the decision to do so had been taken without Elgin's being aware of the reasons.<sup>2</sup> It is conceivable that the members of the Government had discussed the issue with Fowler and he may have intended sending an official communication to Elgin. But at the time Fowler was seriously ill, and this together with the confusion resulting from the fall of the Government may have prevented the intention from being translated into action.

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1. HC. Vol.1. Elgin to Hamilton, 2 October, 1895.

2. HC. Vol.1. Elgin to Hamilton, 2 October, 1895. I have not seen either of the telegrams referred to and must rely on Elgin's recollection of them.

On 3 September Fowler opened the debate on the East Indian Revenue Accounts with a powerful speech on Chitral policy.<sup>1</sup> But though he raised the moral issue he did not press the Government hard in this direction, nor did he propose a motion of censure. He pointed out that Hamilton, in his despatch, had guarded himself with four if's: if the cost was not prohibitive, if peaceful arrangements could be made with the tribes, if a permanent garrison on the Malakand was really essential, and if the terms of the proclamation were rigidly adhered to. Only one of these conditions were Elgin's proposals to be accepted. In all fairness, the Liberal Party should wait and see the result of these strictures before acting.

But one member wished to press the attack and he charged that Fowler was being so generous to the Government because he himself had been responsible for the invasion of Dir, Swat, and Chitral and was trying to wash the blood from his hands in preparation for the General election.<sup>2</sup> To this outburst Fowler replied, and this is significant:

"The Indian Government believes - I do not agree with them... that peaceful arrangements can be made for the construction of this road. If they are made, of course there will be no violation of the terms of the proclamation".<sup>3</sup>

But Fowler did not hesitate to attack on other fronts. He admitted that the whole question hinged upon the strategic importance of Chitral in the event of an attack upon the North-West Frontier, and that the Government of India

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1. PD.(Commons) 4th Series. Authorized edition. Vol. 36  
3 September, 1895. Col.1582 ff.
  2. Ibid. Speech of J.M.MacLean.
  3. Ibid. Fowler. Col. 1644-45



obviously had to accept expert military advice. But the British Government also had its expert advisers, and when experts disagreed, whose advice should be accepted? The Government of India had accepted the advice of Roberts, White, and Brackenbury but the advisers of the British Government, Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Neville Chamberlaine, Sir John Adye, Sir Charles Gough, and Lord Chelmsford, had entirely different views. Their opinion, which coincided with that of the late Government was:

"that the gigantic natural geographic defences of the North-West Frontier renders the advance of an invading army practically impossible; that having regard to these and other considerations, our position is at the moment practically impregnable; that Chitral is not a place of considerable importance as a base for military operations defensive or offensive; that to lock up troops in Chitral or the Chitral Valley would be a military blunder; and that the construction of a military road to Chitral would...be an advantage to an invading army".

He had also had political advisers, Fowler said, and he quoted Sir James Lyall as advising that the construction of the road would mean in practice the subjection of the tribes and the annexation of the country between Peshawar and Chitral, since the road could only be held by complete military occupation. These arguments plus the point raised by Sir William Harcourt that these frontier operations were an intolerable burden on the Indian taxpayer who was getting no concomitant gain from the tremendous outlay,<sup>1</sup> formed the basis of the parliamentary attack, which in truth, at no time gave the Government cause for worry.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid. Sir W.M.Harcourt, col. 1629 ff

2. Only 165 members voted on a motion proposed by McLean, the vote was 137 to 28 for the Government.

Hamilton pointed out that Fowler had quoted many authorities but had failed to quote the Indian Government, whose unanimous opinion it was a grave responsibility for the Secretary of State to overrule. But ironically, he defended the policy he had adopted largely on moral grounds, pointing out that the Pamir and Durand Agreements could only be satisfactorily maintained if each contracting power would "do its utmost to prevent anarchy, disorder, and disturbance" within its sphere of influence. To do otherwise was an invitation to the other power to come and "do our job for us". Concerning financial affairs, he argued that economy meant getting good return for your money, and asked why the Government should not try to get good return for the money spent on the expedition, which, he was careful to note, had been sanctioned by Fowler.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile Elgin had been making arrangements for the future administration of Chitral and for opening the road. Robertson had prepared a report on Chitral which recommended that the country should be divided into its two principal parts, Khushwakt and Katur, and that Shuja-ul-Mulk should be set up as Mehtar in Katur country where he would be accepted by the people, and that Khushwakt country should be divided into a number of districts each to have its own Governor, nominally appointed by the Maharaja of Kashmir, but actually by the British resident political officer.<sup>2</sup> This solution was

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1. PD (Commons) 4th Series. Authorized edition. Vol. 36. 3 September, 1895. col. 1620 ff.

2. HC. Vol. 1. Elgin to Hamilton, 22 July, 1895. Enc. Note by Sir G. S. Robertson.

accepted by the Government of India and as soon as its Chitral policy was sanctioned Robertson was sent to Chitral to put the scheme into operation.<sup>1</sup>

The instructions with which he was equipped<sup>2</sup> informed him that the general internal administration of Katur country was being left to the Mehtar who would be given three local advisers to assist him until he reached his majority. The British concern would be largely with external affairs and the general welfare of the state, but inasmuch as the Mehtar was still a child the political officer would be expected to advise him, and this could extend to advising him to delay action recommended by the local regents until the British agent at Gilgit had expressed satisfaction with the advice given. As between the Mehtar and the Agent at Gilgit, the advice of the latter was to be final and authoritative.

✓ The subsidy of Rs.30,000 which had been paid to Aman-ul-Mulk was to be continued, but the distribution was to be somewhat different. The Mehtar was to get Rs.1,000 per month plus a sum of Rs.8,000 per year in lieu of revenue lost from Khushwakt country. The Governors of Mastuj, Ghizr, Koh, and Yasin, as well as each of the three regents were to get Rs.100 per month, and the remaining Rs.1,600 could, Elgin thought, be profitably spent in small salaries to headmen of particular villages of sub-divisions, whom it might be helpful to have under obligation.

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1. PSLI. Vol.81. No.172. 27 August, 1895. Enc. No.9. India to Robertson, 17 August, 1895.

2. Ibid.

Robertson was also told that the slave trade would have to be abolished, though slavery itself would have to be tolerated for a time since it was a well established social institution. The Mehtar was also to be given help in the punishment of murder and other outrages, which the Government of India was "unable to tolerate in a state under its protection".

Protestations to the contrary, it is difficult to see how these arrangements could be equated with "non-interference in internal affairs". In fact, it is apparent that the Mehtar was to be a puppet and that real power, internal as well as external, was to lie with the British Agent in Gilgit, working through his deputy in Chitral.

On 2 September, 1895, Robertson held a Durbar at Chitral<sup>1</sup> to declare Shuja-ul-Mulk official Mehtar of Katur country; to announce a general amnesty to all those who had taken part in the rebellion; and to proclaim all the other provisions that the Government had decreed for the well-being of Chitral. All the leading men attended and there seemed to be a feeling of general satisfaction especially when it became known that there was to be no retributory massacre of those who had aided Umra Khan and Sher Afzal. On 20 September, the troops of the relief force were withdrawn with the exception of those who were to form the garrison.

Meanwhile Major Deane had been conducting negotiations with the Swat and Dir Tribes relative to the opening of the

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1. PSLI. Vol.82. Chitral and Peshawar Chitral Road Series. Part VIII. No.4. Robertson to Daly, 12 September, 1895

Peshawar-Chitral Road. There had been no serious trouble along the road though there had been isolated acts of violence for which fines had been imposed on areas rather than on individuals.<sup>1</sup>

The mullas continued throughout the summer of 1895 to preach opposition to the infidels and had pointed to the continued presence of troops as an indication that the Government had no intention of keeping its word to respect tribal independence. General Low issued an explanation and Deane gave a written statement to the effect that annexation was not intended, though he did take advantage of the occasion to point out that continued opposition might lead to steps that the tribes would not find to their advantage.<sup>2</sup>

As soon as the Government decision had been made negotiations were begun for the establishment of a levy system and the agreement entered into with the Khan of Dir<sup>3</sup> may be taken as typical of the sort of arrangements made. The Khan promised to keep open his section of the road, to maintain the road and the levy posts, to make postal arrangements over the same distance, to protect the telegraph, and to refrain from the imposition of tolls or taxes on any traffic using the road. In return he was promised four hundred Snider rifles with ammunition, a personal allowance of Rs.10,000 per year, Rs.25,000

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1. PSLI. Vol.82. No.199. 9 October, 1895

2. Ibid.

✓ 3. PSLI. Vol.82. Chitral and Chitral-Peshawar Road Series. Part VIII. No.13. Draft Agreement with the Khan of Dir.

for past services, Rs.10,000 per year in commutation of the right to levy tolls and taxes on the road, Rs.28,000 for the purpose of constructing by tribal labour eight levy posts, Rs.1,500 per month for the postal service, and Rs.60,000 per year for the employment of approximately 300 levies. Similar arrangements were made with the Swat Khans.

The test of the system would come in the Spring of 1896 when the reliefs for the garrison at Chitral would attempt to march up the road from Peshawar. Deane worked assiduously to prepare for this event.

Elgin had found in Deane the right man to put into practice the theories regarding strict non-interference with internal matters that he had wished to see applied in Waziristan, for Deane believed that the assertion of influence could only lead to "mischievous interference with the people, which would inevitably sooner or later bring its own troubles with it".<sup>1</sup> He thought that peace could only be assured by convincing the people that there was no intent on the part of the Government of annexing tribal country, and that this could only be done by concentrating on the road and letting everything else alone. The Major difficulty was to prevent the system of tribal administration from breaking down and thus forcing interference;<sup>2</sup> for tribesmen sought interference, the stronger because they would be confirmed in positions of

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1. PSLI. Vol. 81. No.172. 27 August, 1895. Enc. to Enc. No.6. Note by Major H.A. Deane, 3 August, 1895.
  2. PSLI. Vol.87. No.134. 14 July, 1896. Enc. Deane to India, 14 June, 1896.

authority and made secure by the force of British arms, the weaker because they wished to see the mighty humbled. There were several petitions from various sections asking that troops should be placed in their midst, that revenue should be collected, and their territories directly administered.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Deane received innumerable requests to adjudicate between quarrelling tribesmen.<sup>2</sup>

But he had ample work to keep him busy without this. The Khan of Dir was very inefficient and "so long as he himself is not bothered he does not care who does the work required, or whether it is left undone". To make matters worse his brothers had been given responsible positions in the levy system and they paid no heed to the Khan's orders, were extremely careless of Government property, and were "only roused by the most preemptory orders...[from Deane], orders attended only as long as there...was someone on the spot to see that they were enforced".<sup>3</sup>

Preparations for the march of the reliefs had to be personally supervised by Deane and his staff. Nothing could be left to the Khan. Supplies paid for in advance were not placed in the posts. At Dir itself the Khan had to be roused from bed in the middle of the night to collect supplies for the next day. Fortunately the same difficulties were not met in Swat, and in Dir they were overcome. The troops marched

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1. PSII. Vol.82. Chitral & Chitral Peshawar Road Series. Part VIII. No.1. Low to India. 11 September, 1895.
  2. PSII. Vol.87. No.134. 14 July, 1896. Enc. Deane to India, 14 July, 1896.
  3. PSII. Vol.88. No.154. 25 August, 1896. Enc. Note by Deane, 13 June, 1896.

from Peshawar to Chitral without incident, without firing a shot, and without delay. The tribes and levies behaved admirably in preventing small parties of fanatics from reaching the line of march.<sup>1</sup> Elgin was perfectly satisfied.<sup>2</sup>

The acquisition of Chitral decreased the importance of Gilgit. Consequently the status of that post was reduced and the Malakand Agency was formed from Dir, Swat, and Chitral, and placed under Major Deane in direct subordination to the Government of India.

The problem of Chitral had for the time been solved. The question of which group of strategists had been right is one that cannot be properly answered, but Elgin had accepted the advice of those he thought most competent to judge the requirements of Indian defence. However from the Chitral controversy emerges an apparent conflict between Liberal and Conservative opinion on frontier questions. It is generally true that Liberals thought of themselves as inheritors of the Lawrence frontier philosophy,<sup>3</sup> while Conservatives looked to the "Sind school" for guidance,<sup>4</sup> but when it came to the practical business of maintaining the British dominion in India the distinction mattered little. Elgin might comfort himself

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1. PSLI. Vol.87. No.134. 14 July, 1896. Enc. Deane to India, 14 June, 1896.
  2. PSLI. Vol.88. No.154. 25 August, 1896. Enc. India to Deane, 20 August, 1896.
  3. PD.(Commons) 4th Series. Authorized edition.Vol.36. 3 September, 1895. Sir Henry Fowler. Col.1582 ff. Ibid. Vol.53, 15 February, 1898. Sir William Harcourt, Col 729. HC. Vol.VIII. Hamilton to Elgin, 21 January, 1898.
  4. PD.(Commons) 4th Series. Authorized edition. Vol.36. 3 September, 1895. Lord George Hamilton. col.1620ff.




that he was "reaping the whirlwind" sown by Conservative governments, but it was a Liberal viceroy who sent Sandeman into Baluchistan and Liberal administrations which guaranteed the integrity of Afghanistan and negotiated the Durand Agreement. It should be remembered, too, that it was Fowler who sanctioned Elgin's Waziristan despatch which contemplated far more interference with the tribes than did his Chitral proposals, and which in addition was opposed by the majority of the Governor-General's Council. The answer to the seeming paradox is that the overriding consideration was the defence of India. In the case of Waziristan military authority had been agreed and a Liberal Government did exactly what a Conservative Government would have done. In the case of Chitral military opinion was divided, with the greater weight, of numbers at any rate, in favour of withdrawal. Here was an opportunity which, perhaps, the Liberal leadership saw to heal one of the splits in their hard-pressed, divided party; to placate Little Englanders, offended by the advance in Uganda, and to take their minds off Africa by withdrawal in India. Some members of the Party were prepared to make political capital of the issue, but it seems clear that Fowler's heart was not in it. But political differences notwithstanding, the end of 1895 saw Lansdowne's policy advanced in two important respects. The garrisoning of Chitral and the opening of the Peshawar-Chitral road guaranteed the approach to what was considered an important outpost of the

"scientific frontier"; and secondly, the whole northern area had been brought under the immediate supervision of the Government of India.

# Utman Khel and Mohmand Countries

Scale of Miles

0 5 10 15 20



## THE MOHMANDS: A PROBLEM OF DEMARCATION

Lord Elgin was convinced that the demarcation of the Durand Line was of the utmost importance, indeed was vital to the success of his frontier policy. The main object of the line was not to mark the limit of British possession, but rather, to mark clearly the limits beyond which the influence of the Amir of Afghanistan could not be exercised.<sup>1</sup> For if roads and passes were to be opened; if tribal hostility were to be converted to friendliness; if civilizing influences were to supplant tribal barbarism; if the tribes were to be a source of strength in the event of a war with Russia; it was essential that political officers should be able to work in an atmosphere free from extraneous influences. That is to say, that the Durand Line should be an effective barrier to the interference of the Amir.

By the end of 1895 the line had been demarcated from the Persian border to the Kurram Valley. There had been tribal opposition in Waziristan but the Amir had not created any serious difficulties. Certain concessions had been made to him but the Boundary Commissioners and the Government of India were equally sure that nothing of strategical significance had been sacrificed. It is true that the Waziristan Commission

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1. PSLI. Vol.78. No.40. 27 February, 1895. Enc. No.50.  
India to Udry, 13 February, 1895.

had had to work unassisted by an Afghan counterpart, but nevertheless, progress had been satisfactory.<sup>1</sup>

Attempts to demarcate the portion of the line north of the Kabul River led, however, to more serious complications, complications which stemmed from the conception of the strategical significance of the Bashgal and Kabul River Valleys, the relationship existing between the Amir and certain of the border tribes, and a lack of precise geographical data.

According to the Durand Agreement the line from Asmar northwards was to follow the left bank of the Chitral River at a distance of about four miles from it as far as Chandak. At that point it was to cross the valley and the river and then follow the southern watershed of the Bashgal Valley thus separating the whole of the valley from Afghanistan. The reservation of the Bashgal Valley, actually a part of Kafiristan, was made with two objects, firstly, to secure certain strategical advantages in the event of a hostile advance from the north, and secondly, to prevent the Afghan interference in the affairs of Chitral, Bajaur, and "other states which it was considered desirable to keep under political control".<sup>2</sup>

Though this was the intention of the Durand Agreement, ignorance of the geography of the area led to a confusion

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1. Comprehensive reports of Boundary Commission Proceedings are contained in various volumes of PSLI for 1895.
  2. PSLI. vol.78. No.40. 27 February, 1895. Enc. No.50. India to Udry. 13 February, 1895.

that enabled the Sipah Salar, Ghulam Haider Khan, to claim the entire Bashgal Valley for the Amir. The first sentence of Article III of the Durand Agreement stated that the Amir was entitled to the Kunar Valley up to Chandak but the second sentence excluded the Arnawai Valley from the Amir's territory. This implied that Afghan territory was to include the Kunar Valley up to the point where the spurs of the Kunar watershed formed the southern edge of the Arnawai Valley.<sup>1</sup> Durand negotiated on the assumption that Arnawai was an alternative name for the Bashgal, and in fact, the agreement map showed a stream entering the Chitral River from the west designated as "the Arnawai or Bashgal". Further evidence that the names were believed to be synonymous is contained in the convention itself which stated that the Amir would at no time exercise interference in Chitral "including the Arnawai or Bashgal Valley."<sup>2</sup>

When the Sipah Salar met Udney at Jelalabad on 21 August, 1894, for the purpose of discussing the demarcation of the line north of the Kabul River, he declared that the Arnawai River lay to the south of Chitral and actually belonged to the British but that it entered the Kunar River from the east and not from the west as was shown on the British maps.<sup>3</sup>

As for the Bashgal Valley, the Sipah Salar declared that he knew nothing of it but that in any case Kafiristan

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1. Ibid. Enc. 23. Udney to India. 1 January, 1895.
  2. PSLI. vol.78. No.24. 6 February, 1895. Memorandum of information from beyond the N.W.Frontier. January, 1895.
  3. PSLI. Vol.75. 27 August, 1895. Enc. Udney to India. 23 August, 1894.

had fallen in its entirety to the Amir. The Afghan Commissioner's interpretation of the agreement was that the valley on the east bank of the Kunar River up to the Arnawai and the entire Bashgal Valley fell within the Amir's sphere of influence.<sup>1</sup>

The territory above Chandak as far as the Arnawai and lying between the east bank of the river and the main Kunar watershed was that piece of territory known as Narsat to which the Mehtar of Chitral laid claim but which was occupied by Umra Khan of Jandol. No claim of the latter to Narsat and Lansdowne's attempt to negotiate with him for a road to Chitral, might have influenced Durand's attempt to secure British control of the area. However, no evidence to this effect has come to light, nor is there evidence that the Amir raised any objection to the form of the agreement. Of course, the possibility of a genuine misunderstanding exists. But it is also possible that the Amir, aware of the loophole, led Durand to believe he was getting the agreement he wanted, while planning to use the loophole to break down the agreement when the time was ripe.

Udny's maps were so defective that he was unable to argue the point with the Sipah Salar,<sup>2</sup> while local enquiry confirmed the Afghan's statement.<sup>3</sup> Under the circumstances the Government of India decided that no progress could be

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1. PSLI. vol.78. No.24. 6 February, 1895. Memorandum. January. 1895.
  2. PSLI. vol.75. 27 August. 1894. Enc. Udny to India. 23 August, 1894.
  3. PSLI. vol.78. No.24. 6 February, 1895. Memorandum. January, 1895.

made and Udney was called to Simla for instructions.<sup>1</sup>

The Amir's obduracy forced Government to consider modification of the Durand Agreement. They concluded that certain modifications were possible as a result of changed circumstances since the signing of the Convention.<sup>2</sup>

Firstly, the attitude of the Amir as the ally had been more clearly defined and "the hold upon him in other respects" had been strengthened; secondly, conditions in the area concerned had not improved, indeed they had deteriorated. The insecurity of anyone in power in Chitral had been demonstrated, while Umra Khan's designs whether aimed at "personal aggrandizement or fanatical aggression" were constantly developing.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the Indian Government faced two alternatives. They could enforce their own interpretation of the Agreement and interfere decisively in the area or they could accept the Amir's interpretation. The second seemed more attractive. It would achieve the original purpose of establishing a fixed boundary, it would conciliate the Amir, and finally the Government was in no position to occupy the disputed territory. In an emergency, of course, it would be occupied in any case.<sup>4</sup>

Since, however, the readjustments of the boundary was a very definite concession the Government felt that it could

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1. PSLI. vol.75. 27 August, 1894. Enc. India to Udney. 21 August 1894.
  2. PSLI. vol.78. No.40.27 February, 1895. Enc. 50. India to Udney. 13 February, 1895.
  3. Ibid. The hold referred to was a financial one strengthened by the increased subsidy the Amir had been granted as a result of the Durand Agreement.
  4. Ibid.



be used as a bargaining point. Udny was therefore instructed to give way slowly and to take every opportunity of thus strengthening his position with the Sipah Salar.<sup>1</sup> Umra Khan, who was to be dispossessed, was to be told that he had "forfeited the countenance of the Government of India" by his aggression against Chitral and by his refusal to come to the demarcation proceedings".<sup>2</sup>

By April, 1895, the Sipah Salar and Udny, as representatives of their respective Governments, had agreed to a boundary from the Hindu Kush to Nawa Kotal, a distance of one hundred and thirty miles.<sup>3</sup> Asmar and the Bashgal Valley had been surrendered to the Amir and Umra Khan had been given one more reason for his enmity towards the British. The agreement was ratified by the Amir in December, 1895.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile attempts to reach agreement concerning the section of the Line from Nawa Kotal south to the Kabul River had resulted in stalemate. The difficulty arose from the fact that the line had been drawn through the heart of the country occupied by the powerful Mohmand tribes.

Generally speaking, the Mohmands occupied the territory bounded on the south by a line midway between the Kabul River and the Khyber Pass, on the north by Bajaur, on the east by the Peshawar District, and on the west by the

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. PSII. vol.90. Note for Secretary of State to accompany Letter from India No.24. 17 February, 1897.

4. Ibid.

Kabul Tsappar Range. The Mohmand Hills are wild and rugged, water is scarce, and cultivation can only be carried on with difficulty. The Mohmands are described as "fierce, treacherous, and ruthlessly cruel,"<sup>1</sup> with domestic customs similar to those of the Yusafzai but with a political organization according to Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, more "democratic" than that of the Waziris."<sup>2</sup>

Down to 1860 the Government of India had considered the tribesmen right down to the Peshawar border as subjects of the Afghan Amir. Even so, the Government of India had asserted the right to deal directly with the border sections and between 1850 and 1880 six expeditions were undertaken against them. Abdur Rahman continued to claim all the Mohmands as Afghan subjects but the Government of India had "avoided recognition of the claim and wished to regard them as semi-independent tribes with which both Governments had direct relations."<sup>3</sup>

When the question of demarcating the Durand Line arose, the Mohmand border was at peace as it had been since 1880. British relations with the tribes was confined to the Tarakzai and Halimzai sections who lived near the Peshawar District in value totalling just over Rs. 6000 per year.<sup>4</sup>

While the right to deal directly with these sections

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1. Davies. op.cit. p.62. See also. Caroe. op.cit. Merk.W.R.H. "Report on the Mohmands" (Confidential) Unpublished.
  2. PSLI. Vol. 90. No.4. 13 January, 1897. Enc. No.36. Panjab to India. 5 December, 1896.
  3. PSLI. Vol.61.No.124. 7 October, 1890. Enc.to Enc. No.2. Confidential Note by Sir James Lyall upon the Letter of the Government of India. 17 October, 1897.
  4. PSLI. Vol.74. No.58. 30 March, 1894. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Uduy to Panjab. 15 February, 1894.

had been maintained, the Mohmands themselves, though proud of their independence, had always looked to the Amir of Afghanistan as a sort of "feudal suzerain" and their chief, the Khan of Lalpura, who lived on the left bank of the Kabul River about eight miles above the new boundary as shown on the map of the Kabul Convention, was to some extent a subject of the Amir and drew from him a large annual allowance.<sup>1</sup> The tribal connection with Kabul was marked in other ways as well, for each section received allowances from the Amir in addition to sums paid them in return for the commutation of their rights to transit duties on traffic using the Kabul River through their territory.<sup>2</sup>

This being the case the question arises of why the Amir consented to a delimitation that placed a large part of the tribe within the British sphere of influence. The answer ✓ must be speculative, for the Mohmands are not mentioned in the Durand Agreement, nor in Durand's report of the proceedings at Kabul. In fact the only evidence of an agreement to divide the tribe was the line drawn on the Convention map, and this map the Amir had not signed. Now, let us proceed to our speculations.

We are told that Durand drew the line on the map as he did because he wished to keep the strategic route of the Kabul River Valley under British control.<sup>3</sup> We know also that

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1. PSLI. Vol.74. No.58. 30 March, 1894. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Udry to Panjab. 15 February, 1894.

2. Ibid.

3. PSLI. Vol.86. No.100. 19 May 1896.

Durand thought that the Amir had difficulty in understanding the significance of a line on a map, but that his pride prevented him from admitting as much<sup>1</sup>. It is not inconceivable that Durand, fearing that the Amir would not consent to a formal written agreement dividing the tribe, avoided a serious discussion of the question and trusted to the map to gain the concession he desired. But one must not forget that the Amir was a shrewd negotiator, well aware of his relations with the Mohmands. It is possible that he did not understand the maps in which case he would have been cognizant of his weakness. It is possible that he understood them quite well. In either case, it is conceivable that he saw a way of gaining his own objective while appearing to give Durand a completely satisfactory agreement which it was in his own financial interest to do. In other words he signed an agreement accepting the line on the maps to which he refused to append his signature. Thus, when the occasion of demarcation arose, he was able to deny that the maps produced by the Government of India were those which he had seen at Kabul, and, since there was no actual mention of the Mohmands in the Durand Agreement, the argument resolved itself into a case of his word against Durand's.

Early in 1894 the Government of the Panjab laid the problem before the Government of India.<sup>2</sup> It was made quite

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1. LP. 1B. Vol.8. No.1. 3 January, 1894. Enc. Durand to Cunningham, 20 December, 1893.
  2. PSII. Vol.74. No.58. 30 March, 1894. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 10 March, 1894.

clear that viewed from an administrative or provincial point of view there was no necessity for a change from arrangements then in existence. For ten years the Panjab had had no trouble with the Mohmands and felt no reason for apprehension. The Amir had been content to leave the tribes almost completely independent and Panjab frontier officials had been in the habit of settling differences with the Mohmands without reference to Kabul.

The Panjab officials could not anticipate the Amir's attempting to establish firm control down to the Peshawar border and were convinced that there would be no cause for concern even if he did. In one case the "status quo" would be maintained, in the other dealings with the tribe would have to be through the Amir. This procedure might cause delay, but the consequences would not be serious, particularly if the Amir succeeded in establishing a firm Government.

But what of Imperial considerations? What were the plans of Government for this area? Why had the Durand Line been so drawn? Fitzpatrick's assumption was that the primary object had been to keep the influence of the Amir out of Bajaur by the establishment of a defined boundary, but that the geographical knowledge at the disposal of Durand had precluded the possibility of his finding a suitable line farther east which would have given all the Mohmands to the Amir and at the same time fulfilled the function for which the line was intended. If such were the case, the true solution would be to find a new defensible boundary that would

let the Amir have the Mohmands but would preserve the integrity of Bajaur.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, if the Government really considered it necessary to exercise control over a portion of the Mohmand tribe, all relations between those sections which had fallen on the British side of the line and the Amir would have to be stopped. In addition the tribes would have to be alienated from the Khan of Lalpura or else his connection with the Amir would have to be broken.

Eventually an attempt was made to wean the Khan from his connection with Kabul. Merk, the Commissioner of Peshawar, invited him to come and live in British territory promising him that if he did so allowances to the tribes would be paid through him.<sup>2</sup> He replied evasively at first but subsequently wrote that he was ready to come but did not dare until his son and brother were safe out of Kabul. By this time Merk had ascertained that the tribes would not object to receiving their allowances personally and without virtue of the Khan's offices, so negotiations with him were broken off.<sup>3</sup>

✓ Fitzpatrick agreed with his frontier officers that whatever was decided no immediate attempt should be made to mark the boundary on the ground, since such a proceeding would be bound to arouse the resentment of the tribes who would draw the obvious inference that the British and the

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1. PSLI. Vol.74. No.58. 30 March, 1894. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 10 March, 1894.
  2. PSLI. vol.90. No.4. 13 January, 1897. Enc. No.16. Merk to Khan of Lalpura. 14 October, 1896.
  3. PSLI. vol.90. No.4. 13 January, 1897.

Amir were dividing the country between them. For this reason Fitzpatrick thought that a paper demarcation would suffice for a time, at least until some sort of agreement had been made with the tribes.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Elgin had meanwhile been in communication with the Amir and by late March was able to inform Fitzpatrick that the Amir had undertaken the agreement willingly, had no desire to overstep the line, and had, indeed, asked that it should be delimited.<sup>2</sup> In fact he had suggested the appointment of three commissioners so that the matter should be settled more quickly.<sup>3</sup>

In the face of such apparent enthusiasm the Government of India was not disposed to accept the cautions of Fitzpatrick<sup>4</sup> and made plans for an early meeting of their Chief Commissioner, Udny, with the Sipah Salar, his Afghan counterpart. It was determined however, that to allay, as far as possible, the fears of the Mohmands, Udny should travel without a military escort and should trust to the Afghan Government for his protection.

Udny thought at first of summoning the jirgas of the Mohmands to meet him in Peshawar so that he could

"clear their minds of the idea that the political boundary settled by the Durand Convention... [was] a menace to their independence as indicating a line up to which we propose to extend our dominions." 5

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1. PSLI. Vol.74. No.58. 30 March, 1894. Enc. No.1. Panjab. to India. 10 March, 1894.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab. 22 March, 1894.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.4. India to Panjab. 28 March, 1894.
  4. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Panjab to India. 3 March, 1894.
  5. PSLI. vol. 74. No.104. 12 June, 1894. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Udny to Panjab. 15 April, 1894.

This would seem to be a necessary preliminary since, as Umra Khan pointed out, it was incredible to the tribesmen that the Amir should have been given six lakhs of rupees per annum merely in return for an undertaking not to interfere on the Indian side of the line unless the Government intended taking possession of the country for themselves.<sup>1</sup>

The jirga was not summoned. Upon reconsideration Udny felt that the sections who were in receipt of allowances from the Amir would be hesitant about accepting a summons from a British political officer unless they had previously been convinced that their connection with Kabul had definitely ceased.<sup>2</sup>

A proclamation was consequently issued which attempted to explain the Durand Line in a manner that would not alarm tribal sensibilities. At the same time, the sections concerned were told that they had fallen within the British sphere of influence and that negotiations were in progress that would result in the demarcation of the line.

But it soon became apparent to Udny that many difficulties had to be overcome before his task was successfully completed. After a year, and only by virtue of large concessions, the Sipah Salar had agreed to a line as far south as Nawa Kotal. No portion of the line through Mohmand territory had been demarcated. Indeed, the Afghan Commissioner

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1. Ibid

2. Ibid,



had declined to recognize the line drawn on the Convention map and maintained that it had been the intention of the Convention to leave the whole tribe to the Amir.<sup>1</sup> Throughout 1895 no progress was made. Reports from the frontier indicated that the Sipah Salar was acting up to his contention and was carrying on correspondence with the Mohmands as if the Amir's claim to the whole tribe was indeed unassailable.<sup>2</sup> Finally in the spring of 1896, the Government of India decided that the actions of the Afghan Commander-in-Chief could no longer be permitted to pass unnoticed.

Near the Durand Line but on the British side, according to the Convention map, was an area known as Mitai. For this area two maliks, Ghairat and Sultanai, contended. In the Summer of 1895, Ghairat, with the help of the Khan of Nawagai, in Southern Bajaur, had succeeded in ousting Sultanai. Sultanai appealed to the Sipah Salar, announcing himself to be a servant of the "King of Islam", whereupon the Sipah Salar threatened to take up Sultanai's cause. Ghairat appealed to the Commissioner of Peshawar, declaring himself to be a servant of the British Government.<sup>3</sup>

The Khan of Nawagai had meanwhile appealed to Major Deane, who, believing that the Sipah Salar would limit his help to moral and perhaps pecuniary assistance, advised the

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1. PSLI. vol. 86 No. 84. 1 May, 1895.

2. Practically every copy of the Peshawar Confidential Diary and the Trans-frontier memorandum from mid 1894 through 1895 & 1896 contains reports of the Sipah Salar's interference with Mohmand sections on the British side.

3. PSLI. vol. 86. No. 100. 19 May, 1896.

Bajauri chief to refrain from interference with the Mohmands. on 25 April, however, the Sipah Salar with four hundred levies occupied Mitai, imprisoned Ghairat, reinstated Sultanai, and ordered Nawagai to evacuate certain villages which he had occupied.<sup>1</sup>

Deane now advised the Khan to evacuate those villages which were on the Afghan side of the line but to reply with respect to the others that the boundary was a matter to be settled between the Afghan and British Governments and that he would not yield places on the British side without the consent of his Government.<sup>2</sup>

Elgin was not prepared to give this consent. He informed the Amir that the area in question was clearly on the British side and that while the Government of India was willing to co-operate in demarcating a boundary, the action of the Sipah Salar was deemed to be distinctly unfriendly. For leaving aside the question of Mitai, the Khan of Nawagai was a Bajauri and thus definitely within the British sphere of influence. The Amir was advised to refrain from conduct which might imperil friendly relations between the two Governments, and to order the evacuation of Mitai.<sup>3</sup>

In reporting these proceedings to London the Government of India confessed that though they had had relations with certain Mohmand sections they knew little of the tribe as a whole, and thus in drawing the line there was even "less

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. ibid. Enc. No.19. Viceroy to Amir. 2 May, 1896.

acquaintance than elsewhere with either the inclination of the people, or the natural line of division". Durand had objected to a division according to tribal boundaries mainly on military grounds for it was considered necessary to hold both banks of the Kabul River since the valley of that river was the projected line of a railway which was considered invaluable for future operations beyond the frontier.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the only proof the Government possessed of what Durand's intentions had been was the map which the Amir had not signed.

The Amir declared that from the time of Dost Mohammed the Mohmands had been subjects of, and payers of taxes to, Kabul and that that Government had always appointed two Khans to rule over them, while their Malikis were in receipt of fixed allowances from Afghanistan. For these reasons Mohmand country had been considered part of Afghanistan and consequently it had not been considered necessary to mention the Mohmands in the Agreement just as, for similar reasons, it had not been necessary to specify Jelalabad as part of Afghanistan or Peshawar as part of India.<sup>2</sup>

As for the map, the Amir contended that it merely represented general limits and many discrepancies had already come to light. There was, for example, the case of the Arnawai River and the Bashgal Valley. Thus the Amir confounded Elgin's hope that the cession of the Bashgal Valley could be

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1. PSLI. Vol.86. No.100. 19 May, 1896.

2. PSLI. Vol.87. No.142. 28 July, 1896. Enc. No.5.  
Amir to Viceroy, 18 May, 1896.

used as a bargaining point, for the Amir regarded it as the rectification of an error in the map and thus his just due.

Elgin, of course, refused to accept this statement of the case. He pointed out that while the agreement did not specifically mention the Mohmands it did say that "the boundary shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown on the map attached to the agreement." This line clearly indicated that the Mohmand tribe was meant to be divided and in any case the Word "Mohmands" was written on the map in such a way as to have half of it on one side of the line and the other half on the other side. Moreover, for forty years the British Government had had relations with Mohmand sections who held jagirs in Peshawar District. The British Government would under no conditions give up their connection with these sections, nor would they relinquish control of both banks of the Kabul River as far as Shinpokh.<sup>1</sup>

As for the discrepancies in the map, Elgin declared that these were not as many as the Amir maintained. Concessions had indeed been made to Afghanistan, but they had been made not because of errors in the map, but as friendly gestures and because the areas yielded had been at a great distance from neighbouring British territory.

Unless one side or the other was prepared to retreat from its position no solution was possible. But Elgin was most anxious to complete the demarcation process which he

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.11. Viceroy to Amir, 7 July, 1896.

considered so important. Even the Panjab administration which was reasonably contented with the "status quo" conceded the necessity, on Imperial grounds, of excluding the Amir's influence from territory bordering on Bajaur,<sup>1</sup> and felt as a consequence that some definite policy should be adopted and that Government should not "go drifting on at the risk of doing (or omitting to do) something which would embarrass those who come after us".<sup>2</sup>

Elgin's problem was to determine the line on which it would be necessary to insist and the method by which demarcation could best be carried out. In order to maintain the desired strategical position in the Kabul Valley, it would be next to impossible to avoid dividing the Mohmands, but to proceed to demarcation without Afghan support and using only British troops would almost certainly arouse the suspicions of the tribes and there was no guarantee that the Amir would accept a line so demarcated. In fact, he had not as yet ratified the Waziristan boundary, though he had himself, in that instance, suggested the expedient of British demarcation without Afghan support.

An alternative course of action would be to leave the line undemarcated but to insist on the non-interference of the Amir beyond the line shown on the map, and at the same time to take steps to consolidate control up to that line by the grant of allowances.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.6. Panjab to India. 27 May, 1896.

2. PSLI. Vol.86. No.100. 19 May, 1896. Enc. No.5.  
Panjab to India. 12 March, 1896.

3. PSLI. vol.86. No.100. 19 May, 1896.

To begin the process of consolidation of control Government decided in July, 1896, to authorize their political officers on the Peshawar border to enter into relations with the Darwezai, Utmanzai, Halimzai, and Tarakzai sections on the British side of the line and to assure them that they would remain under British influence.<sup>1</sup> No assurance was, however, to be given to the sections living in Mitai and in its vicinity since the Viceroy wished to leave the doors open to the possibility of coming to an agreement by giving the Amir reasonable concessions in that area.<sup>2</sup>

After several letters had passed between the Amir and the Viceroy without any progress having been made, Elgin, on 3 October, 1896, wrote an ultimatum.<sup>3</sup> He stated that he could not depart from the position outlined in his letter of July 7, 1896,<sup>4</sup> and added that unless he heard within one month that the propositions laid down in that letter were accepted, he should be obliged to assume that the Amir was unwilling to undertake the demarcation of that part of the frontier. In that case, the warning went, the Government of India would "adhere strictly to the line laid down in the map, which to any survey officer is perfectly clear and precise" and would hold the Amir responsible if any of his

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1. PSLI. vol.87. No.142. 28 July, 1896. Enc. 12. India to Panjab. 7 July, 1896.
  2. PSLI. Vol.87. No. 142. 28 July, 1896.
  3. PSLI. Vol.88. D.O. 7 October, 1896. Enc. Viceroy to Amir. 3 October, 1896.
  4. See page 247 above.

officers should trespass beyond it. Having pointed out the serious consequences that might result from such a condition of affairs, Elgin brought another type of pressure to bear by mentioning the provisions of the Durand Agreement, highly beneficial to His Highness, which were being placed in jeopardy by his present attitude.

But what of the tribal attitude to these proceedings? The officers on the spot claimed that the tribesmen were confused. For thirty years the Afghan and British Governments had exercised joint control and joint influence over certain sections, that is to say, both sides conferred grants and allowances and used coercive measures, independently of, but concurrently with each other. Now, the assurances given by the Government of India did not specify sole influence of that Government and their statements could conceivably mean that while the claim of the Amir to sole influence would not be admitted, the tribes would remain as before under joint influence.<sup>1</sup>

The tribes, if their preference was consulted, would almost certainly prefer to receive favours from both sides and be subject to the domination of neither. The attempt to bring them under the sole control of British officers could be attended with serious consequences because the effect would be to detach from Afghan influence tribes that had for generations had close relations with Kabul, to sever the

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1. PSLI. Vol.88. No.183. 14 October, 1896. Enc. to Enc. No.5. Merk to Panjab. 11 August, 1896.

clans from their hereditary chief, the Khan of Lalpura, and to bring about as a result of this severance the political extinction of that chief.<sup>1</sup> Though, as elsewhere on the frontier, the maliks could be bought for a price, there was bound to be opposition from the Khan while there were many rumours and reports in circulation to the effect that the mullas were increasing their agitation against infidel domination.<sup>2</sup>

The Government of India decided that the tribes should be informed in clear and unequivocal language that there was no question of divided control but that east of the Durand Line the British influence was to be the sole influence. While no present attempt was to be made to settle allowances and services, since such a move would be tantamount to an "ex parte" dismissal of the Amir's claims, the tribes concerned were to be informed that they would not suffer pecuniary loss through the British connection.<sup>3</sup> The Amir gave way.

Two weeks before the expiration of the time allowed by Elgin's ultimatum of 3 October, 1896 he informed the Viceroy that

"in consideration of the friendship and union between the two Governments... [he was] ready, without deviating from what... [was] right and just, to act in accordance with the terms of the agreement." <sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.4. Merk to Panjab. 1 August, 1896.
  2. References are too many to give separately. However, the Memoranda of Information from beyond the North-West Frontier and the Peshawar Confidential Diary for 1895 and 1896, contained in all volumes of PSLI will give numerous examples.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.6. India to Panjab. 29 August, 1896.
  4. PSLI. Vol.89. D.O. 15 November, 1896. Enc. Amir to Viceroy  
17 October. 1896.



The letter then proceeded to list a number of tribes and villages and stated that if Elgin would indicate by reference to this list the exact claims of the Government of India, the Amir would be willing to appoint a Commissioner to effect the partition.

Abdhur Rahman stated that he understood that "all the strictness of the high officials of the Illustrious British Government" was because of the roads "which lead easily to Bajaur through Mohmand country". To meet this difficulty he was willing that "as much land as is required for a good and level road" should be "included in British territory".

At the same time the Amir stated his own case very clearly and this statement gives us a glimpse of one of the mainsprings of his frontier policy. He asked that whatever might be done, the honour of Afghanistan should be kept intact, and that he should not be subjected to the obloquy of his people, "both high and low", and that the neighbours of the northern part of Afghanistan might not be given the occasion to "use taunts against the friendship of the two Governments".

If this plea is genuine, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, the Amir's position is shown to be an unenviable one. The very fact of friendship with the British might be used by religious fanatics to arouse opposition to his rule, while the demarcation of the Durand Line, which in effect handed over to infidel domination hundreds of thousands

of true believers, could not but be detrimental to Abdur Rahman's idea of a stable and united kingdom, or to his aspiration to be accepted as "King of Islam".

Even if he set a value on British friendship so high as to necessitate the willing sacrifice of territory he would rather have seen attached to Afghanistan, he had, to outward appearances at least, to fight every inch of the way.

Elgin, with his battle nearly won, was able to be magnanimous. He informed the Amir that though almost the entire list of villages given in the letter were on the British side, the Government of India was willing to concede certain of them to Afghanistan in order that the division might be as nearly as possible on tribal lines.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, the politicals had not been idle. Early in November the Government was informed that "full jirgas" of the assured clans had "come in", some of them in the "teeth of fanatical opposition".<sup>2</sup> The interviews had gone favourably, the Khan of Lalpura could be ignored since the jirgas had expressed a desire to be paid directly, in fact, the establishment of sole British control was felt to have been effected painlessly. But the "fanatical opposition" to the jirgas and Fitzpatrick's warning that any malik could be bought for a price, if taken together might have indicated, at least the possibility of troublous times ahead.

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1. Ibid. Enc. Viceroy to Amir. 12 November, 1896.

2. Ibid. Enc. Commissioner Derajat to India. 9 November, 1896

On 26 November, 1896, the Lieutenant Governor held a Durbar with one thousand representatives of the six assured clans who were informed that in return for their allowances they would be expected to "render such service as Government might require from them, and to be faithful and well conducted in their dealings with the British Government."<sup>1</sup>

✓ The main object of this proceeding was to detach these clans from their connection with the Amir and to get them to accept the sole political control of the Government of India. According to Panjab officials, this was not an easy task and was accomplished "in the face of the opposition raised by the Sipah Salar and the mullas who for months...had been working heaven and earth and pressing all arguments and all threats, temporal and spiritual, to dissuade these tribes from throwing in their lot with...the Government." <sup>2</sup>

But had the political officers really succeeded in their task? Were the tribesmen who attended the jirga and Durbar really representative? The Lieutenant Governor assumed that they were but at the same time he stated that the constitution of the Mohmand tribe was "even more democratic" than that of the Waziris, and that the maliks, or as the people preferred to call them, the "mishars", were weaker than the Waziri maliks. Indeed, it was often difficult to determine whether a man was a "mishar" or a mere "kishar" or ordinary member of the tribe. At the Durbar it had been impossible to seat the clans in order of precedence so that everyone sat where he liked. Fitzpatrick's conclusion was that therefore a

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1. PSLI. Vol. 90. No. 4. 13 January, 1897. Enc. 36. Panjab to India. 5 December, 1896.

2. Ibid.

settlement had been made with both "kishars" and "mishars" and since it was representative of all elements in the tribe it would be acceptable to everyone.<sup>1</sup> He might as easily have drawn the conclusion that settlement had been made with one thousand individuals.

The Amir now changed his mind again. On the strength of the letter of 17 October, Elgin had assumed that the whole Mohmand question would be quickly settled in the manner he desired. In early December, however, he received from Kabul another letter withdrawing from, or at best modifying, the position which, from the former correspondence, he had assumed the Amir to have adopted.<sup>2</sup>

Elgin responded to this new situation by informing Abdur Rahman that the offer made on 12 November would remain open until 31 January, 1897. After this date the concession offered would be withdrawn without further intimation, and the situation would then revert to that described in the ultimatum letter of 3 October, unless in the meantime a letter was received accepting the concessions and appointing a Commissioner to negotiate a settlement on that basis.<sup>3</sup>

It is to be noted that the Viceroy's letter of 2 January did not actually revive the ultimatum of 3 October, which had actually revived a letter of 7 July; for whereas the original letter of 7 July had fixed preliminary propositions antecedent to any discussion, these propositions

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.40. Amir to Viceroy. 3 December, 1896.

3. Ibid. Enc. No.41. Viceroy to Amir. 2 January, 1897.

were now put forward as the alternatives to the acceptance of the compromise and the nomination of a Commissioner.<sup>1</sup>

In the light of this development, the Amir who did not miss the implication of Elgin's change of ground, agreed to the appointment of a Commissioner to begin demarcation, but stipulated that each party should have its own military escort and that each escort should confine itself to its own side of the line.<sup>2</sup>

This proposition evoked much discussion. Udny prepared a lengthy memorandum<sup>3</sup> the burden of which was that the Amir was neither willing nor able to send an escort into Mohmand territory. He was unable because there was bound to be tribal opposition and unwilling because he had made declarations to the Mohmands through the Sipah Salar that he would not allow one inch of Mohmand territory to go to the British. If this were indeed the case, it is understandable that the Amir could not afford to participate in an overt act that would put him in the position of losing face with the tribes.

The condition imposed by the Amir was, in Udny's opinion, imposed in order to place the Government of India on the horns of a dilemma. Either the Government would be forced to decline to send its own escort, in which case the

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1. PSLI. Vol.90. Lee Warner's note for Secretary of State to accompany Letter from India No.24. 17 February, 1897.
  2. PSLI. No.18. 3 February, 1897. Enc. Amir to Viceroy. 13 January, 1897.
  3. PSLI. Vol.90. No.24. 17 February, 1897. Enc. Memorandum. by Udny. 7 February, 1897.

proceedings would be dropped and the Afghan design would have succeeded, or if the Government did send its own escort the Amir could withdraw from his part of the bargain and say to the tribes that they were being abandoned only under "force majeure".

In a letter written on 30 January,<sup>1</sup> Elgin had pointed out the problems attendant on the employment of separate escorts and had suggested as an alternative procedure that the Government would be content with an affirmation of tribal boundaries in that part of the interior of Mohmand country which could be reached neither from the north nor the south without the necessity of penetrating the country with troops. This interior boundary could be obtained by ascending high hills at various convenient points and from these positions making a general survey sufficient to fix a line on the map. This method had been successfully adopted in the Bashgal Valley.

Udny did not think that the Amir would accept this method any more readily than he had accepted the idea of a full scale demarcation because he did not in any way want to give the appearance of co-operating in the partition of Mohmand country. In any case the example of the Bashgal Valley was not analagous since that area had been largely surveyed by the Chitral mission of 1885. Udny believed, and

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1. PSLI. Vol.90. No.24. 17 February, 1897. Enc. Viceroy to Amir, 30 January, 1897.

Fitzpatrick agreed wholeheartedly with him, that the only hope was to get the Amir's consent to a demarcation on paper, since it would be a foolhardy gesture to send troops into Mohmand country and it would be obviously impossible to demarcate without the presence of troops.<sup>1</sup>

Discussion of the problem by the Government of India led to disagreement. A despatch to the Secretary of State<sup>2</sup> suggested two alternatives. Either, demarcation could be carried along the ground from the Kabul River southward to the Safed Koh, each Commissioner providing his own escort, while north of the River the line would be by tribal limits. A map jointly prepared and accepted by both sides would indicate the facts, as far as geographical knowledge of the area would allow, and would reproduce, with such detail as was possible, the division of the country described in the Viceroy's letter of 12 November, 1896, and accepted by the Amir on 13 January, 1897. Or, on the other hand, the whole idea of demarcation should be given up. In this case the Amir would be asked to sign an agreement defining the boundary without on-the-spot examination, or if that proved impracticable, he would be held to his letter of 13 January and required to evacuate Mitai as tangible proof of his acceptance.

Elgin had preferred the alternative of demarcating

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1. Ibid. Enc. DO. Fitzpatrick to Udry, 3 February, 1897.  
2. PSLI. vol.90. No.24. 17 February, 1897.

in a limited manner<sup>1</sup> and in an earlier draft of the despatch had stated that "the danger of acting on the ground with the Amir's unwilling co-operation, great as it may be, seems... less than the danger of abandoning demarcation altogether".<sup>2</sup> Indeed, Elgin had stated that he saw "more danger in leaving the settlement of the frontier of Afghanistan incomplete than in facing the opposition of any tribe, or even combination of tribes along the frontier."<sup>3</sup>

On this issue Elgin had little support from his Council, in fact, he reported to Hamilton that though a division had not taken place he was apt to stand alone on the question.<sup>4</sup> He was surprised by the stand taken by the military authorities who emphasized the danger inherent in any military demonstration. Udney and Fitzpatrick both held similar views and the civilian members of Council who ordinarily supported the Viceroy seemed overawed by the weight of authority arrayed against him.<sup>5</sup>

But to Elgin this was a crucial issue and an essential part of the policy with respect to the Afghan frontier which he had pursued from the time of his arrival in India. His object was to get the frontier defined in a manner from which the Amir could not go back and the only certain way

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1. E.C. Vol. 15. Part II. Elgin to Hamilton. 17 February, 1897

2. E.C. Vol. 70. Part I. No. 157. White to Elgin. 15 February, 1897.

3. E.C. Vol. 70. Part II. No. 140. Elgin to White. 14 Feb. 1897.

4. E.C. Vol. 15. Part II. No. Elgin to Hamilton. 17 Feb. 1897

5. Ibid.



to do this, he thought, was through demarcation on the ground. If the Amir had signed the map of the Durand Convention things might have been different but he had in fact repudiated that map. Elgin wanted some tangible indication of exactly where the line lay.

The argument was advanced that the Amir should be forced into acceptance of Government terms by threatening the extra subsidy he had received as part of the Durand Agreement. Elgin, though he recognized this as a legitimate weapon, realized that it could only be used once. He would consequently have brought the Mohmand and Khyber frontier to the same state as the Waziristan boundary (i.e. demarcated but not ratified) and then using whatever means of pressure were available insist finally and without hesitation on the execution of both documents. Another possibility, of course, was that the Amir, deprived of the subsidy, might declare the whole agreement null and void and thus invalidate the demarcation that had taken place.

The Sipah Salar and Udny met at Landi Khana on 11 March, 1897, and though the Afghan did not refuse to escort Udny up the Kunar Valley he declined to escort him to the crest of the range on the east of the valley because that crest was a joint line and he would not be responsible for the actions of tribesmen on the British side.<sup>1</sup>

Elgin was at last forced to bow to the odds ranged

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1. PSLI. Vol.90. Tel Elgin to Hamilton. 15 March. 1897.

against him and on 31 March he telegraphed to the Secretary of State that he had written to the Amir accepting tribal boundaries throughout but insisting that Mitai should be evacuated.<sup>1</sup> On 27 April, the Secretary of State was informed that the levies had been withdrawn from Mitai.<sup>2</sup>

Here again we have an example of the flexibility of Elgin's views on frontier problems. When the question of demarcation had first been raised he had expressed a desire to "get rid of the Mohmand tribes"<sup>3</sup>. Two months later he had modified his opinion slightly but still agreed with Fitzpatrick that "only overwhelming military reasons" should lead Government to the inclusion within its boundaries of "this large tract on our side, since it would only bring a peck of trouble".<sup>4</sup> Less than a month later he was so far convinced of the desirability of maintaining the Durand Line, or a line in reasonable proximity to it, that he could make the surprising statement that "if it were not for causing general disquietude I don't know that I should so much object to an expedition [to enforce demarcation]." <sup>5</sup>

A number of factors contributed to this change of view. None of them, however, were related to the local administrative problem since both Fitzpatrick and Udny persistently maintained that they were quite satisfied with the "status quo".

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1. PSLI. Vol.90. Tel.Elgin to Hamilton. 31 March.1897.
  2. PSLI. Vol.91. Tel.Elgin to Hamilton. 27 April, 1897.
  3. H.C. Vol.II.Part.II.Elgin to Hamilton. 31 March,1896.
  4. H.C. Vol.II.Part II.Elgin to Hamilton. 13 May, 1896.
  5. H.C. Vol.II.PartII. Elgin to Hamilton. 9 June, 1896.
- Also same to same. 23 June. 1896.

✓ Strategical considerations played their part. Durand's idea had been to reserve the Kabul River Valley as a possible route for a railway to Jalalabad and Kabul. This idea, we know, was not new, but Elgin originally dismissed it as an important factor.<sup>1</sup> In July, 1896, however, he told Hamilton that he was considering informing the Amir of a projected railway in the Kabul Valley in order to make him understand why the Government of India was insisting on the Durand Line. Elgin pointed out to Hamilton the many advantages of the line and even suggested that surveys and other preliminary work should be begun.<sup>2</sup>

There were other strategic implications. The Amir had constructed a good road through Kafiristan from the Bashgal Valley (it was rumoured in the Bazaars that the Amir's purpose in getting control of the Bashgal Valley and of Kafiristan had been to construct a road that would enable a Russian invading force to reach India without entering Afghanistan), and from the terminus of this road an "easy" route led to the Russian border. The total distance was less than two hundred miles. The distance from the Indian outpost of Michni through Mohmand country to the entrance of the Bashgal Valley was only eighty miles. It was considered undesirable that the Amir should control the entire length of this, a possible invasion route.<sup>3</sup>

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1. H.C. Part II. Vol.II Elgin to Hamilton. 31 March. 1896.
  2. H.C. Part.II. Vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton. 28 July, 1896.
  3. PSLI. Vol.90. Note by Lee Warner for the Secretary of State to accompany Letter from India No.24. 17 February, 1897.

The desire to safeguard the Khyber also played its part in Elgin's conversion. During the course of the Mohmand discussions in his Council, he was surprised to learn that the country between the Kabul River and the Khyber Pass was inhabited by Mohmands.<sup>1</sup> This led to the realization that if all Mohmand country were given up the vital Khyber route would be flanked by the Afghans. This was a contingency that could not be admitted.

But influences other than strategical also were at work. The Government of India was anxious to exclude the Amir's influence from Bajaur. But cession of Mohmand country to Afghanistan would have made the borders of Bajaur and Afghanistan co-terminus. The Mitai affair demonstrated clearly that, despite the Durand Agreement, there would be interference unless a buffer could be interposed between the two. In this connection one is inclined to wonder exactly what interference, in the context of the Durand Agreement, meant to the Amir. Perhaps he interpreted it as meaning armed intervention. Certainly Afghan intrigue flourished on the British side of the line after the signing of the Durand Agreement and there is no indication that the Amir regarded it as a breach of contract.

Again, there was the question of the Mohmand sections living across the Peshawar border. Many of them lived in

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1. H.C. Vol.II. Part.II. Elgin to Hamilton. 6 May, 1896.

Peshawar District, others lived in tribal country but held jagirs in administered territory. In any case, relations were intimate and of long standing. After he had considered the question Elgin concluded that these sections could not be given up to the Amir.<sup>1</sup> Thus even if the Durand Line were forsaken, the task of drawing a new line to include the border sections and the sections flanking the Khyber in British territory would present almost insurmountable difficulties.

Another powerful influence was the desire to demonstrate to the Amir the fact that he could not break down the Durand Agreement when and where he chose. The Amir tended to look on the concessions that had been made to him as rectifications of errors in the convention maps. Moreover, he considered his goodwill as so indispensable to the Government of India that he declared, "I had thought that, if I were to ask the Illustrious Government for a country or a province, there would be no trouble between the two friends".<sup>2</sup> This attitude, if not discouraged, could have led to trouble along the whole line. Elgin, who had declared, "I see more danger in leaving the settlement of the frontier of Afghanistan incomplete than in facing the opposition of any tribe or even combination of tribes along the frontier",<sup>3</sup> was certainly not prepared to jeopardise the work that had been done.

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1. Ibid.

2. PSLI. Vol.90. No.18. 3 February, 1897. Enc. Amir to Viceroy, 13 January, 1897.

3. E.C. Vol.70. Part II. No.140. Elgin to White, 14 Feb.1897.

Lastly, Elgin was subjected to pressure from the India Office where it was felt too many concessions had already been given to the Amir.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, during the 1896 session of Parliament Sir William Wedderburn and other supporters of Congress, as well as other back-bench Liberals asked many questions relating to the cession of the Bashgal Valley, Kafiristan, Asmar, and Narsat to the Amir, and to the alleged mistreatment of the Kafirs by their Afghan conquerors.<sup>2</sup>

"Kafiristan excites a great deal of interest in the semi-religious, sentimental, aboriginal-protecting section of society, and they are plied with information from India,"<sup>3</sup>

Hamilton declared. Elgin was puzzled about the source of information, serious enough to warrant Parliamentary discussion, which had reached London without reaching the Government of India. He wrote,

"It is not perhaps an unnatural suspicion of some here that part of it is manufactured from the sympathies of certain people who are well known to have long taken a more or less sentimental interest in the Kafirs; but if this information really comes from reliable sources, it would be, I think, an advantage to us if we knew what these sources are."<sup>4</sup>

But Hamilton could not supply any specific information.

In any case Elgin supplied Hamilton with information that would enable him to meet an attack that might come if "authentic news of atrocities arrives which would render it very difficult to refuse our good ~~good~~ offices for intercession with the Amir."<sup>5</sup>

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1. HC.Vol.1. Hamilton to Elgin, 31 January, 1896. Enc. Memorandum by Lee-Warner. undated. HC Vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton, 28 July, 1896. Enc. Elgin to Fitzpatrick, 5 July, 1896. Ibid. Elgin to Hamilton. 19 February, 1896.
  2. See Index to PD, authorised edition, 4th series. 1896.
  3. HC. VOL.II. Hamilton to Elgin, 6 March, 1896.
  4. HC. Vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton. 5 February, 1896.
  5. HC. Vol.II. Hamilton to Elgin. 6 March, 1896.

In the first place, Sir George White provided a note which struck at "the very erroneous impression that they [the Kafirs] are a harmless race". He declared:

"It is notorious that they are most aggressive raiders, and their extraordinary powers of endurance make the area of their murderous operations a very wide one. It is almost a matter of religion with them to murder a Mohammedan. For this purpose they raid in parties as far as Dir, and no treachery is too base for them. Their murderous proclivities have made them unbearable neighbours in the Kunar Valley. This, to my mind, furnishes a valid excuse for the Amir's present operations against them: indeed it is largely the same cause of complaint as we had against the Waziris".<sup>1</sup>

In any case, Elgin pointed out, the enforcement of a British right to interfere in Kafiristan would be taken by the Amir as a breach of the Durand Agreement which would give him an equal right to interfere in Chitral, Bajaur, and Waziristan.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Elgin had no desire to expose himself to the anger of the Amir as Lansdowne had done when he attempted to interfere concerning the Amir's treatment of the Hazaras.<sup>3</sup> Concerning the cession of the Bashgal Valley Elgin said that Colonel Holdich and his surveyors had proved that as far as a Russian advance was concerned, there were other routes to the west of the Bashgal equally as good as the Bashgal route. Since these were under Afghan control, it was pointless to make an exception of the Bashgal, especially since occupation of it would have taken British forces so far from the frontiers of India.<sup>4</sup> The cession of Asmar and

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1. H.C. Vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton. 22 April, 1896. Enc. White to Elgin, 21 April, 1896.

2. H.C. Vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton, 4 March, 1896.

3. H.C. Vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton, 5 February, 1896.

4. H.C. Vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton, 22 April, 1896.

Narsat was intimately connected with the position of Umra Khan. At one time he had been regarded as standing above all other tribal leaders in the area, and the Government of India had thought to make use of him. The Government wanted in Dir a man with firmness of character, Elgin Maintained, and if Umra Khan "had played his cards right he might have become a 'Lord Warden of the Marches'".<sup>1</sup> Now, however, he was unacceptable because he was identified in the native mind with opposition to the British; because his latter history left an impression of unreliability; because his rule was oppressive; and, because the faction which looked to him as leader were not "the men who desire the peace and prosperity of their country".<sup>2</sup>

Hamilton reported that he had "adopted a sympathetic view towards the Kafirs, and I hope, by soft words, to ward off any obligation to more."<sup>3</sup> His hope was fulfilled. Nevertheless, he argued that since the Amir bound the Government of India to the "uttermost farthing of every agreement", he should likewise be bound, especially since "insistence on reciprocity is an attitude the oriental understands".<sup>4</sup> If the line of the Durand Agreement was to be modified, Hamilton stated, it ought to be done because the line as it stood was unfavourable to the Government of India, not because the Amir insisted on modification.<sup>5</sup>

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1. HC. Vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton, 29 April, 1896.

2. Ibid.

3. HC. Vol.2. Hamilton to Elgin, 6 March, 1896.

4. HC. Vol.2. Hamilton to Elgin, 24 April, 1896.

5. Ibid.



This was in accordance with Elgin's views who had said privately, with regard to Kafiristan, "Our reason for not interfering is that it is our interest not to interfere".<sup>1</sup>

All these factors contributed to Elgin's change of view and to the settlement reached in 1897. It is, however, worth noting that the line through Mohmand country had been suggested on military grounds, and that that line had been maintained. The settlement did not satisfy Elgin for he deeply regretted that he had been unable to get the whole Durand Line demarcated and ratified.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, he had brought the task as near to completion as possible, and before he left India was able to authorize publication of a new map.<sup>3</sup>

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1. HC. Vol.2. Elgin to Hamilton, 22 April, 1896.
  2. EC. Vo.15. Part II. Appendix to No.xiii. Elgin to Hamilton, 18 May, 1897.
  3. Ibid.

Afridi and Orakzai Countries Miranzai and Kurram.



## RE-EVALUATION OF POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE GREAT TRIBAL UPRISING OF 1897

In the summer of 1896, Elgin paused to consider the success that had thus far attended the new policy which had been substituted "for what had been called the 'close border' system previously in force on the Panjab frontier". The reflection led to self congratulation and to a reaffirmation of the cardinal points of that policy.<sup>1</sup> From the time of the enunciation of the policy by Lansdowne in 1889, progress had been rapid. The Durand Agreement had effectively answered the objection raised by Sir James Lyall and supported by Lord Kimberley, that an attempt to extend British influence into tribal country would arouse the jealousy of the Amir of Afghanistan. Moreover, that same agreement had given to the Government of India that "free hand" on their side of the line to which Lyall had ascribed the success of the policy in Baluchistan.

Between 1889 and 1896 the Zhob District had been brought under administration; the Shirani tribes had been granted allowances and brought under control; the Gomal and Tochi Passes had been explored; Wana and the Tochi Valley had been occupied by troops, and allowances had been granted to the Waziris; the Kurram Valley had been brought under administra -

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1. PSLI. Vol.89. No.1434. 14 November, 1896. Confidential Proceedings of the Panjab Government Relating to General Principles to be followed in dealing with the tribes on the North-West Frontier. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab. 14 August, 1896.

tive control; a limited levy service had been given to the Orakzai clans for the protection of the Kohat border; the road to the Malakand had been placed under the protection of the Ranazais who were in the pay of the British Government; and the Dir-Chitral road had not only been opened as a postal road, but a British right of way had been established, and British forces had moved from Peshawar to Chitral and from Chitral to Peshawar along roads held in the British interest by tribal levies. Elgin felt that

"these achievements...had fully justified the hope expressed by the Government of India in 1889, that with patience and care the policy and the methods, which had proved successful elsewhere, might be expected to produce similar results on the Panjab portion of the frontier." 1

Lansdowne had left on record the conviction that his policy could not be effectively carried out unless there was a change in the Panjab system of frontier management.<sup>2</sup> By 1896 Elgin had reached the same conclusion,<sup>3</sup> but his approach to this aspect of Lansdowne's policy was similar to his approach to the tribal policy. Just as he intended to "proceed tentatively", securing tribal co-operation at every step, towards complete control of tribal territory; so, it would not be necessary to break suddenly with Panjab methods, but rather to get the co-operation of the Panjab Government in a step-by-step improvement of their procedures.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, having assessed the progress that had so far been made, and

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1. Ibid.

2. *LP*.

3. HC. Part II. Vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton, 28 July, 1896.  
Enc. Elgin to Fitzpatrick, 5 July, 1896.

4. Ibid.

having outlined the aims and methods of the policy he wished to see pursued, he asked Fitzpatrick to consider the modification of Panjab administrative procedures to the extent that frontier officers could be permitted greater personal discretion in applying the policy laid down by the Government of India. He wrote,

"We have resolved not to propose either a single province or a second agency similar to Baluchistan. We desire not to interfere with the present sphere of influence of the Panjab Government. We propose to call your attention to the policy to be pursued towards the tribes and to ask you to consider whether your arrangements are not capable of some improvement with a view to carrying out that policy." 1

Though Elgin thought it "neither necessary nor desirable" to curtail the authority and jurisdiction of the Panjab Government,<sup>2</sup> he put forward several suggestions aimed at improvement of method. He thought that the most vital section of the frontier, from the Gomal to the Kabul, might be placed under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Peshawar so as to assure unity of management, or, that a political or frontier secretary might be added to the Panjab Government. In any case he thought that tribal control should not be the responsibility of Deputy Commissioners, who had enough administrative work to occupy all their time, but of special political officers attached to one of the tribal agencies that had been established. And, of course, he argued for greater independence for the politicals:

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1. Ibid. These words are almost identical with those used by Lansdowne in 1889. LP.XIII. Memorandum on the creation of a Frontier Province. 11 September, 1889.
  2. PSLI.Vol.89. Letter from Panjab No.1434. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab. 14 August, 1896

"Given selected officers, it appears to the Government of India that it ought to be practicable to uphold their authority with the tribes by giving them a wide discretion, so as to free them from having to show hesitation or delay in their dealings with the tribesmen. Provided that the financial control is strict, and that the local Government is kept fully informed of all that is going on, the constant necessity for references to head quarters may well be avoided; the powers given to the local officers in their dealings with the tribes may be of a very liberal character, and they should be judged by the results which they achieve". 1

Fitzpatrick's reply to the request for co-operation was a forthright attack on the policy of the Government of India. He argued that it was the duty of the Government of India to retard, rather than to hasten, the progress towards administration, if for no other reasons, because neither the money nor the troops were available for such a scheme; a scheme that would arouse the bitter resentment of the tribes, who despite the blandishments of the political officers would be aware of where the promises of self-Government under British control and non-interference "as far as possible" would eventually lead.<sup>2</sup>

As for the many references and the "regrettable delays" thus occasioned, Fitzpatrick declared that they occurred because

"Our policy is in certain respects unsettled or hazy. In some cases our policy is unsettled and hazy, because after fully thinking out the position we have deliberately determined to leave it so for a time; in others it is so because the Government of India and the Secretary of State have not thought out the position or for 'parliamentary reasons' give their orders in studiously ambiguous terms; and wherever it is so, and from whatever cause, it is hard to see how constant

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1. Ibid.

2. H.C. Part II. Vol. II. Elgin to Hamilton. 28 July, 1896. Enc. Fitzpatrick to Elgin. 9 July, 1896. PSLI. Vol. 89. Letter from Panjab, No. 1434, 14 November, 1896. Enc. No. 4. Note by Fitzpatrick, 26 October, 1896.

references can be dispensed with.....where our policy is not clearly marked out, and explicitly declared, I do not know of any case but one, in which you can allow the Commissioner, or even the Lieutenant-Governor, much of a free hand, and that is a case where you think it expedient to let yourself be drawn on into a greater amount of interference than it is convenient to avow." 1

As far as Elgin was concerned his statement of policy was explicit enough, but Fitzpatrick was intent on getting from Elgin an exact definition of the amount of interference intended.<sup>2</sup> He was willing to accept that fighting should be forbidden in the immediate vicinity of cantonments, and that the more "unauthoritative" influence that could be exerted the better, but he would not admit that between these two "spheres of action" there was any room for discretion being allowed the officers on the spot. On the other hand, Elgin had the "expert" advice of men who had had "experience of the tribes in Baluchistan and elsewhere", to the effect that "a clever political officer can and will hold them [the tribes] in check by a show of determination and that nine times out of ten no demonstration of force is necessary".<sup>3</sup>

The argument dragged on for some time but Fitzpatrick made no definite proposals. Eventually, since the end of his term of office was approaching, he had the excuse that it would be unfair to his successor to undertake any new departure in administrative procedure without his having seen and approved it.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. HC. Part II. Vol.II. Elgin to Hamilton. 1 September, 1896.

3. Ibid.

4. PSLI.Vol.126. No.133. 13 September, 1900. Note by Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, 14 December, 1900

Before his successor could be consulted, the whole affair was pushed to the background by the greatest upheaval that the British had seen on the frontier, the tribal uprising of 1897.

The first outbreak occurred on 10 June, 1897, when the Madda Khel, a Darwesh Khel section of the Upper Tochi attacked the political officer and his escort at Maizar.<sup>1</sup> Military operations in this connection had hardly ceased<sup>2</sup> when, on 26 July, Major Deane reported that a local gathering of about one thousand tribesmen was advancing to attack the Malakand post, that levies were absconding, and that Chakdarra was also under attack.<sup>3</sup> The following day reports indicated that the tribes generally were rising.<sup>4</sup> On 9 August the Mohmands attacked the post at Shabkadar in the Peshawar District<sup>5</sup> and throughout the following week disquieting reports from the Samana posts and from the Khyber indicated that the Afridis were preparing to rise and that the Orakzais would join them.<sup>6</sup> By 23 August practically all Afridi and Orakzai sections had risen and posts on the Samana and in the Khyber were under

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1. PSLI. Vol.92. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State. 11 June, 1897. Also. PSLI. Vol.97. No.155. 4 November, 1897.
  2. PSLI. Vols. 92 et.seq.contain a complete collection of all correspondence and other documents, e.g. daily diary of the Commanding General, under the title of "Waziristan Series". For the official published account of the expedition see Kemble, G.V. Operations of the Tochi Field Force 1897-98 Government of India Publication. 1900. Also. Frontier and Overseas Expedition From India. Vol.II. Simla. 1908. For a briefer account see Wylly H.C. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. London. 1912.
  3. PSLI. Vol.93. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State. 27 July, 1897.
  4. PSLI. Vol.93. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State. 27 July, 1897.
  5. PSLI. Vol.94. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 August, 1897.
  6. PSLI. Vol.94. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State, 17 August, 1897.



attack.<sup>1</sup> By 25 August the Khyber posts had fallen and the Khyber was closed. To put down the various risings seven separate military operations were undertaken and no less than 70,000 troops were employed.<sup>2</sup> It is not within the scope of this study to deal with the military aspect of the Uprising. Suffice it to say that the tribal attacks came in most cases as a complete surprise, that the outposts which had been constructed to dominate tribal country, with the exceptions of the Malakand and Chakdarra, were unable to withstand the tribal attack, and that the operations undertaken to bring the tribesmen to submission were long, arduous, and costly.<sup>3</sup>

The Government of India attributed the Uprising to religious fanaticism,<sup>4</sup> and this view was officially accepted by Hamilton.<sup>5</sup> Lee Warner, at the India Office, prepared a minute which laid the blame squarely at the door of the Amir.<sup>6</sup>

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1. PSLI. Vol.94. Telegram.Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 August, 1897.
  2. See Appendix G.
  3. The complete Official Correspondence relative to the various expeditions may be found in PSLI.1897 and 1898 collected under the titles "The Malakand Series", "The Tirah Series", and "The North-West Frontier Series". Official published accounts include Walters, H.F. Operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, 1897-98 (Government of India,1900); Walters,H.F. Operations of the Malakand and Buner Field Forces, 1897-98 (Government of India,1900 ); Frontier and Overseas Expeditions From India.Vols. I & II. (Simla, 1907 and 1908) Other published sources are Hutchinson,H.D. The Campaign in Tirah,London, 1898. Churchill,W.S. The Story of the Malakand Field Force London. 1916.
  4. PSLI. Vol.96. No.143. 14 October, 1897.
  5. PSLI. Vol.99. Despatch to India. No.1. 28 January, 1898
  6. PSLI. Vol.93. Lee Warner's note on Viceroy's telegrams of 28 and 29 July. The note was based on information culled from the Political Diaries of Frontier Officers and Trans frontier Memoranda for the preceding year.

Others said that the principal cause had been the increase in duty on Kohat salt.<sup>1</sup> Sir Mackworth Young blamed the forward policy of Lansdowne and Elgin,<sup>2</sup> and S.S.Thorburn, the financial Commissioner of the Panjab, created a stir when he publicly attacked that policy at a meeting in the presence of Elgin, Sir George White, and other high officials of Government.<sup>3</sup> In England, the Liberals led by Asquith and Morley revived the Chitral "breach of faith" controversy and party spokesmen toured the country declaring that the "breach of faith" had been the seed which grew into the Uprising.<sup>4</sup> Fowler was dragged unwillingly into the argument,<sup>5</sup> and Balfour and Curzon entered the lists to champion Elgin.<sup>6</sup> The argument which began during the parliamentary vacation continued into the following session and developed into a full scale debate on frontier policy.<sup>7</sup>

The conclusion that seems to emerge from all the discussion is that there might have been Afghan intrigues, and there certainly was religious fanaticism, but there were, underlying both, other factors that produced tribal uneasiness and made it possible for mullas and Afghan agents to stir the tribes to action. Perhaps the largest single contributing

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1. PSLI. Vol.99. Despatch to India. No.1. 28 January, 1898
  2. E.C.Vol.71. Part I. No.94. Mackworth Young to Elgin, 8 August, 1897.
  3. "Times" 29 June, 1897. E.C.Vol.73. Part I. No.1. and enclosures. Correspondence between Mackworth Young and Thorburn and Mackworth Young and Elgin. Thorburn eventually apologized.
  4. The Times. 7 October, 1897. 19 October, 1897. St. James Gazette 18 October, 1897. Reporting Asquith & Morley. Daily Telegraph 3 December, 1897. Campbell-Bannerman.
  5. The Times. 22 November, 1897. and 10 December, 1897.
  6. Curzon, Standard 7 December, 1897. Balfour. Times 24 November, 1897.
  7. (Indian) extracts from authorized edition. Session 1898 8, 14 and 15 February, 1898. pp.5 to 262.

factor was the Durand Line, the demarcation of which must have suggested visibly and forcibly to the tribes that they were no longer inhabitants of completely independent territory, but were brought within the circumference of British influence and control. The extension of levy services, the construction of military posts and cantonments, the building of roads, the increasing interference of political officers in tribal affairs, could not but have heightened the impression given by the sight of boundary pillars being erected. And if indeed the tribesmen did act because they believed their independence to be threatened, it must be remembered that they were correct in so believing. For it was the aim of the Government of India to extend its influence up to the Durand Line, and the authors of the policy designed to achieve this aim felt that, despite their efforts to retard or prevent it, influence would eventually be replaced by administrative control.<sup>1</sup>

But whatever the causes of the Uprising, it is certain that it impressed forcibly upon the Government of India and the British Government the need for a thorough appraisal of what was being done on the North-West Frontier. As soon as the scope and intensity of tribal action had become apparent, Hamilton issued orders that all questions involving future policy after military operations had been terminated should be referred to him for consideration before action was taken.<sup>2</sup>

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1. For a discussion of the Causes of the Uprising see Davies; op.cit. pp. 92-98. Also. Hutchinson. op.cit. Chapter I.
  2. PSLI. Vol.94. Telegram. Secretary of State to Viceroy.  
1 September, 1897.

He also suggested that the opportunity should be taken to define a permanent position and policy, and thus to "obtain a clear and well defined general plan upon which to base local arrangements".<sup>1</sup>

In India the prosecution of the various expeditions kept the Government so busy that for several months they had no time to consider policy, but in the Autumn of 1897, the discussion of a proposed settlement with the Afridis brought the question of future policy to the fore. Sir William Lockhart, Commander of the Tirah force, expressed the opinion that nothing short of permanent occupation of Afridi country would ensure the peace of the frontier.<sup>2</sup> Though Elgin had intended, eventually, to introduce his Waziristan policy into the Khyber area,<sup>3</sup> he knew that "complete occupation" was far outside the scope of his policy; was financially an impossibility; and would have, at that time particularly, met with the objection of outraged public opinion, in England as well as in India.<sup>4</sup>

Surprisingly, Elgin had a difficult time in getting his Council to approve anything less than the annexation and direct administration of the Tirah as the ultimate aim of Government.<sup>5</sup> Only Sir George White, the Commander-in-Chief,

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1. PSII. Vol.95. Telegram. Secretary of State to Viceroy. 13 October, 1897.

2. E.C.Vol. Private Telegram. Elgin to Hamilton. 3 October, 1897.

3. PSII. Vol.89. Letter from the Panjab, No.1434. 14 November, 1896. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab. 14 August, 1896.

4. Elgin was not averse to taking the opportunity to secure agreement to minor modifications to improve the policing of border districts. E.C.Vol. Telegram. Elgin to Hamilton. 3 October, 1897.

5. H.C.Part II Vol.7. Elgin to Hamilton, 3 November, 1897.

openly dissented from the final decision against annexation, but Elgin was convinced that many, "perhaps the majority of members" had agreed to the decision, not because they liked it, but because they thought the finances of India could not stand the strain of the alternative.<sup>1</sup>

The point at issue was whether permanent occupation would render the tribes more amicable if, and when an advance into Afghanistan became necessary. Elgin argued that this had not been proved, but on the other hand White and his supporters, including among others, Lockhart, Warburton, and King, maintained that the policy of Government had so far irritated without dominating the tribes, and the aims of the policy were no closer to attainment than they had been when the Durand Agreement was signed. The contention that tribes left to themselves were friendly tribes had been definitely disproved by the case of the Afridis, who had been interfered with less than any other tribe on the frontier and who were fighting more stubbornly than any other tribe. "There is no middle course" Lockhart declared most emphatically,

"We must either leave the tribes within our sphere of influence entirely to themselves and thus stultify the carefully considered policy of the past ten years, or take steps to render our influence a fact instead of a fiction by insisting on our rights being respected and our orders obeyed.....It is a contest between the forces of civilization and barbarism, and if we vacillate or draw back we shall assuredly suffer for it in the end."

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1. Ibid.

2. PSLI. Vol.97. No.35 M. "Tirah Series", Part II.No.41. Lockhart to India, 5 November, 1897.

Finally, to help shorten the discussion in Council, Elgin asked Hamilton to put officially on record his views "on any interference with present tribal limits".<sup>1</sup> Hamilton replied

"In present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibility should be undertaken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border." 2

The rest of Elgin's proposals were accepted by his Council without any serious opposition. They were, that the Kohat Pass should not be occupied nor the tribes forced to repair the road through the Pass; that a policy requiring the payment of tribute as a recognition of suzerainty should be introduced gradually among the tribes after the war; that the right to improve and realign the road through the Khyber should be secured; and that the tribes should be disarmed, as far as was possible.<sup>3</sup> Hamilton accepted all these proposals except that respecting tribute.<sup>4</sup>

Hamilton already had decided that "some modification of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force" would have to be made; and that interference with the independence of the tribes would have to be strictly limited in order to avoid "serious eventual responsibilities

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1. E.C.Vol. 20 . Private Telegram. Elgin to Hamilton.  
3 October, 1897.

2. E.C.Vol. . Private Telegram. Hamilton to Elgin, 7 October 1897. PSLI. Vol.95. Telegram. Secretary of State to Viceroy. 13 October, 1897.

3. PSLI. Vol.96. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State. 29 October, 1897. The question of tribal armaments was investigated by the Government as a consequence of the Uprising. The documents are in PSLI. 1897-9

4. PSLI. Vol.96. Telegram. Secretary of State to Viceroy. 3 November, 1897.

involved in the extension of administrative control over tribal territory".<sup>1</sup> The new year, 1898, brought forth two significant documents, one, a defence by Elgin of the policy he had so far pursued, the other, a statement by Hamilton of the principles on which future policy was to rest.

Elgin opened his defence by asserting that the tendency to contrast the success of the "close border" system with a "supposed failure of the present policy" led to entirely fallacious conclusions for there had been a radical change in circumstances over the years.<sup>2</sup> Lord Ripon's guarantee of Afghanistan against external aggression had led to a policy "definitely shaped to higher and more Imperial objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border", and the practice of remaining unconcerned with the tribes provided only that they did not cause trouble within British India,

"became impossible when Her Majesty's Government authorized Sir.M.Durand to negotiate with the Amir a treaty, defining the different tribes or clans who were henceforth to be outside the pale of the Amir's interference, and for whose actions the Government of India was therefore made in a measure responsible." <sup>3</sup>

A policy of friendly relations with the tribes had thus become essential and Elgin believed that that policy could not be carried out by conciliation alone, for the Pathan would "neither acknowledge power nor respect authority unless he...[feared] the one and must obey the other". Before

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1. PSLI. Vol.95. Telegram. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 13 October, 1897.

2. PSLI. Vol.99. No.3. 13 January, 1898

3. Ibid.

friendly relations could be established the tribes had, therefore, to be taught that their own interests lay in cultivating the friendship of, and in giving no cause of enmity to, the power "which...[was] willing to live in peace with them, but able to crush them in war"<sup>1</sup> On these assumptions Elgin declared his policy to be based, and, he maintained, that policy could not materially differ from that which had been reaffirmed in 1896. The Uprising had not proved that his policy had broken down, he argued, for no exercise of patience and forbearance could altogether avoid the need for armed interference, since frontier districts had to be protected from "the wild fanatical marauders who haunt their borders". Neither could the particular measures to be adopted at any one moment be prescribed beforehand. But in any case, the fact remained that engagements deliberately entered into made necessary the occupation of strategic positions, the securing of lines of communication, and enough interference to guarantee that obligations could be promptly fulfilled. The watchword of future policy was to be "vigilant and never ceasing defence, which we and our predecessors have professed and to which we unhesitatingly adhere".

Hamilton's despatch <sup>2</sup> written "to indicate the policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue in the future" classified under three heads the duties imposed on the Government of India by the advance of British influence into

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1. Ibid.

2. PSII. Vol.99. Despatch to India. No.1. 28 January, 1898



tribal territory; firstly, the protection of British border districts; secondly, the strict exclusion of extraneous interference from the tribal area within the Durand Line; and thirdly, the fulfillment of obligations towards Afghanistan and the safeguarding of "the natural frontiers of India".<sup>1</sup> Concerning the first of these Government responsibility had increased greatly in a very few years. The growth of trade, the increase of intercourse of all kinds between administered and tribal territory, and the increase of cultivation and prosperity along the border, made strong protective measures necessary, while the closing of a main artery of communication not only affected foreign relations<sup>2</sup> but also injured the trade of India. The tribesmen were now well armed and familiar with British methods, while their mullas travelled to Mecca and to India and brought back distorted stories of affairs in Europe<sup>3</sup> and of what British statesmen were saying of the

1. "The natural frontiers of India" is a rather ambiguous term. Lord Lawrence would probably have taken it to mean the River Indus. Lytton, Lansdowne, Roberts, and others including Hamilton, have been sure that it meant the mountain barrier. Panjab officials, primarily concerned with administration, would probably take it to mean the administrative frontier. Dr. Davies discusses this question in Cambridge History of India. Vol. VI. p. 457.
2. The Amir was upset because the closing of the Khyber Pass was losing his revenue.
3. During the Tirah campaign a letter dated 25 October, 1897, was found in the house of "Mulla Sayad Akbar" which stated that "Aden, a seaport which was in the possession of the British, had been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal through which the British forces could easily reach India in 20 days has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India". PSLI. Vol. 98. No. 37M. "Tirah Series", Part II. No. 171. Lockhart to India. 20 November, 1897.

"status and prospects of Islamism and its rulers". For all these reasons the state of tribal country was a matter of much more serious concern than it had been before. Secondly, the exclusion of extraneous interference with the tribes had been more or less taken care of by the demarcation of the Durand Line. But though this had disposed of the constant friction with the Amir, it had also aroused the suspicions of the tribes and moreover, had increased contacts between the tribes and the British, and whether this increased communication would lessen or increase the risk of collision was a moot point. In any case the responsibility of Government had been increased. Finally, there was

"the ever present duty of watching over the frontier passes... into India, so as to maintain sufficient control over the main routes connecting Afghanistan with India, for the purpose of preventing the establishment of any political influence adverse to Government in the higher plateaux which within Afghanistan dominate these passes."

These obligations would be met, Hamilton declared, by pursuing a general policy designed "To show that we are as determined to respect the rights of others as we are able to enforce our own", and bearing on this policy he laid down certain leading principles. These were, firstly, that military power should be concentrated, and interference with the tribes limited, by the elimination of all military posts not indispensable; secondly, that all posts should be defensible and that in the case of each post gain should be commensurate with cost; thirdly, that administration and annexation were to be avoided because of the severe financial burden they would

impose; fourthly, that tribal disarmament should be limited because the tribesmen needed means of self protection; fifthly, that the Khyber had to be maintained as a safe artery of communication, and though it would be desirable to give the Afridis a share in keeping the pass open the paramount consideration was the safety of the pass; finally, that "the immediate difficulty...was not so much associated with apprehension of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of ...influence", and therefore, the Government of India should devote its foremost attention to that part of the question "which...had thus prominently asserted itself."

✓ These principles are essentially the same as those on which Lansdowne and Elgin based their policy. Both had put forward obligations to Afghanistan as a primary consideration in the formation of a frontier policy; both had advocated the occupation of only those positions which were strategically significant; both had deprecated annexation of territory and the extension of administration; both had avowed the intention of maintaining tribal independence. Of the two new proposals put forward by Hamilton, the first, the concentration of military strength, was the logical sequel to the collapse of so many posts before the tribal onslaught; the second, the necessity to make absolutely sure of the security of the Khyber, was completely in line with the policy followed since 1889, though anticipating, in fact, an increase of responsibilities.

Indeed, Hamilton's long despatch was not intended to impress Elgin, or to put forward a new policy, and its emphasis on finance and the limitation of interference with the tribes had distinctly political connotations. The Liberal opposition had raised a furore in England condemnatory of a policy that had produced the great uprising and which necessitated the expenditure of vast sums of money while thousands of Indians in famine areas were starving. Aware that this was leading to a Parliamentary attack, Hamilton prepared his defence. He declares:

"During this commotion the Government, including myself, remained quiescent, but with the knowledge of my colleagues I was preparing a Blue Book so edited as to make it self-evident to anyone who even skimmed its contents that the successive acts of our predecessors involved wholesale repudiation of their previous and present declarations of policy. The more ignorant they were of its contents, the more damning became their own self-condemnation. I further associated with this Blue Book a long despatch laying down for the future guidance of our policy on the frontier a series of principles which time and recent experience had proved to be essential to the peace of the districts concerned and by removing distrust would secure the co-operation of our neighbours". 1

Hamilton's strategy worked excellently. Not until the opposition had made a formal declaration of the terms of their vote of censure was the Blue Book published. The trap was then obvious, but retreat was impossible. The Liberals were forced to fall back on their 1880 record, and when the "forward policy" was discussed, they themselves were placed on the defensive. When the division came the Government had a majority of over one hundred.

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1. Hamilton, Lord George. Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections. 1886-1906 London. 1922. p.269

To Elgin the despatch simply meant that he had to put forward proposals for the concentration of military forces on the frontier, together with a plan for securing the safety of the Khyber.

This meant in the first place, reconsideration of the position in Chitral and along the Peshawar-Chitral road, on the Samana Range, in the Tochi Valley, at Wana, and in the Khyber. In view of Hamilton's directive Elgin proposed, as a base for his military policy,

"that in future the strength of the more advanced garrisons on the North-West Frontier shall be kept as low as may be practicable, the troops being placed in strong works which cannot be captured by a tribal enemy as long as the garrisons have food, water, and ammunition; that outposts of regular troops shall be as few and as strong as possible; that minor posts, and posts on the lines of communication, shall generally be held by levies, when the duties to be performed are those devolving on a police force, or by regular troops, which we should prefer to see organized as a militia; and that risings among the frontier tribes shall be met by moveable columns of sufficient strength, placed where they can readily support and assist the stationary garrisons. Further, that in the event of serious attacks being made or threatened...the garrisons of the weaker posts shall either be reinforced or withdrawn, according to a pre-arranged plan". 1

Considering Chitral first, Elgin was of the opinion that

"The reasons which induced us in 1895 to recommend its occupation by a force of regular troops still hold good, and that its occupation must be continued for at least some considerable time to come in the same manner as hitherto". 2

Similarly, he held that the arrangements for holding the road had been successful, that the posts at Malakand and Chakdarra were essential, and that the only alterations desirable were to make them completely defensible and to provide a movable

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1. PSLI. Vol. 104. No.95. 23 June, 1898

2. Ibid.

column at Peshawar and a light railway line to Dargai by means of which the column could easily reach the Malakand.<sup>1</sup>

A more difficult area to deal with was the "Miranzai border, extending from Kohat to Kurram, and comprising the Samana Range". This position could hardly be said to be an obligatory one as far as the defence of India was concerned, but Elgin maintained that it was of "local military importance" for it protected the road between Kohat and the military post at Parachinar in the Kurram Valley. Therefore, he argued that a regular garrison would have to be maintained on the Samana to protect this road and to secure the safety of the inhabitants of the Miranzai Valley.<sup>2</sup> He admitted the force of Mackworth Young's argument that it would be desirable to withdraw the troops from the Samana "if it could be effected without loss of prestige, and without danger to our subjects in Miranzai";<sup>3</sup> but he pointed out that there was general agreement that "the time had not yet arrived when this course can be contemplated."

When the decision to retain the garrison had been made, a committee was appointed under Brigadier-General E.R.Elles to consider the position and to propose a plan for its defence. The committee formed two alternative schemes;<sup>4</sup> the first, that the Samana should be held in such strength as would admit of a moveable column being detached, if necessary, from the main

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1. Ibid.

2. PSII. Vol.109. No.122.(Military) 4 August, 1898

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

garrison to support the police posts, the force being dependent on Kohat for its main support; the second, that the ridge should be held with smaller defensive posts supported by a moveable column located at a new cantonment in the Miranzai Valley. The Committee favoured the former scheme, as did Sir William Lockhart,<sup>1</sup> and Elgin accepted it since it avoided the necessity of creating a new cantonment. No changes were suggested for the Kurram Valley except the strengthening of the post at Parachinar.

It was also decided to leave garrisons at Wana and in the Tochi. Elgin suggested that concentration in the Tochi could be accomplished by the construction of a cantonment at Miran Shah and the location of a moveable column at Edwardesabad, but that the principle could only be applied at Wana "if and when we are able to provide an efficient substitute for holding the subsidiary posts".<sup>2</sup>

So far the Government of India had had no difficulty in reaching conclusions that all could accept. Such was not the case when the Khyber was discussed. The Khyber had always been regarded as the most important land entrance into India, but neither Lansdowne nor Elgin had made any effort to increase British influence over the Afridis, though Lansdowne had warned the Amir away from them, and had excused his occupation of the Samana Range on the grounds that it dominated Afridi country. This apparent neglect seems strange since an advance to Kabul

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

via the Khyber was an integral part of the "scientific frontier" policy. But there are a number of explanatory factors. Firstly, knowledge of the Khyber route was complete, exploration was unnecessary; secondly, from 1881 onwards the pass had been kept open in the British interest by the Afridis, and the system showed no signs of breaking down; thirdly, the task of bringing under control the Afridis, a tribe renowned for their fighting abilities and independence of spirit, was not one to be undertaken lightly. Of course, the same might be said of the Mahsuds, but in their case two routes, the Tochi and the Gomal, were at stake, both of them relatively unknown geographically, and neither of them open as was the Khyber. In these circumstances it was logical to concentrate on the Gomal and Tochi first, since no-one would have wished to tackle Afridis and Mahsuds at once. But Lansdowne had expressed the desire to extend the Sandeman system of tribal control over all Pathans, and Elgin had intended the extension of control over the Afridis as soon as affairs in Waziristan were properly settled.

The events of 1897 changed many things. The Afridis violently ruptured the agreement of 1881 and arrangements for keeping the pass open broke down completely. The military campaign which ended in submission of the tribe was long and costly, nor did it greatly enhance the prestige of British arms. Moreover, increased geographical knowledge led to a more restrained appraisal of the strategic value when compared with the Khyber. The military position was put by General Collen who declared that there were only two great military highways



to Afghanistan - the Khyber and the Bolan, all others being subsidiary and secondary.<sup>1</sup>

With the pass itself under military occupation, and the Afridis subdued, there must have been an almost overwhelming temptation to enforce a settlement that would, not only secure the permanent safety of the pass, but would offer some assurance that the Afridis would not again be able to flout British power. This perhaps, accounts for the wide spread support for White's plan of annexation.

Elgin was aware that there were likely to be protracted discussions concerning the Khyber, and he determined to break loose from the Indian practice of written notes and to bring those chiefly concerned face to face around the conference table.<sup>2</sup> The conference consisted of Elgin, Sir George White, Collen, Lockhart, Westland, Udny, and General Nicholson, Chief of Staff of the Tirah Expeditionary Force. The conference met on 2 February, 1898. Next day Lockhart submitted a memorandum drafted by General Nicholson but with which Lockhart agreed.<sup>3</sup> Nicholson based his recommendations on two facts, one, that the Khyber was the main trade route between the Panjab and northern Afghanistan, secondly, that "in the event of a military operation having to be undertaken in Afghanistan, the most direct and easiest road to Kabul lies through the Khyber". Tribal levies might suffice to protect trade, but

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1. PSLI. Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1898. Enc. No.15. Minute by Sir E.H.H.Collen. 17 June, 1898
  2. EC. Vol.16. Part II No. 5 , Elgin to Hamilton, 3 February, 1898
  3. PSLI. Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1898. Enc. No.1. Lockhart to India. 3 February, 1898.

militarily, would not do, since

"we ought to have an advanced military depot at the most commanding point in the pass...near that post an adequate supply of water...and, 2...it would appear to be neither prudent nor conducive to our prestige to expose the defensive works and water-supply...to the chance of being wrecked by a tribal out-break". 1

Therefore, to meet both requirements, he proposed that for trade protection the Khyber Rifles should be organized as a militia with headquarters at Jamrud and occupying posts between Jamrud and Landi Kotal, and that for military purposes a strong work should be constructed at Landi Kotal and garrisoned by regulars.

Elgin was not prepared to accept this plan without further investigation and asked Lockhart and Udny to submit their views, not only on Nicholson's plan, but on other alternatives including the exclusion of the Afridis from participation in the administration and protection of the pass, and, a resort to complete tribal responsibility involving a relaxation of "even that amount of British supervision and superimposed authority that has always been in the Khyber arrangements since 1881." 2

Lockhart arrived at the same conclusions as those reached by Nicholson. He dismissed the notion of holding the whole pass by regulars because the Afridis were much more efficient for picqueting the heights; because during the

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.1. Memorandum by Brig. General. W.G. Nicholson, 3 February, 1898
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Lockhart, 1 March, 1898

summer, heat would make the pass intolerable for British troops and distasteful to natives; and, finally, because to exclude the Afridis from a share in the custody of the pass, and the emoluments attached to the service, would create ill-feeling and lead to mischief. On the other hand, he would not recommend a system that depended on complete tribal responsibility, since "it would mean a reversion to the barbarous system which was condemned as intolerable at the beginning of the last Afghan war." <sup>1</sup>

Udny agreed almost completely with Lockhart, but in addition to the post at Landi Kotal he suggested that a moveable column should be stationed at Peshawar, and that the Afridis, when their allowances were restored, should be persuaded to grant the right of way for a railway through the pass. <sup>2</sup>

W.H.R.Merk, Commissioner of Peshawar, stated most clearly the views of those who opposed the stationing of regulars at Landi Kotal, which, he argued would be a prelude to annexation. His exposition of the argument is worth quoting at length.

"Wherever we plant power, in the shape of British bayonets, across the border among the tribes, one of two things must happen, - either we must withdraw that power or, it must be supreme and must increase and widen as it remains.....It is quite impossible for ourselves or for the tribes to divest British officers of their attributes as the officers of an all-powerful state. All their acts and all their utterances have at their back this power. Unless this power is to be

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Memorandum by General Sir W.Lockhart, undated.
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.5. Memorandum by Sir R. Udny, 15 March, 1898

flaunted what its agents wish and desire must be done; however platonic that wish or desire may be, once that it is expressed, it becomes a clear or veiled command, because it emanates from the source of authority; if it is disregarded then that authority is condemned. A British officer cannot among the tribes act as "amicus curiae", being in truth the "curia" himself." 1

If troops were stationed at Landi Kotal fighting along the twenty mile line of communication connecting them with Peshawar would have to be prevented. But if the Afridis were denied the "tribunal of arms", it would become a British responsibility to substitute other means of settling quarrels, and from the administration of justice to annexation would be an imperceptible step.

Merk was equally sure that a system of complete tribal responsibility would fail for "it postulates a power of combination, of self-government, and of self-restraint which is utterly wanting among the Afridis". Thus, he agreed with Lockhart and Udny that a system of British and tribal co-operation was necessary, and he agreed that the tribal force should be a militia. However, he felt that the British force should be located, not in the pass, but at Peshawar, unless the strategic arguments in favour of Landi Kotal were overwhelming.

Mackworth Young agreed with Merk but he introduced a new consideration, namely, that a force at Landi Kotal would be bitterly resented by the Afridis and by the Amir, and though it might at first be accepted, it would be a constant source of

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.9. Merk to Panjab, 2 April, 1898

irritation to the tribes and of worry to the Government of India. He believed firmly that the construction of posts beyond the border had been one of the prime causes of the uprising and favoured a return to the "status quo ante" in the Khyber though he was agreeable to the constitution of the Khyber Rifles as a militia.<sup>1</sup>

Elgin's solution was a compromise. He agreed to the construction of a powerful fort at Landi Kotal, and to the construction of the other works recommended by the military. He agreed also to the formation of a militia corps and to the desirability of constructing a railway through the pass, but he decided that the fort at Landi Kotal would be held by the militia, supported by a moveable column at Peshawar.<sup>2</sup>

Hamilton agreed on all these points except that concerning the constitution of the Landi Kotal garrison, on which he was noncommittal. He pointed out that it would take a year to construct and repair the works in the pass, and the behaviour of the Afridis in the interim might serve to tip the balance one way or the other.<sup>3</sup>

Hamilton had decided to hold the decision respecting actual policy in abeyance. He took the same action concerning Elgin's proposals for the Samana, Chitral, Tochi, and Wana. He agreed that the proposals had taken account of the principle of concentration, but wished to be convinced that they had

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.9. Memorandum by Sir M. Young, 11 April, 1898

2. PSLI. Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1898

3. PSLI. Vol.104. PSDI. No.18. (Secret) 5 August, 1898

been considered in the light of general tribal policy.

"Accordingly, before deciding finally upon proposals which, if approved, might bring a large extent of trans-frontier country under the permanent protection of the British Government...I think it best to remit the case again to your Excellency for full consideration, upon the political and military principles laid down in my despatch of the 28th. January last". 1

In a private letter Hamilton declared that personally he wished to have the matter settled and would have accepted Elgin's proposals since he feared that there might be "wilder and more ambitious schemes put forward [by Curzon]", but since the despatch had been prepared by the Military Committee and involved the question of finance he was unable to overrule it.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the Khyber discussions had led directly to consideration of the whole problem of tribal control, and particularly to a discussion of the form of administration best fitted to exercise the control. Major-General Symons, General Officer commanding the Khyber Force, opened the discussion when he proposed "that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should also be the Political Officer in the Khyber".<sup>3</sup> This would have been a reversal of the former case, when the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles had been under the orders of the Political Officer. But Elgin and a majority of his council opposed Symon's plan; for though they agreed that one authority in the pass was essential, they maintained that that authority should be the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, since it

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1. PSLI. Vol.109. PSDI. No.37. (Secret) 25 November, 1898
  2. H.C.Part I. Vol. 3, Hamilton to Elgin, 25 November, 1898
  3. PSLI. Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1898. Enc. No.13. Symons to India. 7 May, 1898.

would be impracticable to divorce control of the Khyber from the authority which controlled political relations on the rest of the Panjab frontier.<sup>1</sup>

Two other alternatives were suggested: one, that the political officer in the pass might communicate directly with the Government of India; the other, that he might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar who would be directly responsible to the Government of India.<sup>2</sup> The purport of these alternatives, as in the case of the other, was to oust the authority of the Panjab from the Khyber area. Elgin, as we have seen, was prepared to accept military advice without question from military "experts", but in the case of administrative problems he turned for advice to the administrative "experts". In the case under consideration he echoed the opinions of Sir Mackworth Young, and rejected all three proposed alternatives: the first, because it would introduce a special system in a narrow wedge of country bounded on all sides by territory over which the Panjab Government exercised political control; the second, because the Government of India was not equipped to deal with local, routine affairs, and the district was too small for an expensive staff headed by a man who could be trusted on his own in cases of emergency, and too important for other than a thoroughly reliable authority; and, the third, because it would place the commissioner in the position of serving two masters, would divorce control of affairs on the British side

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1. PSLI. Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1895.

2. Ibid. Enc. No.15. Minute by Sir E.H.H.Collen. 17 June, 1898

of the border from control on the tribal side, while two directing authorities would attempt to work through the same officer.

The acting Commander -in-Chief, Sir Charles Nairne, dissented from these views, and argued that the uprising had been but another proof of the failure of the Panjab policy, and that in order to secure the safety of the Khyber there had to be a reversion to the methods of Mackeson, Edwardes, Nicholson, and others of their stamp. His advocacy was for firmness of control:

"If we go among them and let our rule be felt, these frontier tribesmen will soon become...our faithful friends, soldiers, and allies; but with such people half-hearted and tender methods of repression lead to nothing but failure and loss of prestige. I therefore deprecate allowing the management of the Afridis... to be assumed by an agency which had failed in the past, as under such a system it was bound to fail, and which will fail again in the future". 1

This set the tone of military objection and the view was accepted and expanded in a lengthy minute of dissent by General Collen.<sup>2</sup>

The military party led by Sir George White, who had surprised Elgin with "his extreme forward views", and who, Elgin thought, received "inspiration" from Lord Roberts,<sup>3</sup> had adopted the Panjab Government as a whipping boy. In the years immediately preceding the uprising they had seen their policies

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.14. Minute of Dissent by Sir Charles Nairne, 16 June, 1898

2. Ibid. Enc. No.15. Minute of Dissent by Sir. E.H.H.Collen, 17 June, 1898

3. HC.Part II. Vol.VII. Elgin to Hamilton, 6 October, 1897.

For White's conversion from the Laurence Policy to acceptance of the "Scientific Frontier" idea see, Durand, H.M.

Field-Marshal Sir George White. Edinburgh, 1915. Vol.I



accepted but the uprising had upset their predictions of the beneficial consequences that would follow an advance into tribal territory. They now excused the inaccuracy of their forecasts by claiming that the failure had been due to the inefficiency of the agency employed in putting the policy into practice, and maintained that all might yet be well if the intermediary authority of the Panjab could be eliminated from frontier control. This view, Hamilton reported, was held in high quarters.<sup>1</sup>

The attitude of the military alarmed both Elgin and Hamilton, who believed, that because of the revulsion of feeling in England brought about by the long and not very successful frontier operations,<sup>2</sup> and because of the increasing possibility of a Muslim combination on the border which might spread to India, a curb should be put on the forward movement, at least for a time.<sup>3</sup> Hamilton felt that to remove control of the Khyber from the Panjab Government would be to play into the hands of the military, for the strategic significance of the Khyber was such that if it were created a separate agency, the man appointed to head it would undoubtedly be a military officer.<sup>4</sup>

But "high authority" in England supported the military position. Lord Salisbury, who, when he was Secretary of State

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1. HC. Part I. Vol.3: Hamilton to Elgin, 7 September, 1898
  2. HC. Part I. Vol.3: Hamilton to Elgin, 28 January, 1898
  3. HC. Part I. Vol.3. Hamilton to Elgin, 4 February, 1898
  4. Ibid.

for India in 1877, had proposed a separate frontier province, still favoured that idea, and in Cabinet he was supported by Lansdowne.<sup>1</sup> Hamilton had some difficulty with this formidable combination, and the despatch that was finally approved represented a compromise solution.<sup>2</sup>

The despatch emphasized Hamilton's objections to the creation of a new province. These were that the established administrative units of India would be broken up; that the revenue system would be disturbed; that territorial rectifications and compensations would be entailed; that the Panjab Government, and hence the Government of India, would be deprived of the opportunity of training officers for frontier service and thus of gaining a knowledge of the tribes who were constantly sending settlers into British territory; and, that it would place in the hands of a single officer the whole executive power on a most important section of the frontier without the restraint "which a trained experience of financial and administrative responsibility...imposes upon...the Government of a first class province".<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, Hamilton admitted that

"present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Panjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." 4

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1. HC. Part I. Vol.3. Hamilton to Elgin, 3 August, 1898

2. PSLI. Vol.104. PSDI. No.18 (Secret) 5 August, 1898

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

He therefore proposed a compromise, and though he had previously deprecated the idea of removing control of the Khyber from the Panjab Government, the solution he now suggested contemplated doing exactly that. For he put forward one of the alternatives which Elgin had already dismissed as unworkable: that, namely, in which it was proposed that the political officers in the Khyber might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Commissioner himself being placed directly under the Government of India as far as foreign policy was concerned, while retaining his administrative function under the Panjab Government. Elgin's objections to this plan,<sup>1</sup> Hamilton declared, were "rather formal than substantial", for under the old system the Government of India had conducted its relations with the Amir through the Commissioner of Peshawar without the intervention of the Panjab Government; and, moreover, in the management of the tribes there had always been a distribution of powers between local and Imperial governments with a more immediate supervision than was exercised over the internal administration of the province; while, in war time the Commissioner had often communicated directly with the Government of India.<sup>2</sup>

But Elgin remained adamant, though aware that Hamilton had suggested the compromise "in order to avert, if possible, the creation of a new frontier agency".<sup>3</sup> He asked privately to be spared the disagreeable duty of putting into force a scheme to which he was unalterably opposed,<sup>4</sup> and this request

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1. See above page 298.

2. PSLI.Vol.104. PSDI.No.18.(Secret)5 August, 1898

3. EC.Vol.16.PartII.No.60.Elgin to Hamilton,10 November, 1898

4. EC.Vol.16. Part II.No.31. Elgin to Hamilton,30 June,1898

was readily granted, since Salisbury, Lansdowne, and several members of the Council of India were anxious to have the settlement postponed until Curzon, who would be replacing Elgin in the new year, should have had an opportunity of offering his opinions.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it seems that Elgin would not have received permission to put the scheme into operation even had he so desired. Curzon wrote to him:

"I am surprised to hear you speak as though it were a fixed decision of the Home Government which it only remained for the Indian Government to carry out and which will be in full working order by next spring. My own recollections of the Despatch which I saw, and helped to modify in the sense which I am indicating, was that it invited the views of your Government upon a proposal favoured by the Secretary of State, and differing from your proposal, but by no means enjoined as a final mandate from home. The Secretary of State would, I think, have preferred to send more of a mandate. But Lord Salisbury and the Cabinet were of opinion that it would be unfair to overrule the retiring Viceroy or to tie the hands of his successor".<sup>2</sup>

Though it seemed plain that Hamilton's compromise scheme would never be translated into reality, yet Elgin was asked for an expression of his opinion regarding it. To aid him in his deliberations he invited the views of Mackworth Young,<sup>3</sup> and he in turn referred to Merk, Commissioner of Derajat, Udny, Commissioner of Peshawar, Anderson, Officiating Commissioner of Derajat, and Cunningham, Political Officer on special duty in the Khyber.<sup>4</sup> Opinions differed. Merk's condemnation of the

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1. HC. Vol.3. Hamilton to Elgin, 14 September, 1898
  2. EC. Vol.33(a) No.56. Curzon to Elgin, 21 September, 1898
  3. PSLI. Vol.109. No.207. 10 November, 1898. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab, 19 September, 1898.
  4. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Endorsement by Panjab of India's letter of 19 September, 1898

scheme <sup>1</sup> was no less complete than Udny's acceptance of it, <sup>2</sup> while Anderson <sup>3</sup> and Cunningham <sup>4</sup> chose the middle ground and admitted that the scheme might work, but hedged this admission around with many qualifications.

✓ The main arguments brought against the scheme were as follows: firstly, the administrative frontier was an arbitrary line drawn through a homogeneous population, and trans-border control and cis-border administration could not conceivably be separated; secondly, the scheme would deprive the Government of India of the great experience and knowledge of the Panjab Government concerning frontier affairs, and the frontier officers would be deprived of the personal supervision and influence of the governing authority; thirdly, the Government of India and the Government of the Panjab would not be able to agree on the appointment of a commissioner, the former requiring a man with political experience and ability, the latter an administrator; fourthly, the burden of detail devolving upon the Government of India would be intolerable; fifthly, duality of control would run through the whole administration and lead inevitably to a breakdown; and, finally, the creation of a higher post for the Commissioner of Peshawar would mean in effect that he would be appointed

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Merk to Panjab. 7 October, 1898
  2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Udny to Panjab. 20 October, 1898
  3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Anderson to Panjab, 17 October, 1898
  4. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.3. Cunnungham to Panjab. 25 October, 1898

for life, since he could not be transferred without financial penalty, and the consequent block in promotion would make frontier service even more unpopular than it was.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, some positive advantages were claimed for the plan. These were that the Commissioner's gain in status would help him to influence the tribes; that it would eliminate correspondence, reduce discussion, and accelerate implementation of changes in connection with the Government's plan to extend its influence over the tribes; and, that the Commissioner's direct access to the Government of India, especially in the Military Department, would be of great advantage in shortening the "circuitous channels" through which military support of political officers could be obtained.<sup>2</sup>

Even the difficulties inherent in "making the Commissioner of Peshawar an official Janus with one face to Calcutta and one towards Lahore" were not considered, except by Merk, as insurmountable. For since the two masters would not stand in the relation of subordinate and supreme, the policy of the latter would overrule that of the former. A division of tribal affairs into administrative and political might also be feasible, since the same officer would be responsible for both aspects.

Nevertheless, only Sir Richard Udny announced himself to be strongly in favour of the scheme, (did he, perhaps, as

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Merk to Panjab. 7 October, 1898

2. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Anderson to Panjab. 17 October, 1898

Commissioner of Peshawar, expect promotion to the new position?) and put forward definite proposals for the division of political and administrative matters. But the general feeling is best summed up in the conclusions of Mackworth Young, which were

"That unless and until Her Majesty's Government decide to separate the frontier and place it under a Chief Commissioner ...the existing machinery cannot with advantage be altered. The local Government works in loyal subordination to the Government of India, and while...submitting for its orders, together with the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, all matters of importance with regard to trans-frontier matters... stems the tide of correspondence by assuming responsibility in regard to matters within its competence. Though the views of the local Government have not always been in accord with those of the Government of India...it has never failed in loyal co-operation with the declared policy of the latter....If the Panjab Government has in the past practically acted as a drag on the suggestions...of the forward school...the elimination of its Councils will not strengthen the position of the Government of India...but...to place the Commissioner of Peshawar...under the direct control of the Government of India would indicate a want of confidence in the Government of the Panjab and would introduce confusion into its administration".<sup>1</sup>

These opinions reached Elgin in November when less than two months of his Viceroyalty remained. He thought it unfair to ask his colleagues to commit themselves, since they would have to discuss the whole question with Curzon when he arrived. But his own position was different. This was his last opportunity to make his views heard, and he decided to record, in a form that could be used by the new Viceroy and the Secretary of State, the reasons by which he still adhered.<sup>2</sup>

His minute was an admirable summary of the argument. He supported the opinions of Merk and Mackworth Young that

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1. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.2. Note by Sir Mackworth Young 19 October, 1898

2. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Minute by Lord Elgin on the Management of the Panjab.Frontier. 6 November, 1898

the scheme was indeed unworkable. He admitted that he had, himself, put forward a similar scheme in 1896,<sup>1</sup> because at that time he thought that thus

"we should have secured most of the advantages of a separate province while avoiding the difficulties inseparable from dividing the tribes from the settled districts that adjoin them."

In the event he had been persuaded that the scheme was impossible and he still held to that view.

He enlarged on the argument that the Foreign Department would be unable to cope with the work, and just as Mackworth Young had been unable to suggest a method of applying the scheme without introducing chaos into the administration of the Panjab, he was unable to suggest a method of reinforcing the Foreign Department so that it could cope with the detail. And it was not a question of the amount of extra work, for that could be overcome, but rather, of the class of work which the Department was not equipped to handle. This, he declared, was not a theoretical objection for the experience of Baluchistan was on record, and the results of handling administrative detail from that source "were not satisfactory".

Elgin, of course, knew that Hamilton's compromise was the thin edge of the wedge; that there was pressure at Cabinet level for the creation of a separate province. He, therefore, extended his argument beyond the scope to which Young and the others had been confined. He began by asserting, as Merk, Mackworth Young, and Anderson had done, that many arguments

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1. See above, page 272.



✓ used in condemnation of Panjab methods of border control were in fact based on fallacious assumptions. These assumptions were, that under the Panjab Government political officers had been so busy with district work that they had no time for the tribes; that control of external frontier affairs had been the prerogative of the Panjab Government; and, that Panjab officials were ipso facto adherents of the "close border" policy. It is interesting to note that a condemnation of Panjab methods based on these same "fallacious" arguments had appeared in the correspondence columns of The Times.<sup>1</sup> The contributor remained anonymous. The argument was later refuted by another correspondent who signed himself "expertus".<sup>2</sup> There is no direct evidence of who these writers were, but considering style alone, one might hazard a guess that they were Lansdowne and Fitzpatrick.

In refutation of the first of these assumptions it was argued that on the whole of the Panjab frontier the tribes were already in the immediate and direct charge of officers whose exclusive function was tribal management. The political agents of the Malakand, the Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan, controlled, without other duties, nearly three-fourths of the border tribes. Where political agencies had not been established, tribal control was in the hands of the Commandants of Border Military Police, one of whom was

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1. The Times. 23 August, 1898

2. The Times. 13 September, 1898

appointed to each district, and these, under the orders of the Deputy Commissioners, had the fullest leisure to cultivate relations with the tribes.

The second and third propositions were dealt with in equally positive fashion. Elgin emphasized the self-evident proposition that "it is the business of the Government of India, and the Government of India alone, to formulate and prescribe a policy outside the borders of British India." He further pointed out that "all and every...matter of Imperial interest" was referred by the Panjab Government for the information of the Government of India, and that no measure of importance in border policy was undertaken without the sanction and concurrence of the Supreme Government. As for the affinity of Panjab officers for the "close border", it should be remembered that Panjab officers came from the same classes and received the same training as officers in other provinces. Nor was there a lack of examples of Panjab officials with no desire to hang back. (He might have mentioned Bruce, Anderson, King, Grant, and Udny). In any case the Panjab Government had always co-operated with the Government of India in carrying out its declared policy, whatever the personal feelings of the officers concerned may have been.

Nevertheless, Elgin admitted that circumstances might arise which would make the formation of a separate province or agency a necessity, or, at least, a decided advantage. For example, it might

"be necessitated by the increasing development...of the

country...or by the adoption of a new and energetic policy which it is desired to push by the undivided attention of a special officer. It may be justified by the fact that the tract in question marks itself for separation by the physical features of the country, or by the characteristics of the inhabitants which...facilitate their collective treatment. It may come about by one of those accidents which bring us face to face with the hour and the man".

As far as Elgin was concerned none of these reasons now applied to the Panjab frontier. The Panjab Government was busy but not over-burdened; the question of opening up the country and of following an active policy, though it might have been a sound reason before 1897, had been precluded by the despatch of 28 January, 1898; geography and tribal characteristics made combination difficult if not impossible; and as far as Elgin could judge, no officer on the frontier had proved himself to be the man of the hour. On the other hand, if such a man could be found, where would he find an outlet for his energies and ambitions? For the despatch of 28 January would deny him the career of a Sandeman, would, in fact, limit him to a policy of quieta non movere.

To use a dramatic analogy, the climax, the great up-rising, had now passed, and the shape of the denouement was beginning to emerge. If Hamilton's policy despatch had called a halt to the forward movement, it had also reaffirmed the principles upon which that movement had been based. Moreover, though public opinion had influenced the decision to renounce publicly an extension of responsibilities, such an extension was, from the military point of view, no longer essential. The two main approaches to the "scientific frontier", the

Bolan and Khyber passes, were under firm control; Chitral was held by a British garrison and linked to Peshawar by road; the Kurram and Zhob Valleys were under administrative control; the Tochi and Gomal had been explored and were in fact held by garrisons. The tribes had not been converted into allies, but political agents moved freely among them and their influence might be expected to grow. Only in respect to the creation of a frontier province had there been no appreciable advance, but indications were that this state of affairs would shortly be remedied.

Elgin's career in India was at an end. He had accepted what he considered to be the best advice obtainable, and had firmly and consistently done what he felt to be his duty. He had pushed forward Lansdowne's policies because he was convinced that it was essential to the fulfillment of obligations to do so. He was unfortunate that this policy led to the tribal uprising, but when the crisis came he met it with coolness and determination. The questions thrown up by the uprising remained unresolved, not because Elgin lacked the energy or will to attempt a solution, but because decisions had been deliberately held in abeyance pending the arrival of Curzon. It remained with Curzon to complete the task of reorganization.

## LORD CURZON'S REORGANIZATION OF MILITARY AND TRIBAL POLICY

As soon as Lord Curzon had settled into office he came to grips with the problem of reorganizing the administration and defence of the North-West Frontier, one "of many first class questions left for my solution by my predecessor".<sup>1</sup> The problem of defence was first attacked, and of the many aspects of that problem, the Khyber was chosen as the starting point.

Lord Elgin had devoted much time to the discussion of the Khyber and had left a voluminous file, so voluminous in fact that Curzon declared, after he had worked on it for seven hours, that he was "not much nearer the end". This circumstance called forth one of the first Curzonian blasts against a "system of working...so radically vicious that a stage arises at which a question gets tied up in a tangle of manuscript and print, in which the real issues are utterly obscured, and from which no one seems able to extricate it." 2

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1. HC. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 26 January, 1899
  2. Ibid. Curzon's illustration: "Your despatch of August 5th arrives. It goes to the Foreign Department. Thereupon clerk no.1. paraphrases and comments upon it over 4½ folio pages of print of his own composition dealing solely with the Khyber suggestions in it. Then comes clerk no.2. with 2½ more pages upon clerk no.1. Then we get to the region of Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Secretaries. All these gentlemen state their worthless views at equal length. Finally we get to the top of the scale, and we find the Viceroy and the Military Member, with a proper regard for their dignity, expanding themselves over a proportionate space of print. Then these papers wander about from department to department, and among the various members of Council Each has his say, and the result is a sort of literary bedlam. I am grappling with this vile system in my own Department, but it has seated itself, like the Old Man of the Sea, upon the shoulders of the Indian Government, and every man accepts, while deploring this burden".

A minute by Sir E. Collen<sup>1</sup> soon gave Curzon the opportunity to express his own views at length. The purpose of Collen's minute was to call attention to the need for a speedy solution to the Khyber question since the brigade of troops in the pass and the moveable column at Peshawar were together costing an annual sum of twenty-three and a half lakhs. The minute tended, however, to resurrect the discussion of the type of garrison best suited to the Khyber, and put forward alternate schemes as recommended by Collen himself and as preferred by Lockhart. The former proposed two local battalions forming part of the Panjab Frontier Force, the latter suggested that Landi Kotal should be held by regulars and the Khyber Pass by the Khyber Rifles.

Curzon emphatically denied that the question of the garrison was still open to discussion, not only because he disagreed with Lockhart's scheme and believed that the peace of the Khyber depended on keeping "regulars" out of the pass, where they would be "a provocation to the Amir, an offence to the tribes, and a danger to ourselves"; but because there would be "no finality at all in politics if the decisions of the Government of India, arrived at after months of anxious deliberation, placed on record in a formal despatch to the Secretary of State, and accepted by him, are lightly to be thrown over for no stated reason, and if the entire question at issue is to be reopened 'ab initio' ". 2

It is doubtful whether Curzon would have refused to reopen the question had Elgin's proposals not met with his approval. In

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1. HC. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 2 February, 1899. Enc. Note by Sir E. Collen on the Reduction of the Khyber Brigade, 27 January, 1899
  2. Ibid. Enc. Note by Lord Curzon, 30 January, 1899

fact, Hamilton had reserved the right for Curzon to do so when he gave his sanction "subject to such further consideration as may be needed after fuller experience". 1

But Curzon accepted in principle all the arrangements that Elgin had planned, and concentrated his attention on three important details: the type of post to be built at Landi Kotal, the question of a railway through the pass, and the relationship between Civil and Military authority in the Khyber.

Elgin had accepted his military adviser's plans for a large fort costing eight or nine lakhs. They had argued that the fort was needed to dominate the Upper Khyber, to act as a reduit in case of a rising until relieved from Peshawar, or to be held by troops who were advancing into Afghanistan, and that therefore, it ought to be able to withstand any attack made on it.<sup>2</sup> But who, asked Curzon, were the attackers to be? Clearly the fort was not designed to repel an Afridi attack, for if the garrison remained loyal no combination was likely to come against them requiring elaborate defences, while if disloyal no defence would prevail. On the other hand an Afghan attack was outside the range of practical politics, while the Russians according to plan, would never get as far as Landi Kotal, and if they did then no fort, whether it cost eight lakhs or eighty, would hold them back.

Nor did Curzon accept the idea that the fort was needed

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1. PSLI. Vol.104. PSDI. No.18. (Secret) 5 August, 1898

2. PSLI. Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1898. Enc. No.3. Memorandum by General Lockhart. Lockhart to India, 11 March, 1898

for an advance into Afghanistan, for though such an advance might be necessary, a fort at one end of the pass did not mean control of it, and on the other hand, if the pass were already under British control, what was the need for a fort at all?

The apparent logic of these arguments persuaded Curzon's Council to accept a much less ambitious plan for fortifications in the Khyber than that to which they had formerly agreed.

But a more important question was that of constructing a railway through the pass. The plan prepared under Elgin was for a light military line of two foot gauge, but Curzon thought that this plan should be examined more closely in relation to the larger Imperial policy it was to subserve.

This policy might some day, perhaps sooner than was expected, demand construction of a British railway from Peshawar to Jalalabad and perhaps ultimately to Kabul. But this line would not be a light emergency line but one of standard gauge connected to the Indian Railway system, and linking the advanced positions of British forces with their Indian bases. The Khyber Pass was not an ideal route for this line, since water was scarce, the line would be hard to defend, and the descent into Afghanistan was very steep.

But according to the survey which Lansdowne had ordered, the Kabul River Valley offered a much better route, provided the aversion of the Amir to such a line could be overcome. In this case it would not be wise to jeopardise future policy by the construction of a line in a less desirable quarter,



especially since a moveable column from Peshawar ought to be able to reach Landi Kotal over thirty miles of good road without too much difficulty.

Curzon had already undertaken to sound the Amir about the possibility of a line up the Kabul River Valley,<sup>1</sup> but the reply gave no reason for hopefulness.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief, supported by two other members of Council, requested that construction of the line should be undertaken immediately. But because of the Amir's attitude, because the Durand Line was in that area undemarcated, because there was no suitable terminus for the line within British territory, and because the line could not be extended into Afghanistan during the life of Abdur Rahman; Curzon and the majority of his Council agreed that the proposal was not a sound one. Unanimous agreement had already been reached on cancellation of the proposed Landi Kotal line, so that the whole idea of a strategic railway in the Khyber area had for the time been put to one side.

Concerning the third question: whether the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should be "ex officio" the political authority in the pass, Curzon laid down the following principle:

"In the Khyber and elsewhere along the frontier, the corps of tribal militia, or rifles, or military police, by whatever name they may be called, though semi-military in organization, are more than semi-political in functions and object, and that as such they must necessarily (except in time of active warfare) be under civil authority and control. Sometimes

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1. PSLI. Vol.115. No.141. 20 July, 1899. Enc. Viceroy to Amir, 24 January, 1899

2. Ibid. Enc. Amir to Viceroy, 2 March, 1899

that authority is exercised by a military officer in civil employ (who may also on occasion be in command of the militia or rifle corps as well). Sometimes it is exercised through an officer of the Civil Service. In either case, the principle is the same...is a correct one...and...should be adopted and acted upon along the entire length of the North-West Border". 1

Hamilton had been delighted that Curzon had "pulverized and annihilated the reasons given for this heavy military expenditure",<sup>2</sup> and Sir Alfred Lyall and Sir Donald Stewart had been equally pleased.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the Council of India accepted the proposals contained in the Khyber memorandum with enthusiasm and alacrity.<sup>4</sup>

By September, 1899, the Khyber Rifles had been reorganized into two battalions of 600 men each under a single British Commandant and Adjutant, with two other British officers assigned to each battalion. Arrangements for kafila traffic through the pass had been stabilized in the form that had been adopted after the reopening of the pass in 1898. That is to say, two kafilas each way per week were permitted during the cold weather, and one each way per week during the hot weather. But the right was reserved to use the pass at any time for military purposes.<sup>5</sup> On 9 January, 1900, regular troops were withdrawn.<sup>6</sup>

The problem of the future British position in Chitral also early engaged the attention of the Viceroy, who laid down as the foundation of his policy four general principles.<sup>7</sup>

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1. PSLI. Vol. 115. Secretary's letter from India. No. 28M. 20 July, 1899. Enc. "arnes to Chamberlaine and Cunningham, 22 June, 1899
  2. HC. Vol. 1. Hamilton to Curzon, 24 February, 1899
  3. HC. Vol. 1. Hamilton to Curzon, 10 March, 1899
  4. PSLI. Vol. 115. PSDI. No. 44. 1 September, 1899
  5. PSLI. Vol. 115. No. 156. 10 August, 1899
  6. PSLI. Vol. 119. Tel. Viceroy to S. of S. 9 January, 1900
  7. HC. Vol. 1. Curzon to Hamilton, 23 February, 1899. Enc. Minute on Chitral by the Viceroy, 21 February, 1899

Firstly, the British hold over Chitral should be maintained on the moral grounds that the Government of India owed a duty to those who had sided with them since the first intervention in the state; and on the political grounds that if British forces and influence were withdrawn, Russia, (not necessarily Russian armaments and a Russian resident, but Russian intrigue and Russian roubles) would sooner or later take their place, and India could not afford to admit an alien influence on its side of the Hindu Kush. Secondly, as long as the British remained in Chitral the main and obligatory line of communication was the Dir Road, and that road should be kept open at all hazards. The campaign of 1895 had not been worth fighting if the road were not to be opened as a consequence of success, and the road had not been worth opening if there was to be a reversion to the precarious communication from the north. Thirdly, the dangers arising from the precarious and exposed nature of the road, from fanaticism, and most of all from the tribes' pardonable inability to understand the "raison d'etre" of an authority which affecting to spare their country drove a military road through it; which proclaimed their independence but deprecated the tribal interpretation of that term; and which, while announcing its benevolence killed their men; could only be met by courage and a bold front. Fourthly, the Chitral situation was transitional. For eventually, when regular troops had been reduced and native levies had taken their place, when the Mehtar had consolidated his position and British political predominance had been demonstrated, the

bulk, or perhaps all, of the regular troops could be withdrawn.

Elgin's plan which was based on a report by Colonel O'Sullivan, had advocated the concentration of the entire occupying force at Chitral, the construction of a cart road from Drosh (or the Lowarai Pass) to Chitral, and the establishment of levy posts along this road. Curzon declared that he himself, Hamilton, and "a powerful and almost over-whelming body of opinion at home" objected to this scheme on political grounds.

The objections were indeed overpowering. The purpose of being in Chitral at all was to keep Russia out. But Chitral was a post of observation and control, nothing more. There was no intention of having the garrison at Chitral sally out to battle Russians in the passes of the Hindu Kush. Rather, the garrison was intended to prevent the infiltration of Russian influence and in the event of a Russian move towards the passes to give an early warning so that reinforcements could be moved up from Peshawar.

Who then was to besiege the great fort planned? In 1895 the Chitralis assisted by Pathans had been unable to take a rickety fort held by a few hundred Sikhs and Dogras. But what of an Afghan attack? Curzon argued that in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the Afghans would be better employed elsewhere than in making a diversion towards Chitral. The logical conclusion seemed to be that the fort at Chitral was sufficiently large for the purpose it was meant to serve, and that the

extensive works which Elgin had sanctioned had been the result of a military panic caused by the events of 1897.

Colonel O'Sullivan had maintained in his report that a large garrison at Chitral would have a salutary moral effect. The same salutary effect as Cavignari's force had at Kabul ? asks Curzon. No, he declared, it would provoke the tribesmen and impress the Mehtar with the fact that he was a puppet. Thus it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended.

But there was a yet stronger argument. If there was one weak link in the Chain of Chitral defence, that link was certainly the seventy miles of road between Chakdarra and Dir, that is to say in Pathan country, not Chitrali. It was a logical assumption that the nearer troops were quartered to the area of greatest danger the better. Therefore, Curzon argued, the garrison should be located as near the Lowarai Pass as possible, and the most suitable site in that area was at Drosh. The fortifications already existing there would, with very little extra expenditure be adequate, and it could be garrisoned in part by tribal levies drawn from the Mehtar's feudal retainers.

Early in March Chitral was discussed in Council, and it was decided to reduce the garrison by half and to put into effect the other aspects of the plan outlined in the memorandum.<sup>1</sup> It was also decided to build a light railway from Nowshera to Dargai to support the Malakand force. Meanwhile

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1. HC. Part II. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March, 1899

Colonel Thorburn of the Royal Engineers and Captain McMahon, who was relieving Deane as Political Officer of the Malakand Agency, had been sent to Chitral for an on-the-spot investigation of conditions there. It was a great satisfaction to Curzon to be able to report to Hamilton in April that these officers had returned from Chitral and without having seen his memorandum or without having been aware of its contents, had "arrived on military and political grounds at identically the same conclusions I put forward." <sup>1</sup>

On 28 March Hamilton had written to Curzon to inform him that all his plans for Chitral were "in complete accord with our views here".<sup>2</sup> It was therefore a certainty that the Council of India would approve the plan when it came officially before them, and this they did. The following year the Government of India put forward a plan for the reduction of the Gilgit Agency, on the grounds that the Russian menace had been lessened by the Pamir Agreement, that Chitral had been taken over by the Malakand Agency, and that it was financially expedient to do so.<sup>3</sup> This plan also received the assent of the Council of India.<sup>4</sup>

Curzon's approach to the problem of the Samana Range was similar to that which he had employed in settling the Khyber and Chitral questions. He began by preparing a lengthy

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1. HC.Part II. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 13 April, 1899
  2. HC.Part I. Vol.1. Hamilton to Curzon, 28 March, 1899
  3. PSII. Vol.126. 6 September, 1900. also Ibid. Enc. No.5.  
India to Resident Kashmir, 28 March, 1900
  4. PSDI.(Political) No.123. 1 November, 1900

memorandum <sup>1</sup> in which he set himself some pertinent questions to answer. Why were troops and forts on the Samana at all? What objects, military or political, had led troops there and had kept them there? Had the advantages gained been equal to the costs and risks involved? Was it obligatory or desirable that forces should remain there?

His conclusion was that the position was not an essential consideration in Imperial policy. The position was of no advantage in the eventuality of a march into Afghanistan since military opinion now held that the Kurram route would not again be used for an advance on Kabul. Therefore, the Samana, as far as strategical needs were concerned, was unnecessary and, indeed, an encumbrance.<sup>2</sup>

But what local considerations were so overwhelmingly important as to justify the maintenance of a position detrimental as a factor in the Imperial problem? Some argued that it protected the Kohat-Thal Road and the Miranzai Valley, but could not these objects be better secured by posts in the Valley itself? Others maintained that it lifted the "purdah" of the Orakzais, but was "purdah" lifting such a good thing of itself that it justified the expenditure that had been undertaken? Others said that going there in the first place had been a mistake, but having done so retirement was impossible because of the blow to prestige that would be involved.

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1. HC. Vol. 1. Curzon to Hamilton. 16 March, 1899. Enc.  
Memorandum on the Samana Position. 14 March 1899

2. Ibid  
3. Ibid

This was, in Curzon's opinion the only valid argument that had been put forward, and it suggested to him the possibility of being perpetually condemned to occupy a bad position because Government had once been tempted to occupy it.<sup>1</sup>

In order to make the best of a bad position, he decided that regular troops on the Samana would be replaced by a tribal militia. He agreed, however, to consider the construction of a railway to Kohat and the construction of a cantonment in the Miranzai Valley. But discussion of the cantonment led to a clash between Curzon and his military advisers. The original plan had estimated an expenditure of seven to eight lakhs, but by the time the military authorities had worked out all the details the expected cost had risen to a minimum of eighteen lakhs. The Director General of Military Works, "a bureaucratic 'heathen who rages very furiously' in India", to quote Curzon, estimated twenty-three lakhs, while Collen thought that twenty-five would be nearer the mark. Curzon refused to sign any despatch recommending more than ten.

"Finally, as we have...never planted a frontier cantonment anywhere that has not subsequently been discovered to be entirely the wrong site...and as three successive bodies of military experts have all recommended different sites in the Miranzai Plain", 2

Curzon suggested that the troops should be put in a camp for a couple of years until experience had shown the best course

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1. Ibid

2. Ibid.



to follow. This plan was acceptable to all concerned.<sup>1</sup> But later it was decided to build a railway all the way from Kohat to Thal, and in view of this development the idea of a cantonment was dropped altogether.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the Council of India had been as enthusiastic about the Samana proposals as they had been about those dealing with Chitral and the Khyber.<sup>3</sup> Curzon's plan, including the raising of a militia corps to be known as the Samana Rifles was sanctioned in January, 1900.<sup>4</sup>

The next problem to be faced was that of the British position in the Tochi, which Curzon maintained, "constitutes a melancholy record of unfulfilled military predictions, of unverified political assurances, and of immature and inconsequent policies".<sup>5</sup> By midsummer, 1899, the Viceroy had prepared a minute on the Tochi, this time an "extremely lengthy one", in order to spare his colleagues "the labour [ of reading the file ] which I have felt it my duty to incur".<sup>6</sup> He pointed out that though strategical considerations had persuaded the Government of India to occupy the Valley, four years afterward, it was

"generally admitted by the military authorities that the Tochi is not a practicable line of advance into Afghanistan; that no

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1. PSLI. Vol.131. No.46. 14 March, 1901. Also. HC.Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 25 October, 1899
  2. PSLI. Vol. 123. No.68. 24 May, 1900. Enc. India to Panjab, 15 May, 1900
  3. HC? Vol.1. Hamilton to Curzon, 5 April, 1899. Ibid.21 April, 1899
  4. PSLI. Vol.120. PSDI.No.3. (Political) 4 January, 1900
  5. HC.Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 31 May, 1899
  6. HC.Vol.II. Curzon to Hamilton, 28 June, 1899. Enc. Memorandum on our present and future position in the Tochi Valley, 19 June, 1899. Curzon said that the Tochi file was "considerably over a foot " in height.

railway to Ghazni is ever likely to be made that way; that the valley is unhealthy and malarious; while...we have to pay large annual sums to the tribes, who desired to be protected, for the privilege of protecting them". 1

Nevertheless, it was admitted by all concerned that the position in the Tochi gave the Government a hold over the Darwesh Khels, and, to a limited extent, over the Mahsuds. Hamilton's despatch of 28 January, 1898, had laid down the principle that

"the arrangements and the delimitation effected by the Durand Agreement have made the protectorate an accomplished fact, and no interference from outside can be tolerated within the territory now distinctly recognized as belonging to the sphere of British influence."

He had gone on to quote Fowler's dictum that "it is essential that the Indian Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control of Waziristan". Thus, though Elgin had recognized the fact that the strategic reasons for being in the Tochi had largely evaporated, Hamilton's instructions were justification for retention of the position. In any case, the guarantee given to the Dauris meant that complete withdrawal was impossible, even if the question of prestige were not involved.

Curzon accepted the position that total withdrawal was impracticable, but he maintained that permanent military occupation was unnecessary, as was the construction of large forts and cantonments. He therefore proposed that a militia corps similar to the Khyber and Samana Rifles should be raised;

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1. Ibid

that a moveable column to support this force should be located at Bannu; that the existing levy system should be discontinued but that the levies should be permitted to enroll in the militia if they wished to do so; and, that the militia should be a civil corps under the political officer in the valley. Similar plans were detailed for Wana, which, like the Tochi, had been occupied for strategic reasons and held for political ones.<sup>1</sup>

Once again the India Office accepted Curzon's plans without demur, declaring them generally "to be well conceived", which was about as near as the Council ever came to enthusiasm.<sup>2</sup>

The solution of one other problem completed Curzon's plans for the defences of the North-West Frontier. This was the problem of the Kohat Pass Road. The territory occupied by the Kohat Pass Afridis formed a "peninsula", as it were, of hill country thrust into the Indus Valley plain right to the banks of the Indus, separating Peshawar and Kohat, and constituting a serious break in border communications. The Kohat Pass crossed the "isthmus" and though the Afridis of the area had long been in receipt of allowances they had never permitted any improvements to be made to the road. As a consequence it was still unfit for wheeled traffic.

Curzon determined that this situation should be rectified.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Correspondence relative to the implementation of these plans is contained in PSLI.Vol.123. No.68. 24 May, 1900.Enc. Panjab to India, 5 March, 1900. Ibid. Enc. Anderson to Panjab 12 March, 1900. Ibid. Enc. India to Panjab, 15 May, 1900
  2. PSLI. Vol.123. PSDI. No.87. (Military) 12 July, 1900
  3. PSLI. Vol.116.No.177. 21 September, 1899. Enc. No.1. Barnes to Dane, 26 April, 1899

He informed the Panjab Government that the anomaly of paying the tribe large sums for the nominal protection of a road which had never been constructed had to cease and that the tribes were now to be forced to put the road in order.<sup>1</sup> The Panjab authorities were somewhat alarmed at the threat of force and suggested that the concurrence of the tribe should be bought,<sup>2</sup> but Curzon refused the considerable increase of subsidy suggested.<sup>3</sup> The jirga of the tribe was interviewed early in September 1899, and appeared dissatisfied with the amount of allowances offered to them. They asked for a month to think the matter over, They were given a week.<sup>4</sup> At the end of that time they agreed to the construction of a road but stipulated that they should receive adequate compensation for any arable land used and that no railway or telegraph should be built without further consultation.<sup>5</sup> The agreement was concluded on those terms and Curzon wrote to Hamilton in high elation that a disgrace of fifty years standing had been removed and on his terms.<sup>5</sup>

Curzon's defence policy was based on three cardinal principles. In the first place was a desire to avoid locking up regular troops in costly positions, at a distance from their

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Dane to Barnes. 1 June, 1899

2. Ibid. Enc. No.3. Barnes to Dane, 20 June, 1899

3. Ibid. Enc. to Enc. No.6. D.C. Kohat to Dane. 8 September, 1899

4. PSLI. Vol.116. No.40M. 12 October, 1899. Enc. Dane to Barnes, 19 September, 1899

5. HC. Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September, 1899

base, where they would be lost to the offensive strength of India and where they might require additional forces for their protection in time of emergency. Secondly, since the positions from which regular troops were to be withdrawn could not be left unprotected, the inhabitants of the areas concerned would be interested in their own defence, the methods to be used to vary according to the development of relations with the tribes or the nature of defence needed. And, thirdly, since these native garrisons could not be left entirely to their own devices to be "eaten up" in time of trouble, camps and moveable columns were to be maintained at bases within or contiguous to the administrative frontier, and connected to the military resources of India by light railways.<sup>1</sup>

A system such as this had the advantage of relieving soldiers of the Indian Army of distasteful trans-frontier duty, and, moreover, left them free in the event of a war to be concentrated on the Bolan and Khyber routes, the two main lines of advance into Afghanistan. Another advantage was that by utilizing local garrisons it would be possible to avoid much of the publicity attached to army proceedings on the frontier and in the case of a "contretemps" there would be less chance of "the commotion and reproach attached to military disaster". At the same time the tribesmen might be expected to increase in loyalty to the British "Raj" through service that would concurrently conciliate their own patriotism.<sup>2</sup>

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1. PSII. Vol.117. No.208. 26 October, 1899

2. Ibid

Though Curzon has been credited, by Ronaldshay and Lovat Fraser for example, with evolving a completely new plan of frontier defences, we can see that what he actually did was to modify proposals that had been made by Elgin. Elgin's Khyber scheme was adopted completely except for the details concerning the size of the fortifications at Landi Kotal, though the part of the plan that called for railway construction was placed in abeyance for a time. Similarly, Elgin's proposals for Chitral were accepted, except that once again the scale of proposed fortifications was reduced. In the case of the Samana, Tochi, and Wana, there was again a reduction in scale and a substitution of militia forces for regular troops. But it must be remembered that Elgin had suggested that

"...minor posts, and posts on the lines of communication, shall generally be held by levies, when the duties to be performed are those devolving on a police force, or by regular troops, which we should prefer to see organized as a militia; and that risings among the frontier tribes shall be met by moveable columns of sufficient strength, placed where they can readily support and assist the stationary garrisons." 1

Militia forces to garrison frontier outposts, moveable columns to support them, and light railways to link them with bases of supply in India; all these proposals were made by Elgin, and they form the basis of Curzon's policy.

The differences in the scheme proposed by Elgin and that put forward by Curzon can be traced to the differences in the personalities of the two men. Curzon's plan was forced on his advisers by the force of his own conviction and his imperious character. Elgin's was in part the plan of his advisers,

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1. PSLI.Vol.104. No.95. 23 June, 1898. See above page 290.  
The emphasis is mine.

accepted by him because they were experts. Hamilton described Elgin as the most bureaucratic Viceroy who ever held office in India,<sup>1</sup> and there appears to be a measure of truth in the assertion. Curzon accepted this assessment and enlarged on the reasons for his acceptance. Elgin was, he said,

"A painstaking, upright, sagacious man, who, knowing nothing whatever either of India or of administration, decided that the safest thing to do was to place himself in the hands of his officials." 2

But though Elgin may have distrusted his own opinions concerning matters of a technical nature, Curzon had no such scruples. He looked upon his military advisers as "weak men" who tended to thrust upon him the responsibility for action taken collectively by the Government of India. The military authorities had, he declared,

"for so long had the Viceroy tied to their apron strings, or perhaps I should say to their 'sabertaches', that the phenomenon of a Governor-General who dares to interfere, to supervise, or to control, is one that shocks them beyond words." 3

Elgin accepted the advice of his officials and stood by them, they rewarded him with loyalty and admiration. Curzon's dictum was "popularity or unpopularity, I am going through".<sup>4</sup> He fought constantly with some of his colleagues, though he says that the fights were recognized by everyone as being purely "official". He maintains that in Council he endeavoured "to be scrupulously fair...and to give everybody his say without

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1. HC. Vol.II. Hamilton to Curzon, 16 March, 1900
  2. HC.Vol.IV. Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April, 1900
  3. HC. Vol.II. Curzon to Hamilton, 25 June, 1900
  4. HC. Vol.II. Curzon to Hamilton, 28 June, 1899

prejudging the issue"; but he relied on the fact that the "old Indian official is by nature courteous, if not to his subordinates, at any rate to his colleagues and chief".<sup>1</sup>

We can hardly accept the argument that he did not prejudice issues. In the case of the Khyber, of Chitral, of the Samana, and of Waziristan, he presented his council with lengthy memoranda putting forward specific proposals for each of these areas. In each case these proposals were accepted by the Council, exactly as they stood, or with such minor modifications as to be insignificant.

The similarities in the policies advocated by Elgin and Curzon are but manifestations of a similarity of aim. For Curzon, too, accepted the "scientific frontier" idea, and declared, after Hamilton had refused to give him a firm guarantee of reinforcements from England in case of a war,<sup>2</sup> that "to adopt an attitude of passive defence behind the Indian frontiers, while the enemy consolidated himself in Afghanistan, would be suicidal; and that it would be far better to march out with or without reinforcements from home, and make a show in the nearer parts of Afghanistan, than to sit still in the Khyber or on the Indus, and wait for the people to rise in our rear." <sup>3</sup>

But Curzon anticipated an advance to the "scientific frontier" by two routes only, the Khyber and the Bolan. Ghazni, he thought could be occupied either from Kabul or Kandahar if it appeared necessary to do so, while Chitral had to be held to prevent a force moving down the Kunar Valley to cut the line of advance

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1. HC.Vol.V. Curzon to Hamilton, 23 April, 1900

2. HC.Vol.II.Hamilton to Curzon, 29 August, 1900. Ibid.  
8 November, 1900

3. HC.Vol.VI. Curzon to Hamilton, 17 September, 1900



to Kabul.<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of advancing on Kabul, he contemplated construction of a railway line through the Kabul River Valley. Moreover, Curzon felt that an advance even on two fronts would tax the powers of the Indian army if it were operating without reinforcements.<sup>2</sup> But in any case, from 1897 onwards the strategical significance of the Tochi and Gomal had been deprecated, and the emphasis during the last eighteen months of Elgin's Viceroyalty had definitely been on the Khyber. Curzon himself thus described the policy he pursued:

"...sometimes the mountain-barrier may be, not a ridge or even a range, but a tumbled mass of peaks and gorges, covering a zone many miles in width..., and within this area the inhabitants may be independent or hostile. Such has been the case with a large portion of the Pathan frontier of India, where the physical conformation of the border lends an immense advantage to the holders of the mountains against the occupants of the plains. The desire to counteract this advantage and to transfer it to the cis-border power has led to the pursuit of what is known as the Scientific Frontier, i.e., a frontier which unites natural and strategical strength, and by placing both the entrance and the exit of the passes in the hands of the defending power, compels the enemy to conquer the approach before he can use the passage. It is this policy that has carried the Indian out-posts to Lundi Khana, to Quetta, and to Chaman..."<sup>3</sup>

On the question of tribal control Curzon's position was also close to that which had been adopted by Elgin, and, as with Elgin, it was in Waziristan that his theories were put to the test. Unlike Elgin, he declared that he had "never had the least confidence in the foresight or judgement of the forward school of military officers",<sup>4</sup> but like Elgin, and Lansdowne

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1. HC. Vol.IV. Curzon to Hamilton, 1 March, 1900

2. HC.Vol.V. Curzon to Hamilton, 23 April, 1900

3. Curzon, Lord. Frontiers. (The Romanes Lecture) Oxford. 1907. p.19.

4. HC.Vol.V. Curzon to Hamilton. 23 April, 1900.

before him, he maintained that it was vital to win the tribes over to the British side.<sup>1</sup>

But how was the principle of obtaining tribal friendship to be applied? The answer given was identical to the answer given to a similar problem by Elgin. That is to say, political officers were to be encouraged to exercise a close control in tracts where there were troops and where revenue was collected. Elsewhere they would have an indefinite authority to enforce jirga decisions wherever they could, the tribes being left to manage their own affairs subject to the obligation which the political officers would enforce, as far as was practicable, to preserve public tranquility and to submit serious disputes to the arbitration of a jirga.<sup>2</sup>

Fairly early in his Viceroyalty an opportunity arose for Curzon to demonstrate how he meant the policy to be applied. The Darwesh Khels of Waziristan lived in fairly open country, kept large herds, and were subject to frequent raids by the Mahsuds. Their system of retaliation was similar to that employed by the Panjab Government in that they allowed offences to accumulate for some time and then undertook a large scale expedition against their tormentors.<sup>3</sup> The Darwesh Khels had planned one of these expeditions, which were known

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1. Ibid.

2. PSLI. Vol.117. No.208. 26 October, 1899. Enc. No.8. India to Panjab. 7 August, 1899

3. PSLI.Vol.118. No.5C. of 1899. Enc. No.4. Panjab to India 28 September, 1899

as "torahs", for the autumn of 1899, and Mackworth Young agreed with his frontier officers that they need not be expressly forbidden to carry out their plan, though they were to be denied the use of British territory as a base of operations.<sup>1</sup>

Curzon refused to accept this stand, and declared that for "inter-tribal warfare...[to] be conducted with the cognizance and to a certain extent with the sanction of Government, seems to the Government of India to constitute a dangerous precedent (though not now set for the first time) and to involve some abnegation of responsibility in a region which has, since 1893, been brought within the direct sphere of British influence." 2

Since the "torah" was a method of reprisal inconsistent with the policy of settling disputes by jirga decision, Curzon maintained that political officers should be encouraged to do all in their power to prevent, or obstruct, such appeals to force.<sup>3</sup>

Mackworth Young would not accept this position. He told Curzon that he was not distinguishing between an authoritative interference and friendly influence, as was the practice of the Panjab Government. "The practice was that direct interference could only be undertaken in areas that had been brought under administrative control. The area where the "Torah" was to take place was not in this category, therefore Government should not interfere. It would be unfair to put pressure on the Darwesh Khels without putting similar pressure on the Mahsuds. In other words, if the Darwesh Khels were forbidden to protect

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. 24 July, 1899
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. India to Panjab, 21 August, 1899
  3. Ibid.

themselves in the traditional way, and in the only way in which they could, then the Government would have to guarantee them protection. This would involve the extension of administrative control over the Mahsuds. On the other hand, the area concerned was not under control and there could be no abnegation of a responsibility that did not exist. He declared that he hesitated to convey orders to his officers that would clearly indicate a new policy of authoritative interference in areas outside the sphere of direct control.<sup>1</sup>

Curzon replied that the distinction between spheres of authoritative and friendly intervention was of little practical interest. The Government of India had no desire forcibly to extend its authority, nor did it contemplate any new departure. But it had clearly stated the policy that was to be enforced and it was incompatible with that policy that the local officers should not, when and where they had the requisite authority, prevent or obstruct appeals to force and attempt to get settlements peaceably. They were not called upon to interfere everywhere and at all risks, but they certainly ought to exercise the authority they had. Curzon believed that the posts at Sarwekai, Gomal, Wana, Datta Khel, and Miran Shah, gave them all the authority they needed to prevent this "Torah!"<sup>2</sup>

When the question came before the Council of India some members of the Council wished to warn Curzon that the course

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.4. Panjab to India. 28 September, 1899

2. Ibid. Enc. No.8. India to Panjab, 16 November, 1899

he projected would possibly lead to a greater assumption of responsibility than had been recognized as desirable in the despatch of 28 January, 1898.<sup>1</sup> Hamilton, however, refused to send the warning on the ground that the "Torah" would probably have prevented the formation of the Militia corps and for this reason Curzon had been perfectly correct in preventing it.<sup>2</sup> Fitzpatrick, the only Councillor who minuted on the subject, though "not at all sanguine as to the result of the proposed experiment" in Waziristan, grudgingly admitted that since the Council of India had given its blessing to Curzon's plan for Waziristan, it was its duty to give the system a chance of success.<sup>3</sup>

Two other incidents of a minor nature will serve to indicate other aspects of Curzon's tribal policy. The first was an attack on the village of Gumatti, just outside the Bannu border, the other an attack on the Chamkannis, a tribe of the Kurram Valley.

In the Autumn of 1898, Lieutenant McPherson, the Assistant Commissioner of Bannu, reported that there were no less than twenty outlaws wanted for twenty-five different crimes being sheltered in the Village of Gumatti, only eight miles from the administrative border. He considered that this village was a menace to the peace of the entire area and that it

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1. PSII. Vol.122. Secretary's Letter from India. No.18M  
3 May, 1900. Note by Fitzpatrick on this letter.Undated.
  2. Ibid. Minute by Hamilton, undated.
  3. Ibid. Minute by Fitzpatrick. undated.

ought to be destroyed in a night raid.<sup>1</sup> In December, Grant, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, submitted a report the burden of which was "delenda est Gumatti",<sup>2</sup> and in January, Gunter, the Deputy Commissioner Bannu, sought permission to carry out an attack.<sup>3</sup> Anderson, the Derajat Commissioner, submitted all the correspondence to the Government of India and to the Panjab Government. Curzon pronounced that in such cases the local authorities, that is the Panjab Government, had sufficient authority of itself to act.<sup>4</sup> Troops were immediately requisitioned, but not without further correspondence, and the attack was made on 6 February, 1899. Though the distance to the village had been given as eight miles, it turned out to be nearly sixteen, and though the marching time had been estimated at three hours, it turned out to be eight. Moreover, though the raid was supposed to be a surprise, the political officer, when the village was surrounded, sent a messenger to inform the outlaws of the fact and to ask them to surrender. Instead of surrendering they took refuge in a strong tower which could not be breached without guns. In an ineffectual attempt to storm the tower, six soldiers were killed and thirteen wounded.<sup>5</sup> It was only on receipt of preemptory orders from Curzon that the force

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1. PSLI. Vol.III. D.O.Letter from India. 9 February, 1899. Enc. Note by Lieutenant McPherson. Undated.
  2. Ibid. Memorandum by Grant. 30 December, 1898
  3. Ibid. Enc. Gunter to Anderson, 9 January, 1899
  4. Ibid. Enc. India to Panjab. 2 February, 1899
  5. Ibid. Enc. D.C.Derajat to India. 2 February, 1899

returned later with guns and destroyed the village.<sup>1</sup>

All in all the affair was a complete fiasco. Curzon poured out the vials of his wrath on the civil authorities connected with the raid and on the Panjab administration generally. He was angered the more because in the official reports of the incident the Panjab Government had offered unreserved congratulations to all concerned; not only for their part in the original attack but also for the vigorous and speedy retribution that had followed the initial repulse. Curzon declared that the expedition had been a complete failure; that congratulations were not in order, at least not to the civil authorities; and that retribution, while it might have been vigorous was certainly not swift, since it had come only after the Government of India had ordered it.<sup>2</sup>

The other incident was the result of Chamkanni raiding into the Kurram Valley. This had been going on for several years and early in 1899, Captain Roos-Keppel, the Officer on Special Duty in the Kurram, asked for permission to make a surprise attack on the Chamkannis with the Kurram Militia and a Turi "Lashkar" supported by as many troops as could be spared from the regular forces in the Valley.<sup>3</sup> Mackworth Young disagreed with this plan and suggested instead a regular punitive expedition.<sup>4</sup> Curzon overruled Mackworth

1. PSLI.Vol.113. No.73. 20 April, 1899. Enc. No.16. India to Panjab. 24 March, 1899. also. PSLI.Vol.112. No.41. 9 March 1899. Enc. Memorandum for February, 1899
2. PSLI.Vol.113. No.73. 20 April, 1899. Enc. No.16. India to Panjab, 24 March, 1899
3. PSLI.Vol.112. Secretary's Letter from India.No.9M.2 March, 1899.Chamkanni Series.No.134F.Panjab to India.10 Feb.1899
4. Ibid.Enc.NO.54C.Panjab to Commissioner Peshawar.10 Feb.1899

Young and sanctioned Roos-Keppel's plan.<sup>1</sup> The attack was made and was a brilliant success.<sup>2</sup> The Chamkanni jirga "came in", released prisoners they had been holding, paid up a heavy fine in rifles, took an oath to raid no more, and undertook tribal responsibility for individual actions.<sup>3</sup>

In commenting on Roos-Keppel's exploit, Curzon said that "the Government of India would prefer, as a principle of general policy, not to allow the offences of any tribe to accumulate until they have attained dimensions which entail a punitive expedition on a considerable scale".

He thought local officers should be in a position to "hit sharply" when necessary; that offences ought to be treated on their merits, and that local offences should be punished locally, using local forces when possible.<sup>4</sup>

This immediately raises another aspect of policy. It is that what is entailed in treating offences summarily and locally, is the exercise of a much wider discretion by the frontier officers than was possible under the Panjab system of frontier management. It will be remembered that Elgin had, in 1896, raised the question of greater freedom of action for local officers, but he had never received the cordial support of Fitzpatrick and, in any case, the events of 1897 and 1898 had pushed the matter to the background. Moreover, Elgin

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1. Ibid. Enc. Tel. No.473F. India to Panjab. 27 February, 1899
  2. PSLI. Vol.112. No.10M. 9 March, 1899. Chamkanni Series.No.22  
Roos-Keppel to Adjutant General. 2 March, 1899
  3. PSLI. Vol.113. No.68. 20 April, 1899
  4. PSLI. Vol.112. No.10M. 9 March, 1899. Enc. No.21. India to Panjab. 6 March, 1899



did not contemplate the complete reorganization of the whole system of Panjab administration in the face of certain opposition from the Lieutenant Governor. But administrative reform was Curzon's hobby-horse and he rode it furiously.

The Gumatti fiasco and the Chamkanni raids, he declared,

"have left me with a most unfavourable impression of the working of the present Panjab system...the intermingling and overlapping of civil and military jurisdiction on the frontier, and the bewildering multiplicity of references for sanction to all the various Authorities, local, provincial, military, and Imperial, who are concerned, are such as to have taken all independence of initiative of judgement out of those who are responsible for the frontier, and have resulted in a nervous timidity from which no one seems exempt." 1

It is apparent that, apart from his attitude towards officials and towards "expert" advice, Curzon's ideas for tribal control were quite similar to those which had been professed by Elgin. In Waziristan, however, he thought it necessary to try a different system from that which had been introduced by Sandeman and Bruce under the orders of Lansdowne and Elgin. Alone of all the frontier tribes, the Mahsuds had never ceased to be troublesome. As soon as the expedition of 1897 had come to an end they had again begun raiding, killing, and creating a general nuisance. Early in 1900, Anderson, who had succeeded Bruce as Commissioner of the Derajat Division, in the course of a lengthy correspondence in which the situation relative to the Mahsuds was discussed exhaustively,<sup>2</sup> claimed that he had succeeded in settling all

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1. HC. Part II. Vol.I. Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March, 1899

2. PSLI. Vol.127. No.145. 18 October, 1900. Enc. No.1. Panjab to India. and Enclosures thereto. 6 February, 1900

outstanding claims against the Mahsuds up to 24 March, 1900.<sup>1</sup>

Curzon was not satisfied that Anderson's claim was based on fact, and eventually the settlement was indeed found to be "defective" in several respects",<sup>2</sup> most significant of which was that the Mahsuds still owed fines totalling Rs.95,000.<sup>3</sup> Further correspondence indicated that matters were drifting from bad to worse.<sup>4</sup> Finally, Merk, who had replaced Anderson, was summoned to Simla for a conference.

The conference was held on the fourth and eighth of September and the problem was discussed by Curzon, Mackworth Young, Egerton, Commander of the Panjab Frontier Force, and Merk.<sup>5</sup> The decisions reached were that the tribe was completely out of hand, that strong measures were needed, and that the Mahsuds would be delivered an ultimatum, on the expiry of which, provided a settlement had not meanwhile been made, a blockade of the whole tribe would be imposed and vigorously enforced.<sup>6</sup>

The conference also agreed to a change of policy towards the Mahsuds. It was decided that the system hitherto in force of dealing with the tribe through maliks, who were in the main nominated by British officers, had not been a success and should be abandoned. They agreed that the maliks so

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Panjab to India.with Enclosures.16 April 1900
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.3. India to Panjab. 16 May, 1900
  3. HC.Part II. Vol.V. Curzon to Hamilton,12 September,1900
  4. PSLI.Vol.127. No.145. 18 October, 1900. Enc. No.10. Panjab to India. with enclosures. 26 July, 1900
  5. H.C.Part II. Vol.V. Curzon to Hamilton. 12 September, 1900
  6. Ibid.

selected should no longer be treated with as representative of the tribe and that negotiations should in future be so conducted that there would be reasonable certainty that the views put forward represented the popular feeling. It was believed that the way to ensure this was to deal, in important matters, with the jirga of the whole tribe, and when accepting the spokesmanship of any individual to be certain that he was accepted by the clan he professed to represent. Allowances, it was felt, should also be paid to the jirga unless the jirga selected individuals to receive the money. A portion, however, might be reserved for individuals whom it might not be politic to neglect, and who might suffer in a popular division. It was further decided that no further attempts were to be made to punish individuals but that the idea of tribal or sectional responsibility should be enforced instead. The new system was to be announced at the same time that the ultimatum was delivered.<sup>1</sup>

Suffice it to say that neither the ultimatum nor the announcement of the new system (actually a reversion to the methods that had been employed before 1889) had any effect and on 1 December, 1900, a blockade was imposed. It is not necessary for us to pursue in detail the course of the blockade; that subject has already been treated comprehensively in

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1. PSLI. Vol.127. No.145. 18 October, 1900. Enc. No.13.  
India to Panjab, 10 October, 1900

Dr. Davies' book.<sup>1</sup> But it is of interest to note that though temporarily successful, it did not solve the problem of Waziristan, for the Mahsuds have continued to be a thorn in the side of frontier administrators down to the present day.<sup>2</sup>

Though the basis of Curzon's policy was still the acquisition of a position from which the "scientific frontier" could be occupied in time of need, the methods which he employed to secure this aim were, in many respects quite different from any which had previously been employed. His policy may briefly be described as follows: first, the organization of tribal militias to occupy all advanced posts in tribal territory, and following from this the withdrawal of regular troops from these positions; secondly, the establishment of military posts and moveable columns within the British border to support the militias in time of emergency; thirdly, the maintenance of safe communications between supporting posts and advanced posts, and the linking of the supporting posts to the Indian railway system by light lines; fourthly, the establishment of friendly relations with the tribes and the gradual acquisition of control over them through the influence of the political officers; fifthly, the elimination of punitive expeditions by dealing with individual offences swiftly and positively; and sixthly, increased freedom for

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1. Davies. op.cit. Ch.VII. pp.116 ff. Complete official records of the blockade are collected in the "Mahsud Blockade Series", enclosures to Secretary's Letters from India. PSLI. 1900.-01 -02.

frontier officers to act on their own responsibility and initiative, and this to lead eventually to a complete reform of the Panjab system of frontier management.

Curzon was proud of the fact that in the first six months of his Viceroyalty he had been able to deal successively, "and on identical principles" with all the frontier questions that awaited solution from Chitral to the Gomal. He thought that the steps he had taken would lessen the risk of risings and expeditions, and also expected advantages to accrue from having

"the whole of our policy from Baluchistan to the Pamirs based, as I must confess I think it never hitherto has been, upon one clear and intelligible principle, differing only in the circumstances of its application to individual cases".<sup>1</sup>

Curzon summed up his own views with regard to the frontier as being, firstly, that the Government of India should be in a position to fulfill its obligations; secondly, that Russia should be kept out of India and every possible chink of entry closed; thirdly, that an effort should be made to secure the good opinion of the tribes, but to "hammer them hard" when they massacred, plundered, or raided across the border; fourthly, that the tribesmen should only be taken into the British system by slow degrees and as the administrative system was ready to assimilate them; fifthly, that the tribes should be trained to co-operate in the common defence of their own country.<sup>2</sup>

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1. HC. Part II. Curzon to Hamilton. 28 June, 1899

2. HC. Vol.II. Curzon to Hamilton, 9 August, 1899

In the record of Curzon's reorganizational activities, several significant factors may be noted. The first of these is that his proposals were in all cases approved unanimously by his Council in the form in which he had set them forth in memoranda prepared as preliminary to Council discussion. Secondly, it is apparent that private correspondence played a more significant role than it had in the deliberations of either Lansdowne or Elgin. Official despatches merely recorded plans and decisions which Hamilton and Curzon had made privately. And, thirdly, Curzon's proposals received complete and unhesitating support from the Council of India. But the great challenge of administrative reform was still to be met, for though both Lansdowne and Elgin had attacked that problem, both of them had failed. Curzon's indomitable will and monumental self-confidence were eminently suited to meet such a challenge. The next chapter will record how he did so.



# MAP TO ILLUSTRATE H. E. THE VICEROY'S MINUTE

OF THE  
27th AUGUST 1900.

## REFERENCES.

The Frontier Agency ... Yellow.  
The remainder of the Frontier Districts ... Pink.





## THE CREATION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

The discussion that followed the events of 1897 brought to the foreground the question of administrative reform on the North-West Frontier, and led to a declaration by Hamilton that the management of frontier affairs would have to be brought "more directly than heretofore" under the direct control and supervision of the Government of India. But how was this control and supervision to be exercised? Lansdowne, having tried and failed to improve existing procedures, had recommended strongly the creation of a frontier province. Elgin had been determined to try again where Lansdowne had failed, but instead had been instructed by Hamilton to discuss the possibilities of a compromise scheme, brought forward when Salisbury and Lansdowne insisted on the creation of a new province. The compromise pleased no one, and the whole question was postponed pending Curzon's arrival in India.

Having discussed the problem with Elgin, and read the pertinent papers,<sup>1</sup> Curzon visited the frontier in April, 1899, after he had been only three months in India, and in separate interviews with Mackworth Young and various frontier officers presented a choice of four alternatives.<sup>2</sup> These were to

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1. HC. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 12 January, 1899
  2. The interviews were conducted separately, but Curzon afterwards read out to Mackworth Young the notes of his conversations with the others. PSLI. Vol.130, No.32. 21 February, 1901. Enc. No.3. India to Panjab, 21 February, 1901. Also. HC. Vol.VI Curzon to Hamilton, 3 October, 1900 Enc. Curzon to Mackworth Young, 23 September, 1900. Ibid. Mackworth Young to Curzon, 26 September, 1900.



maintain the "status quo", to establish a separate frontier province and commission, to adopt Hamilton's compromise, or to adopt another compromise suggested by Curzon himself. This last would have involved the division of the trans-frontier districts into five or six separate charges each under a political officer subordinate to a local agent to the Governor-General who would report directly to the Government of India; the civil and administrative organization of the Panjab to remain untouched, except in so far as the abstraction of the trans-frontier tracts was concerned.<sup>1</sup>

Each of the frontier officers, independently and unhesitatingly, declared in favour of the frontier province, and denounced the third and fourth alternatives as unworkable. Mackworth Young, though favouring the "status quo", did not appear to be "either unreasonable or immoderate in his attitude towards [the idea of a separate province], but he unreservedly condemned the third and fourth alternatives".<sup>2</sup> Curzon himself expressed no preference, since at that time he had not, officially at any rate, made up his mind apart from the conviction that the "status quo" was unsatisfactory.<sup>3</sup> His private letters to Hamilton clearly express this conviction,

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1. HC. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April, 1899.
  2. HC. Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April, 1899
  3. Ibid. Privately, he must have been quite sure of what he intended to do, for eighteen months later he wrote of the plan for a frontier province as one which was seldom out of his mind, and which he had "studied for many years".  
HC. Vol.V. Curzon to Hamilton, 12 September, 1900

a conviction largely influenced by the consideration that

"the frontier policy of the Panjab Government is the policy of the Government of India, in fact of the Viceroy. He and he alone is responsible to the Secretary of State, to Parliament, and to public opinion. He receives either the praise or the blame. And yet how is he required to conduct it? Through a Lieutenant-Governor who is not primarily selected for frontier knowledge or political capacity, and who has sometimes never been on the frontier in his life; through a Chief Secretary to that Governor who (I am speaking of the present case) has never seen the frontier in the whole of his service; and through a number of Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners in the appointment, or interchange, or removal of none of whom can the Viceroy have a word". 1

The upshot of this system he declared to be that

"in ordinary times the Panjab Government does the frontier work and dictates the frontier policy without any interference from the Supreme Government at all...but that in extraordinary times the entire control is taken over by the Government of India, acting through agents who are not its own; while the Panjab Government, dispossessed and sulky, stands on one side criticising everything that is done". 2

Week after week the indictment continued as Curzon proceeded to "accumulate...evidence of the utter rottenness of the existing system";<sup>3</sup> a system under which frontier affairs were in the hands of men with "no idea of any frontier policy at all";<sup>4</sup> a system which had the mastery of the men;<sup>5</sup> a system which "was fraught with perpetual friction, with inevitable blunders, and with scandalous delays";<sup>6</sup> a system under which the Lieutenant-Governor was allowed to pursue his own inclinations,

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1. HC.Vol.1. Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April, 1899

2. Ibid.

3. HC.Vol.I. Curzon to Hamilton, 31 May, 1899

4. HC.Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September, 1899

5. HC.Vol.I. Curzon to Hamilton, 31 May, 1899.

6. HC. Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September, 1899.

"until one day the frontier is in flames, and the Government of India rushes in, hot with indignation, takes everything out of his hands, and very likely mismanages for another twelve months, what it has freely allowed the local Government to mismanage for the preceding four or five years". 1

Curzon tended, perhaps, to exaggerate the defects and to ignore the virtues of the existing method of frontier administration. This can be explained in part by his desire to bring Hamilton to his way of thinking; but in addition, he was apparently convinced that any Government operation which he did not personally supervise was bound to be badly managed. The Foreign Department was his department, and the foreign policy of the Government of India was his policy: he did not want advice or argument from any subordinate, whether that subordinate was an individual or a powerful government. He declared,

"I cannot...sit quietly by, while I see the policy for which I shall be held exclusively responsible in England muddled, contradicted, upset, or delayed, by the traditions or the foibles of a subordinate administration.....No Viceroy in the world with any self-respect, who had a definite frontier policy of his own, and meant to carry it through, could possibly do so with the mechanism which he is now compelled to employ." 2

But it was not only of organic defects in the system that he complained, for he charged that the Panjab Government deliberately misinterpreted the policies of the Government of India. He wrote:

"though they know that the pivot of our policy is the desire, as far as possible, to reduce our interference with the frontier tribes, they persist in attributing to us...the desire

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

to take these tribes more directly under our control. If we suggest a militia we are told this would be the result, if we discourage a system of internicine strife called 'torahs' we are told it's because we want to interfere ourselves. But all the while the Lieutenant-Governor knows that nothing is further from our intentions and this is merely a feint that he keeps up in defence of his own dignity and the independence of his Government versus the Government of India". 1

Of course, Curzon must have been aware that in the long run, as Elgin had pointed out, the Government of India determined trans-frontier policy, and was able to impose that policy on the Panjab Government whether the latter approved or not. But an agency that unwillingly pursued a policy of which it did not approve, and argued every step of the way, did not match Curzon's concept of efficient administration. Nor was Curzon the one to accept, from any subordinate, argument, remonstrance advice, and criticism, touching every aspect of his frontier policy. He wished to have the reins firmly in his own hands.

"I cannot work a Government under this system. I cannot spend hours in wordy argument with my Lieutenant-Governors as to the exact meaning, purport, scope, object, character, possible limitation, conceivable results, of each petty aspect of my frontier policy. If they deliberately refuse to understand it, and haggle and boggle about carrying it out, I must get some fairly intelligent officer who will understand what I mean and do what I say". 2

Meanwhile, Curzon had succeeded in one respect at least. he had apparently persuaded Hamilton of the necessity for a complete change in the administrative system. Hamilton, in anticipation of the changes to be recommended, suggested that the Government of India should occasionally forward a despatch

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1. HC. Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 18 October, 1899
  2. HC. Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 16 November, 1899.
- The emphasis is mine.

to the India Office containing instances of the procedures and delays of the Panjab Government so as to prepare the minds of the Council of India for the forthcoming proposals.<sup>1</sup>

Curzon accepted the suggestion with alacrity,<sup>2</sup> and throughout the Autumn and Winter of 1899-1900 regular despatches of this type were sent to London. These despatches did not directly attack the Panjab Government, but Curzon proposed that the inevitable attack, when it came, should be in the form of a minute for which he himself should be responsible, and which would contain references to all the cases that were being brought to the attention of the India Office. Concerning these cases, he remarked to Hamilton,

"I shall be very much surprised if their cumulative effect, when published, is not such as to leave the world in astonishment that a system of administration so cumbrous and imperfect has been allowed to continue for such a number of years".<sup>3</sup>

The promised minute was completed in August, 1900.<sup>4</sup> It began by summarising the measures that had so far been taken to ensure the adequate defence of the North-West Frontier. It pointed out that these measures had been inspired, not by a local Government but by the Supreme Government, that they were under the control, not of the military authorities but of the Foreign Department, i.e., of the Viceroy, and that they were intended to emphasise the responsibility which the

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1. HC. Vol.I. Hamilton to Curzon, 6 September, 1899

2. HC. Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 11 October, 1899

3. HC.Vol.III. Curzon to Hamilton, 18 October, 1899

4. PSLI. Vol.126. No.133. 13 September, 1900. Enc. Minute by Lord Curzon on Frontier Administration, 27 August, 1900

Government of India had assumed for the control of the frontier regions. The avowed intention of the minute was to supplement the proposals which had already been made, by submitting the plan

"which is their natural complement and climax, and upon which they are...dependent for the prospects of continuing success, viz., the constitution of a form of administration in the tracts in question which shall bring to bear upon them the authority and influence of the Government of India in a manner more prompt, more imperative, and more direct than will ever be found possible, so long as the elaborate machinery of a local government of the first class intervenes between it and them". 1

Curzon's correspondence with Hamilton has already prepared us for the scathing indictment of the existing frontier administration which he wrote into his minute. His strongest objection was to the invidious position in which the Viceroy, in his capacity as "Foreign Minister", was placed with regard to "his most important sphere of activity", the Panjab Frontier.<sup>2</sup>

"Upon this stretch of boundary the Foreign Minister of India, who is also the Viceroy, cannot issue an order or make an appointment except through the medium of the Panjab Government .....the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, the Political Officers and Commandants of Border Police, in whose hands rests the entire responsibility upon the frontier, are nominated not by him but by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Chief Secretary to the Panjab Government, who is the principal adviser of the Lieutenant-Governor, is selected, without reference to the Viceroy, by the latter. The Viceroy cannot even remove an indifferent or unsuitable official; since promotion in the Panjab is regulated by the conditions of a

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1. Ibid.

2. The Foreign Department of the Government of India was concerned with Native States, and in the sphere of external policy with China and Yunnan, Tibet, Afghanistan, Muskat, the Arab States of the Aden Protectorate, and with the Persian Gulf; but Curzon considered that the major issues arose from and were connected with the frontier tribes and frontier problems.

service of which, not he, but the Lieutenant-Governor, is the effective head.....I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action - a plea which it-self breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the Supreme and the local Governments are both located in the same spot, simla"

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The geographical contiguity of the Panjab with the frontier districts had been an important consideration in the early days of the British connection with the North-West Frontier, but Curzon was exaggerating when he claimed that it was still considered as a serious factor. In fact, it had not been mentioned during the discussions of 1898. The principal reasons that had then been advanced for the retention of the Panjab Government as an intermediary were these: that it gave to the Government of India the benefit of the special knowledge and experience of the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Secretary of the Panjab with relation to frontier affairs; that it provided the Panjab Government with a valuable training school for officers in its Commission; that it gave to the frontier officers valuable opportunities of consulting personally the knowledge and experience of the Lieutenant-Governor; and, that it provided for wise and necessary decentralization. But these arguments, too, Curzon dismissed.

In the first place, he argued, the Lieutenant-Governor and his secretaries were chosen, not for their knowledge of

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1. Curzon's Minute, op.cit.

the frontier, but rather for their administrative abilities.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, because of the wider scope for promotion in the areas of revenue and finance, there was an inclination among ambitious men to devote themselves to these fields rather than to the frontier.<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, if frontier officers gained by reason of their personal consultations with the Lieutenant-Governor, the continuing presence of an Agent to the Governor-General, appointed in the first place because of his wide knowledge of the tribes, would be infinitely more valuable to them. And, finally, Curzon maintained, the interposition of the local government resulted in "centralization of the pettiest and most exasperating description", brought about by the

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1. The frontier records of Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Secretaries from 1877-1900 are as follows:

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS

SIR ROBERT EGERTON (1877-82) never in a frontier district, except as additional Commissioner, Peshawar, November, 1863-March, 1864.  
 SIR CHARLES AITCHINSON (1882-87) never in a frontier district.  
 SIR JAMES LYALL (1887-92) never in a frontier district.  
 SIR DENIS FITZPATRICK (1892-97) never in a frontier district.  
 SIR MACKWORTH YOUNG (1897-1900) sixteen months as third grade assistant Commissioner, 1865-66.

CHIEF SECRETARIES

SIR LEPEL GRIFFIN (1878-80) never served on the frontier.  
 SIR MACKWORTH YOUNG (1880-86) as above.  
 C.L. TUPPER (1890-95) previously officiating. Sixteen months as third grade assistant Commissioner doing settlement work in Dera Ghazi Khan.  
 H.C. FANSHAW (1895-96) seven months settlement officer. Dera Ismail Khan.

L. DANE (1896-99) settlement collector, Peshawar, 1893-96.

2. Sir Richard Udny pointed out in 1898 that between 1878 and 1891 only five men had been sent to the frontier who were still there in 1898; that it was a constant occurrence that no covenanted officers were forthcoming for frontier work; and that uncovenanted Europeans and Natives had to be appointed.



"indecision of a local government, apprehensive of being over-ruled, nervous as to the issues of frontier troubles, and anxious to place the final responsibility upon the shoulders of the Government of India, and partly by the timidity of the junior local officers, who...might be entirely new to the frontier...most of all from the system adopted by the Panjab Government...of restricting in every possible way the initiative and authority of its own officers". 1

These are formidable arguments, but not in all cases completely unanswerable. For, statistics to the contrary, the Panjab Government had had fifty years of valuable frontier experience. Moreover, a Lieutenant-Governor who annually toured the frontier districts and frequently consulted local frontier officers, had an excellent opportunity of acquiring first hand knowledge of frontier problems, lack of previous frontier experience notwithstanding. In any case he would have been better placed than a Viceroy, who (ignoring Curzon for the moment) would presumably have started with a minimum of knowledge, and would, perhaps, have visited the frontier once during his term. Again, it seems somehow unreal that Curzon should complain of over-centralization. Certainly, we should not forget that he wanted an agency on the frontier which would "understand what I mean and do what I say". Perhaps his quarrel was not with centralization as such, but with centralization in hands other than his own.

But there was another argument, so self-evident as virtually to preclude the possibility of contradiction: that the existing administrative system was productive of "departmental irresolution, the dissipation instead of the

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1. Curzon's Minute. op.cit.

concentration of responsibility, and long and injurious delays". It is axiomatic that the longer the chain --- the more links of reference there are --- the less likelihood there will be of prompt and efficacious action. Under the Panjab system of administration the chain was indeed long. In the first instance the local political officer or deputy commissioner reported to the Commissioner who then studied the case, the recent history of the tribe concerned, and other pertinent facts, and made a report which he sent with the original report to the Panjab Government. This process usually took a minimum of two weeks. The documents then passed through the Panjab Secretariat where precedents and history were again examined and after another period of at least two weeks the question was referred to the Government of India, usually with alternative suggestions. In the meantime, if the Panjab Government had felt that a reference to military authority was necessary another three weeks or month would have elapsed as the papers were passed first to the Lieutenant-General Commanding in the Panjab, then to the General Officer Commanding the Panjab Frontier Force, and finally to the Officer Commanding in the area concerned. The reply would come by the same compulsory stages. In the Government of India the file would pass through the Foreign Department for analysis, annotation, and illustration, and finally orders would be issued by the Viceroy to go back to the frontier through the same chain. After several months a decision would be reached on

a matter which might have been settled by an authoritative local officer in a matter of days.

Another factor which militated against promptitude was that there were many cases in which the Government of India were reluctant, in the early stages, to interfere; partly because they had little alternative but to accept the advice of the local government from whose officers their information was derived, and partly from an indisposition to overrule frequently a powerful subordinate, and thereby give that subordinate the excuse that his methods did not work because he was never given a free hand. We recall Elgin's contention that he would prefer to overrule a colleague and friend with whom, for five months of the year, he held daily consultations at Simla, rather than a subordinate, residing on the frontier, whom he seldom, if ever, saw. This probably was a perfectly valid argument as far as Elgin was concerned, but so much depended on personal relations and the weight attached to the Lieutenant-Governor's advice, that it could never be accepted as a general rule. What to Elgin would have been valuable consultation, would to Curzon have been unnecessary quibbling. And Curzon would much prefer making up his own mind and issuing definite instructions to an agent who would carry them out without question, to discussing every question with a "quasi-independent administration" where "the dignity and susceptibilities of a local government and of its head demand the most scrupulous and respectful consideration."

Under a man like Elgin the system could be made to work, under Curzon it could not, and by him it stood utterly condemned. He sums up his catalogue of criticisms:

"It attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents not an ambassador, or a minister, or a consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a local government, and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant-Governor. Worked as the system has been with unfailing loyalty and with profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralization, of interminable delay". 1

Elgin had not been unaware of these shortcomings, but he had anticipated an amendment of procedures rather than an abrupt and complete change. But in what way was amendment possible? One suggestion was that the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Secretary of the Panjab could be appointed on the basis of their frontier knowledge. But Curzon rejected this idea, not only because such officers could not be found in the Panjab Commission, but because it would be grossly unfair to the interests of the province as a whole, since the frontier constituted a relatively small part of the interests involved. Again the suggestions that the Panjab might be given greater financial latitude and a larger staff; that a special frontier secretary might be appointed to the Panjab Government; or, that the frontier officers themselves might be given a greater freedom of action, were all rejected. For though any of these suggestions, if put into practice, might speed up the work, they would not make the Panjab "any the more faithful an

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1. Curzon's Minute. op.cit.

exponent of the policy of the Government of India". In other words, all these proposals were open to the same objection, the more they gave to the Panjab, the more they took away from the Government of India, and thus the greater was the conflict with Hamilton's dictum that control of the frontier must be "more directly than heretofore under the supervision of the Government of India".

Of the four alternatives which Curzon had presented to the frontier officers, the first, the maintenance of the "status quo" had now been disposed of, and the two compromise solutions were rejected. with equal vehemence. That suggested by Hamilton was dealt with first. It is not necessary to point out the arguments that had been urged against it in 1898, but Curzon raised two other serious objections. Firstly, it would introduce two different systems with two different sets of officers on the Pathan frontier. Since it had been suggested that only the Commissioner of Peshawar would be appointed by and act under the Government of India, the Commissioner of Derajat would still, presumably, continue under the Panjab and he would be dealing with the most troublesome of the tribes, the Waziris. Secondly, with the single exception of the Commissioner of Peshawar the frontier policy of the Government of India would still be conducted by agents not its own.<sup>1</sup> The compromise which Curzon had suggested, and which had been rejected by all

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1. A similar system was tried in Sind in the third quarter of the Nineteenth Century. The Commissioner received his administrative orders from Bombay and his foreign policy orders from the Government of India. The system broke down and the Commissioner, Sir W. Merewether, was, in 1876, relieved of all responsibility for Kelat which was handed over to Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of Derajat.

the frontier officers consulted, was open to all the arguments against dualism which had been urged against Hamilton's scheme in 1898.

The only solution left, and the one accepted by Curzon, was the creation of a new province. But here again difficulties arose, and first among them was the question of the territories the new province would include, the question upon which Lytton's scheme had foundered. But Lytton's plan did not appeal to Curzon. Sind, Baluchistan, and Kashmir were well managed and each was of sufficient importance to justify a separate existence.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the suggestion that the new province should cross the Indus and embrace the districts of Rawalpindi and Jhelum, which contained the military bases upon which frontier positions were dependent, was rejected as a needless dismemberment of the Panjab, which would create a province overshadowing the older one, and besides arousing intense opposition would involve the creation of an extensive new Commission.

The province proposed by Curzon would include, with minor exceptions, the whole of the trans-Indus districts of the Panjab as far south as and including Dera Ismail Khan.<sup>2</sup> The exceptions, subject to the approval of the Panjab, would be the Mianwali sub-division of the Bannu District which was astride the Indus, the trans-riverain "tahsil" of Isa Khel which was inhabited by non-Pushto speaking people and which had little or no connection with the frontier. The cis-Indus

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1. Lansdowne had made a similar decision when discussing a frontier province in 1889.

2. See map accompanying this chapter.

portions of Dera Ismail Khan and all of Dera Ghazi Khan would be left to the Panjab, since Curzon wanted the new province to be concerned, as far as possible, with Pathans only. The Northern confines of the province would be strictly trans-Indus, that is Hazara would be left to the Panjab, for though a frontier district its interests were different from those of the North-West border and its inhabitants were of different origins. On the other hand, it was left to be debated whether the cis-Indus Black Mountain tribes should be left to the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara under the Panjab or should be included with their trans-Indus neighbours, the Bunerwals, under the Political Officer of the Malakand. The new province would therefore consist of Peshawar; Kohat; Bannu; Dera Ismail Khan; Dir, Swat, and Chitral; the Khyber; Kurram; Tochi; and Wana.

The head of this administration would be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General appointed by and subordinate to the Government of India. He would reside at Peshawar and would be assisted by Revenue and Judicial Commissioners. The question of a Civil List posed many problems. A small Commission would have many draw-backs from the point of view of recruitment, replacement, and promotion. An occasional failure within a small civil list would not be easily redressed by transfer or removal and as Mackworth Young said, "the pick of a large Commission is likely to be far superior to the best outturn of a limited number of specialists"

Curzon proposed to,escape those difficulties and to ensure the best abilities of the Civil Service for the new province by relieving the Panjab Commission of the duty of providing its establishment and by bringing the latter upon the graded list of the Indian Political Department. This department was made up partly of Civil Servants and partly Military officers seconded from the armed forces. Its primary function was, under the direction of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, to provide residents for the courts of the Indian princely States, and political officers for tribal areas like Baluchistan and the Malakand Agency which were under the direct control of the Government of India.<sup>1</sup> Curzon's plan would mean a decrease in the numbers of the Panjab Commission and an increase in the Political List. But the proposals would only apply to the higher posts, and not necessarily to all of those. It might be expedient to borrow from the Panjab, or from other provinces, judicial personnel and settlement officers since there would be no prospects for such in the Political Department. For the miscellaneous departments such as police, jails, medical educational, irrigation, public works, and for the subordinate establishment of all departments, it would be necessary to take over the whole staff employed in the area by the Panjab Government and to work out changes as experience should dictate. The result of the change would be to leave the pay and prospects of the Panjab Commission very much as they

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1. Before leaving India Curzon provided for re-organization of the Political Department so as to provide separate cadres for military officers and for Civil Servants, though the highest posts were still to be allotted by selections among both branches.



were, but vastly to improve chances in the political Department, since a wider field would be open to frontier officers in the Foreign Service of the Government of India than within the confines of a single province and service on the frontier would be opened for the first time to officers on the political list,

Having outlined his plan, Curzon now turned to the objections that had been offered to the idea of a new province in 1898. First there was the objection that by breaking up the administrative units of the Panjab the revenue system would be disturbed. This was a serious matter for Peshawar had some of the richest and most highly assessed land in the Panjab, and for its administration specially trained officers such as were not likely to be found in the Political Department were needed. The same was true to a lesser extent of Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail.Khan. But the plan provided for this. Technical hands would be drawn from the parent province, and the revenue system would not only be the same as that applied in the Panjab but would be administered by the same men. The question of territorial compensations no longer applied as the only province affected would be the Panjab and the areas taken from that province did not belong to it, said Curzon, geographically, ethnologically, or historically. In any case the area, population, and resources remaining to the Panjab would still

leave it a first class province.<sup>1</sup>

Opponents of the idea of a new province had also urged the argument that it would be inexpedient to deprive the Panjab Government of the valuable opportunity of training officers for frontier service and of gaining knowledge of the tribes who sent settlers to British districts. Curzon maintained that his scheme would enhance such opportunities, as in future, there would be no chance of an officer being sent to the frontier with experience only in civil work or of being withdrawn because of the exigencies of the public service or because the demands of grade promotion demanded his return to an interior district. In fact he would be withdrawn, if he showed exceptional ability, only to take a responsible post in Baluchistan or elsewhere in the foreign service of the Government of India. If deficient in frontier ability, on the

1. Statistics respecting the areas to be taken away from the Panjab, as per the census of 1891 are as follows:

	<u>AREA IN SQ.MILES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>REVENUE</u>
PESHAWAR DISTRICT----	2,444-----	703,768---	11,02,626
KOHAT DISTRICT-----	2,771-----	203,175----	1,90,849
BANNU DISTRICT-----	1,664-----	204,469----	2,58,000
(less Mianwali)			
DERA ISMAIL KHAN-----	3,812-----	254,163----	3,24,372
TOTAL-----	10,691-----	1,365,575---	18,75,847
TOTALS FOR PANJAB---	148,966-	25,130,127--	2,75,32,972

Thus it was proposed to take away approximately 1/14 of the total area of the Panjab, 1/15 of the revenue, and 1/18 of the population. Moreover it could be shown that most of the territory being taken away had no connection with the administration of the local government as was indicated by the appointment of special political officers, of which idea the new province might be said to be the logical extension.

other hand, it would be easier to find a place for him elsewhere in the political service. Meanwhile, all officers in the department would have a fresh goal of ambition and a wider field of reward. Curzon anticipated that the frontier province would draw the best ability of the civil and military service in India and would become the nursery of a new school of political officers who would "revive the memories and credit of a former time". Of course this argument does not satisfactorily answer the objection. For though it shows how the Government of India would be provided with a trained corps of frontier officers, it makes no provision for providing officers of the Panjab Commission with experience of the tribes. And the Panjab authorities had made the point that men with such experience were required to deal with tribesmen who moved into Panjab territory to settle.

It had also been argued that the Panjab should be left in control of the frontier because there particularly a strong administration was needed that was capable of resisting forward aggressive tendencies. Curzon declared, in the words of Lord Salisbury, that the new province was "a measure of defence and security, not of aggression", and that if he believed otherwise he would not recommend the scheme. In fact, it was because he believed that the Panjab system of administration

"by its unbusinesslike diffusion of responsibility, by its inveterate irresolution, by its lack of nerve or consistency, and by its proneness to an attitude of drift and delay, is incapable of generating a strong or uniform policy, and is

certain, sooner or later, to lead the Government of India into an ill considered advance, and consequent disaster, that I advocate its supercession."

Though the Panjab Government could not be charged with the sole responsibility for the forward moves that had been made, for the frontier wars that had been fought, or for the punitive expeditions that had been undertaken, still these were visible proof that the intervention of the Panjab Government had not preserved the Government of India from these manifestations of aggressive tendencies. And if a succession of cautious and prudent administrators had been unable to prevent disturbances, it was clear that not the men, but the machinery through which they worked, was at fault. Of course, one should not forget the other side of the argument. The Panjab Government recognized that punitive expeditions were part of their system of tribal control, but, they claimed, while the administrative necessity for such measures was declining, the aggressive policies of the Supreme Government had produced more serious and far-reaching disturbances.

Among other arguments adduced, the one that the new province would mean greater centralization had already been dealt with. The financial objection was overruled by Curzon, who maintained that the cost of frontier administration would probably decrease, and a comprehensive table of estimates was prepared to demonstrate the accuracy of this contention. Finally, it was stated that the new administration would mean the devolution of a great quantity of detailed work on the

Foreign Department, which that department was not equipped to handle. Curzon admitted that the work of the Foreign Department would increase, especially at the beginning, but he thought that as local responsibility developed under a trusted authority the references would diminish. He gave the example of Baluchistan to support his contention.<sup>1</sup> But we must not forget that Elgin had used the Baluchistan analogy to show that the Foreign Department would be overburdened with administrative detail.

Having disposed of the arguments against the new administration, Curzon summarized its positive merits as follows

"It will express and enforce the direct responsibility of the Government of India for Frontier affairs. It will enable the Viceroy to conduct the most important business of the Department of which he is the personal Chief. It will free the management of Frontier politics from the delays that are inseparable from a chain of reference, whose strength is sacrificed to its length. It will promote greater rapidity and consequently greater freedom of action. Its tendency should

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1. The following is a synopsis of the receipts and issues of the Foreign Department from the Panjab relative to the frontier alone and for the entire Baluchistan Agency for 1899.

<u>PANJAB FRONTIER</u>	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>
POLITICAL	720	316
ADMINISTRATIVE	115	119
TOTAL	<u>835</u>	<u>435</u>
 <u>BALUCHISTAN</u>		
POLITICAL	301	186
ADMINISTRATIVE	326	357
TOTAL	<u>627</u>	<u>543</u>

There is no strict analogy here, since Baluchistan was less populous and less advanced than the Panjab border regions, but it is nonetheless apparent that the Baluchistan correspondence was of quite modest proportions.

be not towards aggression, but towards peace, since war with the tribes is commonly the result of ignorance or indecision at earlier stages. It will entrust tribal management exclusively to those who know the tribes. It should train up a school of officers worthy of the most critical but splendid duty that is imposed upon any of the officers of the Queen's Government in India".<sup>1</sup>

Curzon's minute was forwarded to the Secretary of State in a despatch from the Government of India "with an expression of our unanimous and hearty agreement with its main propositions".<sup>2</sup> Up to this point the Panjab Government had not been consulted, though the despatch stated that if the plan were approved in principle by the Council of India, the Panjab would be consulted as to details.

Hamilton was well prepared. In fact, he had received a private copy of the minute some time before. Without consulting his Council he had a draft reply prepared, which accepted in principle the scheme recommended by Curzon.<sup>3</sup> He did, however, point out several objections which he felt had not been adequately dealt with. In the first place he wished to be clear as to how Curzon intended to ensure that the administrative side of the work in the new province did not suffer. The Agent to the Governor General would be appointed for his political abilities, and he would not have at his command either the personal experience or the great number of experts that the Lieutenant Governor of the Panjab had been able to draw upon.

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1. Curzon's Minute. op.cit.

2. PSLI. Vol. 126. No.133. 13 September, 1900

3. Ibid. Original draft despatch, undated.

Secondly, he was worried about the difficulties of recruitment that might arise, since the limited numbers of the new Commission would mean that a very high standard of efficiency would have to be maintained. Thirdly, he thought that the new province might lose considerably in such matters as public works from not having the ways and means of a first class province. To these, Sir Arthur Godley added another objection:<sup>1</sup> that it would be very difficult to keep the staff of the province at a requisite level of efficiency without drawing picked men from other provinces. This could not fail but create dissatisfaction on the frontier since it would obviously retard the rate of promotion from the lower grades. These objections were never adequately answered, nor did Hamilton press the issue. The purpose of the new province was to bring the trans-frontier regions under the control of the Government of India, but these regions could not be separated from the contiguous administered areas. Curzon had argued that a Lieutenant-Governor appointed for his administrative abilities was incapable of dealing adequately with the political problems of the frontier; by the same token an Agent to the Governor-General appointed for his political abilities would be incapable of dealing effectively with the administrative problems of his charge. But this aspect of the case was played down; apparently control of the trans-frontier region was the main consideration. Nevertheless, the difficulties envisaged in Hamilton's despatch did materialize. The North-West Frontier

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1. Ibid. Sir A. Godley's comment on Minute Paper.

Enquiry Committee which reported in 1924<sup>1</sup> emphasized the difficulties that had been occasioned by the small Commission, the necessity of obtaining technical personnel outside the province, and the lack of resources which hampered the Public Works Department particularly. Indeed, a minority report suggested the return of the administered districts to the Panjab Government.

Since, as Lee Warner pointed out, the scheme involved financial obligations and fresh expenditures, Curzon's Minute and Hamilton's Despatch had eventually to go before the Council.<sup>2</sup> Hamilton, however, first took his draft, with the addition of Godley's comment,<sup>3</sup> before the Cabinet, and there it was unanimously affirmed.<sup>4</sup>

The Secret Committee of the Council accepted the scheme and the main terms of Hamilton's reply despatch. Only Fitzpatrick minuted on the subject, and as an ex-Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, it is understandable that he should have wished to come to the defence of the Panjab system.<sup>5</sup> However, it speaks well for the cogency of Curzon's argument, or else for the justice of it, that in his first minute Fitzpatrick did not dissent from the proposals, and condemned only that part of Curzon's minute which reflected unfavourably on the men and not the system. He argued that the Lieutenant-

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1. India, Government of: Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee (Bray Report) 1924
  2. Ibid. Lee Warner's note on Minute Paper.
  3. Ibid. Draft submitted to Cabinet. Undated.
  4. Ibid. Minute by Hamilton.
  5. Ibid. First Minute by Sir D. Fitzpatrick. 4 December, 1900



Governor of the Panjab should have been given an opportunity to defend himself, and suggested that an appendix to the minute should have given the opinions of the Panjab Government. He requested that the reply despatch should be so drafted as not to imply that the Secretary of State condoned the personal attack, and also recommended the addition of a sentence asking for the opinions of the Panjab Government.

But after the despatch had lain a week upon the Council table, Fitzpatrick wrote a second minute in which he proposed to correct erroneous and distorted impressions that had been conveyed by Curzon.<sup>1</sup> The tone of this minute is distinctly more unfriendly than that of the former, and Hamilton said that this was because Fitzpatrick had been in communication with Panjab officials and had been influenced by their views.<sup>2</sup> He still supported the scheme, but declared that he now did so because relations between the Panjab Government and the Government of India had become so strained that the part the Panjab could play had become negligible. In other words, the system could not work, not because of inherent defects, but because of Curzon's personality.

Nevertheless, Fitzpatrick's attempts to defend the system are notably weak. He declared that the Panjab had had nothing to do with the formation of the "Forward" policy, that it had not quarrelled with the policy since it was an Imperial matter,

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1. Ibid. Second Minute by Sir D. Fitzpatrick, 14 December, 1900

2. HC. Vol.III. Hamilton to Curzon, 18 April, 1901

but that there had been disagreement as regarded the "modus operandi", and that the Panjab had tended to hang back while the Government of India wished to push ahead. This argument supports Curzon's thesis rather than otherwise, for even if it could be shown that the "Forward" policy of the Government of India was a mistaken policy, there would have been no excuse for the Panjab tendency to retard the forward movement in the face of the expressed desire of the Supreme Government to advance.

Again, Fitzpatrick challenged Curzon's contention that Elgin had attempted to get the Panjab to initiate a new policy but failed. The crux of his argument was that action had not been taken because Elgin was still waiting for the Panjab Proposals when the Uprising of 1897 occurred. This pushed all other matters to the background and when it was over a complete new departure was made. But if we consider that a full year elapsed between Elgin's initiation of discussion on 14 August, 1896, and the Uprising in August, 1897, instead of an argument in support of the Panjab position we have another instance of the procedural delays that Curzon condemned.

With regard to the great number of references to the Government of India, Fitzpatrick declared that this was indicative, not of over-centralization as Curzon had charged, but of the simple fact that the Government of India had no settled frontier policy. It might be maintained that there was no settled policy because the Government of India under Elgin had attempted to work out a scheme that the Panjab approved;

that the Panjab, because it distrusted the basis of the policy that Elgin wished to pursue, had equivocated; and because Elgin had been unwilling to overrule, or force a decision from, the Lieutenant-Governor who was his "expert" adviser on frontier matters.

The political committee of the Council of India suggested the addition of two paragraphs to the despatch which the Cabinet had approved. The first of these expressed the "conviction" of the Secretary of State that Curzon's remarks were not intended to:

"deprecate the eminent abilities of the Lieutenant-Governors named...or to undervalue the substantial services which all the Lieutenant-Governors of the Panjab, beginning with Sir John Lawrence, have rendered in the discharge of the difficult duties connected with these affairs, although none of them had any previous personal experience of political work on the North-Western Frontier." 1

The paragraph continued that though the assumption was that the minute had intended to show that the present system was unworkable, and not to reflect on the manner in which Mackworth Young had worked it, yet the minute and the schedule attached conveyed a different impression. The Secretary of State was prepared to pass no opinion on passages reflecting on personalities, but approved proposals respecting the "unworkableness" of the system. The second paragraph, expressed doubts as to the realization of Curzon's financial expectations, but nevertheless set no limit hoping only that no pains would be spared to

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1. Ibid. Proposed changes in Despatch put forward by Political Committee. undated.

prevent the imposition of any unnecessary strain on the revenues. Fitzpatrick's desire for the insertion of a paragraph asking for the opinions of the Panjab Government relative to the main proposals was overruled by the Council.<sup>1</sup> Hamilton had anticipated a hostile reaction by his Council to any attempt to take the frontier away from the Panjab,<sup>2</sup> even though he was aware that Curzon's military reorganization had been well received, and that the Government of India despatches had been having the desired effect.<sup>3</sup> He felt that if Mackworth Young had been taken into consultation, the news of what was impending would have reached the Council of India through other than official channels, and the official despatch containing the proposals would have met with a well prepared opposition. Consequently, the Panjab Government was not consulted, and moreover, Curzon's proposals, when they reached London, were not presented to the Council but taken straight to the Cabinet for approval.<sup>4</sup> Since the Council were constitutionally bound to accept a Cabinet decision, they may have decided that objection was pointless, or, they might have accepted the scheme on its merits. In any case, no dissentient opinion was recorded, and only Fitzpatrick registered any form of objection at all.

The despatch recording approval of the plan was forwarded

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1. Ibid. Opinion recorded by Sir D. Fitzpatrick, 17 January, 1901
  2. HC. Vol. 2. Hamilton to Curzon, 5 September, 1900
  3. HC. Vol. 1. Hamilton to Curzon, 6 September, 1899
  4. HC. Vol. III. Hamilton to Curzon, 15 August, 1901

to India on 20 December, 1900,<sup>1</sup> but not before one other change had been made, It had become necessary to inform the Panjab Government of what had been done and to ask their help in working out the details of the scheme. But before forwarding the correspondence on the subject to the Panjab Government for its information, Curzon asked that certain sections of his minute should be excised and that references to these sections in the Secretary of State's despatch should likewise be removed.<sup>2</sup> This suggestion was gladly accepted by all concerned.<sup>3</sup>

Curzon felt that the acceptance of the scheme was a remarkable personal achievement, and his vanity was hurt by the "balanced and tepid phraseology" of Hamilton's despatch. To salve the hurt, Hamilton pointed out that the scheme had been carried in the teeth of the opposition of "Indian Officialdom"; that two years earlier he himself had written a despatch in the name of the Government urging objections against the scheme; than an enthusiastic despatch would have been tantamount to the Council's "Glorying in its own overthrow"; and that the "balanced and tepid phraseology" was for Curzon the greater triumph since it represented success in the face of great odds.<sup>4</sup>

Curzon had privately broken the news to Mackworth Young

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1. PSDI. No.140. (Political) 20 December, 1900
  2. Ibid. Tel.(Private) Curzon to Hamilton, 9 January, 1901
  3. Ibid. Tel.(Private) Hamilton to Curzon, 17 January, 1901.  
also Note to Hamilton from Fitzpatrick, 14 January, 1901  
For revised copy of Minute see PSLI. Vol.130. D.O. Letter from India. Register No.256. 30 January, 1901. Enc.
  4. HC. Vol.II. Hamilton, to Curzon. 31 January, 1901

much earlier, after he had decided, in consultation with Hamilton, not to consult the opinions of the Lieutenant-Governor regarding the main proposals.<sup>1</sup> They both knew that the consultation with the Panjab would be a time consuming process and that the decision of Mackworth Young would inevitably be in opposition to the creation of a new province. They rationalized their behaviour by the assertion that the opinions of the Panjab Government were already contained in "a score of files", and in any case, ample opportunity had been given them for an expression of opinion in 1898, and that no useful purpose could be served now by repeating all that had been said at that time. They were, nevertheless, aware that Mackworth Young would not accept the decision calmly, and Curzon proposed telling him that Hamilton was eager to get the scheme in operation before the General Election in Britain and that there had not been in consequence, time for consultations.<sup>2</sup>

Soon after the Minute had been sent to the Secretary of State, Curzon informed Mackworth Young, in a letter most conciliatory in tone, that he and his colleagues had decided that a new province should be created; that the Panjab had not been consulted because of a request from Hamilton for speed in view of the impending General Election; but that if the Secretary of State should agree to their proposals the Panjab would be taken into full and immediate consultations.<sup>3</sup>

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1. H.C.Part II. Vol.6. Curzon to Hamilton, 3 October 1900.  
Enc. Curzon to Mackworth Young, 15 September, 1900
  2. H.C.Part II.Vol.5. Curzon to Hamilton, 15 August, 1900
  3. HC. Part II.Vol.6. Curzon to Hamilton, 3 October, 1900.  
Enc. Curzon to Mackworth Young (Private & Confidential)  
15 September, 1900

Mackworth Young's reply expressed anger and surprise.<sup>1</sup> He declared that he had not conceived of the possibility of proposals going to Hamilton without his having had an opportunity of discussing them. He asserted that he had at no time given Curzon his views on the subject, that his opinions of 1898 were on an entirely different proposal, and that though the most important reason for the Lieutenant-Governor's going to Simla was to advise the Viceroy on frontier matters, yet Curzon and his Council had discussed this vital issue without consulting him though he had been only half an hour's drive away. He thanked Curzon for his efforts "to sugar the pill", but maintained that the Viceroy could hardly have chosen a "more forcible method of showing me what little confidence you repose in my judgement". An acrimonious correspondence followed.<sup>2</sup> The main argument hinged upon what had passed between Curzon and Mackworth Young when the former had visited the frontier. Mackworth Young insisted that he had received verbal promises both from the Viceroy and his private Secretary that he would be given the opportunity to record his written opinions before final decisions were reached, Curzon's version was that Mackworth Young had asked for assurances that the opinions of the frontier officers should not be used without prior reference to himself. This assurance Curzon had

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1. Ibid. Enc, Mackworth Young to Curzon (Private) 20 Sept. 1900
  2. Ibid. Curzon to Mackworth Young (Private) 23 September, 1900  
Mackworth Young to Curzon, 26 September, 1900.  
Curzon to Mackworth Young, 30 September, 1900

given and had not had any need to break his word since he had made use, in his minute, of the opinions recorded by the same officers in 1898. It seems clear that Mackworth Young really believed he had been promised a chance to speak. One must assume that Curzon was not aware of the interpretation Mackworth Young attached to his promise. To believe otherwise would be to accuse the Viceroy of having deliberately broken his word.

The official communication to the Lieutenant-Governor of the news of the scheme that had been proposed by the Government of India and approved by the Secretary of State aroused a storm in the Panjab.<sup>1</sup> The Chief Secretary, Fanshawe, resigned because of the treatment that had been accorded the Panjab Government by Curzon,<sup>2</sup> and in an official letter Mackworth Young went over all the ground that had already been covered in his private correspondence with Curzon.<sup>3</sup> The decision to dispense with his advice he declared to be "as surprising as it is humiliating". It is ironic that Mackworth Young should say that he would have been utterly unable to accept the position had it not been for the assurances contained in Hamilton's despatch; for it had been Hamilton who had suggested to Curzon the possibility of a collection of cases condemnatory of the way in which the Panjab system was functioning. Hamilton, too, had been in Curzon's full confidence.

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1. PSLI. Vol.130. No.32. 21 February, 1901. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab. 28 January, 1901

2. HC. Part II. Vol. 8. Curzon to Hamilton, 22 May, 1901

3. PSLI. Vol.130. No.32. 21 February, 1901. Enc. No.2.

Panjab to India, 13 February, 1901



at every step of the way, had approved his every decision, and in the original draft despatch had said nothing to salve the feelings of Panjab officials.

Apart from the affront to his personal dignity Mackworth Young complained that Curzon's action had been "unconstitutional" and that it was "unprecedented and involved a most dangerous doctrine". The only constitution of India, he said, was the duty imposed on the Government of India to consult its most responsible advisers. Curzon's injunction now preventing him from discussing the merits of the case under consideration, and confining him to a discussion of detail was therefore "unconstitutional". Curzon replied that his action was not without precedent since Sir R. Egerton, Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab in 1877, had not been consulted by Lytton when he proposed his scheme, and as for the charge of unconstitutionality, neither the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, nor any member of the Viceroy's Council could entertain such a suggestion.<sup>1</sup>

Another cause of complaint was the appointment of Deane as the first Agent to the Governor General, though he had "only" sixteen years experience. Merk and Cunningham, on the other hand, under both of whom Deane had served, were respectively ten and thirteen years senior to him. Curzon, rightly, would not concede the principle that the head of the new administration should be the senior member of the previous

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1. Ibid. Enc. No.3. India to Panjab, 20 February, 1901

administration. He had to select the man whom he thought would be most competent to do the work required of him. Nevertheless, it is understandable that Merk and Cunningham would have had heart burnings both at the thought of having to serve under a junior officer and at the thought of having future prospects of advancement disappointed. It might have been that the various officers consulted by Curzon had individually favoured the creation of the province because each had hoped for preferment.

The appointment of Deane created a flurry of excitement in the India Office as well as arousing feelings of jealousy in the Panjab. Of course Curzon had advised Hamilton of his intention of promoting Deane, but the Council was made aware of it by a Reuters telegram.<sup>1</sup> A series of telegraphic exchanges soon established the fact that Deane's appointment had not been gazetted, in fact, it hardly could have been, since the province did not at that time officially exist.<sup>2</sup> Curzon had wished to get Deane to help with the working out of the details of the new administration, and in order to be able to select him over the heads of his seniors, had had to announce his pending appointment.

The Government of India had suggested that the Panjab Government should appoint an officer to meet Deane at Lahore, where between them they would hammer out details for the

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1. PSLI. Vol.130. Minute Paper. Register No.274. Note on Reuters Telegram as reported in Times. 21 February, 1901
  2. Ibid. Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 22 February, 1901. Viceroy to S.S. 23 February, 1901. S.S. to Viceroy, 25 February, 1901. Viceroy to S.S. 25 February, 1901.

administration of the new province. Cunningham had been suggested as the best choice,<sup>1</sup> but he refused and Mackworth Young supported him,<sup>2</sup> so the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, Bunbury, was named instead. He and Deane between them worked out a scheme varying but little from that which had been outlined by Curzon in his minute. The greatest change was in the inclusion of Hazara as part of the territories to be detached from the Panjab. This came about as a result of Panjab insistence,<sup>3</sup> and though at first Curzon hesitated because he thought the Panjab was insisting as a result of "pique",<sup>4</sup> he was finally persuaded by the argument of Deane and of Mackworth Young that it would be difficult for the Panjab to find the staff, under its changed circumstances, to administer such an area, which, in any case, though cis-Indus, was none the less a frontier district.<sup>5</sup>

A report entitled "Scheme for the Administration of the North-West Frontier Province", signed by Deane, Bunbury, and O'dwyer, was presented on 15 July, 1901.<sup>6</sup> In a despatch of 20 September, 1901, the approval of the Secretary of State

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1. PSLI. Vol.130. No.32. 21 February, 1901. Enc. No.1. India to Panjab. 28 January, 1901.
  2. Ibid. Enc. No.2. Panjab to India. 13 February, 1901.
  3. PSLI. Vol.132. Secretary's Letter No.17M. Reg. 572. 25 April, 1901. Enc. Panjab to India. 1 April, 1901.
  4. HC.Vol.8. Curzon to Hamilton, 22 April, 1901
  5. PSLI. Vol.133. Secretary's Letter from India. No.18M. Reg, No. 601. 2 May, 1901. Enc. Deane to India, 15 April, 1901. Vol.134. Secretary's Letter No.23M. Reg.No.734. 6 June, 1901. Enc. Panjab to India, 30 May, 1901. Enc. India to Panjab, 15 June, 1901.
  6. PSLI. Vol.135. No.124. 25 July, 1901.Enc.

was received.<sup>1</sup> Mackworth Young had begged that the scheme should not be put into operation during his term of office which was due to expire in March, 1902, since he did not think that a few months would make any difference and he did not wish to be at the helm of Panjab affairs when the province was dismembered.<sup>2</sup> Curzon would hear of no delay. He wanted to get the scheme operating as quickly as possible so that he would have a longer period of his viceroyalty to supervise its initial operation.<sup>3</sup> The North-West Frontier Province was proclaimed on the King's birthday, 9 November, 1901.<sup>4</sup>

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1. PSLI. Vol.135. No.89 (Political) 20 September, 1901
  2. PSLI. Vol.130. No.32. 21 February, 1901. Enc. No.2. Panjab to India, 13 February, 1901.
  3. Ibid. Enc. No.3. India to Panjab, 20 February, 1901
  4. PSLI. Vol.138. Telegram. Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 October, 1901. announcing intention. See Proclamation Appendix D.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The major aim of this thesis has been to show that from 1889 to 1901 British policy on the North-West Frontier of India was consistently directed towards a single goal. This goal was the attainment of a position from which the Indian army could, in time of need, advance with a minimum of delay and with the support of the independent tribes to occupy the line best suited to defensive or offensive action against Russia - the "Scientific Frontier". Underlying this acceptance of a policy based on a military-strategic concept was the fear of Russia as a potential aggressor against India, the desire to maintain a strong Afghanistan as a buffer state, and the need to fulfill obligations to Abdur Rahman undertaken in 1880.

Obviously, the whole argument falls to the ground if it can be shown that the Russian threat was not regarded seriously by the British and Indian Governments. But such is not the case. When Lord Lytton spoke of Russian aggression as "a very real, a very close, and very ponderable, danger",<sup>1</sup> he was not merely expressing a personal opinion but one widely held at that time, and one which continued to be prevalent throughout the next twenty-five years. In 1885 at the time of the Pandjeh we find Lord Kimberley writing, "Russia, it must be recollected, has a very large army composed of troops (putting aside her Central Asian irregulars)

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1. B.M. add.MSS. 39164. Vol.CCXXXIV. Lazard Papers. Lytton to Salisbury, 16 July, 1877. Quoted in Greaves. op.cit. p.27.

more than a match for any but our best native troops (of whom we have but a limited number). Poland and the Caucasus and the preservation of internal order in her vast and not very contented Empire absorb, it is true, a great number of these troops: but still, allowing for this she has a powerful force at her disposal for a foreign expedition, and her position on the Caspian, communicating with the interior of her Empire and the Volga, and with the Black Sea via Tiflis is very favourable for the movement of such a force towards India.

Without pursuing the matter further I have said enough to show why I am strongly of the opinion that India should have a properly armed frontier, such as exists between the great Continental States.

If we settle our present difference with Russia, we shall have an interval which she will use to improve her means of aggression. If we on our side use it diligently to put our frontier in a real state of defence, we have no reason to dread the future, but on this condition only". 1

Lord Roberts, in a memorandum written in 1886 and on many occasions thereafter, declared his certain conviction that war in the East between Russia and England was inevitable.<sup>2</sup>

In 1889 Brackenbury wrote

"I am ... convinced that at some future day, when Khorassan and Northern Afghanistan have been pierced by Russian railways and turned into granaries for Russian armies, unless an unforeseen convulsion has broken up the Russian Empire, Great Britain will be confronted with the fearfully difficult problem - how to defend her Indian frontiers against the masses which Russia will then be able to employ." 3

Nor did Lord Wolseley express any doubt, for he declared,

"I firmly believe that eventually we shall have to fight Russia for the maintenance of our position in India". 4

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1. PSLI. vol. 43. No.38. 10 March, 1885. Minute by Lord Kimberley on this letter. 5 April, 1885.
  2. PSM.A.117. The Defence of the North-West Frontier of India. Note by General Sir F. Roberts. 22 June, 1886.
  3. PSH. Vol.109. p.1181. Memorandum by Lieutenant-General Brackenbury, 8 October, 1889.
  4. W.O. 33/49. Memorandum by Lord Wolseley on the Report of the Indian Mobilization Committee. 25 August, 1889.

One might go on to quote Salisbury, Cross, Lansdowne, and many others, but suffice it to say that there is incontrovertible and abundant evidence that the fear of Russian aggression was genuinely and widely held.

Russian spokesmen, too, recognized the possibility of Russian activity on the Afghan frontier. The Foreign Minister, M. de Giers, declared that Central Asia provided Russia with "a basis of operations which, if required, can be offensive",<sup>1</sup> and Czar Nicholas II wrote more pointedly,

"the strongest fleet in the world can't prevent us from settling our scores with England precisely at her most vulnerable point. But...the time for this has not yet come; we are not sufficiently prepared for serious action, principally because Turkestan is not yet linked up with the interior of Russia by a through railway line." 2

The Czar was at this time boasting that he could change the course of the Boer War by marching his Turkestan army on the Afghan frontier. Similarly, many British statesmen who doubted the feasibility of a Russian invasion of India, believed that Russia would use her position in Central Asia to occupy British troops while she moved towards her major objective in the Bosphorous.

Once the danger of Russian aggression had been acknowledged as real, the logical thing to do was to follow the course of action outlined by Kimberley in his minute quoted above and put the Indian frontier "in a real state of defence". This idea was, in fact, adopted and Lord Dufferin

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1. Giers to Mohrenheim, 6 August, 1883. A. Meyendarff (ed) Correspondance diplomatique de M. de Staal, i, 18. Quoted in Greaves. op.cit. p.15.
  2. Printed in Sumner. B. 4. Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914 London. 1942. pp.29-30

pushed forward a railway building programme designed to expedite the massing of British troops at Kandahar at any time a Russian advance threatened. Moreover, Committees were appointed by the Government of India in 1885 and again in 1887 to study the strategical position in Central Asia and to report on the way in which the Indian army could be most effectively used in a defensive war against Russia.

Under the inspiration of Lord Roberts the Committees recommended as their first choice a defence based on an offensive thrust from Quetta via Kandahar to Herat which would require reinforcements to the Indian army of at least 30,000 British troops. If this plan did not prove feasible, then the irreducible minimum of action recommended was the occupation of the Kandahar-Kabul line. The idea of an adventure towards Herat was condemned by General Brackenbury, General Newmarch, Lord Wolseley, and other officers at the Horse Guards, but there was unanimous agreement that Russia would have to be fought outside the frontiers of India, and unanimous acceptance of the Kandahar-Kabul line as a suitable military frontier for India.

When Lord Lansdowne became Viceroy of India two principles were generally accepted: firstly, that this frontier was the military frontier of India against Russia par excellence: and, secondly, that India's frontier should be put "in a real state of defence". But the problem remained of how to arm a frontier that lay in its entirety within the confines of another state, the ruler of which, though



technically a friend and ally of the British, was jealous of his independence and would under no conditions brook the peace-time occupation of his territory by British forces.

The solution to this problem put forward by Lord Lansdowne was to push forward by all the passes leading from the Indus Valley to the Kabul-Kandahar line, to improve communications and to construct advanced military posts from which the military frontier could be rapidly occupied. But this solution raised other knotty problems. In the first place the plan could only work if the independent tribes could be brought under firm control, and, secondly, the tribes could only be subjected to controlling influences if the Amir of Afghanistan could be persuaded to disavow his claim to suzerainty over them.

Hence, Lansdowne's first major policy statement concerned the improvement of relations with the tribes. The tribal policy he envisaged was a complete break with the "close border" policy that had been applied by the Panjab Government for so many years. Consequently, an essential part of Lansdowne's plan was the substitution of new administrative procedures for those previously employed; and, since tribal policy was now an integral factor in Imperial policy, he declared it to be essential that the Government of the Panjab should be eliminated as an intermediary and that the administration of the frontier should be under the direct control of the Government of India working through a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General.

Running through the mass of documentation that constitutes the recorded history of the North-West Frontier for the thirteen years under consideration are these three discernible threads: the attempt to open roads and passes leading towards the "Scientific frontier"; the attempt to bring the independent tribes under such control as would make them reliable allies in time of war; and, an attempt to formulate administrative procedures conformable to a policy Imperial in scope and conception. These threads, like separate strands that may be woven into a single rope, unite to form a single policy.

If frontier activities during the Viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne are examined in this context the pieces fall readily into place. Activities in the Zhob and Gomal Valleys, in Gilgit and Chitral, the survey of the Kabul River Valley and the railway to New Chaman, can be interpreted in only one way. On the other hand, the occupation of the Samana Range and the Black Mountain expeditions, could be ascribed to other local motives. But it is significant that the Madda Khel villages of Miranzai could have been brought under British administration without occupying the Samana. More significant are the two arguments used in justification of occupation: firstly, that the Samana Range dominated the eastern approach to the Kurram route to Kabul; and, secondly, that a position on the range dominated the Afridis and Orakzais and made possible the exercise of control over these tribes. It should

also be remembered that Lansdowne justified the Black Mountain expeditions on the grounds that control of the area made possible the use of a shorter route to Gilgit than that via Kashmir. Therefore, though it might be argued that Lansdowne was moved by a jingoistic desire to expand British territories and British influence, the fact remains that he linked each and all of his frontier activities with the "Scientific Frontier" policy.

Lansdowne's attitude towards Abdur Rahman and his consistent efforts to keep Afghan influence out of tribal territory is also a strong indication of the nature of his policy. He was not content to rely on Afghanistan as an effective buffer against Russia. He anticipated sending troops into Afghanistan in the event of any of several contingencies. There might, for example, be a Russo-Afghan coalition against India, a Russian invasion that the Afghan armies alone would be powerless to check, or, it might be necessary to interfere in order to prevent the dissolution of Afghanistan at the death of Abdur Rahman and to place on the throne a successor who would remain faithful to the British alliance. In any of these eventualities the Kandahar-Kabul line would be the military frontier on which operations would be based. To acknowledge the Amir's claim to Waziristan, to Mohmand and Afridi countries, and to Bajaur would have completely disrupted Lansdowne's policy, since it would have placed under Afghan control the Gomal and Tochi Passes, the Kabul River Valley,

and the Peshawar-Dir road to Chitral. To prevent this happening Lansdowne was prepared to demarcate unilaterally the boundary he wanted, even though he might have by so doing precipitated an open quarrel with Afghanistan. The Durand Agreement, however, gave him all the scope he needed, and though it came too late for Lansdowne himself, it provided Lord Elgin with a free hand to pursue Lansdowne's policies.

Elgin unswervingly followed the course laid down by his predecessor. He insisted on the speedy erection of boundary pillars to mark the Durand Line and to indicate clearly the area in which British influence could be freely exercised without fear of Afghan interference. In Waziristan, where the lack of such a boundary had hampered Lansdowne, Elgin quickly set plans on foot to implement the tribal policy that had been laid down in 1889. He occupied the Tochi Valley and constructed military posts there and in the Gomal. Though he made concessions to the Amir at many points along the Durand Line, he would not retreat from the line dividing Mohmand country because to do so would have placed under Afghan control the Kabul River Valley which had been surveyed for a railway to Kabul via Jalalabad. In Chitral, too, he continued the policy that had been adopted by Lansdowne and insisted on the necessity of opening the road from Peshawar to Chitral through Dir.

The great tribal uprising of 1897 led to reconsideration of frontier policy but not to disavowal of the aims of that policy. Hamilton's despatch of 28 January, 1898, despite its

insistence on reappraisal and restatement of aims, in fact, confirmed the basic tenets of the policy that had been operative since 1889. Moreover, the plan for the future put forward by Elgin and his Council anticipated no change except the concentration of British forces in larger numbers and in more defensible positions. Public opinion had been aroused by the tremendous cost in money, lives, and prestige, of the frontier wars, and Hamilton, recognizing this,<sup>1</sup> declared: "I think we must, for the present, put a curb upon the forward movement".<sup>2</sup> The implication is clear.

But the discussions that followed the uprising indicated that there had been a modification of the strategic concept which determined frontier policy. Before 1897 effort had been largely concentrated on Waziristan and the opening of the Gomal and Tochi Passes. After the events of 1897-98 emphasis was shifted to the Khyber. There are a number of factors which help to explain this fact. Of course the Khyber had always been regarded as the most important route along the frontier and Lansdowne had certainly aimed at extending the Sandeman system of tribal control over the Afridis, indeed over all Pathans. Elgin's ultimate aim was the same, but he did not intend trying conclusions with the Afridis until success in Waziristan had proved the feasibility of the project. In any case, the problem of the Khyber was not considered to be urgent since

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1. HC. Vol. 3. Hamilton to Elgin. 25 February, 1898.

2. Ibid. 4 February, 1898. The emphasis is mine.

there was an agreement with the Afridis whereby the Pass was kept open. But the tribal arrangements broke down in 1897 and the pass was closed. It was reopened and the Afridis were subdued in the most costly operation that the frontier had known. The feeling was strong, especially among the military, that the great expense should be turned to practical account. The agreement of 1881 had been violated by the tribes and was no longer binding; the tribes had made submission; the pass was held by British troops; conditions were right for the negotiation or imposition of a new arrangement which would place this vital artery of communication under firm control. As an additional argument the military maintained that the knowledge acquired during the campaigns of 1897-98 indicated that the strategic value of the Gomal and Tochi passes had been overrated, and that the "Scientific Frontier" could best be occupied by a simultaneous advance from Quetta and Peshawar towards Kandahar and Kabul.

The Khyber discussions led also to a resurrection of the idea of a frontier Chief Commissionership. Elgin, like Lansdowne, had come to the conclusion that the new tribal policy could not be implemented without a change in administrative procedure. In fact, in 1896 he had initiated discussions with the Panjab Government aimed at getting that Government to accept new methods. But Elgin would accept neither the exclusion of the Panjab Government from the direction of frontier affairs, nor the system of dual control

recommended by Hamilton. The result was that Elgin left India with the matter still in abeyance.

Many people believed that Curzon's appointment meant that the forward movement, which had come to a halt in 1897, was again to be resumed. Brackenbury wrote to Elgin:

"[Curzon] is such a pronounced advocate of a forward frontier policy, and has shown himself such a strong Russophobic, that, in view of the financial situation of India, I can only conceive that he has been appointed because the Government are seriously anxious as to our relations with Russia, and look upon war as a reasonable probability." 1

But far from displaying forward tendencies, Curzon concentrated on the withdrawal of regular troops from posts beyond the administrative frontier. This does not mean that he denied the possibility of Russian aggression, or, that he repudiated the "Scientific Frontier" concept. That he insisted on the maintenance of a British garrison in Chitral where only the narrow Wakhan "tongue" separated Russian territory from that within the British sphere of influence is indicative of his distrust of Russia. Concerning the "Scientific Frontier", he accepted the position that it could best be occupied by an advance through the Bolan and Khyber Passes. The first of these was already under firm control, and Curzon took steps to secure the latter. He denied the strategic importance of the Gomal, Tochi, and Kurram routes, and pointed out that in any case the limited forces at the disposal of the Government of India would make impossible an advance on more than two fronts.

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1. E.C. Vol. 33(9): No.50. Brackenbury to Elgin, 11 August, 1898.

But Curzon's God was administrative efficiency, and in the interests of efficiency he determined that the control of the frontier should be brought under the direct supervision of the Government of India, i.e., of the Viceroy. He argued, as Lansdowne had done, that frontier policy, in all its aspects, was an Imperial consideration. As such, it was vital that it should be under the direct supervision of the Viceroy, the exponent of Imperial policy in India.

But Lansdowne, though anxious to see the creation of a frontier province, in the face of opposition from his Council, the Panjab Government, and the Council of India had feared to press the issue. He attempted to work a compromise solution that proved unsatisfactory. Elgin, too, sought a compromise without notable success. But Curzon's conceit was monumental. He knew what was good for India. He knew what was good for the frontier. He could count on the support of Hamilton, Lansdowne, and Salisbury, which in effect meant the Cabinet; and with Cabinet backing he could ignore the Council of India. His own Council he completely overpowered, and he by-passed the Panjab Government which would have offered the only serious opposition and, in his own time, presented Mackworth Young with a "fait accompli".

To what extent had the aims of Lansdowne's policy been achieved? The "close border" system of tribal management had been completely broken down. British political officers, whose sole duties were to extend influence over the tribes, were



stationed at political agencies throughout tribal territory. The two major approaches to the "Scientific Frontier" were under British control, and troops were in position for a forward move in case of need. The threat to the northern flank was blocked by the garrison at Chitral and a road from Peshawar provided for support of this garrison. Subsidiary routes and lines of communication were held by tribal militias, which, theoretically, at least, would fight to defend their country against a Russian aggressor. The militia forces were supported by regulars garrisoned within the administrative frontier. The North-West Frontier Province had been created. Though the final shape of things was not that which Lansdowne had anticipated, nevertheless, the position attained was a decided advance in the direction which he had pointed. Perhaps, in the nature of developments, it was a position that he would have accepted as satisfactory.

At this point it might be interesting to trace the means by which policy decisions were reached. We have, for example, credited to Lansdowne the policy which took shape after 1889. This is as it should be, of course, for Lansdowne was the responsible figure. But to what extent was the policy his own creation? Sir Charles Crosthwaite maintained that it was "Lord Roberts and Sir H.M. Durand whose views have practically guided the action of the Government of India on this frontier for years past"; 1

and Kimberley believed Roberts' presence in India to be

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1. PSM. A.102. Policy towards Chitral. Note by Sir C.H.E. Crosthwaite, 28 April, 1895.

"undesirable, because he has, I believe, got command of the Indian frontier policy and carries the Foreign Office (Indian) and Lansdowne too much with him". 1.

Lansdowne certainly sought and accepted Roberts' advice on military and strategic matters, but from the evidence one would not be warranted in assuming that he had no ideas of his own, or that he had lost to Roberts the power of initiative. Certainly Lansdowne's views were respected in London. His approval of Elgin's Waziristan policy was considered by Lord Reay, the Liberal Parliamentary Under Secretary for India, as "all-important", and Hamilton gladly accepted his advice in examining the Chitral question, declaring him to be "the highest living authority in this country on questions of this kind".<sup>2</sup> In any case a Viceroy who ignored the advice of the Commander-in-Chief and other highly placed officers both in India and in England on matters affecting the military security of India would have taken upon himself a grave responsibility.

In the light of Kimberley's views it is interesting to note that the man whom he selected as Commander-in-Chief was Sir George White, "who takes his politics from Roberts".<sup>3</sup> Apropos of this appointment Kimberley wrote,

"Whether we get into another Afghan war will depend much more on the Secretary of State and the Viceroy than White... No one is likely to get this influence Roberts has over the Government of India. If we are in office when Lansdowne's term is

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1. C.B.P. B.M. Add. MSS. 41,221. Vol.xvi. p.103. Kimberley to Campbell-Bannerman. 7 October, 1892.

2. See above page

3. C.B.P. B.M. Add. Mss. 41,221. Vol.xvi. p.106. Kimberley to Campbell-Bannerman, 14 October, 1892.

over we can select a Viceroy, who is not a jingo, and I hope we should be able to find one strong enough to counteract even White!." 1

This is, in a sense, a denigration of the forcefulness of White's character, but it also implies a fear of Lansdowne's "jingo" tendencies. In the event, the drift towards hostility with Afghanistan, so much feared by Kimberley, was halted by an agreement negotiated under Lansdowne's authority by Sir H.M.Durand, who, in Kimberley's opinion, was as great a danger to peace as was Roberts.<sup>2</sup>

The Viceroy selected to succeed Lansdowne was a professed "Laurentian". Nevertheless, he relied on White for advice on matters pertaining to military strategy, just as Lansdowne had relied on Roberts. In fact, reliance on "expert" advice was characteristic of Elgin. On strategical questions he supported the military and deprecated the fact that civilians should even express an opinion. In the case of the Shahur Valley he overruled White and the majority of his Council on the advice of the "experts" on the spot. On the question of administrative reform he accepted the advice of the "expert" administrators in the Panjab Commission. He declared,

"It is all very well to talk of a 'strong Viceroy' overruling this or that member [of Council]. That is not the way to do business. At any rate...it is not the way it has been done in my time. I should have considered myself to have failed miserably were it so". 3

This was the very antithesis of Curzon's approach. He

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1. Ibid. p.125. Kimberley to Campbell-Bannerman. undated.

2. Ibid.

3. E.C.Vol.72. Part II. No.15. Elgin to Collen. 6 January, 1898

decided what he wished, prepared an elaborate minute, presented it to his Council, and virtually demanded unanimity. Sir E. Collen once, after reconsideration of a decision taken in Council, attempted to submit a minute of dissent. He withdrew it however, after Curzon informed him that he would not allow any member of Council to dissent from a decision to which he had formerly agreed.

The methods employed by individual Viceroys in dealing with their Councils varied, but all alike worked in close collaboration with the Secretary of State. It was accepted procedure that Viceroy and Secretary of State would write each other at least one private letter per week. In addition private telegrams were used freely. Hamilton explained that the procedure of the India Office was so inconvenient, at times almost impossible, that the private telegram had become a necessity.<sup>1</sup> By statute every communication to the Government of India had to pass through the Council, unless the Secretary of State declared it urgent and sent it in anticipation of Council approval. Even then he had to give reasons for the urgency and this was not always convenient. Rigid adherence to the system would have made it almost impossible to act promptly. The alternatives to private telegrams would be to make them urgent, which was not always expedient, or to wait several weeks for Council approval. Hamilton added that members of

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1. H.C. Vol.2. Hamilton to Curzon. 1 February, 1900

Council often advocated a private telegram when prompt action was necessary.

The result of this system was that official policy despatches usually reflected decisions made jointly by the Secretary of State and Viceroy. Consequently, the Viceroy was normally assured of powerful support for his recommendations, and only on the rarest of occasions was he overruled. Hamilton explained to the Commons,

"Our machinery for governing India is of a very complicated and delicate character; and the Secretary of State incurs a grave responsibility if he imposes a policy on the Indian Government contrary to their wishes.". 1

Sir Charles Dilke also declared that it was accepted that, as the Duke of Argyll had said when in Gladstone's government,

"such powers of control as are claimed for the Secretary of State must be used with great deliberation, and on the rarest occasions". 2

This principle could, of course, be easily upheld when the duumvirate of Viceroy and Secretary of State worked in close accord through the medium of private correspondence.

There was also another reason for the use of private correspondence, and this can best be illustrated by quoting an example. On 4 March, 1896, a question concerning a military campaign was addressed to Sir G. White. On 23 December, 1897, the question was answered by a Secret despatch from the Government of India, signed by the Viceroy and six members

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1. P.D. (Commons) 4th Series. Authorized edition. Vol. 36 .  
3 September, 1895. Lord George Hamilton's speech on the Chitral debate.
  2. Ibid. Speech by Sir Charles Dilke.

of Council. In the correspondence there appeared the names of the Admiral commanding the East India Squadron, the Secretary in the Indian Military Department, the Quarter Master General in India, the Secretary of State for India, and the Under Secretary of State for India. In all, up to this point, twelve officials and a number of copyists and compilers had been familiarized with the contents of a "secret" despatch. When the correspondence finally reached the War Office, it passed through the General Registry before reaching the Permanent Under Secretary, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of State for War. Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, in commenting on this case, pointed out that had the enquiry been handled privately by White "risk, circumlocution, and delay" would have been avoided. He also pointed out that the absence of secrecy in official despatches was recognized and evaded by the use of private and demi-official correspondence "which pervades all public business in India". In fact, he declared, official despatches from India were marked "secret" mainly with a view to their being withheld from publication in Blue Books without further enquiry".<sup>1</sup>

In any discussion of policy making the Council of India must be considered. This Council, Hamilton writes,

"...may be said to be the Cabinet for India. Its functions are much the same as those of the Imperial Cabinet, with the

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1. A.P. PRO. 30/40. 11. Loone Papers. Draft note on Procedures in India respecting secret matters. Undated.

important exception, that their procedures and their powers are defined by an Act of Parliament. They have absolute control over the expenditures of India.....The business of checking expenditure is far more efficaciously performed by the India Office than it is by the Treasury, and a better result is obtained from the expenditure sanctioned." 1

In 1898, Hamilton wrote to Elgin,

"The Political Committee here has exceptional ability and is supported by the Finance Committee so that I have not power to overrule, nor knowledge to combat their arguments." 2

But this may have been a convenient excuse, for it appears that the Secretary of State was always able to find a way to overrule his Council when he wished. Hamilton writes to Curzon,

"I think I can ensure acceptance of any gradual advance but I must take care to put it in such a shape that I can overrule any opposition without rendering myself subject to the statutory obligation of obtaining a majority of the votes". 3

And Sir Arthur Godley wrote to Elgin,

"there will be strong opposition among our notables here, but...the new Secretary of State will easily overrule them if he chooses". 4

A point worth consideration is that Councillors were usually advanced in years when appointed. Consequently, vacancies occurred fairly frequently and any Secretary of State who enjoyed a reasonably long term of office would probably have the opportunity of selecting some members of the Council himself. Lord Cross, for example, had only been in office two years when he informed Dufferin that he had.

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1. Hamilton, G.F. Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections 1868-1885 London. 1916 pp.307-8
  2. H.C. Vol. 3. Hamilton to Elgin. 25 March, 1898
  3. HC. Vol. 1. Hamilton to Curzon. 8 June, 1899
  4. EC. Vol. 30. No.77. Godley to Elgin, 28 June, 1895.

appointed "five out of the fifteen".<sup>1</sup> Cross, apparently, made sure of his appointees. Concerning Sir A. Lyall, he said,

"I was much pleased with him, and finding him to be quite sound according to my own views as to what I call Ripon's mischievous policy, I have sent his name in to the Queen for Council".<sup>2</sup>

But even if the Secretary of State could, and did, on occasion, overrule his Council, the knowledge and experience of the Councillors was valuable and often consulted. Lyall, for instance, was a trusted adviser, not only of Cross, but of Fowler, Kimberley, and Hamilton. Nor must we forget that in the background were the permanent officials of the India Office, men like Sir Arthur Godley, of whom Lord Morley wrote, "[his] experience, judgment, character, and address made him one of the most eminent members of the Civil Service, who, as one of them well said, prefer power to fame".<sup>3</sup>

It was to the initiation and instruction that he received from Godley, Sir Henry Fowler maintained, that he owed his knowledge of Indian affairs.<sup>4</sup>

The final authority on all questions of policy was, of course, the Cabinet and Parliament to which it was responsible. But from the available evidence it would appear that the Cabinet was quite willing to trust the majority of decisions to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. References to Cabinet consultations contained in private letters are very few.

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1. C.C. Vol. 18. Cross to Dufferin. 12 January, 1888

2. Ibid. Cross to Dufferin, 5 January, 1888.

3. Morley, J. Recollections. London, 1918. Vol.II. p.153.

4. Hamilton, E.H. The Life of Sir Henry Hartley Fowler. London, 1912. pp. 289-90.



The only two occasions during the thirteen years under consideration when Cabinet authority was actually invoked was when the Liberal Cabinet overruled Elgin's Chitral policy, and when the authority of the Cabinet was needed to quell opposition to the creation of the Frontier Province. References to the North-West Frontier contained in the biographies and memoirs of political figures of the period are significant only by their absence. Such private papers as have been consulted tell a similar story, and the political and secret correspondence addressed to the India Office from the Foreign Office contains surprisingly few references to the frontier.

Nor, during the period under consideration at least, was Parliament deeply interested. There were occasional questions from "Little Englanders" and supporters of Congress, but Frontier policy was debated only twice, once in 1895, and again in 1898, when public opinion had been aroused, in the first instance by the "breach of faith" controversy, in the latter by the tribal war of 1897-98. Even these debates were poorly attended, and few members expressed opinions.

In summary it may be said that North-West Frontier policy during those years was designed to achieve a military objective. Pursuit of this objective inevitably raised serious political and administrative problems. These, on occasion, threaten to obscure the strategic aspect, which, nevertheless, was always the basic consideration. As Hamilton pointed out to Elgin in 1898,

"Lord Cross's despatch of 1890 advances as a reason for initiating a further development of advance the possibility if not necessity of fighting Russia outside our own frontiers. We could not well publish this document and yet without it the Government of India are deprived of the sanctions upon which they have throughout acted." 1

The nature of the policy made it inevitable that military counsels should play a significant role. The extent to which they preponderated at any given time largely depended on the man who was Viceroy. Lansdowne's political convictions were undoubtedly determinant factors in his complete acceptance of the military position that a "forward" policy was essential. Elgin, who at Westminster would have considered his views the antithesis of those held by Lansdowne, in India accepted Lansdowne's policies because it was his duty to defend British territory, to uphold British prestige, and to fulfill obligations; and, because he felt himself incompetent to judge how these things could best be done. Curzon was driven by a burning desire for fame; by determination to institute a reform that had defied the best efforts of eminent men for twenty-five years; by a mania for administrative efficiency. But he did not forget the Russian threat and the consequent need to provide adequate frontier defences. Characters and motives differed and there were diversions and detours, but the course set in 1889 was not forsaken, the goal was kept steadily in view. The position attained in 1901 was a distinct modification of that envisaged by Lansdowne, but in the circumstances it

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1. H.C. Vol.3. Hamilton to Elgin. 25 March, 1898

might have been as effective, and perhaps, more realistic.

The British connection with the North-West Frontier of India has provided the theme for a fairly extensive bibliography. Considering this fact one might ask whether this study has offered anything that is new, either of facts or interpretation? Before attempting an answer to this question, let us look briefly at what in fact has been written.

In the first place a high proportion of the works that have been published are concerned with the military repercussions of frontier policy. That is to say, they discuss the mechanics of the various expeditions, which, in most cases are ascribed to tribal intransigence and the necessity to employ coercive measures from time to time. Very little attempt is made to equate tribal hostility with British activities on the frontier, which is, perhaps, understandable in contemporary works which are often official, or at least semi-official, in character. Among works such as these we can list the Government of India publication, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, and the works of Paget and Mason, Nevill, and Wylly. Hutchinson's history of the Tirah campaign does develop the theme that the uprising of 1897 was the direct result of the "forward Policy", but he makes no attempt to explain what the aims of the "forward policy" were. Thus, though we are given adequate accounts of all the military actions undertaken against the tribes, we are left with the distinct impression that the sole motive of such actions was

to protect administered territory by the severe repression of outrages. We are not told why it was necessary, at a time when the occasion for repressive expeditions was comparatively rare, for the Government of India to undertake a programme of expansion into tribal territory.

Histories of Lansdowne's and Elgin's administrations have not been written, nor has Elgin found a biographer; while Newton's biography of Lansdowne devotes only one chapter to his Indian administration and that consists largely of "human interest". His biographer explains that

"no political incidents of much importance occurred between the years 1883-1893 either in Canada or in India, and it has therefore seemed permissible to confine the narrative of this period chiefly to personal experiences and impressions". 1

Curzon has attracted more attention, but neither Lovat Fraser in his history of Curzon's administration, nor Ronaldshay in his biography, have seen Curzon's policies as growing out of the policies that had previously been pursued by Lansdowne and Elgin. In other words, they are both concerned with Curzon's policy to the exclusion of a British policy. Nevertheless, both works, but Ronaldshay's particularly, are useful for their accurate accounting of what Curzon actually did.

Considering Sir Mortimer Durand's intimate connection with the formation of policy under Lansdowne, his biographies of Sir George White and Sir Alfred Lyall are disappointing. Of course, neither White nor Lyall were at the centre of policy

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1. Newton, Lord. Lord Lansdowne: A Biography. London. 1929  
Preface.

formation, and in any case, there would have been a great deal that Durand could not have disclosed. Sir Percy Sykes' biography of Durand gives some interesting extracts from a private diary which relate to the Kabul Mission, but offers very few clues to the nature of British frontier policy or the part played by Durand in its formation. Of the biographies of British political figures only that of Sir Henry Fowler is in any way useful, and this, written by a daughter about her beloved father in the year of his death, is as much a eulogy as a piece of historical writing.

Works actually and specifically devoted to a discussion of policy are very few. In fact, only two need be mentioned here, Dr.C.C.Davies' Problem of the North-West Frontier, and Bruce's The Forward Policy and Its Results. The former provides an excellent summary of frontier policy up to the 1880's and offers a lucid exposition of the two great problems that confronted the British on the frontier, that of Imperial defence and that of local administration. The blockade as a means of coercion is discussed effectively in the context of the Mahsud blockade of 1900-02. On the other hand, only two chapters are devoted to the "forward policy" which took definite shape during Lansdowne's Viceroyalty and reached its culmination during that of Curzon. The topics which form the major part of this thesis, Indo-Afghan relations that led to the Durand Agreement, Lansdowne's initiation of a new tribal policy, Elgin's efforts in Waziristan, the question of the Mohmand demarcation, among

others, are given but brief attention, obviously because Dr. Davies lacked source material from which to work. Nor does this book relate the events of the 1890's to any overall policy. Again a lack of sources is indicated. The other work that has been mentioned, Bruce's Forward Policy and its Result is as well a valuable addition to the bibliography. It gives a clear picture of Bruce as a "Sandemaniac" without Sandeman's flair for tribal management. It is as well an excellent exposition of the methods employed by Sandeman in Baluchistan and of Bruce's own activities in Waziristan. But writing so soon after the event, there was, of course, much that could not be said and there is very little discussion of policy at the higher level.

Earlier writers have in fact, been greatly handicapped by a lack of source material. It is only since 1950 that the official records of the India Office covering the period of the 90's have been available. The same is true of the private papers that have been such an essential part of this study. It is as a result of this mass of documentation that is now available that one is able to construct a framework of policy into which the facts, which had been published in Blue Books and elsewhere, can be fitted. It has been the purpose of this thesis to provide that framework. In doing so less well known aspects of the "forward policy" have been discussed as new facts have come to light. As examples may be cited the negotiations between Lansdowne and Abdur Rahman, the frictions

that nearly produced open conflict, the Durand Mission to Kabul, the Durand Agreement, the Mohmand demarcation negotiations, and the reasons behind Lansdowne's "tough line" with the Amir.

There are many questions still unanswered. Was there ever a real danger of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan or India? Was there danger of a Russo-Afghan alliance against the British power in India? Was there danger of a rising in India in support of an invasion? Any attempt to answer these questions here would be highly speculative, and in any case, though the answers would be instructive and interesting, what really matters, from the point of view of policy making, is not what the realities were, but what they were thought to be. And there was a genuine fear that in each case the answer would be an affirmative. There were, of course, those who held the opposite opinion, and those who were undecided, but most people concerned believed that the contingencies, however remote they might be, could not be ignored when the safety of the great Indian Empire was at stake. It was to the defence of that Empire, in the face of any eventuality, that British policy on the North-West Frontier was directed. As Hamilton pointed out to Elgin, the Government of India were unable to publish the documents that would have given sanction to its actions throughout the period of expansion. It is hoped that the preceding chapters will have established these sanctions and will have shown that the policy based on them was consistent throughout.

CORRESPONDENCE between the INDIAN GOVERNMENT and the  
AMIR of AFGHANISTAN (1880-1883)

Under instructions addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, Commanding the forces in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, by the Viceroy of India in Council on 20 July, 1880, Mr. (afterwards Sir Lepel) Griffin communicated the following message to the Amir Abdur Rahman on his recognition by the Afghan Sirdars at Kabul:-  
(extract)

I am commanded to convey to you the replies of the Government of India to the questions you have asked. Firstly, with regard to the position of the ruler of Kabul in relation to foreign powers. Since the British Government admit no right of interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghan affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign power except the English; and if any such foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it, provided that he follows the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.



The following correspondence took place in 1883  
between Lord Ripon and Abdur Rahman:

The Viceroy of India to the Amir of Afghanistan.

Simla, June 16, 1883.

(After compliments)

Your Highness will remember that, at Sir Lepel Griffin's interview with you at Zimma, on the 31st July, 1880, he said that the Government of India could only start your administration by giving you a grant to pay your army and officials and your immediate expenses; and that, having recognized you as Amir, it was anxious to see you strong; but after you had taken possession of Kabul, you must rely on your own resources.

I have always interested myself so much in your Highness' success, and have felt so great a desire for the establishment of a strong and friendly power under your Highness' auspices in Afghanistan, that I have on various occasions gone beyond the determination then communicated to you, and have from time to time aided your Highness with sums of money and arms, besides devoting some lakhs a year to the support of Afghan refugees and detenus, whose presence in Afghanistan is, I understand, regarded by your Highness as dangerous to your power. Still my view of the relations to each other of the two countries had

throughout been that, in matters of internal policy and finance, India should not seek to interfere with Afghanistan, but should confine herself to the part of a friendly neighbour and ally. On these conditions, it would be in accordance with the practice of nations that Afghanistan should regulate her own finance and bear her own burdens, as she has always done heretofore.

As regards matters of external policy, your Highness was informed in the communication from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 20th July, 1880, and again in my letter of the 22nd. February, 1883, that if any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as might appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it; provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.

On consideration, however, of your accounts of the condition of your north-west frontier, I have been satisfied that your Highness has to contend with exceptional difficulties in that quarter. I have understood

that, owing to various untoward circumstances, your Highness has not yet been able to reduce the important frontier province of Herat to the orderly and secure condition so essential for the protection of Afghanistan as a whole; and therefore that, for the settlement of the affairs of that frontier, some friendly assistance may be needful to you. I further observe, with satisfaction, Your Highness' assurances of good faith and loyalty to the British Government; and your Highness' language convinces me that you realize how much it is to the interest of Afghanistan to maintain friendly relations with the Government of India.

Impressed by these considerations, I have determined to offer to your Highness personally, as an aid towards meeting the present difficulties in the management of your State, a subsidy of 12 lakhs of rupees a year, payable monthly, to be devoted to the payment of your troops, and to the other measures required for the defence of your north-western frontier. I feel that I may safely trust to your Highness' good faith and practised skill to devote this addition to your resources to objects of such vital importance as those which I have above mentioned.

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The Amir of Afghanistan to the Viceroy of India.

(Translation)

(Extract)

6th. Ramazan, 1300H. (July 11th., 1883)

I have announced the glad tidings of your Excellency's determination, which is calculated to conduce to the well-being of the British Government and of the people of Afghanistan, and to put in order and keep going my affairs to the people of Afghanistan at large, who all offered up thanks, saying: "For many years we, the Afghan nation, have been suffering from innumerable calamities. Thanks be to God that a glorious Government like this (British Government) had befriended us."

God willing, the people of Afghanistan will never allow their heads to swerve from the line of friendship to the illustrious British Government, and so long as I live I will not think of making friends with anyone but with the illustrious British Government.

AGREEMENT between His Highness AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN,  
G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies,  
on the one part, and SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E.  
C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,  
representing the Government of India on the other part.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:

(1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown on the map attached to this agreement.

(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

(3) The British Government thus agrees to His

Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal Valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tibrai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Peha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and

the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the new Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half-way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future, as far as possible, all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import

by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir had entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

Kabul;  
The 12th November 1893.

(sd) H.M.Durand

(sd) Abdur Rahman Kham



Agreement between His Highness AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I. Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies on the one part, and SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India, on the other part:

Whereas the British Government has represented to His Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses for the literal fulfillment of the Agreement of 1873 between Russia and England by which it was decided that the River Oxus should form the northern boundary of Afghanistan from Lake Victoria (Wood's Lake) or Sarikul on the east to the junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas the British Government considers itself bound to abide by the terms of this agreement, if the Russian Government equally abides by them, His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, wishing to show his friendship to the British Government and his readiness to accept their advice in matters affecting his relations with foreign powers, hereby agrees that he will evacuate all the districts held by him to the north of this portion of the Oxus on the clear understanding that all the districts lying to the south of this portion of the Oxus, and not now in his possession, be handed over to him in exchange. And Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, hereby declares on the part of the British Government that the transfer to His Highness the Amir of the said districts

lying to the south of the Oxus is an essential part of this transaction, and undertakes that arrangements will be made with the Russian Government to carry out the transfer of the said lands to the north and south of the Oxus.

Kabul, 12th. November 1893.

sd. H.M.Durand

sd. Amir Abdur Rahman

12th. November 1893 = 2nd. Jamadi-ul-Awal 1311.

AGREEMENT between the GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN and RUSSIA with regard to the SPHERES of INFLUENCE of the TWO COUNTRIES in the REGION of the PAMIRS, embodied in an EXCHANGE of NOTES between the EARL of KIMBERLEY and M.DE STAAL. (London, March 11th., 1895.)

As a result of the negotiations which have taken place between our two Governments in regard to the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia in the country to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul), the following points have been agreed upon between us:

1. The spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul) shall be divided by a line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its eastern extremity, shall follow the crests of the mountain range running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the lake as far as the Bendersky and Orta-Bel Passes.

From thence the line shall run along the same range while it remains to the south of the latitude of the said lake. On reaching that latitude it shall descend a spur of the range towards Kizil Rabat on the Aksu River, if that locality is found not to be north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, and from thence it shall be prolonged in an easterly direction so as to meet the Chinese frontier.

If it should be found that Kizil Rabat is situated to the north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, the line of demarcation shall be drawn to the nearest convenient point on the Aksu River south of that latitude, and from thence prolonged as aforesaid.

2. The line shall be marked out, and its precise configuration shall be settled by a Joint Commission of a purely technical character, with a military escort not exceeding that which is strictly necessary for its proper protection.

The Commission shall be composed of British and Russian delegates, with the necessary technical assistance.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government will arrange with the Amir of Afghanistan as to the manner in which His Highness shall be represented on the Commission.

3. The Commission shall also be charged to report any facts which can be ascertained on the spot bearing on the situation of the Chinese frontier, with a view to enable the two Governments to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government as to the limits of Chinese territory in the vicinity of the line, in such manner as may be found most convenient.

4. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control, the

former to the north, the latter to the south, of the above line of demarcation.

5. Her Britannic Majesty's Government engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan, that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain, and that no military posts or forts shall be established in it.

The execution of this Agreement is contingent upon the evacuation by the Amir of Afghanistan of all the territories now occupied by His Highness on the right bank of the Panjab, and on the evacuation by the Amir of Bokhara of the portion of Darwaz which lies to the South of the Oxus, in regard to which Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia have agreed to use their influence respectively with the two Amirs.

## PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Simla, the 25th. October, 1901

WHEREAS the following territories, that is to say, the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, and Hazara (as altered by the Notification of the Panjab Government, No.994, dated the 17th. October, 1901), the Bannu and Marwat Tahsils of the district of Bannu, and the Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, and Kulachi Tahsils of the district of Dera Ismail Khan (as altered by the Notification of the Panjab Government Nos. 992 & 993, dated the 17th October, 1901), are part of the dominions of His Majesty the King-Emperor of India; AND WHEREAS it is expedient that the said territories, which are now under the administration of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, should be formed into a separate Province and constituted a Chief Commissionership under the administration of a Chief Commissioner:-

KNOW ALL MEN AND IT IS HEREBY PROCLAIMED, that his Excellency the Viceroy and GOVERNOR GENERAL of India in Council, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Government of India Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict.,c.77), and with the sanction and approbation of the Secretary of State for India, is pleased hereby to take the said territories under his immediate authority and management on and with effect from the ninth day of November, 1901, and further to direct that, on and with effect from the

said ninth day of November, 1901, the said territories shall be formed into a separate Province and constituted a Chief Commissionership, to be called the Chief Commissionership of the North-West Frontier Province and to be administered by a Chief Commissioner.

By order of His Excellency the Viceroy and  
Governor General of India in Council

J.P.Hewett

Secy. to the Govt. of India

GOD save the KING-EMPEROR

STATEMENT OF THE ALLOWANCES ETC., GRANTED ON THE PANJAB  
BORDER AS OF 28 OCTOBER, 1896.

NAME	TRIBAL ALLOWANCE	ADDITIONAL JAGIRS, ETC.	NATURE
<u>PESHAWAR DIVISION (MOHMANDS)</u>			
Aka Khel Afridis - - -	Rs.1000 - - -	- - -	tribal allowance
Tarakzai Mohmands - - -	1000 - - -	11,400 - -	Kabul River canal jagir
Isa Khel Mohmands - - -	1000 - - -	- - -	tribal allowance
Halimzai Mohmands - - -	- - -	4,500 - - -	jagir
Border Military Police - - -	- - -	71,075 - - -	cost of force
Frontier revenue remissions - - -	- - -	25,621	
Total	<u>3,000</u>	<u>1,12,596</u>	

PESHAWAR DIVISION (KOHAT)

Jowakis - - - - -	1,848	} - - - - -	on account of tribal towers and posts
Pass Afridis - - - - -	5,940		
Daulatzais - - - - -	2,000		
Sepah - - - - -	500		
Muhammed Khel - - - - -	2,016		
Sturi Khel - - - - -	500		
Sheikhan - - - - -	1,008		
Mishai - - - - -	1,008		
Rabbia Khel - - - - -	1,008		
Akbel - - - - -	1,008		
Bangash - - - - -	1,878		
Kohat Border Military Police - - -	- - -	53,305 - - -	cost of force
Frontier Revenue remissions - - -	- - -	16,974	
	<u>18,714</u>	<u>70,279</u>	



PESHAWAR DIVISION (HAZARA)

NAME	TRIBAL ALLOWANCE	ADDITIONAL JAGIRS ETC.	NATURE
Hassanzai - - -1,700	}	- - - - -	Tribal
Akazai - - - 800			allowances
Manda Khel - - 1,000			"
Parari Syads - 500			"
Nasaharis - - 1,000			"
Isazai Chief - 2,000			"
Nawab of Amb - - - - -	- - - - -	9,083 - - - - -	jagir
Nawab of Amb - 6,000	- - - - -	- - - - -	pension
Khan of Garbi			
Habinindahar - - - - -	- - - - -	9,113 - - - - -	jagir
Khan of Bhat-			
giranin - - - - -	- - - - -	400 - - - - -	jagir
Kaghan Syads - - - - -	- - - - -	4,010 - - - - -	jagir
Hazara Border			
Military Police - - - - -	- - - - -	24,809 - - - - -	cost of force
	<u>13,000</u>	<u>47,415</u>	

PESHAWAR DIVISION (KHYBER)

Kuki Khel - - 15,600	}	- - - - -	tribal
Kamrai - - - 3,000			
Kambar Khel - 6,000			
Sepah - - - - 15,600			
Malikdin - - 15,600			
Zakka Khel - 20,400			
Shinwaris - - 9,660			
Shilmanis - - 2,000			
Mullagoris - - 2,000	}	- - - - -	special
Juma, Kuki Khel - 300			
Malik Khowas,			allowance
Zakka Khel - - - 600			special
Malikdin Maliks-2000			allowance
Sepah Maliks - - 540			"
Saleh Muhammed,			
Kambar Khel - - -200			"
Khyber Rifles-1,06,760	- - - - -	- - - - -	cost of force
	<u>2,00,260</u>		

PESHAWAR DIVISION (KURRAM)

Massuzai - - - - 500	- - - - -	- - - - -	tribal
			allowance
Kurram Militia 1,41,706	- - - - -	- - - - -	cost of force
Inams - - - - -	- - - - -	10,736	
Mowajibs - - - - -	- - - - -	4,128	
Mafis - - - - -	- - - - -	1,007	
	<u>1,42,206</u>	<u>15,871</u>	
TOTAL FOR	3,77,180	2,46,161	

NAME	TRIBAL ALLOWANCE	ADDITIONAL JAGIRS ETC.	NATURE
<u>DERAJAT DIVISION (BANNU)</u>			
Bannu Border			
Military Police	- - - - -	29,772	- - - - cost of force
Malik Durana Khan	- - - - -	50	) - - - service
Arsala Khan	- - - - -	50	) Waziristan
			delimitation
Malik Mani Khan	- - - - -	2,200	- - - political all.
Waziris	- - - - -	820	- - - lungi inams
Darwesh Khels	- - - - -	8,225	- - - frontier
Bannuchis	- - - - -	762	) revenue
Marwats and	}		remissions
Bhittanis		3,696	- - - - "
		<hr/> 45,575	

Note: Border villages assessed very lightly. Amounts given as remissions equal the sum by which assignment fell short of full assessment.

<u>DERAJAT DIVISION (TOCHI)</u>			
Utmanzais	39,714	} - - - - -	{ maliki and tribal service allowances
Ahmadzais	8,158		
Dauris	15,864		
	<u>63,736</u>		

<u>DERAJAT DIVISION (SOUTHERN WAZIRISTAN)</u>			
Mahsuds	61,548	} - - - - -	{ maliki and tribal service allowances
Wana Ahmadzais	17,820		
Shakaiwals	3,612		
Mianis	2,940		{ service
Suleiman Khels	900		{ maliki
Bhittannis	12,204		{ service
	<u>99,024</u>		

<u>DERAJAT DIVISION (DERA ISMAIL KHAN)</u>			
Shiranis	12,444	- - - - -	maliki & service
Shiranis at			
Charwashkai	900	- - - - -	service
Border Military			
Police		46,740	- - - - cost of force
Additional Police			
at Chitarwatta	1,420	- - - - -	cost of force
Azim Khan		2,000	- - - - jagir for life
Rabnawaz Khan		150	- - - - jagir for life
Azim Khan		100	- - - - cash to age 21
Muhammad Afzal		100	- - - - inam to age 21

NAME	TRIBAL ALLOWANCE	ADDITIONAL JAGIRS ETC.	NATURE
Bhittanis - - - - -		3,437 - - -	{ assignment 1/4 revenue of 3 villages
Khoedad Khan and Namzan Khan ) - - - - -		587 - - -	1/4 Kham Tahsil
Mahsuds - - - - -		1,529 - - -	{ revenue assignment for 5 years
	<u>14,772</u>	<u>54,643</u>	

## DERAJAT DIVISION (DERA GHAZI KHAN)

Kasranis - - - - -	500		pass allowance
Bozdars - - - - -	4,332		" "
Gurchanis - - - - -	1,200		" "
Mazaris - - - - -	300		" "
Khosas - - - - -	1,300		" "
Legharis - - - - -	1,300		" "
Barkhankind - - - - -	100		" "
Sori Lunds - - - - -	200		" "
Durkanis - - - - -	480		" "
Haddianis - - - - -	1,440		service allowance
Muhammad Khan - - - - -	700		pension
Mazari Tumandar - - - - -	10,000		tumandari all
Leghari - - - - -	12,000		"
Khosa - - - - -	5,000		"
Sori Lund - - - - -	4,000		"
Gurchani - - - - -	3,000		"
Drishak - - - - -	3,217		"
Kasrani - - - - -	1,200		"
Tibbi Lund - - - - -	800		"
Border Military Police - - - - -		55,732 - - -	cost of force

	<u>11,152</u>	<u>95,649</u>
Totals for		
Derajat	<u>1,88,684</u>	<u>1,95,649</u>
Grand Total	<u>5,65,864</u>	<u>4,42,028</u>

Total cost of Border Military Police in Peshawar Division  
1,49,139  
Total cost of Border Military Police in Derajat Division  
1,32,244  
Total frontier revenue remissions in Peshawar  
42,595  
Total frontier revenue remissions in Derajat  
12,683

## APPENDIX F

## THE "BREACH OF FAITH" PROCLAMATION

## PROCLAMATION

To all the people of Swat and the people in Bajaur who do not side with Umra Khan.

Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned that,

Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his often repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected State under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral Valley and attacked the Chitral people.

The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st. of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal 1312H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march this force through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral.

The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and to prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and, as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's

misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transport will be paid for, and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary vocations in perfect security.

A STATEMENT SETTING FORTH THE WARS AND EXPEDITIONS ON THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ENGAGED FROM 1849 to 1900, IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, UNDER THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS: (1) DATE; (2) TRIBE CONCERNED; (3) CAUSES; (4) NUMBER OF TROOPS EMPLOYED; (5) RESULTS; AND (6) THE COST OF EACH WAR OR EXPEDITION WHERE SUCH COSTS ARE SHOWN SEPARATELY IN THE ACCOUNTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) & (6)
1849	Yusufzai border villages	refusal to pay revenue and preparation to resist demands of British officers	2,300	Refractory villagers and their abettors in independent territory were punished
1850	Kohat Pass Afridis	Attacks on sappers road making. Nearly all killed or wounded.	3,200	Troops traversed country and punished tribe.
1851	Miranzai	Disturbed state of country owing to entry of Afghan troops	2,050	Order re-established and hostages taken for future good behaviour.
1851-52	Mohmands	Constant raids and robberies in British territory	1,597	Villages on border destroyed, tribe, after a crushing defeat, submitted.
1852	Mohmands	Threatening attitude and firing into British villages	600	Tribe dispersed, Halimzai section made complete submission.
1852	Ranazais	Constant attacks on British villages and an attack on a detachment of "guides"	3,270	Tribe punished and order and security restored.
1852	Utman Khel	Attacks on British villages	2,200	Troops traversed country, destroyed chief villages

1852	Umarzai	Raids on British territory	1,500	Troops traversed country. Tribe punished.
1852-53	Hassanzais	Two British officers murdered. Tribe sheltered murderers.	3,800	Troops traversed country, destroyed villages and grain.
1853	Hindustani Fanatics	Co-operated with Hassanzais in creating disturbances in British territory.	2,000	British troops traversed their settlements without opposition.
1853	Sherannis	Raids into British territory	2,795	Country overrun and villages destroyed
1853	Kasranis	Raids into British territory	954	Country traversed, much property destroyed.
1853	Jowaki Afridis	Raids and giving asylum to criminals	1,740	Tribe defeated in several engagements, Bori destroyed, after which submission was made.
1854	Michni Mohmands	Raids into Peshawar District	1,782	Country traversed villages destroyed Tribe submitted unconditionally.
1855	Aka Khel Afridis	Cattle thefts robberies, an attack on a British camp	1,500	Troops entered country, inflicted severe punishment. Tribe submitted and agreed to fine of RS. 2,170
1855	Miranzai	Non-payment of revenue and disturbed state of country.	3,766	Country traversed, satisfactory settlement reached

1855	Rabbia z Khel Orakzais	plunder of British villages.	2,457	Troops traversed country, inflicted heavy loss. Tribe submitted, entered into agreement for good conduct.
1856	Turis	Raids on British territory	4,896	ditto
1857	Bozdars	ditto	2,755	Troops traversed country and compelled tribes to accept terms offered them.
1857	British villages on Yusuf- zai border	Disaffection towards ruling authority and refusal to pay revenue.	3,015	villagers severely punished.
1858	Khudu Khel and Hindu- stani fanatics.	Attack on camp of Assistant Commissioner. All baggage taken, five servants killed.	4,877	Troops traversed country and destroyed villages.
1859- 60	Kabul Khel Waziris	Gave shelter to murderers of a British Officer	5,372	An expedition was sent against them but arrangements having been made for the surrender of the murderers, troops were withdrawn without bloodshed.
1860	Mahsuds	Raids on British territory.	6,796	Troops traversed country, destroying much property.
1863	Hindustani fanatics	Raids into British territory	9,000	Tribesmen defeated after heavy fighting and Malka destroyed.
1864	Mohmands	Unprovoked aggressions	1,801	Tribesmen met and defeated while threatening Shabkadar Fort.



1868	Bizot Orakzais	Attack on Police posts in British territory	970	A blockade was established and tribe suffered heavily in engagement with troops.
1868	Black Mountain tribes	Attack on a police post at Oghi	12,544	Troops entered the country and the tribes made submission.
1869	Bizot Orakzais	Attack on a police post. One policeman killed, three carried off.	2,080	The tribe made submission, agreed to pay a fine of Rs.1,200, and gave nine of their headmen as hostages for future good behaviour.
1872	Dauris	Refusal to pay fine for sheltering certain Waziris who were in rebellion against the Government	1,826	Tribe made submission, paid the fine, and entered into an agreement with Government.
1877	Jowaki Afridis	Cutting telegraph wires and raiding into British territory.	1,750	Troops traversed country and destroyed much property.
1877-78	Jowaki Afridis	A series of outrages in British territory.	7,400	Tribe made submission and accepted Government terms.
1878	Utman Khel	Raid on a gang of unarmed coolies working on the Swat Canal	280	Certain sections of the tribe submitted to Government terms
1878	Ranazais	Village of Shakhot was harbouring outlaws and was otherwise troublesome	860	Tribe complied with Government terms, including the expulsion of outlaws.
1878	Utman Khel	Punishment of sections who did not submit. (see above)	875	Tribe made submission and agreed to fine of Rs. 1,000

1878	Zakka Khel Afridis	Hostility to troops marching to Afghanistan second Afghan war.	2,500	Troops traversed country, tribe eventually made submission.
1879	Powindahs	Raids into British territory	640	They were severely punished and a fine of Rs. 60,000 levied.
1879	Zakka Kehl Afridis	Misconduct during second Afghan war.	3,750	After suffering loss, the tribe made submission.
1879	Mohmands	Hostility during Afghan war.	600	Tribe punished
1879	Zaimukhts	Hostility during Afghan war.	3,226	Hills traversed. Tribe submitted.
1880	Mohmands	Hostility during Afghan war.	2,300	Tribe severely punished.
1880	Bhitannis	Under influence of Mulla giving trouble and refused to give information about raiders.	721	Punished by troops. Tribe submitted.
1880	Marris	Attack on a railway convoy and the plunder of treasure.	3,047	Chiefs submitted and accepted Government terms. Fine of Rs.200,000 levied of which Rs. 1,25,000 paid. Hostages taken for good behaviour.
1880	Malik Shahi Waziris	Non-payment of fines for offences during Afghan war.	800	Whole fine of Rs. 13,200 recovered and Rs. 6,000 taken as security for good behaviour.
1881	Mahsuds	Raids into British territory.	8,531	Troops traversed country, tribe made submission. Cost. RS. 9,91,210

1883	Sherannis	Opposition to a survey party on the Takht-i-Suleiman.	1,700	Tribesmen who opposed the expedition were dispersed.
1884	Kakars	A series of outrages, ending in an attack on coolies in the Duki Cantonment.	4,850	A small force was entrenched at Zandra for some months to prevent outrage. Sir. R. Sandeman marched through the country. Chiefs submitted, engaged to prevent further raids acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government, paid a fine of RS.20,000 and acknowledged the right to station troops in the Zhob and Bori Valleys. Cost. RS.16,08,180
1888	Black Mountain Tribes	Raids on British territory and an attack on British detachment. Two officers killed	12,554	Country traversed, heavy punishment inflicted. Cost. RS.11,70,100
1890	Khider-zais	General turbulence	3,989	Whole Sheranni tribe submitted. Country explored and mapped. Cost. RS. 4,71,100
1891	Orakzais	Refusal to pay fines due for raids. Insolence	5,261	Tribe accepted Government terms: payment of fines, location of posts on Samana, tribal responsibility for offences and revenue on lands south of Samana. Cost. RS.19,03,590 (A)
1891	Orakzais	Non-payment of fines by two Samil clans.	8,402	Tribe made submission and accepted terms. Included in (A) above.

1891	Black Mountain	Tribes fired on force in British limits.	7,289	Tribes made submission and entered into agreement to keep peace. Cost. RS.17,71,480
1891	Hunza	Hostility to Agent at Gilgit.	1,183	Hunza and Nagar occupied. Chief of Hunza deposed.
1892	Isazai	allowed an outlaw to settle among them.	5,997	Troops entered country and destroyed defences. Cost. RS.3,36,120
1894	Waziris	Attack on camp at Wana	10,983	Troops traversed country, destroyed towers and other property. Terms accepted. Cost. RS.25,11,370
1895	Chitralis and others	Seige of Agent Gilgit with officers and troops in Chitral Fort.	16,399	Seige raised. Chitral retained in military possession. Cost. RS.1,68,39,150
1897	Waziris	Attack on Political Officer Tochi and his escort.	7,188	Country traversed. property destroyed. Tribe submitted and agreed to terms. leaders imprisoned. Cost. RS.38,45,380
+ 1897	Swatis Bajauris	Attack on Malakand and Chakdarra	11,826	Insurgents defeated. Gathering dispersed. Large fine in money and arms taken.
+ 1897	Mohmands	Attack on frontier posts	6,799	Tribe severely punished. Large fines of money and arms recovered.
+ 1897	Utman Khel	Joined attack on Malakand	3,200	Tribe submitted and gave up arms demanded.

+				
1897	Bunerwals	Joined attack on Malakand	7,315	Tribe severely punished.
+				
1897	Zaimukht	Attacks on British Posts	14,231	Tribe severely punished
+				
1897	Afridis	Destruction of Khyber posts	43,703	Troops traversed country and inflicted severe loss. Tribe finally submitted and paid heavy fine of money and arms and agreed to Government terms.

NOTE: The combined cost of all operations marked (+)  
was approximately RS. 4,47,16,100 //

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13. Journal of the Anthropological Institute
14. Journal of the United Services Institution of India
15. New Review
16. Nineteenth Century
17. Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society
18. Proceedings of the Central Asian Society
19. Quarterly Review
20. Slavonic Review
21. The Times
22. United Service Gazette



# SKELETON MAP OF THE NORTH WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA

Administrative Frontier of British India - - - - -  
Durand Frontier Line (demarcated) - - - - -  
Do. do. (undemarcated) . . . . .

